JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This is defendants appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) by the Secretary, Ministry of Education, Punjab, Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar and the Principal, Government Girls High School, Kot Mahant Ram Saran Dass, Putlighar, Amritsar challenging the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below. The suit has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent. 2. The facts of the case as revealed in the orders passed by both the Courts below are that on 19.11.1934 Akhara Nirbansar gave on lease for 50 years, the land measuring 2 kanals comprised in Khata No. 79/112-113, bearing Khasra Nos. 251, 254 and 252 min and present Khasra No. 391 as entered in the jamabandi for the year 1932-33 situated in abadi Kot Ram Saran Dass Putlighar, Amritsar. The lease deed was registered and executed in favour of one Amar Nath son of Ralia Ram. The period of 50 years was to commence w.e.f. 1.5.1938 because till that time some one else was in possession. The lessee constructed a school building on the land and floated a trust named as Master Daulat Singh Memorial Trust Society (for brevity, the Trust). The Trust through its President Sadhu Singh gifted the school to the appellant-State of Punjab on 6.7.1994. The lease amount was earlier used to be paid by Amar Nath, the lessee. But after the gift the State of Punjab started paying the lease amount. The period of 50 years was to expire on 30.4.1988 and, therefore, the plaintiff-respondent served a legal notice with a request to hand over possession of the land to the plaintiff-respondent who is the present Mahant and Administrator of Akhara Nirbansar. The defendant-appellants did not hand over possession of the suit land which resulted into filing of Civil Suit Nod. 300 of 1989, instituted on 2.12.1989 seeking possession of the land. A further prayer was also made for mandatory injunction directing the defendant-appellants to demolish the building constructed on the land and to deliver its vacant possession relying on the terms of lease deed. It was claimed that statutory period of two months as required under the law has been given and the defendant-appellants have failed to demolish the building. 3. A further prayer was also made for mandatory injunction directing the defendant-appellants to demolish the building constructed on the land and to deliver its vacant possession relying on the terms of lease deed. It was claimed that statutory period of two months as required under the law has been given and the defendant-appellants have failed to demolish the building. 3. The defendant-appellants took the stand that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of plaintiff-respondent because he is not authorised agent nor he is competent to sign and verify the plaint. It has further been asserted that the property has vested in the State of Punjab as it has been donated to it by Amar Nath. Therefore, the State of Punjab was required to be impleaded as party. The defendant-appellants also set up the plea that they are tenants over the suit property, regularly paying rent and, therefore, the suit for possession was not maintainable. However, it was submitted that the suit land was on lease with the Trust. The plea of subletting by Amar Nath was also denied claiming that it was donated by a gift deed in favour of State of Punjab. The defendant-appellants still further asserted that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellants and the suit has been filed only to get the rent enhanced. 4. The trial court on the basis of pleadings framed large number of issues. Issues Nos. 5, 6, 8 and 9 are core issues and the same read as under :- 5. Whether Babu Amar Nath s/o Ralia Ram took on lease the land measuring 2 Kanals detailed in para 3 of the plaint vide lease deed dated 19- 11-34 for 50 years ? OPP 6. Whether the period of the lease has since expired, if so, it effect ? OPP 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit property ? OPP 9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the mandatory injunction prayed for ? OPP Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of facts in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on the aforementioned issues holding that Amar Nath has taken the land on lease from the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff- respondent and the lease period of 50 years had expired. On the expiry of lease period on 30.4.1988, the plaintiff-respondent has become entitled to get back the possession. On the expiry of lease period on 30.4.1988, the plaintiff-respondent has become entitled to get back the possession. It has further been found that according to the lease deed Ex. P2, the lessee was entitled to construct the building of the leased land on the expiry of lease period and on expiry of the lease period, he was to get the construction demolished at his own expense. If on the expiry of the lease, the construction is not demolished, then the lessor or his successor-in-interest was to become owner of the building as well in accordance with the stipulation of the lease deed. The version of the defendant-appellants that they had become tenant under the plaintiff- respondent was rejected. The plaintiff-respondent has been held entitled for possession of the suit land. 5. The findings on issue No. 7 concerning the effect of gift deed on the rights of the parties recorded by both the Courts below are that it did not create any right, title or interest in favour of the defendant-appellants. 6. Similarly, on issues No. 4, 9-C, 9-D and 9-E, the Courts below concluded that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant merely because an offer was made by the plaintiff-respondent for payment of rent on P.W.D. approved rates. The rent receipts Ex. D1, D2 and D4 were issues during the subsistence of the lease period i.e. 6.8.1977 or 26.8.1975. It has further been held that the conduct of the plaintiff-respondent does not estop him from filing the suit and he was held entitled to maintain the suit. The Appellate Court came to the conclusion that no suggestion was put to the witnesses of the plaintiff-respondent during their cross examination suggesting that a tenancy has been created in favour of the defendant-appellants, especially the plaintiff-respondent PW-3 Mahant Chattar Muni himself when he appeared as his own witness. The findings of the Appellate Court showing that the defendant- appellants could not become owner of the suit land read as under :- "........The period of lease was to commence on May 1, 1938 and was to expire on April 30, 1988. One of the terms of lease deed was that the lessee could raise a building on the land in suit but the building so raised was to be removed after the expiry of the lease period otherwise it was to vest in the lessor. One of the terms of lease deed was that the lessee could raise a building on the land in suit but the building so raised was to be removed after the expiry of the lease period otherwise it was to vest in the lessor. Lease deed is available on the record of the learned trial court as Ex. P.2 and its Punjabi transliteration is Ex. PA/2. This land, after construction of building thereupon, is said to have been gifted by Babu Amar Nath aforesaid to the State of Punjab and Government Girls High School is running in the building so constructed. These facts are not in dispute. However, on behalf of the appellants it is sought to be highlighted that the suit property having been gifted by Babu Amar Nath they have been clothed with status of ownership and thus the respondent cannot seek possession of the same. Alternatively it is being submitted on behalf of the appellants that Akhara having accepted the rent from them (as evidenced by photostat copies of receipts Ex. D1, Ex. D2 and Ex. D4) the tenancy has come into existence is their favour and the suit for possession thus could not be maintained by the respondent who, even otherwise, has not been validly appointed/installed Mahant of the Akhara. The plea of the appellants is liable to be out-rightly rejected. Respondent Mahant Chatter Muni appeared in support of his case as P.W. 3. In addition to reiterating his plea as contained in the plaint he came out with very specific plea that he was appointed Mahant of the Akhara Nirbansar in a religious ceremony on May 22, 1985 and also proved on record Ex. P.1 a writing executed in this respect. He also proved on record the lease deed Ex. P.2 and its transliteration Ex. P2/A. In the cross-examination of this witness the appellants maintained complete and calculated silence with respect to the statement of the witness pertaining to his appointment/installation as Mahant of the Akhara, validly of the religious ceremonies and execution of writing Ex. P.1. Similarly, no questions were put to the witness with respect to the execution of the lease deed Ex. P.2, correctness of its transliteration Ex. P2/A and the statements/covenants contained in the lease deed. Silence of the appellants in respect of all these circumstances leads to the only and irresistible [? P.1. Similarly, no questions were put to the witness with respect to the execution of the lease deed Ex. P.2, correctness of its transliteration Ex. P2/A and the statements/covenants contained in the lease deed. Silence of the appellants in respect of all these circumstances leads to the only and irresistible [? sic irresistible] conclusion that the appellants either had nothing to dispute the truthfulness of the statement made by the respondent as P.W.3 or did not intend to dispute the same. Similarly, the case of the appellants sought to be put forth now regarding the creation of tenancy in their favour was not put to PW3 Mahant Chatter Muni respondent. Receipts, photostat copies of which are Ex. D1, Ex. D2 and Ex. D4, were also kept back from the witness and, therefore, the respondent was denied an opportunity to put forth his plea vis-a-vis the said plea of the appellants and receipts Ex.D.1, Ex. D.2 and Ex. D.4. That being so, no benefit can be allowed to the appellants on account of these facts which, even otherwise, have not been proved in accordance with law of evidence." 7. I have heard Mr. Sanjay Majithia, learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab who has made the following submissions before me :- (a) That the defendant-appellants have become statutory tenants under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for brevity, the Act) and no suit for possession is competent. In this regard, reliance has been placed on rent receipts Exs. D1, D2 and D4. The learned State counsel also relied upon two judgments of this Court in the cases of Prithi Raj v. Sardara, 1974 PLR 183 and Aneel Kaur v. Bhupinder Singh, 1989(2) Recent Law Reporter 293. He has also cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardev Misra v. Jamunadas Aggarwal, 1989(2) SCC 112; (b) That it is not in public interest to dispossess the defendant- appellants as the approved teaching staff strength is 52 teachers along with non teaching staff and there are hundreds of girls students who are studying in various classes; (c) That defendant-appellant No. 1 has consented to pay rent to the plaintiff-respondent at P.W.D. rates as per the offer made by the plaintiff- respondent on 26.5.1997. 8. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab and regret my inability to accept the same. 8. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab and regret my inability to accept the same. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that plaintiff-respondent is the owner of the property in dispute whose predecessor-in-interest has leased the same to one Amar Nath. The lessee Amar Nath floated a trust styled as Master Daulat Ram Memorial Trust Society and Sh. Sadhu Singh was appointed as its first president. In 1974, the Trust gifted the school building to the defendant- appellants. The covenants in the lease deed would be as binding on the defendant-appellants as they were binding on Amar Nath because defendant- appellants can have no better title than its assignee-namely Amar Nath. The plaintiff-respondent, therefore, having determined the lease by serving two months legal notice had a cause of action to seek possession of the suit land along with the structure. Moreover, the case of the defendant-appellants that they have acquired tenancy rights under the plaintiff-respondent has remained part of the written statement alone because none of the witnesses appearing for the plaintiff-respondent were confronted with any such suggestion. PW-3 Mahant Chattar Muni when appeared in the witness box as his own witness was not asked these questions in the cross-examination as has been observed by the learned lower Appellate Court. These findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below are based on cogent evidence which cannot be re-opened in an appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code. No illegality or material irregularity in appreciation of evidence has been pointed out persuading me to admit this appeal. No substantial question of law is involved nor any such question has been raised before me. It is well settled that this Court under Section 100 of the Code would not enter into the area of re-appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the appeal is without merit and is, thus, liable to be dismissed. 9. It is the true that plaintiff-respondent on 26.5.1997 vide Ex. D3 has made an offer during the proceedings of the civil suit that he may be paid rent at P.W.D. rates but that offer has never been accepted. There is no document on the record showing an agreement in writing with regard to tenancy of the building between the defendant-appellants and the plaintiff-respondent. The rent note between the defendant-appellants and the plaintiff-respondents is required to be executed in writing. There is no document on the record showing an agreement in writing with regard to tenancy of the building between the defendant-appellants and the plaintiff-respondent. The rent note between the defendant-appellants and the plaintiff-respondents is required to be executed in writing. Under Article 299 of the Constitution, all contracts made by the State and all assurances of property made in exercise of the power of the State has to be executed on behalf of the Governor. A rent note or a lease deed is necessarily a contract within the meaning of Article 299 of the Constitution which necessarily means that such rent note has to be in writing and executed in the name of Governor. It is settled proposition of law that provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution are mandatory as has been held by two Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. M/s B.K. Mondal and Sons, AIR 1962 SC 779 and Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 113. Commenting upon the public interest involved in execution of contracts between private individuals and the Government, their Lordships in Bhikraj Jaipurias case (supra) observed as under :- "It is in the interest of the public that the question whether a building contract has been made between the State and a private individual should not be left open to dispute and litigation; and that is why the legislature appears to have made a provision that the contract must be in writing and must on its face show that it is executed for and on behalf of the head of the State and in the manner prescribed. The whole aim and object of the legislature in conferring powers upon the head of the State would be defeated if in the case of a contract which is in form ambiguous, disputes are permitted to be raised whether the contract was intended to be made for and on behalf of the State or on behalf of the person making the contract. This consideration by itself would be sufficient to imply a prohibition against a contract being effectively made otherwise than in the manner prescribed. It is true that in some cases, hardship may result to a person not conversant with the law who enters into a contract in form other than the one prescribed by law. This consideration by itself would be sufficient to imply a prohibition against a contract being effectively made otherwise than in the manner prescribed. It is true that in some cases, hardship may result to a person not conversant with the law who enters into a contract in form other than the one prescribed by law. It also happens that the Government contracts are sometimes made in disregard of the forms prescribed; but that would not in our judgment be a ground for holding that departure from a provision which is mandatory and at the same time salutary may be permitted." The aforementioned judgments were relied upon by another Constitution Bench in the case of K.P. Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1967 SC 203 holding that there is no room for implied contracts left by Article 299 of the Constitution. The observations of their Lordships read as under :- "What was said in these cases with respect to Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, applies with equal force to Article 299(1) of the Constitution. Two consequences follow from these decisions. The first is that in view of Article 299(1) there can be no implied contract between the Government and another person, the reason being that if such implied contracts between the Government and another person were allowed, they would in effect make Article 299(1) useless, for then a person who had a contract with Government which was not executed at all in the manner provided in Article 299(1) could get away by saying that an implied contract may be inferred on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. This is of course not to say that if there is a valid contract as envisaged by Article 299(1), there may not be implications arising out of such a contract. The second consequence which follows from these decisions is that if the contract between Government and another person is not in full compliance with Article 299(1) it would be no contract at all and could not be enforced either by the Government or by the other person as a contract. In the present case it is not in dispute that there never was a contract as required by Article 299(1) of the Constitution. In the present case it is not in dispute that there never was a contract as required by Article 299(1) of the Constitution. Nor can the fact that the appellant bid at the auction and signed the bid-sheet at the close thereof or signed the declaration necessary before he could bid at the auction amount to a contract between him and the Government satisfying all the conditions of Article 299(1). The position therefore is that there was no contract between the appellant and the Government before he bid at the auction, nor was there any contract between him and the Government after the auction was over as required by Article 299(1) of the Constitution. Further in view of the mandatory terms of Article 299(1) no implied contract could be spelled out between the Government and the appellant at the stage of bidding for Article 299 in effect rules out all implied contracts between Government and another person. The view taken by the High Court that Section 155(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code which provides for recovery of money as arrears of land revenue would therefore ensure in favour of the Government and enable it to recover the deficiency cannot be sustained. That clause provides for recovery of all moneys falling due to the State Government under any grant, lease or contract and says that they shall be recoverable in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. The High Court was of the view that the word "contract" in this clause includes an implied contract. But if there can be no implied contract between the Government and another person in view of the mandatory provision of Article 299(1) of the Constitution there can be no question of recovery of any money under an implied contract under Clause (b) of Section 155. The view therefore taken by the High Court that this amount could be recovered under Section 155(b) is not correct." The aforementioned question as to whether the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution are mandatory in character further came up for consideration in the case of Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 145. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 145. It has been held that a contract between the State or Union Government and a private individual must satisfy three conditions, namely, (a) it must be expressed to be made by the Governor or the President; (b) it must be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor; and (c) its execution must be by such person and in such manner as the President or the Governor may direct or authorise. 10. The first argument raised by the learned State counsel that the defendant-appellants have become statutory tenants or at best they are sub- tenants and appropriate proceedings under the Act are required to be initiated would not require any detail examination because there is no privity of contract between the defendant-appellants and the plaintiff-respondents. Reliance placed on Ex. D1, D2 and D4 i.e. rent receipts is also not well placed because the rent receipts have been issued by the plaintiff-respondents during the continuation of the lease period of 50 years i.e. before 1988. Two judgments of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court in Haridev Mishra (supra) on which reliance has been placed would also not require any detail examination because all the three judgments pertains to a tenant under the Rent Act. In the instant case, the defendant-appellants have failed to acquire any statutory status of a tenant as there is no document witnessing any lease deed between the defendant-appellants and plaintiff-respondents as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the first submission made by the learned counsel. 11. The plea of public interest raised by the learned State counsel has failed to impress me because the public interest lies in complying with the terms and conditions of the lease deed. The period of 50 years has come to an end on 30.4.1988 and a citizen has become entitled to compensation of his property. It is well settled that under the spacious plea of public, an individual cannot be deprived of his property, unless the defendant-appellants proceed in accordance with law. In so far as teaching and non teaching staff of the school is concerned, it can always be adjusted in other government schools along with the students. But that cannot be the basis for depriving a citizen of his right to enjoy his property. In so far as teaching and non teaching staff of the school is concerned, it can always be adjusted in other government schools along with the students. But that cannot be the basis for depriving a citizen of his right to enjoy his property. Therefore, there is no substance even in the second argument raised on behalf of the defendant-appellants. 12. The last submission made by the learned State counsel about acceptance of the offer of the plaintiff-respondent made by the Secretary Education for payment of rent at P.W.D. rates would also not require any detailed consideration because the process of the Court cannot be used for creation of relationship of landlord and tenant. If the plaintiff-respondent is agreeable for acceptance of rent at P.W.D. rates from the defendant-appellants, then it is for him to consider and accept the same. The Court has no role to play in such a process. For the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.