Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 937 (MP)

M. P. AUDHOGIK KENDRA VIKAS NIGAM LTD. , GWALIOR v. RAM RAKSHA DWIVEDI

2003-08-01

P.C.AGARWAL, SUBHASH SAMVATSAR

body2003
JUDGMENT Subhash Samvatsar, J. This appeal is filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal, challenging the legality and validity of judgment dated 21-12-1999, passed by a single bench of this High Court in W.P. No. 1284/1999, whereby the petition filed by the present appellants, challenging orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial is dismissed. At the time of hearing Shri Prashant Sharma the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 raised preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this appeal. He submitted that since the petition is filed challenging the orders passed by Tribunals, the petition is essentially a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. To support this argument, he relied on the judgment passed in the case of State of M.P. and Others Vs. Yankappa and Another, , Abdul Rahim Khan Vs. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others, . He submits that in these cases it is held that no Letters Patent Appeal lies against a judgment in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and hence the present appeal be dismissed as not maintainable. Shri R.D. Jain, the learned senior counsel appearing with Shri S.K. Jain, Advocate opposed this prayer contending that the present petition is under Article 226 as well as 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore the appeal is maintainable, even though the petition is filed challenging the orders of the Tribunals. It is, now, well settled law that no Letters Patent Appeal lies against a judgment delivered in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, we need not burden this judgment by discussing the judgments cited by Shri Prashant Sharma, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. It is also, now, well settled law that an appeal lies against a judgment in a petition under Articles 226, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The question thus arise for consideration is whether the present petition is under Article 227 or under Article 226 or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. To decide the said question, it is necessary to examine the language of Article 226, Article 227 and the nature of the petition and the case law referred by Shri Jain, learned counsel for the appellant. To decide the said question, it is necessary to examine the language of Article 226, Article 227 and the nature of the petition and the case law referred by Shri Jain, learned counsel for the appellant. The present petition is filed challenging the judgments of Labour Court and the Industrial Court. The respondent No. 1 who is an employee of the appellant had filed an application under sections 31, 61 and 62 of M.P.I.R. Act, 1960 for classification as a permanent employee before the Labour Court. This application was opposed by the appellant by filing a written reply. The Labour Court framed the issues and filed the case for evidence on 19-9-1998. On that date, the employer and his counsel were absent when the case was taken up. The Labour Court, therefore, recorded the evidence of the employee ex-parte and closed the case for delivery of judgment. Thereafter, an application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings was filed by the employer. This application was held to be not maintainable in view of Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others, and the ex-parte order was passed by the Labour Court in favour of employee. This order was challenged by the appellant by filing an appeal u/s 65 of the M.P.I.R. Act. The said appeal was dismissed. The present petition is filed challenging the judgments of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court stating to be under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari. To find out whether the said petition is under Article 226 or both under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to first refer to Article 226, which reads as under: 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs -- Notwithstanding anything in Art. 32 every High Court shall have power, through the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Govt. within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them [for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose]. within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them [for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose]. From the reading of Article 226, it is clear that the High Court has a power to issue a writ including in the nature of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part-Ill and for any other purpose. Thus a writ can be issued under Article 226 for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution or for enforcement of any other legal right, which is legally enforceable right, as has been laid down by the Apex Court in Banchhanidhi Rath Vs. The State of Orissa and Others, . Article 227 provides for the powers of superintendence over all the Courts and Tribunals. The said Article reads as under: 227. Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court -- (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may -- (a) call for returns from such Courts. (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such Courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such Courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein; Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Thus Article 227 provides the High Courts with the powers of superintendence and powers of judicial revision of the orders passed by various Courts and the Tribunals. (4) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Thus Article 227 provides the High Courts with the powers of superintendence and powers of judicial revision of the orders passed by various Courts and the Tribunals. Shri S.K. Jain, learned counsel has relied on number of decisions to show that the orders passed by the Tribunal can be challenged under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and hence L.P.A. against the said order is maintainable. Shri Jain first referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Hindustan Lever Limited Vs. B.N. Dongre and Others, . From reading of the para 19 of the said judgment, it appears in the said case an L.P.A. was preferred against a judgment of Industrial Tribunal under Industrial Disputes Act. In that case, the Appellate Company himself was appellate in L.P.A. and there the Apex Court has held that the Company never questioned the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide the writ petitions nor did it raise the question of jurisdiction of the Division Bench under the Letters Patent. Even the Company had appealed against the learned Single Judge's decision to the extent it was against it. No contention regarding the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Division Bench was raised in the appeal, as the company itself invoked the provisions of L.P.A. In such circumstances, the Apex Court has rejected the contention of the Appellate Company about the jurisdiction of Division Bench to hear L.P.A. In the case of M/s. Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shankarprasad, , also no question about the maintainability of L.P.A. was raised before the Division Bench and the Appellant who was respondent in the L.P.A. did not take up the contention that L.P.A. was not maintainable. Hence, the Apex Court has rejected the objection about the maintainability of the L.P.A. However, while rejecting the preliminary objection about the maintainability, the Apex Court in para 16 of the judgment has laid down as under: 16. Hence, the Apex Court has rejected the objection about the maintainability of the L.P.A. However, while rejecting the preliminary objection about the maintainability, the Apex Court in para 16 of the judgment has laid down as under: 16. It is, therefore, obvious that the writ petition invoking jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution had tried to make out a case for the High Court's interference seeking issuance of an appropriate writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Basic averments for invoking such a jurisdiction were already pleaded in the writ petition for the High Court's consideration. It is true, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, that the order of the learned Single Judge nowhere stated that the Court was considering the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is equally true that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by observing that the Courts below had appreciated the contentions and rejected the complaint. But the said observation of the learned Single Judge did not necessarily mean that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India only. The said observation equally supports the conclusion that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Articles 226 and 227. As seen earlier, he was considering the aforesaid writ petition moved under Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the Single Judge had refused to interfere only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he dismissed the writ petition of the respondent. Thus, the Apex Court has laid down that the writ petition was moved under Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution that if the Single Judge has exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution L.P.A. would be maintainable, but if the jurisdiction is exercised under Article 227, the L.P.A. will not maintainable. Thus, the Apex Court has laid down that the writ petition was moved under Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution that if the Single Judge has exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution L.P.A. would be maintainable, but if the jurisdiction is exercised under Article 227, the L.P.A. will not maintainable. Averments made in a writ petition that while interpreting statutory provisions, Labour Court and Industrial Court committed serious error of law which resulted into miscarriage of justice and violation of fundamental rights and as such the prayer made to call for the record of the proceedings, and after perusal thereof quashed and set-aside the order passed by the Labour Court and Industrial Court in revision. The Apex Court has held that in substance the petitioner sought writ of certiorari under Article 226, though the Single Judge has not expressly stated that the Court has considered the writ petition under Article 226, but it cannot be said that the petition was dismissed under Article 227 of the Constitution. Where facts justify filing of the petition both under Articles 226 and 227 and the petition is dismissed by the Single Judge on merits. The petition should be treated to have been made under Article 226 so as not to deprive the petitioner of his right to prefer an appeal before the Division Bench. Thus, it is clear that the nature, of the petition is to be decided on the basis of the averments made in the petition and the relief prayed for. If the relief prayed for by the petitioner is for enforcement of any fundamental rights or any legally enforcement right, then the petition will be covered under Article 226, and if there are no such prayer and the petitioner has challenged the orders only on the ground of jurisdictional error, the petition will be covered under Article 227 of the Constitution. Another case cited by the learned counsel is reported in 2002(1) MPJR 1 (Dwarika Prasad Tiwari vs. M.P.S.R.T.C. and another). After perusing the said judgment particularly para 3 of the judgment, it appears that the Apex Court has refused to set out the law on the matter, as the same is already decided by Apex Court in its earlier decision in the case of Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. (supra). After perusing the said judgment particularly para 3 of the judgment, it appears that the Apex Court has refused to set out the law on the matter, as the same is already decided by Apex Court in its earlier decision in the case of Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The learned counsel for the appellants has also invited our attention Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of State Bank of India Vs. Shri Shyamji Sales and Others, , this was the L.P.A. arising out of dismissal of writ petition challenging the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Division Bench observed that a Single Judge can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution with respect to Debts Recovery Tribunals. However, that is permissible in exceptional cases. Perusal of writ petition would disclose that it has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and not under Article 227 alone and the facts constituted in the writ petition under Article 226 and not under Article 227 alone. Simply because the judgment mentions exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, that would not be the end of the matter. The statement of facts and the reliefs sought in the petition are to be considered to find out whether the petition is under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution and in that case the Division Bench found that the petition was both under Articles 226 and 227 and therefore L.P.A. as maintainable. Thus, the gist of the cases the question about the maintainability of L.P.A. depends on the facts mentions in the petition and the reliefs prayed for. In the present case the petition is filed challenging the orders of Labour Court and Industrial Court on the ground that the provisions of M.P.I.R. Act are not applicable, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction for passing a direction of classification of employee and that the application for setting aside the ex-parte proceedings is wrongly rejected by the Labour Court. Thus, from perusal of the entire petition, it appears that the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court are challenged on the ground of jurisdiction and the procedure adopted by the Labour Court in not holding that the application for setting aside the ex-parte proceedings was not maintainable, after the matter was reserved for judgment. Thus, from perusal of the entire petition, it appears that the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court are challenged on the ground of jurisdiction and the procedure adopted by the Labour Court in not holding that the application for setting aside the ex-parte proceedings was not maintainable, after the matter was reserved for judgment. This relief clearly shows that the petitioner was invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, the petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioner has nowhere averred that his fundamental rights or any legally enforceable right is affected, and hence the petition cannot be said to be a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and it is purely a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Hence L.P.A. is not maintainable and is, therefore, dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed