ORDER : Shivaraj V. Patil, J. - The appellants filed a civil suit seeking eviction of the contesting Respondent 1 herein under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'). The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the appellants had neither pleaded nor proved as to what was the requirement of the second appellant; and he had not stated in his plaint whether he wanted to open a new business or wanted to continue the old business which has expanded in the meanwhile. In the appeal filed by the appellants against the dismissal of the suit by the trial court, the first appellate court, after reappreciating the evidence placed on record in the light of the contentions raised, concluded that the appellants established their case under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act for eviction of the respondent from the premises in question. The respondent filed second appeal before the High Court challenging the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. The second appeal was admitted by the High Court on 22-6-1989 on the following substantial question of law: 'Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the landlords have proved their case within the meaning of the provisions of Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act for starting new business by proving and establishing the nature of the business?' 2. The High Court found fault with the judgment of the first appellate court on the ground that the appellants in their plaint seeking eviction of the respondent did not specify the nature of the business. According to the High Court, merely stating that the premises was required bonafide for the purpose of starting business was not enough; it was essential that the particulars and nature of business should have also been averred in the plaint. It is mainly on this ground that the High Court set aside the judgment of the first appellate court and restored that of the trial court. Hence, this appeal questioning the validity and correctness of the judgment and decree passed by the High Court. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants strongly contended that the High Court was not at all right and justified in upsetting the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court based on proper appreciation of the pleadings and evidence that were placed on record. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants strongly contended that the High Court was not at all right and justified in upsetting the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court based on proper appreciation of the pleadings and evidence that were placed on record. According to the learned counsel, no substantial question of law arose for consideration between the parties. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the impugned judgment does not call for any interference; the High Court has rightly and properly appreciated the respective contentions and concluded that the judgment of the first appellate court could not be sustained. 5. This Court, on 4-10-1999, ordered to issue notice indicating why the impugned order should not be set aside on the ground that the proceedings did not squarely arise under the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure , as amended since 1976. 6. A bare perusal of the substantial question of law as framed by the High Court, which is extracted above, shows that it is not even a question of law, much less a substantial question of law. Under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act what are the requirements, are stated in the impugned judgment itself. As found in the pleadings, the appellants did plead that the suit premises was bonafide required for the purpose of starting business. It is true that what kind or nature of business the appellants wanted to start is not pleaded. It is not in dispute that in the evidence led, the case is made out by the appellants as to the nature of the business they wanted to start in the premises. The High Court did not say that there is no evidence in this regard but it found fault that there is no pleading specifically about the nature of the business. The learned counsel for the first respondent relied upon a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 , in support of his submission that the plaint should have contained a specific averment as to the nature of the business. It is not possible for us to find from the judgment that under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, even the nature or a particular type of business should be pleaded. The provision itself speaks of bonafide requirement of premises for business. It is not possible for us to find from the judgment that under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, even the nature or a particular type of business should be pleaded. The provision itself speaks of bonafide requirement of premises for business. Assuming that the finding of the first appellate court on the basis of the evidence was erroneous, which is not a fact in this case, that itself was not a ground for the High Court to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court, particularly in the absence of any substantial question of law that arose for consideration. The substantial question of law so framed by the High Court, as already stated above, was not at all a substantial question of law. 7. Viewed from any angle, having regard to the pleadings and the evidence that are placed on record, the High Court was not at all justified in interfering with the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. In this view of the matter, the appeal is entitled to succeed. It is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are restored. 8. No costs. Appeal allowed.