ORDER : RAMANNA, J.:— This Revision Petition preferred by the revision petitioner - accused No. 10 under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr. P.C. is directed against the order dated 14.12.2000 passed in S.C. No. 210/1997 on the file of the Prl. Sessions Judge, Bijapur, by the impugned order the Court below has dismissed the application filed by the revision petitioner - accused No. 10 under Section 227 Cr. P.C. 2. The brief facts leading to this petition is that on 12.8.1996 on the road leading to Vittal Mandir, Bijapur, at about 9.30 a.m. within the jurisdiction of Gandhichowk police station, Bijapur, accused Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6, armed with deadly weapons, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object to commit the murder of Mahalingappa Veerabhadrappa Patil (hereinafter referred to as “M.V. Patil” in short). The revision petitioner - accused No. 10 and accused No. 1 being the friend and classmate of accused Nos. 2 to 9 and the deceased intended to take vengeance against M.V. Patil by committing murder. In pursuance thereof the revision petitioner hired the accused persons A-2 to A-6 and A-9 in agreement with deceased A-1, A-7 and A-8 to provide money and vehicle for committing the murder. Ultimately, they committed murder of M.V. Patil on that broad day light near the Vittal Mandi, Bijapur. Therefore, after completion of the investigation the charge sheet has been filed against all the accused persons including this petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and Sections 114, 109, and 120-B I.P.C. 3. During the pendency of the trial the petitioner herein had filed a petition before the Sessions Court, Bijapur, for discharge since the Trial Court kept the application pending and therefore this petitioner approached this Court in Crl. P. 4118/2002 seeking direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the application. Accordingly, the said petition was allowed by this Court. In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing both sides, dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner by an order dated 4.12.2002. As against this the petitioner has come up with this Revision Petition. 4. In this behalf the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner argued that according to the F.I.R. the deceased accused No. 1 Gopala Gowda and accused Nos. As against this the petitioner has come up with this Revision Petition. 4. In this behalf the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner argued that according to the F.I.R. the deceased accused No. 1 Gopala Gowda and accused Nos. 7 and 8 said to have been committed the murder of M.V. Patil since the accused Nos. 2 to 6 and 9 had an ill-will against the deceased M.V. Patil. Therefore they alleged to have approached the revision petitioner to hatch a conspiracy to commit murder of the deceased with the help of hired accused persons. Accordingly, on 12.8.1996 at about 9.30 a.m. they murdered M.V. Patil. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no direct evidence with regard to the involvement of accused 10 - petitioner in the commission of the offence to invoke Section 120-B of the I.P.C. The petitioner is a practicing advocate and in order to tarnish his image a false case has been foisted. Further it is contended that statements of C.W. 13, Basavaraj and C.W. 14, Ashok, recorded on 12.8.1996 and further statements on 18.8.1996, so also the statements of C.W. 15, Neelavva wife of the deceased, C.W. 16, Geetha, daughter of the deceased, C.W. 17, Kalavathi, C.W. 18, Siddappa Ningappa Hogare, C.W. 22, Thammannappa Siddagoudappa Gavigere, clearly show that the name of this petitioner taken as Basappa @ Basavaraj, but their statements said to have been recorded on 12.8.1996 does not discloses that this petitioner being an advocate had a conspiracy with other accused persons who were hired to commit the murder. It was also contended that there is a delay in recording the statements of the aforesaid witnesses. The aforesaid witnesses are not the eye witnesses. A case came to be registered only on the basis of a complaint of one Sridhara, son of Ganapath Rao, whereas the aforesaid witnesses are the sons, daughter and neighbours of the deceased M.V. Patil of Mahalingapura village and the name of this petitioner was subsequently mentioned in their further statement which is highly illegal and incorrect. Moreover, there is no semblance of evidence or prima facie case to frame a charge against the revision petitioner punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC. Therefore the petitioner herein is entitled for discharge. Moreover, there is no semblance of evidence or prima facie case to frame a charge against the revision petitioner punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC. Therefore the petitioner herein is entitled for discharge. In support of this the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on a decision reported in Hiralal Jain v. Delhi Administration1 wherein it was held that: “Where an advocate was engaged by some persons for identifying them as claimants in an application made on their behalf to claim certain Land acquisition compensation amount and the advocate believing the statements of the claimants as true filed his vakalathnama agreeing to act on their behalf, and there was no evidence to show prior knowledge on the part of advocate that the claimants were not the real persons entitled to claim the amount and no concert between the former and the latter was brought on record”. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a prima facie evidence entitling the Magistrate to commit the advocate for the offence punishable under Section 120-B read with Sections 419, 420, 467 read with Section 471 IPC. Further he has also, relied on another decision reported in Suresh Budharmal Kalani Alias Pappu Kanali v. State of Maharashtra2 - wherein it has been held that: “Under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872, a confession of an accused is relevant and admissible against a co-accused if both are jointly facing trial for the same offence. Where the accused has been discharged from the case and would not be facing trial with the co-accused his confession cannot be used against the co-accused. In the instant case the Designated Court decided to rely upon the confession on the specious ground that the prosecution was not in any way precluded from examining him as a witness in the trial for establishing the facts disclosed in his confession. This was a perverse approach of the Designated Court while dealing with the question of framing charges. At that stage, the Court is required to confine its attention to only those materials collected during investigation which can be legally translated into evidence and not upon further evidence (dehors those material) that the prosecution may adduce in the trial which would commence only after the charges are framed and the accused denies the charges”. At that stage, the Court is required to confine its attention to only those materials collected during investigation which can be legally translated into evidence and not upon further evidence (dehors those material) that the prosecution may adduce in the trial which would commence only after the charges are framed and the accused denies the charges”. Further, in the case reported in Rajaram Gupta v. Dharamchand3 Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that: “The mere act of engaging in an agreement to do an illegal act is an overt act, and the word ‘act’ also includes an illegal omission. The overt acts constituting a conspiracy are acts either (i) signifying agreement, or (ii) preparatory to the offence and (iii) acts constituting the offence itself. The gist of the offence of conspiracy, therefore, lies in forming the scheme or agreement between the parties. The external or overt act of the crime is concert by which mutual consent to a common purpose is exchanged. It therefore, suffices if the combination exists and is unlawful. Merely the allegation of conspiracy, without any evidence signifying the agreement itself or acts preparatory to the offences or acts constituting the offences, itself is not enough 1970 Crl. L.J., 707 (SC).” In the case reported in Smt. Leela Das v. Union of India.4 it has been held that: “The essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. But if those circumstances are compatible also with the innocence of the accused persons, then it cannot be held that the prosecution had successfully established its case. Even if, some acts are proved to have committed it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. An offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmise or inferences which are not supported by cogent evidence.” 6. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. An offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmise or inferences which are not supported by cogent evidence.” 6. It is contended that since there is no direct evidence or circumstantial evidence to invoke the provisions of Section 120-B of I.P.C. against the revision petitioner, therefore the order passed by the Trial Court holding that there is a prima facie case is illegal. The conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmise or inference which are not supported by cogent evidence. 7. On the other hand the learned High Court Government Pleader submitted that of course, C.Ws. 13 to 18 and 22 are not the eye witnesses to the incident but their statements clearly establish that the accused Nos. 2 to 6 and 9 are having vengeance against deceased M.V. Patil and that the deceased was the root cause for taking procession in the street of Mahalingapura by putting a garland made up of chappals to Poojari Mastara and assaulted him. Basappa Poojari was wreaking vengeance against the deceased. Further the High Court Government Pleader submitted that the statements of C.W. 41, Shivalingappa, C.W. 43 Bheemarao Basappa Kaggonda, C.W. 44 Mahadeva Shankarappa Tippakkadavara, and C.W. 45 Murari, clearly show that the accused -2 to 6 and 9 approached this petitioner accused - 10 who is a practicing advocate and he assured them that he would see that the work would be done through hired persons. Accordingly, the said accused persons said to have been agreed to the terms and conditions of this revision petitioner. Therefore, there is a prima facie case against this revision petitioner - accused 10 for the offence punishable under Section 120-B. 8. I have carefully perused the records and also the statement of the complainant and statement of the aforesaid witnesses. Of course, C.Ws. 13 to 18 and 22 are not the eye witnesses to the incident they are all circumstantial witnesses and their statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. disclosed about the motive to commit the murder of the deceased M.V. Patil by accused Nos. 2 to 6 and 9 through accused-1, 7 and 8 with the help of revision petitioner-accused-10. 13 to 18 and 22 are not the eye witnesses to the incident they are all circumstantial witnesses and their statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. disclosed about the motive to commit the murder of the deceased M.V. Patil by accused Nos. 2 to 6 and 9 through accused-1, 7 and 8 with the help of revision petitioner-accused-10. But the statement of C.W. 41, Shivalingappa, who is the owner of the house, the upstair portion of the house was let out to this revision petitioner and accused namely Gulappa Patil, Mahalingappa Itappa Koligudda, Basappa Hanamantha Poojari Mastara were visiting the house of the accused - 10 and they were talking hours together and about one and half months back on one night they sat with the petitioner and they were talking, and he over heard about those persons asking the revision petitioner about entrustment of the work of finishing off the deceased M.V. Patil. In turn this petitioner stated that he has already engaged some persons of Athalatty village and they had agreed to finish the work. Then this petitioner further informed them that they must be ready to give amount and the jeep to the persons of Athalatty village and in turn the aforesaid persons told this petitioner that let three to four lakhs rupees be spent for the purpose of murdering the deceased at the earliest. 9. The statement of C.W. 43 Bheema Rao Basappa Kaggonda, Manager of Gokula Lodging, shows that during the month of April - May and June three to four persons stayed in a room for 5 to 6 days. At that time the aforesaid three persons as well as the revision petitioner went inside and locked the room. While they were talking C.W. 43 over heard that they were talking about Bhemappa Erappa Yallappa and Ningappa. The Lodging charges and restaurant charges were paid by Gulappa Patil and Mahalingappa Koligudda. 10. The statement of C.W. 44, Mahadev Shankarappa Tippakkadavara, a room boy of Gokula Lodging, corroborate the statement of C.W. 43. 11. The statement of C.W. 45, Murari son of Beviram, the proprietor of Gokula Lodging, discloses that in the month of April, May and June 3 to 4 persons hired room for about 5 to 6 days. During that period Mahalingappa Koligudda Mastera and the petitioner visited the room where those persons stayed. 12. 11. The statement of C.W. 45, Murari son of Beviram, the proprietor of Gokula Lodging, discloses that in the month of April, May and June 3 to 4 persons hired room for about 5 to 6 days. During that period Mahalingappa Koligudda Mastera and the petitioner visited the room where those persons stayed. 12. Considering the statements of the aforesaid witnesses, accused Nos. 2 to 6 and 9 were frequently visiting the chambers of the petitioner which was in the upstairs building of C.W. 41 and also three to four persons were staying in the Gokula Lodge of C.W. 45, and their stay for 5 to 6 days in that lodge, it can be inferred that they have conspired to murder the deceased in that lodge. 13. In the instant cases the material on record discloses that the petitioner is an advocate and he was in occupation of the upstairs portion of the building of C.W. 41 where he was running his office and the accused 7 and 8 and other persons used to meet him frequently and they used to talk hours together in his chamber. Subsequently, C.W. 41 over heard about the work entrusted to finish M.V. Patil and the reply said to have been given by this petitioner, clearly disclosed that there is a conspiracy ‘which clearly attracts provisions of Section 120-B of I.P.C. Therefore, there is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions. But in the instant case the statement of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses clinches that the respondent - complainant has placed prim facie evidence to connect this petitioner and to frame charge against him. 14. In the recent judgment reported in Ram Narain Poply v. Central Bureau of Investigation5 wherein the Apex Court has held that: “The essential ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. Where the conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature as contemplated in Section 120-B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 120-A, then in that event more proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under Section 120-B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one of them would not be necessary. The provisions, in such a situation, do not require that each and every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act towards the fulfillment of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these requirements and ingredients are established, the act would fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in Section 120-B. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the object, which the objectors set before themselves as the object of conspiracy and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity. During its subsistence whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts he would be held guilty under Section 120-B of the I.P.C.” So in the instant case the statement of the prosecution witnesses discloses that there is an agreement between this revision petitioner and the other accused persons to commit the murder of M.V. Patil which took place on 12.8.1996 in the broad daylight in the presence of Sridhara, who is the complainant in the case. 15. The main allegation made against the revision petitioner is that accused Nos. 2 to 6 and 9 have hatched conspiracy to commit murder of M.V. Patil. In order to appreciate this contention it would be appropriate to deal with the question of conspiracy, Section 120-B of IPC is the provision which provides for punishment for criminal conspiracy. The definition of ‘criminal conspiracy’ given in Section 120-A reads a follows: “120-A - When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done. (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement inpursuance thereof.” Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the above case have elaborately discussed the pros and cons of the conspiracy. At para 346 it has been held that: “conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law, the punishment for which is imprisonment or fine or both in the discretion of the Court.” 16. Therefore, viewed from any angle I do not find any reason to come to a conclusion that the order under challenge, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, is perverse or illegal. Hence the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 17. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed.