Judgment Ashutosh Mohunta, J. 1. This petition is directed against the judgment dated May 11, 1991 passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, vide which the order dated February 21, 1987 passed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Chandigarh, making the award dated June 30, 1983 of the arbitrator a rule of the Court, was set aside. 2. On the application made by the Bhakra Beas Management Board (for short the Board) for adjudication of its claim for the recovery of Rs. 51,011/- on the plea that the Board had to incur extra expenditure to complete the unfinished construction work entrusted to M/s Sat Pal Singh Bhupinder Singh (for short the Contractors), Shri K.K.Agarwal, General Manager, Hydel, Punjab State Electricity Board, was appointed as the sole arbitrator under the orders of the Court. The Contractors (petitioner herein) preferred a counter claim for Rs. 9,170/-). After giving both the parties an opportunity to produce evidence in support of their respective claims the arbitrator rejected the claim of the respondent and directed the Board to pay the amount of Rs. 9,170/- vide award dated June 30, 1983. Thereafter, the award was filed in the Court on January 18, 1984. Sub Judge, 1st Class, Chandigarh, issued notices to both the parties. An unstamped objection petition under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was filed by the Board with the prayer for setting aside the award of the Arbitrator on the ground that the counter claim made by the Contractors was barred by limitation and about which no reference was made by the Court and, as such, the counter claim of the Contractors could not be entertained by the Arbitrator. The Sub Judge, 1st Class, Chandigarh, decided the issue with regard to the time-barred counter claim made by the Contractors in favour of the Board. However, award of the Arbitrator was made a rule of the Court on the grounds that the objection petition filed by the Board was unstamped and was barred by limitation. The appeal filed by the Board was, however, allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court were set aside. Resultantly, the objection petition of the Board was allowed and the award dated June 30, 1983 of the Arbitrator was set aside. It is against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, that the present revision petition has been filed. 3. Resultantly, the objection petition of the Board was allowed and the award dated June 30, 1983 of the Arbitrator was set aside. It is against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, that the present revision petition has been filed. 3. It has been contended by Mr. Gopi Chand, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Board had clear knowledge about the filing of the award in the Court in January 1984 as a copy of award was forwarded by the Arbitrator to each of the parties at the time of filing the award in the Court in the month of January 1984. Thus, according to him, the period of limitation for filing the objection petition would commence from the date of knowledge of the respondent and, on this account it has been contended by the counsel that the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, has erred in reversing the order of the Sub Judge, Ist Class, Chandigarh, making the award a rule of the Court. Further it has been contended by the counsel for the petitioner that it is for the arbitrator to consider the question of limitation and the Court cannot interfere in the award given by the Arbitrator. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on Union of India v. Manchanda Brothers and Anr., A.I.R. 1979 Punjab and Haryana 255; The Jullundur Ex-Servicemen Motor Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. The General Assurance Society Ltd., Calcutta and Anr., (1978)80 P.L.R. 465; and N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerata State Electricity Board and Anr., A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 230. 4. After hearing the counsel for the parties and on going through the case file, I am of the view that contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not carry any weight and deserve to be rejected. 5. Undisputedly, the Court had appointed Shri K.K. Aggarwal as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the claim of Rs. 51,011/- made by the Board from the Contractors, who had left unfinished the construction work entrusted to them and which work the Board had to complete by incurring its own expenses. The final payment to the Contractors was made on January 29, 1979, The Contractors did not raise any dispute until the Arbitrator was appointed by the Board in May 1982. The period of limitation for the Contractors had expired in January 1982. The final payment to the Contractors was made on January 29, 1979, The Contractors did not raise any dispute until the Arbitrator was appointed by the Board in May 1982. The period of limitation for the Contractors had expired in January 1982. The counter claim made by the Contractors was never referred by the Court for adjudication by the Arbitrator. It shows that the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction while giving the award. In the case reported as Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Prannath Vishwanath Rawlley, A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 2014, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that when the Arbitrator is appointed with the intervention of the Court, then the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to entertain claims without a further order of reference from the Court. In such a situation, the order of reference is limited to a particular relief and the Arbitrator cannot enlarge the scope of reference. In the present case it is the Board which had approached the Court and raised a claim to the tune of Rs. 51,011/- from the Contractors, who had left the work of construction unfinished and the Board had to incur extra expenditure to complete the work. The final payment to the contractors had been made on January 29, 1979 by way of adjustment. The Contractors did not raise any dispute thereafter with regard to the payment until the appointment of Arbitrator in May, 1982. The period of limitation so far as the Contractors are concerned had expired on January 29, 1982. After a lapse of three years the counter claim made by the Contractors was clearly beyond limitation. Both the Courts below have concurrently held in favour of the Board and against the petitioner with regard to expiration of the period of limitation so far as the filing of counter claim by the Contractors is concerned. It being a concurrent finding of fact, it would not be fair on the part of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence at this stage. Moreover, I do not find any infirmity with regard to the findings of both the Courts below on the point of limitation for filing the counter claim by the Contractors (petitioners herein). 6. Consequently, I hold that the counter claim to the tune of Rs. Moreover, I do not find any infirmity with regard to the findings of both the Courts below on the point of limitation for filing the counter claim by the Contractors (petitioners herein). 6. Consequently, I hold that the counter claim to the tune of Rs. 9,170/- made by the Contractors was beyond limitation and the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction while entertaining the counter claim put forth by the petitioner for adjudication at a belated stage; more so, when no reference with regard thereto was made by the Court tohim. The facts of the authorities cited by the counsel for the petitioner are quite different which are not relevant and applicable to the facts of the present. 7. So far as the contention with regard to the filing of unstamped objection petition beyond the period of Limitation by the Board is concerned, I do not find any merit therein. Section 149, C.P.C., deals with making up the deficiency of Court-fee and the same is reproduced hereunder:- "Power to make up deficiency of Court-fees. - Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fees; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." 8. A bare look at the aforesaid provision would show that the Court in its discretion can allow a party to make up the deficiency in Court-fee at any stage of the case. It has been held by this Court reported as Gurdial Singh v. Massa Singh and Ors., (1977)79 P.L.R. 130, that a party would be entitled to the benefit of Section 149, C.P.C., and the discretion should be exercised by the Court in favour of the party making prayer for making up the deficiency in the Court-fee, unless the Court finds that the party concerned was acting mala fide or with contumacy. Undisputedly, the Board had offered to make up the deficiency in Court-fee when an objection with regard thereto was raised. Undisputedly, the Board had offered to make up the deficiency in Court-fee when an objection with regard thereto was raised. On the prayer made by the Board, it was the duty of the trial Court to have allowed it to make up the deficiency in Court-fee. The Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, has rightly reversed the finding of the trial Court on this point. 9. So far as delayed filing of the objection petition by the Board is concerned, I also do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, service of the notice issued by the Court was effected on the Board on February 22, 1984 and the date of hearing was February 23, 1984, Shri N.S. Bawa, Law Officer of the Board, appeared in the Court on the said date and the case was adjourned to March 1, 1984, on which date the objection petition was filed by the Board. Thus, the objection petition filed by the Board was very much within limitation. The Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, has rightly reversed the finding of the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Chandigarh on this point as well. 10. In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in the present petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed.