ORDER S.L. Jain, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 9-10-2002, passed by the learned single Judge, in Writ Petition No. 1592/2002, appellants have filed this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. The factual matrix of the case is in a narrow compass. Santosh Kumar, the respondent No. 1 herein belongs to Other Backward Class (hereinafter referred to as 'OBC'). He applied for LL.B. Entrance Examination conducted by appellant No. 1: Rani Durgawati Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as 'University') in the year 2001. He was allowed to appear in the said examination. On being successful in the entrance test, he was admitted as a regular student of The New Education Society Law College, Jabalpur, respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 1 deposited requisite fees of Rs. 2,600.00 and obtained the instructions for the whole year. The respondent No. 1 prepared himself to take the examination which was to commence from April 4, 2002 as per time table, Annexure P-5. Vide communication dated March 7, 2002, Annexure P-6, the respondent No. 1 was informed by the University that his form for appearing in the LL.B., Part-I examination has been rejected as the marks obtained by him in the graduation and post graduation are below 40%, therefore, he was not entitled to be admitted in the first year of LL.B. course. 3. Aggrieved by the above order of the University, the respondent No. 1 filed a Writ Petition No. 1592/2002 before this Court alleging inter alia that he had secured 38.72% marks in the B. A. Examination and 38.62% in the M. A. Examination. He represented to the University claiming that he is entitled to a relaxation of 3% marks but his representation was rejected by the University. 4. Combating the allegations made in the writ petition, the appellant -University filed return. It was put forth that according to the Ordinance of the University, the minimum marks for the purpose of admission in the entrance examination of law stream was 40% in the aggregate. A relaxation of 5% marks was permissible to the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes categories. Since the petitioner did not belong to either of these categories and admittedly belongs to OBC, the benefit of relaxation is not available to him. A relaxation of 5% marks was permissible to the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes categories. Since the petitioner did not belong to either of these categories and admittedly belongs to OBC, the benefit of relaxation is not available to him. Since the respondent No. 1 was not fulfilling the eligibility criterion laid down for admission in LL.B. First Year, he was not entitled to admission. 5. It was further put forth on behalf of the University that the respondent No. 1 applied for admission in the entrance test by submitting requisite form. Copy of his application form is Annexure A-1, wherein the respondent No. 1 did not fill up the prescribed column of aggregate marks in the graduation. About the marks in the post graduation the respondent No. 1 declared in the form that result is awaited. No document was enclosed with the form. The respondent No. 1 was not having requisite percentage of marks in graduation. Therefore, he intentionally left the columns blank. Subsequently, in M.A. Examination also the respondent No. 1 secured only 38.62% marks which too were below 40%. As per Ordinance No. 22 which was in vogue, the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to enter the stream of law. 6. Since the result of post graduation was awaited, the respondent No. 1 was given provisional admission in The New Education Society Law College, Jabalpur. Later on, he filled the form for Part-I examination of LL.B. which was to commence from April 4, 2002. At the time of scrutiny of examination forms the University found that the respondent No. 1 had secured only 38.72% -narks in B. A. Examination and 38.62% marks in M.A. Examination, therefore he was not entitled to enter the stream of law. This was brought to the notice of the respondent No. 1 as per order dated 7-3-2002, Annexure P-6. 7. Learned single Judge, by the impugned order held that the respondent No. 1 disclosed the percentage of marks obtained by him in B.A. and M.A. Examinations and on the basis of those marks he was allowed to appear in the entrance examination conducted by the University. He cleared the test and he was admitted in The New Education Society Law College, Jabalpur on the directions of the University. At that time also no objection regarding the eligibility criterion was raised. He cleared the test and he was admitted in The New Education Society Law College, Jabalpur on the directions of the University. At that time also no objection regarding the eligibility criterion was raised. The respondent No. 1 deposited the admission fees and pursued his studies for the whole year, therefore, his admission should not have been cancelled because infirmity, if any, should have been locked into before giving him permission to appear in the examination. It is only at the stage of commencing of the examination that the University raised the objection to his eligibility for admission to the law course. The University is, therefore, estopped from refusing the respondent No. 1 to enter in the examination and from rejecting his form. It was the duty of the University to scrutinize the matter thoroughly before permitting the respondent No. 1 to appear in the entrance examination and accordingly, directed the University to continue the respondent No. 1 in the course of LL.B. to which he was admitted. It is against this order that the appellants have filed this appeal. 8. We have heard Smt. Indira Nair, learned senior counsel with Shri Naveen Dubey, counsel, appearing for the appellants and also the respondent No. 1, Santosh Kumar, who appeared before us in person. None appeared for respondent No. 2 despite service of notice. 9. The main thrust of the contention raised by the learned counsel. Appearing for the University is with regard to the paragraphs 5 and 7 of the impugned order which read as below :- 5. The petitioner submits that petitioner disclosed the fact that when the University conducted the entrance examination he had disclosed his mark-sheets of B.A. and M. A. No suppression was made.... 7. In the instant case this fact is not in dispute that petitioner had disclosed the percentage in B.A. and M.A....Her submission is that it was not the case of the respondent No. 1 in his writ petition that he enclosed his mark-sheets of B.A. and M.A. examinations along with his form. His only prayer was that he should have been given the benefit of relaxation as he belongs to OBC. 10. We find considerable substance in the contention of the leaned senior counsel, appearing for University. We have carefully perused the photocopy of the admission form. His only prayer was that he should have been given the benefit of relaxation as he belongs to OBC. 10. We find considerable substance in the contention of the leaned senior counsel, appearing for University. We have carefully perused the photocopy of the admission form. In this form in the column "particulars of the examination passed", against the entry "graduation" the respondent No. 1 had left blank the columns of "marks obtained", "division" and "percentage". In the column of "post graduate examination", in the sub-columns "marks obtained" and "division and percentage" he specifically mentioned - "the result is awaited". No document was enclosed with the form. 11. The Ordinance specifically provides that if a person appears in the qualifying examination and the result is awaited, he shall be given provisional admission but his admission shall be final only when he obtains 40% marks or more in that examination. In the instructions enclosed with the form also this provision was specifically mentioned and it was further clarified that a person obtaining less than 40% marks shall not be entitled to admission. 12. The learned senior counsel submitted that as the respondent No. 1 declared in his application form that the result of post graduation is awaited, he was given provisional admission and subsequently, when he could not get 40% or more marks in post graduation, he was not entitled for admission in LL.B. Part-I. It was the duty of respondent No. 1 to inform the college authorities or the University that he could not obtain 40% marks in post graduation examination. It was the duty of respondent No. 2 as well to scrutinize the form within reasonable time but it failed to discharge its duty. The respondent No. 1 cannot take advantage of his own wrong. The respondent No. 1 was aware that the minimum marks for admission in the entrance examination was 40%. He deliberately concealed and did not mention the marks obtained in graduation and played a fraud, therefore, he was not entitled to admission in LL.B., Part-I and learned single Judge erred in giving the benefit of promissory estoppel to the respondent No. 1, more so, when the respondent did not plead the promissory estoppel in his writ petition. 13. We find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. 13. We find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that respondent No. 1 obtained the admission by playing fraud on the University and the college. The manner in which he left the columns of percentage and marks obtained by him in graduation blank was with a design to secure admission by taking undue advantage. It is a cheating intended to get some advantage. He knew that the minimum percentage of marks required for admission is 40%. Even then without disclosing the marks obtained by him in graduation he submitted the form. A candidate who applies for the admission is bound to submit all relevant information's and produce all necessary documents. If he withholds any important information or any material document in order to gain some advantage, he would be guilty of playing fraud. 14. The respondent No. 1 submitted that the marks sheet of graduation was enclosed by him along with the form. The learned single Judge also observed in paragraph 7 of the order impugned that the petitioner had disclosed the fact as to his percentage in the very beginning, but the perusal of the writ petition does not reveal that it was the case of the petitioner that he enclosed the mark sheet of his graduation along with the admission form. 15. We have carefully seen the copy of the admission form submitted by the respondent No. 1, as the original form has been eliminated on the lapse of period prescribed by the Ordinance. The respondent No. 1 also did not dispute that the copy of the form which has been filed by the University is the true copy of the original. As per the instructions given in the form itself, it was obligatory for the respondent No. 1 to put a tick mark against the document enclosed by him but no such mark was put by him in his form which clearly indicate;; that no mark-sheet was enclosed with the form. The University had no interest in removing or detaching the mark-sheet, if the same was enclosed with the form or attached thereto. There is a presumption in favour of regular performance of official work. This conduct of respondent No. 1 also appears to be a well designed one. 16. The University had no interest in removing or detaching the mark-sheet, if the same was enclosed with the form or attached thereto. There is a presumption in favour of regular performance of official work. This conduct of respondent No. 1 also appears to be a well designed one. 16. Thus, respondent No. 1 neither filled the necessary columns in the form nor he enclosed the mark-sheet obviously with a view to conceal the fact that the marks obtained by him in graduation were less than 40%. 17. The learned single Judge, applying the principle of promissory estoppel and relying upon the Apex Court judgments in Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University and Others, AIR 1990 SC 1075 , Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 , decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Seema Shorti v. Rani Durgawati Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur, 1989 (34) MPLJ 628 and a decision of Orissa High Court in Tripureshwar Mallik v. Council of Higher Secondary Education and Another, AIR 1990 Ori 228 , held that it was the bounden duty of the University to scrutinize the matter thoroughly before permitting the petitioner to appear in the examination and without having done so, it could not be permitted to reject the form of the petitioner after a period of one year when the petitioner pursued his studies for the whole academic session, on the ground of less percentage of marks which he obtained in the qualifying examination. In coming to this conclusion the learned single Judge observed that he was not guilty of misrepresentation of any fact. 18. The respondent No. 1 did not disclose in his form about the marks obtained by him in the qualifying examination. He deliberately concealed this fact to mislead the University. His case was considered for provisional admission because he stated in his application that the result of M. A. is awaited. It is this information which made him eligible for provisional admission. When the final checking was done, it was found that the respondent No. 1 deliberately did not show that the marks obtained by him in the graduation were less than 43%, and it was also found that the marks obtained by him in post graduation too were less than 40%. 19. The question, therefore, is whether in a case of this nature the principle of promissory estoppel should be invoked? 20. 19. The question, therefore, is whether in a case of this nature the principle of promissory estoppel should be invoked? 20. In order to operate as an estoppel, it ought to have been established that the University had by its declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted respondent No. 1 to believe a thing to be true. 21. The respondent No. 1 who had himself misled the authorities by concealing his marks in graduation and by not informing the University or the college authorities that he could not obtain 40% marks in post graduation, cannot claim equity. A person by concealing the truth cannot invoke the principle of promissory estoppel. The Apex Court in Central Airmen Selection Board and Another v. Surender Kumar Das, (2003) 1 SCC 152 has observed thus - It is well known that the principle of promissory estoppel is based on equitable principles. A person who has himself misled the authority by making a fake statement, cannot invoke this principle, if his misrepresentation misled the authority into taking a decision which on discovery of the misrepresentation is sought to be cancelled. Regarding promissory estoppel in Kumari Madhuri Patil and Another v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 241 , the Supreme Court observed as under :- A party that seeks equity, must come with clean hands. He who comes to the court with false claim, cannot plead equity nor the court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. There is no estoppel as no promise of the social status is made by the State when a false plea was putforth for the social status recognised and declared by the Presidential Order under the Constitution as amended by the SC and ST Amendment Act, 1976, which is later found to be false. Therefore, the plea of promissory estoppel or equity have no application. When it is found to be case of fraud played by the person concerned, no sympathy and equitable considerations can come to his rescue. He who conceals the facts cannot claim the equity nor the Court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. When it is found to be a case of fraud played by the person concerned, who deliberately concealed the fact that the percentage of his marks is less than 40%, no sympathy and equitable consideration can come to his rescue. 22. When it is found to be a case of fraud played by the person concerned, who deliberately concealed the fact that the percentage of his marks is less than 40%, no sympathy and equitable consideration can come to his rescue. 22. The relief's granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts intends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy. The Supreme Court in Gurdeep Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1953 SC 2638 has observed that:- What remains to be considered is whether the selection of respondent No. 6 should be quashed. We are afraid, unduly lenient view of the Courts on the basis of human consideration in regard to such excesses on the part of the authorities, has served to create an impression that even where an advantage is secured by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalized in courts of law. Courts do and should take human and sympathetic view of matters. That is the very essence of justice. But considerations of judicial policy also dictate that a tendency of this kind where advantage gained by illegal means is permitted to be retained will jeopardize the purity of selection process itself; engender cynical disrespect towards the judicial process and in the last analyse embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs could be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the Court. Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of Courts into private benevolence. The tendency should be stopped. 23. Where a provisional admission was given and the candidate knew that the matter is under consideration by the University, the moment he learnt that he could not secure 40% marks in post graduation, he should have informed the University and should have discontinued the studies. In this background, he plea that he had spent whole session under expectation that he will be allowed to appear in the examination cannot be accepted and as such the principle of promissory estoppel is not applicable. 24. Having found that the admission of the respondent No. 1 was illegal at its very inception, we are not in a position to accede to the plea based on estoppel or equity put forward by the respondent. 25. 24. Having found that the admission of the respondent No. 1 was illegal at its very inception, we are not in a position to accede to the plea based on estoppel or equity put forward by the respondent. 25. Even in the absence of any misrepresentation, in a case of this nature where a candidate who is not eligible for admission is admitted by mistake contrary to the rules, when such mistake is detected, the authorities are bound to correct the mistake and recall the admission. 26. De hors then rules of admission the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. Even if the admission was given under a mistake of fact, the university was entitled to cancel the admission. 27. The principle of promissory estoppel cannot be applicable in strict sense to the academic courses particularly in the field of education. It is not the case where the respondent No. 1 is being punished for no fault of his at a belated stage by cancelling his admission. The mere fact that the respondent No. 1 pursued his education for one year cannot bring about any change or alteration of the position of the respondent. 28. If the rules do not postulate some admission mere delay on the part of the University where there was no representation on the part of the University that the eligibility criterion may be relaxed, respondent No. 1 cannot invoke the principle of promissory estoppel. Since there was no express or implied declaration, act or omission on the part of the University, there car be no promissory estoppel. 29. Even if an authority makes a promise contrary to law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The University cannot be compelled to go against the rules. A person cannot be allowed to continue his education contrary to rules. It is beyond the powers of University to allow such candidate to continue his studies. 30. Where the admission of respondent No. 1 was provisional as the result of post graduation examination was yet to be declared unless he satisfied the University that he had secured 40% or more marks in the post graduation, he was not entitled to seek continuation of his LL.B. course. 31. 30. Where the admission of respondent No. 1 was provisional as the result of post graduation examination was yet to be declared unless he satisfied the University that he had secured 40% or more marks in the post graduation, he was not entitled to seek continuation of his LL.B. course. 31. The Apex Court judgments in Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University and Others, AIR 1990 SC 1075 , Shri Krishan v. Kurvkshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 , decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Seema Shroti v. Rani Durgawati Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur, 1989 (34) MPLJ 628 and a decision of Orissa High Court in Tripureshwar Mallik v. Council of Higher Secondary Education and Another, AIR 1990 Ori 228 , are not applicable to the facts of the present case and they are not of any help to :he case of respondent No. 1. 32. It will be apposite to mention here that in the writ petition the claim of the respondent No. 1 was based only on the plea that he being a candidate belonging to OBC is entitled to a relaxation of 3% marks as per the rules of the University and he represented the University regarding the same but his representation was rejected by the University. No such rule was placed before us. In this regard, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants has also stated that there is no such rule otherwise, the University would have happily given the benefit of that rule to respondent No. 1. 33. The respondent No. 1 lastly submitted that since the concession has been given to the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes categories, there is no justification in depriving the candidates of OBC of that benefit as they also belong to the backward class. The candidates of OBC, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes cannot be placed at par. The inclusion of only candidates of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes categories, excluding the candidates of OBC, for concession cannot be said to be arbitrary. 34. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the order of learned single Judge allowing the respondent No. 1 to continue his education cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. No costs.