Judgment Ravi S.Dhavan, J. 1. The cause of the petitioner-appellant has seen several rounds of litigation. The first round begins when the petitioner filed Title Suit No. 53/ 17 of 1978/1978. This title suit was decreed in favour of the petitioner-appellant on 11th April 1978. The plaint had challenged the termination of his services and sought a relief that he be reinstated. The suit succeeded. The reliefs were granted on the plaint. The petitioner-appellant was not reinstated. The Board filed a title appeal. It was allowed. The petitioner appellant challenged the decision in the title appeal by a second appeal before the High Court. The judgment of the lower appellate court was set aside and that of the trial court was confirmed. The Board went to the Supreme Court. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed. Ultimately, the judgement and decree of the trial court stood. 2. The petitioner appellant was reinstated after the dismissal of the second appeal at the High Court in 1985. During the course of litigation, persons junior to him including one Sardeshwar Prasad was given promotion against one or an another higher post. The petitioner as a senior employee found himself Junior to his juniors. 3. The petitioner filed a writ petition at the High Court. This was CWJC no. 2390 of 1995. This was the second round of litigation. This writ petition was allowed on 16 March, 1994. The learned Judge noticed the discrimination as was alleged in the writ petition. In particular an aspect from record was pointed out in paragraph 6 of the judgment. It is on record of this judgment that the petitioner was appointed on 3 January, 1955 whereas Sri Sardeshwar Prasad was appointed on 21 March, 1955. In the circumstances, the Board was put under a direction by a mandamus that it would consider the case of the petitioner and record a reasoned order, in accordance with law. 4. When the Board examined the matter it rejected the case of the petitioner and issued an office order as memo no. 1066 dated 11 July 1994, in effect, declaring that the representation of the petitioner seeking promotion to different posts stood rejected. The aspect that the petitioner was to be granted promotion as given to Sri Sardeshwar Prasad was ignored. 5. Consequently, the petitioner filed CWJC No. 6819 of 1994 : Babu Lal Singh V/s. The Bihar State Electricity Board. 1066 dated 11 July 1994, in effect, declaring that the representation of the petitioner seeking promotion to different posts stood rejected. The aspect that the petitioner was to be granted promotion as given to Sri Sardeshwar Prasad was ignored. 5. Consequently, the petitioner filed CWJC No. 6819 of 1994 : Babu Lal Singh V/s. The Bihar State Electricity Board. This was the third round of litigation. In this writ petition the learned Judge relied on the counter affidavit which had been filed by the Board and not so much on the judgment which had been passed on CWJC No. 2390 of 1985 dated 16 March, 1994 and on the defence contained in the counter affidavit, and not the decision between the parties, rejected the petition and denied the reliefs as sought by the petitioner. This is the judgment dated 4 May, 1995 (CWJC No. 6819 of 1994) under challenge in the present appeal. At the out set the Court is of the opinion that the learned Judge was in error in not giving due consideration to the earlier judgment of 16 March, 1994 between the same parties, on the same issues and the same facts and circumstances. The subsequent order challenged in the present Letters Patent Appeal is not in conformity with the principle of res judicata. 6. This Court will come to the aspect straightway as much emphasis has been laid that Sardeshwar Prasad, in fact, was senior. This is a circumstance of fact. This aspect cannot be made a issue in the next round of litigation by the Board. But, it has become necessary for this Court to notice as to how the learned Judge, in CWJC No. 2390 of 1985, noticed the record of the Board to give a finding that the petitioner- appellant was senior and Sardeshwar Prasad was junior by reckoning the chronology on the date of appointment. The finding of learned Judge recorded in the order dated 16 March, 1994 rests on an office order of the Board bearing No. 4/A Store-5004/92 dated 5 December, 1994. This entire office order is reproduced below: 7. In the circumstances it is hardly fair of the Board to resist the finding which is based on its own record. The Board seems to be relying on a record, and that also half heartedly, which apparently makes some suggestions that Sardeshwar Prasad may have been appointed in 1952. This entire office order is reproduced below: 7. In the circumstances it is hardly fair of the Board to resist the finding which is based on its own record. The Board seems to be relying on a record, and that also half heartedly, which apparently makes some suggestions that Sardeshwar Prasad may have been appointed in 1952. Reliance is being had by the Board on Annexure D to the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. This is an inter-departmental correspondence dated 2 April 1962 No. 1586/1A-2/61 E along with which is appended a chart. What has been placed on record is, otherwise, illegible but it is being pointed out to the Court that it refers to an appointment being made in 1952. But what has not been noticed is that this record is being generated in 1962 and on that the comment of the Boards office is "it has been reported by E.E.E., Chapra, that C.R. of the incumbent has been furnished to the Board vide his letter no. 3631 dated 29.10.1961 but the period to which it relates has not been mentioned therein. No. C.R. for any period available in this office. The incumbent is borne on workcharge establishment and C.R. for the period prior to 1960-61 of store-keeper under work-charge estab. has not been maintained as intimated in this office no. 6856 dated 31.10.1961." 8. In the circumstances this is not a document which inspires confidence that beyond reasonable doubt the incumbent Sardeshwar Prasad can be declared to have been appointed in 1952 when his records of the last ten years were not available, and could not be made available when sought by the headquarters of the Board, at Patna. Thus, the less said about this record the better it would be. This office noting further records that the engagement, even if the record is made available is being reported as not regular, on the other hand, is an office order of the Board itself, clearly without doubt certifying that Sardeshwar Prasad joined his service on 21 March, 1955. The Board cannot resile from this date. It has also been declared to the Court that these employees were initially the employees of the State Government and they became employees of the Board when the said Electricity Board was established. The Board cannot resile from this date. It has also been declared to the Court that these employees were initially the employees of the State Government and they became employees of the Board when the said Electricity Board was established. Thus, if the Board has itself certified that Sardeshwar Prasad joined "Sarkari Sewa" and was appointed on (Niyukti Ki Tithi) 21 March, 1955, then, the Board is estopped from pleading otherwise. And even this on an uninspiring record. This is not only unfair but it is inequitable. 9. In the circumstances, record for record the date of appointment of Sardeshwar Prasad is 21 March, 1955. The date of appointment of the petitioner is not in issue and is 3rd January, 1955. 10. Clearly, there has been a discrimination through out when the petitioner- appellant has been denied due promotion to which he was entitled to and similar benefits granted to Sardeshwar Prasad. The petitioner-appellant is by right and legally entitled to receive the same benefits and promotions. 11. Learned counsel for the Board requests the court that one months time be granted to the Board to go into an exercise and grant reliefs to the petitioner- appellant whether of promotion or other service benefits as granted to Sardeshwar Prasad. Let this time be had. 12. The order dated 4 May, 1995 (C.W.J.C. No. 6819 of 1994) is quashed. The appeal is allowed with costs through out.