JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:-This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the School Tribunal, Pune Region, Pune dated February 14, 1989, in Appeal No. 135 of 1987. 2. Respondent No. 1 was appointed as Junior Clerk in Jai Bhavani High School, which was conducted and administered by the petitioner-Corporation on 22nd September, 1983 on temporary basis. The petitioner-Corporation is running that High Schools since its establishment in 1970. Besides, it is also running two other High School being Camp High School established in 1983 and Urdu High School established in 1988. According to the petitioner, they were maintaining one seniority list of all the Junior Clerks employed by the petitioner Corporation. As vacancy in the post of Senior Clerk became available in the said Jai Bhavani High School, in which the said respondent No. 1 was working, on the basis of the seniority list of Junior Clerks maintained by the petitioner, they promoted respondent No. 2 to that post by order dated 22nd July, 1987, to be promoted with effect from 1st August, 1987. That decision was taken as respondents No. 2 was in service since 1957 and was the seniormost Junior Clerk working with the petitioner Corporation. Against this decision, respondents No. 1 filed suit before the Civil Court contending that he was seniormost Junior Clerk working in Jai Bhavani High School and, therefore, he was entitled to be promoted to the post of Senior Clerk in that school. However, in the meantime, the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, were made applicable even to the schools run by the local authorities, such as the petitioner Corporation, by virtue of the Amending Act passed by the Legislature on 16th July, 1987 and which was published in the Official Gazette after obtaining the Governor's assent on 7th August, 1987. In other words, by this Amending Act, the provisions of the Act of 1977 became applicable to the school run by the petitioner Corporation. As per the provisions of the Act of 1977, the management is required to maintain separate seniority list of the teaching and non-teaching staff employed in each school. Besides, the provisions of section 9 became available to the respondent No. 1 to challenge the so-called supersession. As per the provisions of the Act of 1977, the management is required to maintain separate seniority list of the teaching and non-teaching staff employed in each school. Besides, the provisions of section 9 became available to the respondent No. 1 to challenge the so-called supersession. In the circumstances, the suit filed by respondent No. 1 came to be withdrawn, and, instead, respondent No. 1 filed appeal before the School Tribunal being Appeal No. 135 of 1987. The School Tribunal by the impugned judgment and order has allowed the appeal, accepting the contentions pressed into service on behalf of respondent No. 1 that he was alone entitled to be promoted to the post of Senior Clerk in Jai Bhavani High School. It is this decision, which is subject-matter of challenge in this writ petition. 3. This writ petition has been filed on 25th April, 1989. While this writ petition was pending, there has been further amendment to the provisions of the Act of 1977, whereby the earlier Amending Act of 1987 has been nullified and the status quo ante, as obtained prior to the amendment of 1987, came to be restored. In other words, after the Amending Act of 1989, the position is that the provisions of the Act of 1977 are not available and applicable to the school run by the local authority, such as the petitioner Corporation. Beside, the Amending Act of 1989 expressly provides that, if any appeal filed by the employee of the school run by the local authority is pending before the School Tribunal filed under the provisions of the Act of 1977, the same should be transferred to the appropriate authority. We would advert to this aspect a little later. 4. Having considered the rival submissions, the position that emerge is that the respondent No. 1 was appointed in Jai Bhavani High School as Junior Clerk on 22nd September, 1983 and the vacancy to the post of Senior Clerk in that school arose some time in 1986-87, which was, however, filled in by appointing respondent No. 2, who was the seniormost Junior Clerk in the services of the petitioner-Corporation. The grievance of respondent No. 1 was that only those Junior Clerks, who were working in Jai Bhavani High School were entitled to be considered and promoted to the post of Senior Clerk in that school and respondent No. 2, who was only a Junior Clerk working in the Corporation on the administrative side, was not competent to be appointed to that post. The argument on behalf of the petitioner, however, is that the seniority list of Junior Clerks was maintained by the Corporation as per the provisions, which were applicable at the relevant time, namely, section 51 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, which obligated the petitioner to maintain one seniority list of all the Junior Clerks employed by the petitioner-Corporation, though working in different branches or institutions of the Corporation. If that argument were to be accepted, then no fault can be found with the decision of the Corporation to appoint respondent No. 2, who was the seniormost Junior Clerk having been appointed in 1957, to the post of Senior Clerk in Jai Bhavani High School. It is also argued on behalf of the petitioner that there is no specific provision in the Secondary School Code in regard to the service conditions of the teaching and non-teaching employees to be employed in the school run by the local authority, such as the petitioner Corporation. It is on that basis that the provisions of section 51 of the B.P.M.C. Act were pressed in to service and common seniority list as prepared by the petitioner-Corporation was justified. The Tribunal, however, has answered the issue of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the appeal, but insofar as the merit of the contention raised before it by the petitioner Corporation is concerned, it has not adverted itself to the above aspects of the matter : whereas it proceeded to adjudicate the matter on the basis that the petitioner-Corporation was obliged to maintain separate seniority list in respect of the teaching and non-teaching staff of Jai Bhavani High School, which requirement was mandated by virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1977. It has not addressed itself to the aspect as to whether there was any such provision in the Secondary School Code, which would have obliged the petitioner Corporation to maintain separate seniority list of teaching and non-teaching employees working in Jai Bhavani High School run by the petitioner-Corporation. It has not addressed itself to the aspect as to whether there was any such provision in the Secondary School Code, which would have obliged the petitioner Corporation to maintain separate seniority list of teaching and non-teaching employees working in Jai Bhavani High School run by the petitioner-Corporation. This is the mainfest error committed by the Tribunal. 5. To my mind, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as preferred by the respondent No. 1 is proper, having regard to the purport of section 9 of the Act of 1977, read with the legislative intention of Amending Act of 1987. However, even if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, it was obliged to decide the matter on the basis of the law, as applicable to the parties when the promotional post became vacant and the actual promotion was made by the petitioner Corporation to that effect by appointing respondent No. 2 in preference to respondent No. 1. In this case, that event had happened on 22nd July, 1987 by issuance of order of promotion of respondent No. 2 by the petitioner Corporation which was to become effective from 1st August, 1987. On that date, the provisions of the Act of 1977 were obviously not applicable to the school run by the local authority, such as the petitioner Corporation. The provisions of the Act of 1977 became applicable only with effect from 7th August, 1987. This position is indisputable. If that is so, then the School Tribunal ought to have examined the matter as to whether the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code would have required to rather obliged the petitioner Corporation to maintain separate seniority list. Only then, the respondent No. 1 would succeed in his argument that he alone was entitled to be appointed to the post of Senior Clerk in Jai Bhavani High School. Reliance is rightly placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1983(3) S.C.C. 284 in (Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao and others)1, that vacancies in promotional post occurring prior to the amendment have to be filled up in accordance with the unamended Rules. Reliance is rightly placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1983(3) S.C.C. 284 in (Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao and others)1, that vacancies in promotional post occurring prior to the amendment have to be filled up in accordance with the unamended Rules. Applying this principle, it will have to be held that the matter will have to be decided on the basis of the provisions which applied at the relevant time, that is, on 27-7-1987, with regard to maintenance of seniority list and promotion to higher post. However, the Tribunal has not addressed itself to that aspect of the matter and, therefore, this is the aspect of the matter and, therefore, this is the manifest error, for which reason the judgment under challenge cannot be sustained, because it proceeds to decide the matter in favour of respondent No. 1 by applying the provisions of the Amending Act of 1987. 6. In such a situation, the appropriate course for this Court was to remand the matter to the School Tribunal for fresh adjudication in the light of the observations made above. However, as observed earlier, during the pendency of this writ petition, the Amending Act of 1989 came into force from 2nd June, 1989, which nullified the effect of the Amending Act of 1987. In other words, the position which obtained prior to Amending Act of 1987 has been restored, which means that the remedy of appeal under section 9 will be unavailable. In fact, the Amending Act of 1989 makes an express provision that all appeals, which are pending before the School Tribunal, should be transferred to the appropriate forum. If that is the legislative intent of the Amending Act of 1989, it will not be open for this Court to relegate the parties to the school Tribunal, for it will have no jurisdiction to decide the present matter. In such a situation, therefore, the matter will have to be referred to the Competent Authority provided either under the provisions of the Secondary School Code or the B.P.M.C. Act, as the case may be. 7. Mr. Bodake, for respondent No. 1, fairly concedes that there is no express provision in the Secondary School Code that such a reference could be made to appropriate authority under that Code. Therefore, the remedy of challenging the order of supersession is not provided for under the Secondary School Code . 7. Mr. Bodake, for respondent No. 1, fairly concedes that there is no express provision in the Secondary School Code that such a reference could be made to appropriate authority under that Code. Therefore, the remedy of challenging the order of supersession is not provided for under the Secondary School Code . However, in this case, the petitioner being a local authority is governed by the provisions of the B.P.M.C. Act. Therefore, as per that statute, the aggrieved employee of the Corporation can maintain an appeal under section 51 read with section 54 of the B.P.M.C. Act before the Commissioner of the Corporation. In other words, the Commissioner is the appropriate authority, who is competent to decide the controversy that arises for consideration in the present case. 8. In the circumstances, in the interest of justice, although the petition succeeds, the parties will have to be relegated to the remedy before the Commissioner of the petitioner Corporation, who, in turn, shall examine the claim of respondent No. 1 in the context of the provisions of the Secondary School Code and/or the B.P.M.C. Act and consider the same in accordance with law after giving fair opportunity to all the parties. The petition, therefore, succeeds on the above terms, with no order as to costs. 9. It is made clear that all questions are left open, to be decided by the Commissioner, as those proceedings will have to be heard as de novo appeal before that authority. The Commissioner shall decide the matter as expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. Order accordingly. -----