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2003 DIGILAW 955 (AP)

Mandala Appa Rao v. Pinninti Sreedevi

2003-08-01

C.Y.SOMAYAJULU

body2003
C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANTS in O. S. No. 99 of 1983 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry are the appellants. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT filed the above suit against the appellants for recovery of rs. 11,828/- being the principal and interest due under the promissory note dated 10-9- 1980 executed by them in favour of Jyosyula dakshayani for Rs. 8,000. 00which was transferred for consideration in her favour on 12-2-1983. The case of the appellant is that he did not borrow the amount covered by the suit promissory note and that infact they borrowed only Rs. 5,000. 00 from dakshayani on 1-9-1980 and executed a registered mortgage bond in her favour and that the suit promissory note must have been brought into existence by using of the- blank stamped papers on which they had signed at the time of execution of the mortgage bond in favour of Dakshyani since it was stated that those papers would be returned to them when the mortgage debt is discharged. When Dakshyani sent a notice demanding payment of the amount covered by the suit promissory note they sent a reply thereto. Thereafter respondent, in collusion with Dakshayani and her husband, obtained a transfer of the suit promissory note. Respondent has no capacity to pay rs. 11,000/ -. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the pleadings two issues were settled for trial by the trial court. In support of her case, the respondent examined four witnesses as P. Ws. l to 4 and got marked Exs. A-1 to A-6. On behalf of the appellants, the 2nd appellant was examined as D. W. I and Exs. B-1 to B-6 were marked. The trial Court held that the suit promissory note is true and valid and decreed the suit. Appeal preferred by the appellants to the Court of the II Additional District judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry in a. S. No. 127 of 1986 was dismissed. Hence this second appeal. ( 4 ) THE main contention of Sri M. Krishna mohan Rao, on behalf of the appellants is that both the Courts below failed to take into consideration the fact of the respondent did not go into the witness box to swear to the fact that she, in fact, obtained a transfer of the suit promissory note Ex. ( 4 ) THE main contention of Sri M. Krishna mohan Rao, on behalf of the appellants is that both the Courts below failed to take into consideration the fact of the respondent did not go into the witness box to swear to the fact that she, in fact, obtained a transfer of the suit promissory note Ex. A-1 by paying consideration, when it is the specific case of the appellants that she has no capacity to pay cash consideration to obtain transfer of the suit promissory note and erred in not drawing an adverse inference against the respondent for not going into the witness box, and that fact is enough to rebut the presumption under Section 118 of the negotiable Instrument Act because rebuttal of the presumption need not be made by direct evidence and can also be done by circumstantial evidence. It his contention that both the Courts below failed to take into consideration that the suit promissory note is not supported by consideration and so the suit is liable to be dismissed. ( 5 ) IT is no doubt true that an adverse inference has to be drawn against a party, who having first hand knowledge of the information about the facts in issue, fails to go into the witness box to swear to those facts which are in controversy. It is no doubt true that the appellants contend that the respondent has no capacity to pay rs. 11,000/- to obtain transfer of Ex. A-1 promissory note from Dakshayani, who was examined as P. W. 2 in whose favour they executed Ex. A-1. In the circumstances of the case the failure of the respondent to go into the witness box does not, and cannot, affect the merits of the case because respondent is not the promisee under Ex. A-1 but only is a transferee of Ex. A-1 from P. W. 2. Therefore, appellants who third parties to the transaction of transfer that took place between the respondent and P. W. 2 cannot question the consideration between them. The transferor of Ex. A-2 did go into the witness box and swore to the fact that she, having received an amount of Rs. 11,000. 00, transferred the Ex. A-1 to the respondent. Appellants have no right or authority to question the consideration between P. W. 2 and the respondent. The transferor of Ex. A-2 did go into the witness box and swore to the fact that she, having received an amount of Rs. 11,000. 00, transferred the Ex. A-1 to the respondent. Appellants have no right or authority to question the consideration between P. W. 2 and the respondent. Even assuming that no consideration passed from by respondent to p. W. 2 for transfer of Ex. A-1 in favour of the respondent, still the respondent would be a holder of Ex. A-1, though not a holder-in-due course. Irrespective of the fact whether consideration passed between respondent and P. W. 2. In my opinion the respondent cannot be said to be a holder-in-due course of Ex. A-1 because she obtained the transfer after coming to know that payment of the amount due under Ex. A-1 was demanded by P. W. 2 from the appellant under Ex. B-1. Had the respondent obtained transfer of ex. A-1 for consideration, without having knowledge of Ex. B-1 notice she should be treated as a holder-in-due course. But when she having knowledge of Ex. B-1 notice, obtained the transfer of Ex. A-1 for consideration, respondent cannot be a holder-in-due course because as per the definition of the holder-in-due course the transfer for consideration must be prior to the amount becoming due under the instrument. The written statement of the appellants makes a specific reference to ex. B-1 notice and their issuing Ex. B-2 reply notice. Respondent who filed a rejoinder did not even allege therein that she obtained the transfer of Ex. A-1 for consideration without having knowledge of the demand made by p. W. 2 to the appellants under Ex. B-1. So in spite of the fact that the respondent might have paid the amount of Rs. 11,000. 00 for transfer of Ex. A-1 she cannot be said to be a holder-in-due course of Ex. A-1 and should be treated only as a holder thereof. The difference between the holder and holder- in-due course is well known. It the respondent were to be held to be a holder- in-due course irrespective of the fact whether the suit promissory note is supported by consideration or not she would be entitled to a decree against the appellants, because the appellants admitted the execution of the suit promissory note, in view of Section 20 and 118 of the Negotiable instrument Act. If she is a mere holder of ex. A-1 she would be the same position as that of P. W. 2, the promisee under Ex. A-1, and so all the defences available to the appellants as against P. W. 2 would also be available against the respondent also. ( 6 ) NOW the main question whether the suit promissory note is supported by consideration or not. Both the Courts below concurrently found that the suit promissory note Ex. A-1 is supported by consideration. Except merely stating that P. W. 2 obtained some blank stamp signed papers at the time she lent an amount of Rs. 5,000. 00 under a mortgage bond to them, no further concrete evidence is adduced by the appellants to show that they, in fact, had signed such blank stamp papers. A perusal of the suit promissory note, Ex. A-1, shows that the signatures of the appellants and the body of ex. A-1 are in the same ink, and so prima facie that the theory of the appellants signing blank papers contained stamps cannot be accepted. Since the question whether the appellants signed on blank stamp papers or not is a pure question of fact and since both the Courts below concurrently found that the contention of the appellants that they signed blank stamp papers is not true and that Ex. A-1 is supported by consideration, through the respondent is but a holder, but not hold-in-due course, she is entitled to recover the suit amount from the appellants. Therefore, I find no merit in the second appeal. ( 7 ) THE Second Appeal therefore is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal.