JUDGMENT - SHAH A.P., J.:---Whether the provision of the Maharashtra Act XXXXV of 2000 whereby the definition of "molasses contained in section 2(28) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 has been amended are void on the ground that (i) the State legislature lacked the legislative competence to enact that Act and (2) the provision of the Act contravene Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution and are not protected by Article 304 is the main question which arises for determination in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2.By the impugned amendment black gur (jaggery), rotten gur (jaggery), rotten gur (jaggery) and rab etc. are brought within the definition of molasses contained in section 2(28) by inserting the following words: "and shall also included substance containing sugars obtained from sugarcane known as black gur (jaggery), rotten gur (jaggery), rab or rotten rab, which contain irrespective of their colour. i) total sugars (expressed or invert sugar) less than 90 percent and sucrose less than 60 percent); or ii) extraneous matter insoluble in water more than 2 percent; or iii) total ash more than 6 percent; or iv) ash insoluble in Hydrochloric acid (HCL) more than 0.5 percent; or v) more than 10 percent of moisture; or vi) sulphur dioxide in concentration exceeding 70 parts per million." 3.The petitioners before us are the associations of traders. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the amended provision is patently illegal and unreasonable as it severely affects the lawful conduct of trade in jaggery by the members of the petitioners. As a consequence of the amendment the respondents are conducting raids on the godowns of the petitioners members and seizing their trucks/vehicles on a mere suspicion that the jaggery which is lawfully and bona fide being traded is black jaggery within the meaning of the amended definition and is meant for illicit purposes. It is contended that the gur and jaggery are popular commodities, consumed by humans and cattle and used in the preparation of sweets ayurvedic medicines as also in certain industries; and consequently the amended provision under challenge is causing serious difficulties in carrying on business not only in black jaggery but also in jaggery, which is edible. It is contended that the gur and jaggery are popular commodities, consumed by humans and cattle and used in the preparation of sweets ayurvedic medicines as also in certain industries; and consequently the amended provision under challenge is causing serious difficulties in carrying on business not only in black jaggery but also in jaggery, which is edible. According to the petitioners a commodity like jaggery is likely to be spoiled due to long storage heat contact with moisture or water while at the time of its procurement the same was perfect in all its ingredients being meant for human consumption. However it is alleged that the respondents want to classify such jaggery as molasses when it cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as such so as to attract the provisions of the Bombay prohibition Act. 4.The main points raised in support of the present petition are mentioned below: i)The Amending Act, which is a State Act seeks to legislate on gur/ jaggery in its various forms whereas this very subject matter is already legislated upon by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which is a central Act. ii)The provisions of the Amending Act are unreasonable and offends Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. iii) The Amending Act has the direct and immediate effect of restricting the freedom under Article 301 of the Constitution as it directly impedes the right of intercourse throughout the territories of India. 5.We may set out in brief legislative history leading to the amendment to section 2(28). In exercise of powers under section 139-B of the Bombay prohibition Act, the then Government of Bombay had issued Order bearing G.O.R.D No. PRH. 1757/176159 dated 6-11-1958 to include gur/jaggery unfit for human consumption and therefore injurious to public health under restricted trade by providing for a licence for the possession use and sale of black jaggery. The order extended to the pre-organization State of Bombay It was repealed in 1962. The Government of India issued the Gur (Regulation of Use) Order, 1968 defining chemically the word gur and prescribing its sale strictly for consumption in its own form and for the purpose of preparing food or a drink for human consumption and for the purpose of making cattle feed. The Government of India issued the Gur (Regulation of Use) Order, 1968 defining chemically the word gur and prescribing its sale strictly for consumption in its own form and for the purpose of preparing food or a drink for human consumption and for the purpose of making cattle feed. The use of gur for preparing alcoholic liquor was specifically prohibited and under section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act such gur used for the preparation of alcoholic liquor was liable for seizure by the competent authority under the said Act. According to the State Government the definition of molasses has been amended in order to stop the illicit trade in black jaggery in the interest of public health and public revenue. It is pointed out that even though the Essential Commodities Act has prohibited the use of jaggery for brewing liquor the traders evade the law and large scale trading in black jaggery is being conducted in the State under the cover of selling the same as cattle feed. In fact 99% of this jaggery goes into the brewing of illicit liquor. In most cases jaggery is transported from the State of Andhra Pradesh Karnataka U.P. to various interior and coastal villages in Maharashtra in benami or fictitious names and stocked in filthy and unhygienic conditions to be sold along with ammonium chloride and yeast for the purpose of brewing illicit liquor. Even in villages where the market for edible jaggery is not more than few kilos a day tons of black jaggery are traded in a month in the name of the edible jaggery. It has been argued on behalf of the State that the constitutional validity of a similar provision relating to prohibition of the possession of rotten jaggery by the amendment of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 by the State of Gujarat has been upheld by the Supreme Court in (Razakbhai Issakbhai Mansuri v. State of Gujarat)1, 1993 Supp(2) S.C.C. 659. It is pointed out that the law only requires permit to be taken in advance and there is no hurdle in obtaining such a permit which is easily available on payment of a nominal fee. The purpose of the permit on a licence is only to make available information to the authorities concerned so as to facilitate vigilance against misuse of black jaggery for illicit distillation. The purpose of the permit on a licence is only to make available information to the authorities concerned so as to facilitate vigilance against misuse of black jaggery for illicit distillation. Upon obtaining the licence the members of the petitioners are free to engage in the trade of black jaggery itself by maintaining necessary records of the purchases sales etc. 6.In Razakbhai Mansuris case (supra) the petitioners had challenged the constitutional validity of the amendment made to the Bombay Prohibition Act by the Gujarat legislature prohibition possession of rotten gur in excess of the prescribed limit without a permit and regulating manufacture etc. of rotten gur. The provisions which had been challenged were those of section 2(39A) defining rotten gur section 64 imposing restriction on possession of rotten gur section 64-A regulating manufacture etc. of rotten gur and section 70-A providing for imposition of punishment for contravention of the relevant statutory provisions. The main contention raised by the petitioners therein was that the impugned amendments are ultra vires on the ground of lack of legislative competence. It was argued that Entry 8, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution under which the State Legislature has purported to Act does not cover the subject matter and Entries 26 and 27 of List II of the constitution being subject to the provision of Entry 33 of List III are not available as the legislative field referable to Entry 33 of List III is occupied by the Gur Control Order 1968 read with Essential Commodities Act. It was contended that even otherwise the impugned provisions are violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 301. The Court expressly rejected the submission that the State lacks legislative competence to enact the said provisions. Sharma C.J. speaking for the bench observed: "In the cases before us we are concerned only with the scope of regulatory power of the State section 64 prohibits possession by a person of rotten gur in excess of the prescribed quantity without a valid permit. Similar is the provision in section 64-A regulating the manufacture etc. of rotten gur. It is only the regulatory power which has enabled the State Legislature to make the impugned provisions requiring the person concerned to take a permit. There is no grievance that the fee payable for such a permit is in any way excessive. Similar is the provision in section 64-A regulating the manufacture etc. of rotten gur. It is only the regulatory power which has enabled the State Legislature to make the impugned provisions requiring the person concerned to take a permit. There is no grievance that the fee payable for such a permit is in any way excessive. We in the circumstances hold that Gujarat Legislature was fully competent to enact the Amendment Act." 7.In Razakbhai Mansuris case the Court also turned down the argument that the State Legislature could not have made the impugned amendments as the field was already occupied by the Gur (Regulation of Use) Order 1968. The relevant observation are reproduced below: "It is significant to note that Clause 3(b) above of the order excluded from its scope the regulation of gur in relation to its use for preparing alcoholic liquor by the use of words "not being alcoholic liquor", within brackets, in the sub clause. The field for the State Legislature to enact the impugned provisions and incorporate them in the principal Act is thus left untouched. There is another relevant aspect which needs consideration. Section 64 prohibits the possession of rotten gur in excess of the prescribed quantity without a permit and section 64-A deals with regulation of manufacture use or consumption of rotten gur. The State of Gujarat is implementing the policy of prohibition of intoxicating liquor as envisaged in the Directive Principles contained in Article 47 of the constitution. It is this policy which has led to the enactment of the impugned provisions. So far as the 1968 Order is concerned, it was a measure adopted to eliminate covert trade practices which cause artificial scarcity of essential commodities or pushes their prices to an unjustifiable high level to the prejudice of the general public. It has, therefore to be noticed that the 1968 Order is made applicable to only gur. It does not extend to rotten gur as defined and deal with by the amended provisions of the principal Act in that it has the potentiality of being used for manufacture of intoxicating liquor. We are, therefore of the considered view that in pith and substance it is a law relating to intoxicating liquor providing for regulatory measure and squarely falls under Entry 8 List II of Seventh Schedule. As rightly urged by Mr. We are, therefore of the considered view that in pith and substance it is a law relating to intoxicating liquor providing for regulatory measure and squarely falls under Entry 8 List II of Seventh Schedule. As rightly urged by Mr. Subramania Poti learned Counsel for the respondent if the manufacture of liquor could be prohibited certainly its manufacture with rotten gur could be regulated. Entry 8 confers the necessary competence on the State Legislature to enact laws for such regulation. We may also add that 1968 Order excludes alcohol from its purview because it is covered by Entry 8 of List II. It is therefore incorrect to suggest that the State Legislature was lacking in legislative competence in passing the Amendment Act." 8The Court also overruled challenged based on Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution. In para 9 it was observed: "9. While considering the argument addressed on behalf of the petitioners, it should be kept in mind that the impugned provisions do not place absolute restriction or prohibition either against the possession of requires only a permit to be taken in advance and admittedly there is no hurdle in obtaining such a permit which is readily available on the payment of nominal fee. The purpose of the permit is to make available information to the authorities concerned as to the persons dealing in rotten gur to faciliate vigilance against misuse of rotten gur for preparation of intoxicating liquors. There is absolutely no difficulty in obtaining such a permit in advance which will be a complete remedy for all the hardships highlighted on behalf of the petitioners. The grievance of the petitioner is that the requirement to obtain permit is violative of the freedom to carry on any trade and business of ones choice guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). We do not find any substance in the argument that the restriction complained against can be considered to be such a hindrance as to infringe sub-clause (g). The freedom is not uncontrolled and Clause (6) of Article 19 authorizes legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public". 9.The Court categorically held that the impugned amendments fully satisfy the public interest test. The freedom is not uncontrolled and Clause (6) of Article 19 authorizes legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public". 9.The Court categorically held that the impugned amendments fully satisfy the public interest test. With regard to the submission that the chance of gur turning into rotten gur are inherent in the business the Court observed that for the purpose of the Prohibition Act the Legislature can define "rotten gur" even if it is fit for human consumption in such a way, to eliminate mischief. The following observations of the Court are pertinent: "13. The unlawful activities of bootleggers are too well known. In this country as also in several other countries of the world where the policy of prohibition was attempted, they have jeopardized its success. The problem, therefore, has been engaging the attention of the social reformers and other experts on the subject. With what view in mind several committees have been set up in this country from time to time, which after making extensive and thorough study of the malady and its cure have reported that it is necessary to adopt further remedial measures by way of placing restrictions on the business of such Articles which aid the illegal manufacture of liquors---The problem which faced the State was that unscrupulous persons while pretending to be engaged in business of rotten gur or for the matter gur were aiding and abetting bootlegging on large scale. For checking effectively this illegal activity it was considered necessary to require a person in possession of rotten gur in excess of the prescribed quantity to obtain a permit. This would help the administration in keeping a vigilant eye on the violators of the law. We have examined the materials placed before us by the parties. We are fully satisfied that the impugned steps were taken after a detailed careful and deep deliberation of the problem and its solution and that the impugned amendments fully satisfy the public interest test. 14. As has been mentioned earlier there is no restriction whatsoever on carrying on business in gur or rotten gur and what is required by the law is merely to get a permit which is granted as a matter of course to anyone making an application. 14. As has been mentioned earlier there is no restriction whatsoever on carrying on business in gur or rotten gur and what is required by the law is merely to get a permit which is granted as a matter of course to anyone making an application. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that although the law does not require the taking of a permit for business in gur it becomes necessary to do so also for a person engaged exclusively in the business of gur and not in rotten gur and that in view of the wide powers available to the enforcing machinery the restriction is arbitrary and uncalled for. The basis of this argument is the assumed fact that it becomes difficult to distinguish between gur and rotten gur for the purpose of section 2(29-A). It has been stated in the course of a few days while gur of fairly the other States to Gujarat it deteriorates in quality on the way and may be mistaken for rotten gur. In other words the process of gur being rendered rotten gur is not a long one and it does not take much time for the Article to reach from one stage to another. If we accept what is being asserted before us on behalf of the petitioners as correct it means that the chances of gur turning into rotten gur are inherent in the business. What follows from this? By whatever reason it may be the Article which was harmless is converted quickly into the from in which it acquires the potentiality of being misused for the purpose of preparing intoxicating liquor. If this mischief is not taken care of it will become difficult to effectively implement the policy of prohibition. We are also of the opinion that for the purpose of Prohibition Act it can define rotten gur even if it is fit for human consumption in such a way to eliminate the mischief. The question is, is it capable of misuse? The impugned restriction therefore is fully justified and cannot be condemned as excessive or unreasonable". 10.It is thus clearly seen from the above decision that identical contentions questioning the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Amendment which is similar to the Maharashtra Amendment were repelled by the Supreme Court. It was categorically held that the power to regulate the manufacture etc. The impugned restriction therefore is fully justified and cannot be condemned as excessive or unreasonable". 10.It is thus clearly seen from the above decision that identical contentions questioning the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Amendment which is similar to the Maharashtra Amendment were repelled by the Supreme Court. It was categorically held that the power to regulate the manufacture etc. of "rotten gur" flows from the regulatory power of the State Legislature under Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution under which the State Government has enacted the amended provisions. The submission that Entry 8 does not cover the subject matter, and that Entries 26 and 27 of List II of Constitution being subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III are not available, as the legislature field referable to Entry 33 of List III was occupied by the Gur Control Order 1968 read with Essential Commodities Act was expressly rejected. The Court also overruled the submission that the impugned amendments were violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and Article 301. The impugned restrictions were held to be fully justified sand could not be condemned as excessive or unreasonable. 11.Mr. Naphade appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended that the judgement in Razakbhai Mansuris case does not deal with the entire area of controversy raised in the present petition. According to Mr. Naphade that what was challenged in that case was the definition of rotten gur which is radically different from the definition molasses as amended by the impugned Act. The Gujarat Law can never take in it compass gur as defined in the gur order as it deals with purified, decomposed, disgusting gur which cannot be used for any lawful purposes at all under the gur order whereas the impugned amendment takes within its sweep gur which can be used for the purposes permissible under clause 3 of the Gur Order. He pointed out that the amended definition of molasses overlaps with the definition of gur as defined by clause 2 of the Gur Order. He also pointed out that Clause 3 of the Gur Order lays down that the gur as defined by the gur order cannot be used for the purpose of preparation of alcoholic liquor whereas the impugned amendment read with the Rules framed under the Bombay Prohibition Act permit trading in Black gur. Therefore, according to Mr. He also pointed out that Clause 3 of the Gur Order lays down that the gur as defined by the gur order cannot be used for the purpose of preparation of alcoholic liquor whereas the impugned amendment read with the Rules framed under the Bombay Prohibition Act permit trading in Black gur. Therefore, according to Mr. Naphade the Central law and the State law collide in several respects. They collide in so far as the licensing control is concerned. They also collide in so far as the use to which the gur as defined under the gur order can be put to. According to him they also collide with regard to punishment for offences and the procedure to be followed when offences are to be tried. He urged that the State Law lays down various restrictions such as the maximum quantity of the material that can be stored the maximum quantity that can be sold in a given year the person to whom it could be sold and require that the purchaser must hold a requisite licence and the price also can be the subject matter of the control. According to Mr. Naphade these aspects of the matter clearly takes the impugned amendment beyond Entry 8 List II and it falls under Entry 33 of the List III and therefore it occupies the same filed as under the Essential Commodities Act. 12.At the cost of repetition we may mention that this very issue was considered in Razakbhai Mansuris case and it was specifically held by the Court that the field is not occupied and this is clear from the following observations: "...So far as the 1968 Order is concerned, it was a measure adopted to eliminate covert trade practices which cause artificial scarcity of essential commodities or pushes their prices to an unjustifiable high level to the prejudice of the general public. It has, therefore, to be noticed that the 1968 Order is made applicable to only gur. It does not extend to-rotten gur, as defined and deal with by the amended provisions of the principal act in that it has the potentiality of being used for manufacture of intoxicating liquor." (emphasis supplied) The Court held that in pith and substance it is a law relating to intoxicating liquor providing for regulatory measure and falls under Entry 8, List II of Seventh Schedule. 13Entry 8 of the List II reads as under: "8. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors". The amending Act is enacted by the State legislature with a view to stop manufacture of illicit liquor for which black jaggery is used as raw material. In order to curb this, it is not sufficient to merely prevent manufacture and consumption of illicit liquor. To render it really effective further measures became essential in order to defeat the illegal activities of the anti social elements engaged in manufacture and distribution of illicit liquor including regulating trade in black jaggery which is used in manufacture of illicit liquor. Whereas the object of gur order is to eliminate unfair trade practice which cause artificial scarcity of essential commodities or push prices thereof to the prejudice of general public. The gur order has been enacted under Entry 33 List I and falls under Clause (b) and (c) of Entry 33 which reads as follows: "b) Foodstuffs including edible oil seeds and oils; c) Cattle fodder including oil cakes and other concentrates". 14.We may refer to the well-settled principle that while considering the question as to whether a legislation is covered by a particular entry in any of the Lists in Schedule VII, the various entries in the three Lists are to be considered as fields of legislation and the language of those entries should be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable and each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can from and reasonably be comprehended in it. In (Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal)2, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1044, the Court has observed in para 8 as follows: "Before construing the said entries, it would be useful to notice some of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and this Court in the matter of construing the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries of the different lists or in the same lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them". In (Express Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat)3, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1949, the Court observed that the entries should not be read in a narrow of pedantic sense but must be given their fullest meaning and the widest amplitude and be held to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in them. 15.It is also necessary to refer to another important principle, that if on the view of the statute as a whole, it is found that the substance of the legislation is within the express power, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorized field. In (Gallahagher v. Lynn)4, 1937 A.C. 863, the federal Court observed as under : "It is well-established that you are to look at the true nature and character of the legislation. Russell v. The Queen, the pith and substance of the legislation. If on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express power, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field. The legislation must not under the guise of dealing with one matter in fact encroach upon the forbidden field". If on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express power, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field. The legislation must not under the guise of dealing with one matter in fact encroach upon the forbidden field". 16.We may also refer to the following observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J., in (Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Mathuswami Goundan)5, A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 47: "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one List, touches also on a subject in another List, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind observance to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid, because the Legislature enacting them my appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere..." 17.Therefore in order to Judge whether the State Legislature loses its competence to pass the Act it is necessary to have regard to the object and purpose of that Act and to the relevant provision thereof. The purpose of the impugned legislation is to prevent manufacture and distribution of illicit liquor for which black jaggery is used as raw material. With a view to effectively check this illegal trade, it was considered necessary to require a person in possession of black jaggery to obtain a permit so that the administration would be able to regulate the trade in black jaggery and so as to facilitate vigilance against misuse of black jaggery for illicit distillation. Surely the field of regulating and controlling the illicit liquor cannot be said to be occupied by the 1968 Gur Order which is limited only to control and regulation of the edible jaggery. The scope of Gur Order of 1968 is entirely different and it does not prevent the State Legislature from making and adopting the regulatory measures in Entry B List II of Seventh Schedule. On a comprehensive examination of the relevant provisions as amended by the impugned Act it is clear that in pith and substance it is a law relating to intoxicating liquor and falls squarely under Entry 8 of List II and would in no way conflict with the provisions of Gur Order of would entrench upon any control exercised under the said Order. This pith and substance rule is succinctly stated in (M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India)6, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 898, where the Court observed that so far as matters in the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures are alone competent to legislate. In the event of repungnancy, where a law passed by the State Legislature, while being substantially within the scope of entries in the State List entrenches upon any entry in the Central List, the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the pith and substance doctrine, if on an analysis of the provisions it appears that the law falls within the four corners of the State List, and the entrenchment is purely incidental or inconsequential. Once it is held that the power to regulate illicit liquor was within the compelence of the State Legislature no question of repungnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution could arise. In (The Bar Council U.P. v. State of U.P)7, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 231, the Supreme Court has explained that the question of repungnancy can only arise in matters where both the parliament and the State Legislature have legislative competence to pass laws. Therefore the submission of Mr. Naphade that the State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the amending Act must be rejected. 18.The next submission of Mr. Naphade is based on Article 19(1)(g) and Article 301 and is as follows : By the impugned amendment gur of certain quality and having certain characteristics is brought within the sweep of the definition of molasses. If this commodity is treated as molasses for the purpose of Bombay Prohibition Act, the trading would become subject to the licensing control and the restrictions prescribed under the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the Rules framed thereunder are clearly attracted. The Bombay Molasses Rules read with the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act constitute a serious interference with the citizens right to carry on trade in gur/jaggery defined as molasses under the impugned amendment. Under the Molasses Rules the licensing authority can place restrictions on the quantity to be used and traded by the members of the public and even restrictions are placed on sale to persons outside the State, in that under the conditions of licence gur cannot be sold to a person who does not hold licence under the Molasses Rules. Under the Molasses Rules the licensing authority can place restrictions on the quantity to be used and traded by the members of the public and even restrictions are placed on sale to persons outside the State, in that under the conditions of licence gur cannot be sold to a person who does not hold licence under the Molasses Rules. Thus the Molasses Rules are attracted by virtue of the impugned amendment. But for the amendment the said Rules could not have applied. Therefore, the incescapable conclusion is that the impugned amendment leads to unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners members to carry on trade in jaggery and therefore the impugned amendment is ultra vires Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution. We are afraid that the argument of the learned Counsel is totally misconceived. The amended definition of molasses has nothing to do with inter state trade or commerce. Even assuming that certain restrictions are placed in interstate trade they are not by the amending Act but by the provisions of the Molasses Rules. The Molasses Rules are not the subject matter of challenge in this petition nor is there any prayer in the petition to strike down the said Rules being violative of Act 301 of Constitution. In any event, the provisions in question are regulatory in nature and are not confiscatory or destructive of the right to interstate trade, they cannot be ultra vires Part XIII of the Constitution. The provisions in no way directly and immediately restrict of impede free flow or movement of trade. It is well settled that only such restrictions or impediments which directly and immediately impeded the free floe of trade, commerce and intercourse fell within the prohibition imposed by Act 301. Unless it is established that there was infringement of the guarantee under Article 301 the further question as to whether the statute is saved under Article 304(b) does not arise. 19. In judging the question of reasonableness of the restrictions in the present case we must bear in mind that the impugned Act is enacted to curb the menace of illicit liquor which causes serious consequences to public health. The restrictions placed by the Act are in the public interest. It is well settled that remote or indirect restrictions do not amount to unreasonable restriction under Articles 301 to 304 of the Constitution. The restrictions placed by the Act are in the public interest. It is well settled that remote or indirect restrictions do not amount to unreasonable restriction under Articles 301 to 304 of the Constitution. We have carefully gone through the Molasses Rules. It is not possible to hold that these Rules put any unreasonable restrictions on the inter-state trade. The Rules merely require that the licensee who is desirous of obtaining licence must mention the quantity to be traded upon by him. Moreover it is not the requirement of the Rules or the conditioned of licence that the interstate purchaser should possess licence under the Molasses Rules. It has been clarified on behalf of the respondents that interstate trade is covered under Rule 13 of the molasses Rules and it is not the requirement of the Rules that the purchaser in interstate trade should hold a licence under the Bombay Molassess Rules. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention that the Amending Act has placed unreasonable restrictions on the rights of the petitioners and their members to carry on their trade guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution. We also do not find any merit in the argument that the Amending Act violates Article 19(1)(g). 20.For the reasons stated above the petition is dismissed with costs. At this stage the learned Counsel for the petitioners applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Application is rejected. On the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioners interim relief to continue for a period of four weeks. Certified copy is expedited. All the parties concerned to act on the ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Private Secretary of this Court. -----