ORDER S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 29-1-2001 (Annexure P-14) issued under Section 25O(7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') and also the orders dated 31-3-2001 by which the petitioners have been retrenched. 2. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 3 M.P. Leather Development Corporation Limited was incorporated as a Company in the year 1981 under the Companies Act, 1956 and it was being financed by the State Government. The payment of salary of the employees was being made from the funds received from the Government. The financial condition of this Corporation from the very beginning was not very sound. It was incurring heavy losses. There was a Cabinet decision of the State Government on 11-3-1998 to close and wind up this Corporation. Accordingly the Board of Directors of the Corporation took a similar decision on 2-6-1998. The Finance Department of the Government by the letter dated 26-8-2000 (Annexure R-3-1) asked the Corporation to discontinue the business operation and by this letter a Voluntary Retirement Scheme was floated, so that the employees do not suffer as a consequence of closure. Some of the employees opted for this Scheme. There were others who did not. The number of employees of the Corporation was more than 100 and therefore the provision of Section 25O of the Act was attracted. An application dated. 11-12-2000 (Annexure P-4-a) under Section 25O(7) of the Act was submitted by the Corporation before the State Government for exemption from the provision in Section 25O(1) of the Act. It was dealt with by the Labour Department. After hearing the Managing Director of the Corporation and the Union of the Employees the impugned order dated 29-1-2001 (Annexure P-14) was passed by the Government. The poor financial condition of the Corporation was dealt with at length. It was found that the State Government during ten years from 1991-92 to 2000-01 provided an amount of Rs. 398.03 lacs to the Corporation and still it has not become a viable undertaking. It was stated that there was already a policy decision by the Government to wind up this Corporation. For the reasons given in the order the Corporation was exempted from the provision in Section 25O(1) of the Act. 398.03 lacs to the Corporation and still it has not become a viable undertaking. It was stated that there was already a policy decision by the Government to wind up this Corporation. For the reasons given in the order the Corporation was exempted from the provision in Section 25O(1) of the Act. However, no period as required by sub-section (7) was specified in this order. After obtaining the exemption from Section 25O(1) of the Act, the Corporation has retrenched many of the employees who did not avail of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. 3. There are 41 petitioners in the present case. They were the employees of the Corporation. They have not availed the VRS. They have challenged the 'closure' of the Corporation and their retrenchment. According to them there were no 'exceptional circumstances' within the meaning of the words used in sub-section (7) of Section25O to enable the Government to grant the exemption. It is also stated that this exemption could be "for such period as may be specified in the order" and as no such period was specified in the order dated 29-1-2001 the exemption is not according to law. The 'closure' is said to be illegal as no permission for closure was obtained under Section 25O(2)) of the Act. There was no enquiry and there was no finding with regard to "genuineness and adequacy of the reasons" for permitting the closure. 4. The respondents' case is that the decision to wind up the Corporation was taken by the Cabinet and the Corporation was bound to follow it. The State Government is itself facing 'severe financial crunch'. The precarious financial condition of the Corporation and the decision of the Government that no further financial aid would be provided by it to the Corporation were the 'exceptional circumstances' within the meaning of Section 25O(7) of the Act and the exemption was validly granted by the Government. It is also stated that there was no need to resort to Section 25O(2) when the exemption from the applicability of Sub-section (1) was granted. It is also submitted that the omission to specify any period of exemption does not affect the validity of the order. 5. The learned Counsel for both the sides have been heard. It is necessary to quote Section 25O in extenso as amended by Act No. 46 of 1982 with effect from 21-8-1984. It is also submitted that the omission to specify any period of exemption does not affect the validity of the order. 5. The learned Counsel for both the sides have been heard. It is necessary to quote Section 25O in extenso as amended by Act No. 46 of 1982 with effect from 21-8-1984. It is as under :-- "25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.-- (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under Sub-section (1), the appropriate Government, after taking such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under Sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period, of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under Sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication : Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under Sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under Sub-section (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under Sub-section (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months." 6. Section 2(cc) of the Act defines 'closure'. It means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof. 7. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 2002 SC 708 , has interpreted Section 25O after its amendment in the year 1982. Section 2(cc) of the Act defines 'closure'. It means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof. 7. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 2002 SC 708 , has interpreted Section 25O after its amendment in the year 1982. It has bee n held that the amended Section 25O is the law which lays down the restriction. There is nothing vague or ambiguous in its provision. It is not ultra-vires the Constitution. It is saved by Article 19(6). While dealing with Section 25O(7) it has been held that it is clear that the amended Section 25O recognises that if there are exceptional circumstances then there could be no compulsion to continue to run the business. It has been added that however it does not mean that some difficulty or financial hardship in running the establishment would be sufficient. The employer must show that it has become 'impossible' to continue to run the establishment. 8. It is rightly contended on behalf of the -petitioners that the words "exceptional circumstances" used in the sub- section (7) of Section 25O must be construed ejusdem generis. When particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. (See justice G.P. Singh's Interpretation of Statutes 7th Edition Page 351). That is also borne out from the words "or the like" used in that sub-section. The circumstances specifically mentioned in the section are "accident" and "death of the employer". The Supreme Court has encapsuled these expressions as "impossibility" to run the business. The financial hardship alone may not bring such impossibility if there is reasonable prospect of revival or turning the business undertaking into a viable enterprise. But if there is no money to run the business how long it can continue ? There should be working capital to buy raw material, to pay the salary of the employees and to meet other essential expenditure. In case there is no reasonable prospect of the undertaking generating enough income to sustain itself even after a long trial there is no other way except to close the said undertaking. Unproductiveness can not last long. There is a limit to which public money can be drained. In case there is no reasonable prospect of the undertaking generating enough income to sustain itself even after a long trial there is no other way except to close the said undertaking. Unproductiveness can not last long. There is a limit to which public money can be drained. Everyone, be a citizen or a State instrumentality has a right to start any business which includes the right to close it anytime subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India gives rise to this legal position. (Excel Wear v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 25 ). 9. In the present case there is not only financial crisis but the Government has refused to provide any funds from the State ex-chequer. It has been pumping money into this undertaking from the State budget but it has not been able to stand on its own legs. A huge amount was provided in the last ten years but nothing concrete or substantial could be done to improve the financial health of the undertaking. The policy of the State Government in this respect is not questionable. How long the tax payers' money can be wasted. Any business undertaking whether in the private sector or public sector which can not generate enough income to meet its expenditure even in the long run has to collapse one day. In the absence of budgetary support from the State and also the inability of the undertaking to stand on its own a situation is created which can be termed as "impossibility" to run it further. Therefore, the case of the respondent Corporation was covered by the "exceptional circumstances" and by the impugned order it was rightly directed that the provision of Sub-section (1) of Section 25O would not apply to this undertaking. The exemption under Sub-section (1) of Section 25O would naturally render sub-sections (2) to Sub-section (6) inapplicable. 10. It is also argued on behalf of the petitioners that Binu Sen as Principal Secretary of Gramodyog Department prepared the precis dated 30-10-2000 (Annexure P-2) recommending winding up of the Corporation and she in her capacity as Principal Secretary of Labour Department issued the impugned order dated 29-1-2001 under Section 25O(7) of the Act granting the exemption and therefore this order is vitiated. It is pointed out that the Government under Section 25O(7) has to act in quasi- judicial capacity and therefore there is inherent official 'bias'. In such a situation the impugned order should have been issued by some other officer. However, that does not render the order invalid. The impugned order must have been issued with the approval of the Minister concerned. The precis dated 30-10-2000 (Annexure P-2) was a brief-note submitted to the Cabinet and therefore it can not be said that any decision was taken by the Principal Secretary. The decisions at both stages were really of the Government The impugned order granting exemption under Section 25O(7) can not be said to be suffering from any 'bias'. 11. Then the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that no time limit was specified in the impugned order as required by Sub-section (7) of Section 25O of the Act and therefore it is not according to law. The omission to specify the time limit was not fatal. It is found from Section 25O(4) that in case of permission under that sub-section it remains valid for one year but under Sub-section (7) it has been left to the discretion of the Government to specify the period. In the absence of not specifying the period it should be held that the advantage of the exception could be availed within a reasonable time. 12. The petition is dismissed.