Judgment :- In a suit for permanent injunction, the defendant successfully resisted the same before the trial Court, failed to oppose the appeal successfully and the result was, the suit was decreed as prayed for. Aggrieved by the first appellate court's judgment, the defendant has come to this Court as appellant. 2. The plaintiff/respondent is the brother-in-law of the defendant/appellant. Admittedly, the suit property, an extent of 3 acre 28 cents in Survey No.143/13 situate at Kothavacheri Village, Cuddalore Taluk belongs to the defendant. The defendant is working elsewhere at Cuddalore and the plaintiff is the resident of the suit village. 3. The plaintiff, claiming to be in possession of the suit property, on the basis of tenancy, alleging that lawful and legal possession was attempted to be disturbed, has filed the suit for bare injunction before the District Munsif Court, Cuddalore in O.S.No.709/90. 4. The defendant/appellant, more or less admitting the possession of the suit property with the plaintiff, resisted the suit, that the suit property was never leased out to the plaintiff as incorrectly pleaded, that considering the close relationship, as well as his absence in the suit village due to employment at Cuddalore, his brother-in-law was requested to manage the suit properties and therefore, such a person cannot be termed as tenant or cultivating tenant, which should follow, the suit for injunction against the true owner is not at all maintainable. 5. The trial Court considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as certain admitted facts, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff/respondent was not the tenant or cultivating tenant of the suit property, that his possession in respect of the suit property must be of permissive possession, such a person is not entitled to an order of permanent injunction against the admitted true owner of the suit property. 6. Aggrieved, plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Sub Court and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, analysing the facts as well as appreciating the evidence available on record, according to his best effort, came to the conclusion that the person who is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property is to be protected, until he is lawfully evicted and in this view of the matter, he emboldened to reverse the finding of the trial Court and ordered to decree the suit as prayed for, as per the judgment dated 16.9.1992 in A.S.No.26/92. 7. 7. The defendant/owner of the suit property, questioned the first appellate court judgment in this second appeal as a perverse one, since the learned Subordinate Judge has not perfectly understood the scope of the suit as well as failed to give finding, on the material points. 8. This Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law. "Whether the judgment of the lower appellate Court is vitiated by its failure to consider the entire evidence on record and apply the correct principles of law.?" 9. Heard Mr.D.R.Sivakumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr.Yashod Vardhan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent who took pains to dislodge the finding of the first appellate Court and to buttress the finding of the said Court, respectively. 10. The suit property, cultivable nanja land measuring 3 acres 28 cents admittedly belongs to the appellant, who is the brother-in-law of the plaintiff, a resident of the suit village. The plaintiff himself admits that the suit property belongs to the defendant. Therefore, it is seen that the suit for permanent injunction is aimed, against the true owner of the suit property. It is not the case of the plaintiff that a third party is attempting to interfere with his possession and therefore, his possession should be protected against the third party. Irrespective of the fact whether he is a lessee or the tenant as the case may be, only in the case of third party, i.e. not against the owner of the suit property, taking into account the possession alone, an injunction suit could be decreed. If the suit is one for bare injunction, against the admitted true owner, then it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that he has acquired right to be in possession of the suit property, which could be legally recognised. If the claim of possession could not be traced out, to any legal possession, then possession alone cannot be the criterion to issue an order of injunction against the true owner, in this case the defendant. Realising this fact, in the plaint, it is specifically pleaded, that the property was leased out to the plaintiff on 10.1.79 on his undertaking to give 30 bags of paddy, to the defendant as lease every year. Realising this fact, in the plaint, it is specifically pleaded, that the property was leased out to the plaintiff on 10.1.79 on his undertaking to give 30 bags of paddy, to the defendant as lease every year. Further, it is contended that the plaintiff is exercising his physical labour, toiling in the land, along with his family members and therefore, he should be construed as cultivating tenant and his right should be protected, from the invasion of the defendant, though he is the owner of the property. 11. The defendant/appellant emphatically denied the lease arrangement pleaded in the plaint and contended that the plaintiff was helping him in managing the properties and sending the income after paying kist. Therefore, according to defendant/appellant, the plaintiff is in permissive possession of the suit property, cultivating the same, paying the produce, less the expenses and such a person would not come within the meaning of tenant or cultivating tenant. 12. The trial Court, accepting the contentions as well as taking into consideration, the inaction on the part of the plaintiff, to register himself as the cultivating tenant of the suit property, came to the conclusion, that the plaintiff was not a tenant of the suit premises and a permissive possessor is not entitled to injunction against the true owner. Unfortunately, this finding, which seems to be quite appreciable based on facts, as well as on reasoning were unnecessarily and without any basis, dislodged by the first appellate court, that too, without understanding the scope and without formulating proper points, for consideration. Therefore, it appears, the appellant/ defendant is right in questioning the lower court judgment, as perverse as contended by the learned counsel Mr.D.R.Sivakumar, who is appearing for the appellant. 13. In a suit for bare injunction, the main ingredients required to be proved are: (1) actual and physical possession of the property concerned; (2) that the plaintiff has a right (earned) to be in possession of the same and that right is a recognised one under law. In other words, even if it is found that the plaintiff is in possession of the property, without any legal basis, the court should not go to the aid of that person, to protect his possession against the true owner. The judgment was not rendered in an interlocutory application, whereas a final decision was given after recording evidence and marking documents. The judgment was not rendered in an interlocutory application, whereas a final decision was given after recording evidence and marking documents. Therefore, prima facie case of possession or the balance of convenience alone would not be the ground, to grant permanent injunction. Hence, on the basis of admitted possession alone, permanent injunction could not be granted against the true owner. Having these principles in mind, we have to see the present case. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant Mr.D.R.Sivakumar, would contend that the first appellate Court misguided itself, in approaching the case that possession alone is the criterion for granting an order of permanent injunction, forgetting the right, that the first appellate Court failed to note that there is nil evidence to prove the cultivating tenancy right claimed by the plaintiff, that too in the absence of his registration before the appropriate authority as cultivating tenant, that the lower Court further failed to note that there is nil evidence to prove the so called payment of lease, the fact being the evidence available on record is mutually not only contradictory, but also destructive in nature. On the above grounds, he would contend that the appeal deserves to be allowed, setting aside the perverse judgment of the first appellate Court. 15. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that because of the near relationship between the parties, document was not prepared for the lease or for payment of the lease and that should not be taken into account in view of the long admitted possession of the suit property, with the plaintiff and considering this alone, the first appellate court has granted a decree reversing the finding of the trial Court, which should be confirmed by this Court. 16. Considering the materials available on record and the admitted facts, I am of the considered opinion, that the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, are untenable and the same cannot have the legal sanctity. 17. 16. Considering the materials available on record and the admitted facts, I am of the considered opinion, that the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, are untenable and the same cannot have the legal sanctity. 17. Under Section 100 C.P.C. in the second appeal, the High Court could interfere with the finding of the first appellate Court, if the finding of the lower Court, on facts are contrary to evidence on record and are perverse, and such finding could be disturbed by the High Court, since the High Court is not expected to shut its eyes to the reality or close its ears, to hear the just demand of the person who is entitled to the same, as a matter of right. In this view, we have to see how the first appellate Court judgment is perverse or otherwise contradictory to the realities, warranting disturbance by this Court. 18. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has unnecessarily laboured himself, to give a finding on the admitted facts. As said above, it is the case of both the parties before the courts below, that the plaintiff alone is in possession of the suit property. Therefore, to decide who is in possession, no evidence is required, since law says admitted facts need not be proved by letting evidence. But as seen from the judgment of the first appellate Court, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has repeatedly held that the suit property is in possession of the plaintiff, which is an admitted fact. In paragraph-10 of the judgment, the learned Subordinate Judge has observed, that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove that the suit property was not leased out to the plaintiff, forgetting the fact, who has come to the court pleading lease. Only the plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction on the basis of the possession, tracing the same to a lease hold interest, which is not admitted and in fact emphatically denied. Therefore, the burden is very very heavy on the shoulders of the plaintiff, to prove the alleged lease or tenancy. Unless that tenancy is proved to establish the right to be in possession of the suit property, question of granting permanent injunction against the true owner will not arise, since the law does not command to draw presumption of lease, in favour of the person, who is in possession. Unless that tenancy is proved to establish the right to be in possession of the suit property, question of granting permanent injunction against the true owner will not arise, since the law does not command to draw presumption of lease, in favour of the person, who is in possession. Forgetting this basic principle, the learned Subordinate Judge has observed in his judgment that it is the duty of the defendant, to prove that the plaintiff is not the tenant, a curious observation. The learned Subordinate Judge has further went to the extent of saying, that it is unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff is the tenant of the suit property or not. I am unable to understand the logic behind the said observation. It is the definite case of the plaintiff, that he is possessing the property as tenant. Therefore, unless that right is decided as relevant factor, question of granting injunction would not arise. As said supra, a trespasser or a person who has no legal right to be in possession, is not entitled to be protected. In this view, the main point that should arise for consideration in this case is whether the plaintiff was the tenant of the premises or not, though the suit is not one for declaration of such relief. The main relief of permanent injunction should necessarily depend upon the nature of possession and the position of the plaintiff viz., the tenant's possession or the lease hold right. In the absence of proof for these two things, the suit should fail. But unfortunately, in its judgment, the first appellate Court has observed as said supra, that it is unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff is a tenant or not, which is factually or legally unacceptable to me. In this view of the matter, it should be held that the learned Subordinate Judge has not properly understood the case and has not properly appreciated the facts in issues also and therefore, there is nothing wrong in saying that the finding or the conclusion of the learned Subordinate, Judge is perverse in nature, against the rule of law, as well as contradictory to the evidence. Therefore, this Court is competent to reassess the evidence, on record and it is not possible to accept the finding of the first appellate Court as such. 19. Therefore, this Court is competent to reassess the evidence, on record and it is not possible to accept the finding of the first appellate Court as such. 19. The plaintiff, though claims lease hold right, admittedly, there is no deed of lease. The date of lease is given in the plaint as 10.1.1979 and the premium is 30 bags per year. No detailed plea is given, regarding the payment of paddy to the defendant as lease, every year. Therefore, we have to purely depend upon the oral evidence, which is also permissible. The oral evidence, since aimed against the true owner, it should be inspiring and should pass the test of credibility, failing which, the case of the plaintiff should be rejected. The plaintiff as P.W.1 would state that he is cultivating the suit property, for the past 12 years on the basis of oral lease, agreeing to pay paddy at the rate of six bags per acre. If it is correct, it should be in tune with the pleadings also. For three acres 28 cents, if we calculate lease paddy at 6 bags per acre, it would roughly come to 19.5 bags. But, the plaint would read as indicated above, that the lease payable per year is 30 bags, which is quite contrary, shaking the lease hold interest. If there is a lease, there would not have been such contradiction regarding quantum of lease, whether it is in terms of cash or in terms of kind. But P.W.1 would contend as said above, during the examination in chief that, he agreed to pay six bags per acre and would contend further in the cross examination that he has paid 20 bags paddy as lease. The contradictory evidence given by P.W.1 against his own pleadings, would go to show that he is not in possession of the property, as tenant and that is why this contradiction has been crept in. To prove that for the past 12 years, the plaintiff had paid paddy, no scrap of paper is produced before the court concerned. The explanation that because of the relationship, no document was taken is well acceptable to the defense also. When it is matter of right, arising between the relationship, law does not permit dispensing with the required evidence. To prove that for the past 12 years, the plaintiff had paid paddy, no scrap of paper is produced before the court concerned. The explanation that because of the relationship, no document was taken is well acceptable to the defense also. When it is matter of right, arising between the relationship, law does not permit dispensing with the required evidence. In the case of relationship also, to prove a fact, evidence is an absolute one and if at all some probabilities could be taken advantage of, on the basis of the near relationship. As rightly observed by the trial Court, if the plaintiff was a cultivating tenant, he ought to have taken steps, to register himself as cultivating tenant in the record of tenancy at least after the issue of notice and after the information given by the defendant to sell the property, as seen from Exs.A1 and A2. He ought to have taken steps to register himself as cultivating tenant, which he failed to do so, would indicate that he was not the tenant and that is why, no action was taken by him. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention, to Exs.A1 & A2 to prove the lease hold right. Both the documents would indicate that the plaintiff was in possession of the property and he was cultivating the same, but they failed to disclose that the cultivation was on the basis of the tenancy. Nowhere in the letters, the defendant had admitted that the plaintiff has agreed to pay lease, for the cultivation of the property. The contention of the defendant in those letters was, he has made an arrangement to sell the property and the purchaser wants vacant possession and therefore, the plaintiff should not cultivate or raise any crops, during the period. It is the specific case of the defendant in the written statement, that as brother-in- law, he has permitted the plaintiff to manage the property by cultivating the same and the recitals in the letters are in tune with the defendant's case, and it fails to lead us to draw any inference of lease hold interest in favour of the plaintiff. 21. In the revenue records, there is a specific column to mention the name of the tenant or the cultivating tenant i.e. in 6A as seen from Adangals Ex B1. 21. In the revenue records, there is a specific column to mention the name of the tenant or the cultivating tenant i.e. in 6A as seen from Adangals Ex B1. The plaintiff's name is not entered as tenant whereas the names of the defendant and the plaintiff are given as owner and the person who is actually cultivating the property, which is an admitted one. If really the plaintiff had been the cultivating tenant, his name ought to have been entered in the particular column or at least in the remarks column of the Adangals, that the plaintiff is cultivating the property on the basis of lease. The payment of kist, as seen from Exs. A3 to A10 also would show that payments were made by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant which is the case of the defendant also. Therefore, assuming the payment of kist by the plaintiff to be correct, it will not confer any lease hold interest in the suit property. The parrot-like evidence given by P.Ws.2 & 3 failed to inspire my confidence to establish tenancy, since P.W.1 himself has failed to substantiate the averments made in the plaint, regarding the terms of lease. On the other hand, the evidence given by D.W.1 supported by the admitted facts, that he is the owner of the property makes me to hold that he should have permitted his brother-in-law viz., the plaintiff to manage the suit property including cultivating the same and this was taken advantage by the plaintiff, to lay a false claim when the defendant attempted to sell the property to meet out the expenses of marriage, of his daughter, failing to pay reasonable price for the suit property also when offered to him for sale. Fortunately, the trial Court has considered all these facts and has come to a just conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to an order of injunction against the true owner. But, unfortunately, the first appellate Court misdirecting itself, side tracking the issues, has rendered a perverse finding, shifting the burden of proof even, and in this view of the matter, for the foregoing reasons, the findings of the first appellate Court has to be set aside, restoring the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Hence this point is answered accordingly. 22. Hence this point is answered accordingly. 22. The result therefore is, the appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court in A.S.26/1992; and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S.No.709 of 1990 are restored, with costs, throughout.