Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 12.2.2000 (Annexure-9) whereby the petitioner has been visited with the penalty of reduction in rank to the lowest stage in the immediately lower scale. Further prayer made by the petitioner is to quash the order dated 11.10.2001 (Annexure-12) whereby the appeal preferred against the order of the Disciplinary Authority has been dismissed. Petitioner also prays for quashing of the enquiry report dated 29.7.1999. 2. Facts giving rise to the present writ application are that at the relevant time petitioner was posted as Chief Manager in Scale-IV at Bhadohi Branch of the respondent Allahabad Bank. A show cause notice dated 28.9.1993 (Annexure-1) was issued alleging several irregularities committed by the petitioner in regard to the disbursement of loan beyond the sanctioned limit. Petitioner filed his show cause dated 7.10.1993 (Annexure-2) stating therein that disbursement of loan was done on the basis of the appraisal notes prepared by different officials of the Bank and according to him it was bonafidely done in order to protect the pecuniary interest of the Bank and to meet the genuine needs of the customers of the Bank. However, the explanation submitted by the Petitioner did not satisfy the respondent Bank and a departmental enquiry was initiated against him. He was served with the memo of charges dated 16.9.1996 containing in the following five charges: "Article"Shri S.K.Srivastava, while posted and functioning as Chief Manager at Banks Bhadohi Branch, is alleged to have committed various acts of omission and commission in allowing drawings to various borrowers much in excess of their limits sanctioned by H.O. /Z.O. and also in cases where limits were sanctioned under CMDA without reporting the transactions to higher authorities on daily list. Article:2 Shri S.K.Srivastava sanctioned a Car Loan to Shri B.P.Verma under CMDA although it did not fall under his discretionaly authority. Article:3 The outstanding in m/s Vikash Agencies were adjusted/liquidated by Shri S.K.Srivastava by purchasing foreign bills of M/s Vikas Exports whereby allowing diversions of funds. Article:4 Shri S.K.Srivastava allowed transactions in current account of M/s S.K.International despite a warning note made on the ledger head by the previous Manager to the effect not to allow further drawings. Article:5 Shri S.K.Srivastava allowed drawings much in excess of ZO/ HO sanction to M/s Shanti Sons. Article:4 Shri S.K.Srivastava allowed transactions in current account of M/s S.K.International despite a warning note made on the ledger head by the previous Manager to the effect not to allow further drawings. Article:5 Shri S.K.Srivastava allowed drawings much in excess of ZO/ HO sanction to M/s Shanti Sons. Even Ad-hoc limits were sanctioned to the firm without ZO/HO prior approval and committed various irregularities in conduct of the above said borrower account. The aforesaid acts of omission/ commission committed by the said shri Srivastava are quite unbecoming of an officer of the Bank and are in violation of Regulation 3 (1) and 3(3) of Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1976 amounting to misconduct under Regulation 24 of the aforesaid Regulations. 3. Petitioner submitted his reply denying all the charges and ultimately Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted its report dated 29.7.1999 (Annexure-7). It is relevant here to state that charge no. 1 contained 27 elements out of which 14 were found to have been not proved, three partly proved and the rest proved. Charge nos. 2 and 4 have been found to be proved whereas charge no. 3 partly proved. So far as Charge no. 5 is concerned it contains 8 elements out of which four have been found to be partly proved and the rest proved. By order dated 12.2.2000 (Annexure-9) the Disciplinary Authority inflicted the penalty of reducation in rank to the lowest stage in the immediately lower scale. According to the Disciplinary Authority the acts of the petitioner were in violation of the Regulations 3 (1) and 3 (3) of the Allahabad Bank Officers Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations), which comes under the mischief of misconduct as provided under Article 24 of the Regulation. Petitioner aggrieved by the same preferred appeal dated 23.3.2000 and 1.4.2000 (Annexures-11 and 11/1) but the appellate authority by order dated 11.10.2001 dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders petitioner has preferred this application. 4. Dr. S.N.Jha appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the allegation levelled against the petitioner does not constitute any misconduct. He points out that the allegation levelled against the petitioner is of committing irregularities and allowing unauthorized over drawings in excess of the limits sanctioned. He refers to the circular no. 4. Dr. S.N.Jha appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the allegation levelled against the petitioner does not constitute any misconduct. He points out that the allegation levelled against the petitioner is of committing irregularities and allowing unauthorized over drawings in excess of the limits sanctioned. He refers to the circular no. 3219 dated 4.2.1993 (Annexure-8) and submits that under genuine circumstances additional credit need of exporters for implementing export orders may be made in full even if sanction of such additional credit exceeds maximum permissible Bank finance. Mr. Ajay Kumar Sinha appearing on behalf of respondents submits that the aforesaid circular has nothing to do with the act of the petitioner and it does not authorize the petitioner to allow anauthorized drawings in excess of the limits sanctioned by the Bank. He points out that the circular referred to above is in relation to the maximum permissible limit for Bank finance. 5. Having appreciated the rival submission I do not find any substance in the submission of Dr. Jha. As stated earlier the misconduct alleged against the petitioner is in regard to the commission of various irregularities by allowing unauthorized over drawings in excess of the limits sanctioned by the Bank. The circular referred to above does not extend the power of the petitioner to permit withdrawing in excess of limits sanctioned by the Bank but in fact permits additional credit need of exporter for implementing export orders by sanction of additional credit notwithstanding the maximum permissible Bank finance. 6. Dr. Jha then submits that the Enquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner for some of the charges and hence without giving any notice to the petitioner the Disciplinary Authority had inflicted punishment which is in violation of the principle of natural justice. I do not have the slightest hesitation in rejecting this submission of Dr. Jha. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority on disagreement with the finding of the Enquiry Officer in relation to those charges for which he was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer, he had inflicted the punishment. In my opinion only in such cases in which the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer then an opportunity is required to be given to the delinquent employee to satisfy the Disciplinary Authority that the finding of exoneration recorded by the Enquiry Officer is just and proper. In my opinion only in such cases in which the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer then an opportunity is required to be given to the delinquent employee to satisfy the Disciplinary Authority that the finding of exoneration recorded by the Enquiry Officer is just and proper. Here the Disciplinary Authority had not disagreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and as such there was no occasion for the Disciplinary Authority to give opportunity to the petitioner. 7. Dr. Jha then assails the orders of the Disciplinary Authority on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority before inflicting the penalty had not given to the petitioner the notice of the proposed punishment. According to him this itself vitiates the order of punishment. I do not find any substance in this submission of Dr. Jha also. It is not the case of the petitioner that the "Regulations by which the petitioner is governed provides for giving notice against the proposed punishment. Petitioner is not a holder of the civil post of the Union or the State and thus protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India is not available to him. Even in respect of the employees who are covered under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, after the Constitution (42nd amendment) Act notice on the proposed punishment is not required to be given. I had the occasion to consider this question in C.W.J.C. No. 2327 of 2002 Brij Kishore Yadav V/s. Union of India disposed of on 25.8.2003 wherein I have observed as follows: "The decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Md. Ramzan Khan (supra) and B.Karunakar (supra) are after the Forty Second Amendment and have recognized the right of a delinquent employee to have a copy of the inquiry report and the right to represent against the finding, in case, the disciplinary authority is different than that of the inquiry officer. This right has been found to be following from the principle of natural justice notwithstanding the Forty-second Amendment. But those judgments do not contemplate that providing opportunity against the proposed punishment also flows from the requirement of the principle of natural justice. In my opinion the right to receive the inquiry officers report and to show cause against its finding is independent of the right to show cause against the penalty, proposed. But those judgments do not contemplate that providing opportunity against the proposed punishment also flows from the requirement of the principle of natural justice. In my opinion the right to receive the inquiry officers report and to show cause against its finding is independent of the right to show cause against the penalty, proposed. The right to get the inquiry officers report and to file show cause against the finding of the inquiry officer flow from the principle of natural justice but in my considered opinion the principle of natural justice can not be extended to the extent of giving notice against the stipulation in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution that "it shall not be necessary to give delinquent employee opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed." In fact, in the case of B. Karunakar (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that after the Forty-second Amendment the delinquent employee is not required to be given the notice against the proposed punishment. The Supreme Court in para-24 of the decision in the case of B.Karunakar (supra) has considered the effect of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India after the Forty Second Amendment, in the following words: "24The right to receive the enquiry officers report and to show cause against the findings in the report was independent of the right to show cause against the penalty proposed. The two rights came to be confused with each other because as the law stood brior to the Forty-Second Amendment of the Constitution, the two rights arose simultaneously only at the stage when a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty was issued. If the disciplinary authority after considering the enquiry officers report has dropped the proceedings or had decided to impose a penalty other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, there was no occasion for issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. In that case, the employee had neither the right to receive the report and represent against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause against the report and to represent against the findings recorded in it was thus inextricably connected with the penalty proposed. In that case, the employee had neither the right to receive the report and represent against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause against the report and to represent against the findings recorded in it was thus inextricably connected with the penalty proposed. Since the Forty-Second Amendment of the Constitution dispensed with the issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty proposed even if it was dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, some courts took the view that the Government servant was deprived of his right to represent against the findings of guilt as well. The error occurred on account of the failure to distinguish the two rights which were independent of each other." (underlining mine) Further, in para-28 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has in categorical terms observed that the Forty- Second Amendment had dispensed with the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. Relevant passage from para 28 of the judgment reads as follows: "28.xxxx The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice fo show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty- Second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-Second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officers report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges." (underlining mine) 8. Petitioner was given the copy of the enquiry report and given an opportunity to submit his show cause. This in my opinion, satisfy the requirements of principle of natural justice. 9. Dr. Petitioner was given the copy of the enquiry report and given an opportunity to submit his show cause. This in my opinion, satisfy the requirements of principle of natural justice. 9. Dr. Jha submits that the allegation made against the petitioner is that the misconduct alleged against him is of unbecoming of a public servant and that itself does not constitute any misconduct. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others V/s. J. Ahmed (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1022) and my attention has been drawn to paragraph-17 of the judgment which reads as follows: It thus appears crystal clear that there was no case stricto sensu for a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent. In fact the inquiry was held to establish that the respondent was not fit to hold a responsible post. The respondent was actually retiring from service and there was no question of his any more holding a responsible position. Yet not only the inquiry was initiated but he was retained in service beyond the date of his normal retirement till the final order was made on October 11, 1963 when he was removed from the Indian Administrative Service. It appears that there were large scale disturbances in the State. There followed the usual search for a scape-goat and the respondent came handy. Some charges were framed none of which could constitute misconduct in law. Some charges were mere surmises. Substance of the allegations was that he was not a very efficient officer and lacked the quality of leadership and was deficient in the faculty of decision making. These deficiencies in capacity would not constitute misconduct. If the respondent were a young man and was to continue in the post for a long period, such an inquiry may be made whether he should be retained in the responsible post. He may or may not be retained but to retain him in service beyond the period of his normal retirement with a view to punishing him was wholly unjustified. The High Court was, therefore right in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was no longer in service on the date on which an order removing him from service was made, and, therefore, the order was illegal and void." 10. Another decision on which Dr. The High Court was, therefore right in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was no longer in service on the date on which an order removing him from service was made, and, therefore, the order was illegal and void." 10. Another decision on which Dr. Jha has placed reliance is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A.L.Kalra V/s. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. (A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1361) and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 22 of the said judgment which reads as follows: "Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct." 11. I do not find any substance in submission of the learned counsel. It is relevant here to state that the misconduct proved against the petitioner has been found to be in violation of Regulations 3(1) and 3(3) of the Regulation. Regulations 3 (1) and 3(3) reads as follows: (1) Every officer employee shall, at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. xx xx xx (3) No officer employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. xx xx xx Regulation 24 of the Regulations which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows: 24. Acts of misconduct: "A breach of any, of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the Allahabad Bank (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976." 12. From a plain reading of Regulation 3 (1) it is evident that every officer of the bank is required to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, devotion and diligence and further not to do anything which is unbecoming of bank officers. Further Regulation 3(3) contemplates performance of the official duty in his best judgment. Further Regulation 3(3) contemplates performance of the official duty in his best judgment. Here in the present case for exercise of the powers the bank had sanctioned limits. Allegation proved against the petitioner is that he had allowed unauthorized overdrawings in excess of the limits. As such the respondent bank had not erred in holding that the petitioners act is in violation of the Rule 3(1) and Rule 3(3) of the Regulations. Once it is held so the allegations proved constitute misconduct. Thus this submission of Mr. Jha has no legs to stand. 13. Dr. Jha lastly submits that for the same allegation another employee namely Shri J.N. Sharma was charged and he has been left off with the penalty of reduction in basic pay by three stages, whereas in the case of the petitioner more severe penalty of reduction in rank to the lowest stage in the immediately lower scale has been inflicted. This according to the learned counsel suffers from the vice of discrimination. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Director General of Police and others V/s. G.Dasayan [ 1998 (2) S.C.C. 407 ] and my attention has been drawn to following passage from the said judgment which reads as follows: "Mr. Murlidhar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, while agreeing with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants on the first two grounds, submitted that the order of dismissal at any rate cannot be sustained and if at all an order of compulsory retirement as was made in the case of the Head Constable, who was tried along with the respondent, has to be imposed. We have perused the order of the Tribunal and the relevant documents. We find merit in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants. At the same time, we are of the view that as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that a punishment of compulsory retirement in the case of the respondent as well would meet the ends of justice on the facts and circumstances of this case." 14. There is no difficulty in accepting the broad submision of Dr. At the same time, we are of the view that as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that a punishment of compulsory retirement in the case of the respondent as well would meet the ends of justice on the facts and circumstances of this case." 14. There is no difficulty in accepting the broad submision of Dr. Jha that in case the charges are identical, punishment has also to be identical with a rider that for the same misconduct persons holding higher position and degree of responsibilities can be visited with different punishment than the inferior officer. However, in the present case the same principle has no application at all. So far as the case of Sri J.N.Sharma is concerned he was served with a different chargesheet dated 23.6.1998 whereas charge levelled against the petitioner is much earlier to that which is dated 16.9.1996. From a reading of the charges levelled against the petitioner and said Sri J.N. Sharma there is some similarity in the nature of allegation, but by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the charges levelled against the petitioner and the said J.N. Sharma is identical. Once it is held so the punishment may vary as it is well settled that the equality is amongst equals and the dissimilar punishment can be inflicted in its dissimilar cases. 15. All the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner having no merit, I do not find any merit in the application and it is dismissed accordingly but without cost.