JUDGMENT - BRAHME P.S., J.:---Heard Shri Gilda, the learned Counsel for the applicant, Shri Kasat, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Loney, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 2. 2.The Revision Application is preferred by the applicant (original accused) and appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1997 pending on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur, challenging the order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur on 30-11-1999 rejecting permission for compounding the offence. 3.Respondent No. 1 had filed Regular Criminal Case No. 158 of 1995 against the applicant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. 3, Achalpur, for offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, mainly on the ground that a cheque, dated 2-11-1991, for a sum of Rs. 10,500=00, issued by the applicant, was not honoured. The learned Judicial Magistrate, vide his judgment and order, dated 4-10-1997, convicted the applicant for offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000=00, in default, to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of thirty days. The applicant, taking exception to this judgment of conviction and sentence, had preferred Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1997 before Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur. His appeal came to be admitted and sentence was suspended on conditions. During the pendency of appeal, parties, namely the applicant and the respondent No. 1, came to terms and entered into an agreement by which the applicant paid an amount of Rs. 10,500=00 to the respondent No. 1 in cash and in pursuance of that, a written agreement, dated 29-11-1999, came to be drawn between the parties. It was on the basis of this agreement when the matter was settled between the parties, application (Exh. 14) was filed before the Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur, seeking permission to compound the offence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by his order, dated 30-11-1999, rejected the application mainly on the ground that the offence was not then compoundable. 4.Mr. Gilda, learned Counsel for the applicant, submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the applicant having paid entire amount that was due under the cheque, the Appellate Court ought to have granted permission for compounding the offence. 4.Mr. Gilda, learned Counsel for the applicant, submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the applicant having paid entire amount that was due under the cheque, the Appellate Court ought to have granted permission for compounding the offence. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (O.P. Dholakia v. State of Haryana another)1, 1999(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)118 . 5.The Counsel for the parties also brought to my notice the provision contained in section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which incorporates the compounding of offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 147, thus, reads :-- "147. Offences to be compoundable.--Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable." This amended provision has come into effect from 23rd April, 2003. 6.Mr. Kasat, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, fairly made a statement that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the parties to the matter concerned be permitted to compound the offence. 7.It is a matter of record that in the application (Exh. 14), which came to be filed by applicant as well as respondent No. 1, the factum of a settlement arrived at between the parties in terms of the written agreement, dated 29-11-1999, was brought to the notice of the Court. In addition to that, a Joint Pursis was also filed making reference of the compromise arrived at between the parties. This shows that there was no dispute in respect of settlement, amicable as it was, between the parties; but the Appellate Court refused to grant permission to compound the offence only on the ground that the offence, with which the applicant was charged and convicted and sentenced, was not compoundable. It is true that the amendment incorporating the provision for compounding of the offences is brought on the statute book very recently and as it is provided, it is applicable from the date of 23rd April, 2003; but there could be no hurdle for parties in compounding the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and there was no reason for the Court to refuse permission for compounding the offence. In the case of O.P. Dholakia (cited supra), when the matter was before the Apex Court, wherein conviction for offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was challenged, the Apex Court found that complainant, having received entire money, stated before the Apex Court that he had no objection if the conviction was set aside. However, the State opposed the setting aside of the conviction on the ground that the parties could have entered into compromise only during the pendency into compromise only during the pendency of the appeal and not at this stage. The Apex Court observed that in view of the nature of the offence and existence of a compromise, it granted permission, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, to compound of the offence, and as a consequence of compounding of the offence, conviction and sentence necessarily stood annulled. 8.In the case before hand, the parties have filed an application as well as a Pursis before the Appellate Court which was the appropriate stage where the Court ought to have granted permission to compound the offence. The Appellate Court, in my view, committed an error in rejecting the application and refusing permission to compound the offence. It was much more so when admittedly the parties have come to terms and this Court has held that the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be compounded if parties come to terms. Therefore, the Appellate Court has committed an error and illegality in rejecting the application. The Revision Application will have to be allowed. Revision application is allowed. The order passed by the Appellate Court on application (Exh. 14) is quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Appellate Court with a direction to consider the application afresh for recording the compromise arrived at between the parties, adhering to the law laid down by the Apex Court and the observations made by this Court. Revision application allowed. -----