A. K. MITRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second Appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment delivered and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Midnapore in Title Appeal No. 229 of 1976 dated 11. 5. 1977 and 18. 5. 1977 respectively reversing the judgment and decree dated 12. 3. 1976 and 20. 3. 1976 respectively passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court at Midnapore in Title Suit No. 231 of 1966. ( 2 ) THE defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are the appellants herein. The case as has been made out by the plaintiff Kamal Krishna Goswami in the plaint is, inter alia, as follows: the plaintiff (respondent No. 1 herein) stated in the plaint that the suit land belonged to the mother of the plaintiff Siddeswari Debya who purchased this land by an auction sale and has been possessing the suit land by praying rents to the Government after mutation of her name. The said Siddeswari Debya used to own and possess the suit land along with other lands. Remaining in possession of the said land including the suit land Siddheswari died leaving her son, the plaintiff and daughter Mayalata and she died long before the promulgation of Hindu Succession Act. Siddheswari executed a Will bequeathing her properties in favour of her only son, the plaintiff. After attaining majority the plaintiff took charge of the properties from one Sri Bhuban Mahan Pal who used to look after his properties during his minority. The defendant No. 1 that is Sri Hrishikesh Pahari used to reside near the house of the plaintiff and he had got good relation with the father of the plaintiff. Bholanath Mahapatra was the husband of defendant No. 2 Ashalata and the father of the defendant Nos. 3 and 4. The defendant No. 1 got a 'nadabi' executed from the plaintiff in his favour in respect of the suit land. According to the plaintiff the said 'nadabi' is not binding against him. ( 3 ) SAID Bholanath Patra, the husband of the defendant No. 2 in collusion with defendant No. 1, Hrishikesh managed to record the disputed plot No. 368 (10 decimal) and 368/532 (. 33 decimal) as tenant under plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the ROR in the name of Bholanath is erroneous, illegal and without any basis. ( 3 ) SAID Bholanath Patra, the husband of the defendant No. 2 in collusion with defendant No. 1, Hrishikesh managed to record the disputed plot No. 368 (10 decimal) and 368/532 (. 33 decimal) as tenant under plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the ROR in the name of Bholanath is erroneous, illegal and without any basis. The plaintiff applied before the Revenue Officer under section 44 (1) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 for correction of the erroneous recording but that application was rejected. According to the plaintiff, he never gave settlement to Bholanath in so far as the suit land is concerned. The plaintiff never recognised Bholanath as tenant or realised rent of alleged 13 annas and one pai. The defendant Nos. 1 to 4 taking advantage of the erroneous recording started cutting the branches of the trees in and over the suit land and also collected materials for construction of house therein. Hence the cause of action of the suit arose on 15. 1. 1966 (1st Magh, 1372 B. S. ). The suit was filed by the plaintiff praying for declaration of title in respect of the suit land. The plaintiff in this suit also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing his possession in and over the suit land. The plaintiff further prayed that if the Court finds that by this time the plaintiff has been disposed then the recovery of possession he prayed in his favour. ( 4 ) TWO separate Written Statements were filed. One by defendant No. 1 and the other by defendant Nos. 2 to 4. The defendant Nos. 2 to 4 alleged inter alia that their predecessor late Bholanath Mahapatra took settlement of plot No. 368 and 368/535 having area measuring about. 10 decimals and. 33 decimals respectively from the mother of the plaintiff and other co-sharers on annual rental at Rs. 1. 25 in the year 1350 B. S. After taking settlement in respect of the suit land he has been possessing the suit land since 1350 B. S. by constructing houses, excavating ponds, planting trees and had been enjoying the property in absolution. In this way these defendants by possessing the suit land for more than 12 years adversely against the plaintiff asserted tenancy right in and over the suit land. In this way these defendants by possessing the suit land for more than 12 years adversely against the plaintiff asserted tenancy right in and over the suit land. The defendant No. 16, State of West Bengal also contested the suit by submitting the written statement. ( 5 ) ON the above pleadings the learned trial Judge framed seven issues. On contest the learned trial Judge decreed the suit in part on compromise against the defendant No. 1 in terms of the Solenama filed and dismissed on contest against the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 and the State of West Bengal and ex-parte against the rest. The learned trial Judge observed that there is nothing to show that the contesting defendants took settlement from the mother of the plaintiff. Exhibit 4, the Rent Receipt granted by the estate of Sri Sri Lakshmi Janardan Jew Thakur clearly shows that they took settlement from Lakshmi Janardan Jew alone. The said Lakshmi Janardan Jew had two annas share in the Khaitan. It has also been observed by the learned trial Judge that the contesting defendants have failed to show that they took settlement from Pramita Bala Devi the plaintiff's mother and so the tenancy claimed by them under the plaintiff's mother is not proved. The Exhibit H-1 (Rent Receipt) granted by Lakshmi Janardan Jew shows that the defendant's predecessor paid rent from 1358 B. S. which goes to show that he began to possess from 1358 B. S. and not from 1350 B. S. and on the back of Exhibit H-1 it is clearly overwritten. It appears that ('o' has been overwritten over 8' ). This shows that the contesting defendants have been in possession of the suit land since 1358 B. S. The learned trial Judge concludingly observed that the plaintiff had failed to file the suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession and his suit is clearly barred under the law of limitation and the contesting defendants had acquired title by adverse possession in respect of the suit land by possessing more than 12 years openly, peacefully and continuously. Accordingly, on these observations the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit against the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 and the State of West Bengal on contest. ( 6 ) THE first Appellate Court reversed the finding of the learned trial Judge and allowed the appeal on contest against the defendant Nos. Accordingly, on these observations the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit against the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 and the State of West Bengal on contest. ( 6 ) THE first Appellate Court reversed the finding of the learned trial Judge and allowed the appeal on contest against the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and dismissed on contest against the State of West Bengal. The learned Appellate Court below also dismissed the appeal ex-parte against the defendant No. 1 on compromise in terms of the 'solenama' and dismissed ex-parte without cost against the rest. Challenging this judgment and decree of the Appellate Court below reversing the finding of the learned trial Judge as observed earlier this appeal has been preferred by the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Before arriving at a decision or coming to conclusion on hearing, this Court is to decide first as to what are the substantial questions of law on which this second appeal is to be decided. On consideration of the findings of both the Courts below, on consideration of the pleadings as well as the evidence on record this Court formulates the following substantial question of law which are to be decided here:-1. Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court below is perverse;2. Whether the suit fails and is liable to be dismissed as has been rightly done by the learned trial Judge because of wrong description of the property in the Schedule;3. Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court below is vitiated by non-application of proper legal test;4. Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court below is proper judgment of reversion. Decisions relied upon:on behalf of the appellants: (1)air 1943 Cal 453 (Rani Harshamukhi Dasi v. Kshitindra Debroy and Ors. ). (2) air 1974 SC 1178 (Sikhar Chand Jain v. Digambar Jain Praband Karini Sabha and Ors. ). (3)air 1987 SC 1484 (Budhwanti v. Golap Ch. Prasad ). (4) (2000)1 SCC 434 (Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohanlal ). (5) (2000)5 SCC 652 (State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh ). (6) (2001)3 SCC 179 (Santosh Hazari v. Purusottam Tewari and Ors. ). ON behalf of the respondents: (1) air 1964 All 383 (Lachhmi Nath v. Bhuthnath ). (2) air 1970 Pat 256 (Administrator of District Board, Gaya v. Sri Deonath Sahay ). (3) air 1980 Cal 57 (Friends' Bureau v. Corporation of Calcutta ). (4)69 CWN 210. (6) (2001)3 SCC 179 (Santosh Hazari v. Purusottam Tewari and Ors. ). ON behalf of the respondents: (1) air 1964 All 383 (Lachhmi Nath v. Bhuthnath ). (2) air 1970 Pat 256 (Administrator of District Board, Gaya v. Sri Deonath Sahay ). (3) air 1980 Cal 57 (Friends' Bureau v. Corporation of Calcutta ). (4)69 CWN 210. ( 7 ) ON the above formulations of substantial questions of law and relying on the above referred citations the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent advanced their arguments. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants submits that the judgment of the Appellate Court below can be termed as perverse inasmuch as the learned Appellate Court below did not consider that the plaintiff/respondent through any document or through oral evidence could not prove the title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The learned counsel, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, further submits that the Record of Rights admittedly stand in the name of the defendant and the proceeding under section 44 (2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 was decided against the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not prefer any appeal and as such admittedly it stood vested. The learned Appellate Court below, according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, failed to consider that the effect of the decision of the proceeding under section 44 (2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 is going against the plaintiff and Record of Rights standing in the name of the defendants, make it clear that the prima facie presumption must be in favour of the defendant (appellant herein) and this was not rebutted through cogent evidence and the learned Appellate Court below also did not consider that if the Record of Rights standing in the name of the defendants, and 44 (2) proceeding of the plaintiff is rejected then consequently the presumption goes in favour of the defendants. Therefore, Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that the finding of the learned Appellate Court below is contrary to admitted records and contradictory on the face of it an as such the same is perverse. Mr. Roy Chowdhury in this regard relies on the decision reported in AIR 1943 Cal 453 (supra ). It has been observed ?a party relying on the presumption arising from the Record of Rights is not bound to adduce evidence in support of the entry. Mr. Roy Chowdhury in this regard relies on the decision reported in AIR 1943 Cal 453 (supra ). It has been observed ?a party relying on the presumption arising from the Record of Rights is not bound to adduce evidence in support of the entry. The entry does not loose its weight when the evidence does not disclose that there is foundation for it. ? Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that it is not his clients' duty to find out proof or adduce evidence in support of his clients, that is, the appellants' name how being recorded in the Record of Rights. It is the duty of the respondent to establish that the entry in the ROR made in favour of the defendant is wrong. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 1178 (supra) and refers to the observation of the Apex Court in this regard made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said decision. The said paragraphs of the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court are quoted hereinbelow:it is to be seen whether the first Appellate Court's findings really falls within the grip of section 100 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his Written Statement Shikharchand has admitted Smt. Rajrani's ownership of the land. But he has pleaded that he has become the owner of the land on account of adverse possession for more than 12 years from 1937. The burden of proving the acquisition of ownership by adverse possession lay on him. The Khasra entries from 1937-38 to 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1951-52 are all in favour of Smt. Rajrani. They show that she was in possession over the land during those years. Khasra is a record of right according to section 45 (2) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917. Section 80 (3) of that Act provides that entries in a record of rights shall be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is shown. This provision raises a presumption of corrections of the aforesaid Khasra entries. The burden of proving adverse possession accordingly was a heavy one. The judgment of the first Appellate Court shows that it has not kept in mind this aspect while examining the evidence. In the first step, it has proceeded to assess the evidence adduced by Shikharchand. This provision raises a presumption of corrections of the aforesaid Khasra entries. The burden of proving adverse possession accordingly was a heavy one. The judgment of the first Appellate Court shows that it has not kept in mind this aspect while examining the evidence. In the first step, it has proceeded to assess the evidence adduced by Shikharchand. After discussing that evidence, it has recorded a finding that he was in possession. Thereafter, in the second step, it has proceeded to take the view that no reliance can be placed on Khasra entries. It has summed up the discussion thus: 'all these witnesses (of Shikharchand) have stated that the possession of the fields was with Shikharchand. Their statements are further supported by documentary evidence and, therefore, there is no room for any doubt that the possession was not with Shikharchand. It is true that in Patwari papers Mst. Rajrani's name appears and that the dues were deposited on behalf of Mst. Rajrani. But in my opinion the entries in Khasra and the fact that the receipts were issued in the name of Mst Rajrani would not by themselves establish the fact of possession. It is settled law that entries in Khasra have only presumptive value, and it is difficult to conclude from these entries that the possession was with Mst. Rajrani. The falsity of the entries in Khasra is clear from the fact that from 1937 to 1947 the name of Mst. Rajrani appeared in the Khasra Panchasala and yet Mst. Rajrani's admission in D/1 shows that she was not in possession. This fact is enough to show that no reliance could be placed on the Khasra entries. ' ( 9 ) AS already pointed out, this passage shows that the first Appellate Court proceeded in the reverse order. Moreover, the Khasra entries have been discarded solely for the reason that Smt. Rajrani has admitted in Ex. D/1 that she was not in possession. But Ex. D/1 has been entirely misunderstood by the first Appellate Court. Exhibit D/1 is a copy of the plaint filed by Smt. Rajrani in a suit for profits against Shikharchand. Shikharchand was Lambardar of the mahal in which the patti belonging to Smt. Rajrani was situate. In the first paragraph of her plaint she has mentioned this fact. But Ex. D/1 has been entirely misunderstood by the first Appellate Court. Exhibit D/1 is a copy of the plaint filed by Smt. Rajrani in a suit for profits against Shikharchand. Shikharchand was Lambardar of the mahal in which the patti belonging to Smt. Rajrani was situate. In the first paragraph of her plaint she has mentioned this fact. Thereafter she went on to say that she was entitled ?to get her share of profits from the defendant?. In paragraph 2 she has said:that the defendant is in possession of all the sir and khudkasht land of her full. . . . . patti of the village. . . . . that as the defendant did not render any account, nor paid anything in spite of repeated demands and a notice by the plaintiff, he is liable to pay interest by way of damages at the rate of -/8/- per cent per month? and the amount detailed in the schedule of accounts attached to the plaint. In the schedule she has shown the amount of rent recovered by Shikharchand from the tenants. She has also shown the estimated income from sir and khudkasht land belonging to her. After making certain deductions, a total amount of Rs. 318/7/- was claimed from Shikharchand. The suit was filed in July 1942. The suit for profits related to a period between 1938-39 and 1940-41. We do not think that paragraph 2 of the plaint can be read in the manner it has been read by the first Appellate Court. It was a suit for profits by a co-sharer against the Lambardar. It was not a suit for mesne profits which an owner of land may claim from a trespasser. It was really a suit for accounts from the Lambardar. So it is not possible to spell out from paragraph 2 and admission from Smt. Rajrani that Shikharchand was in adverse possession over her sir lands. Further, Shikharchand did not file a copy of his own written statement, nor a copy of the judgment in the suit. If he had denied his possession over her sir land, the suit for profits from sir land would have been dismissed. If he had pleaded adverse possession, over her sir, then also her suit for profits from sir land would have been dismissed. If he had denied his possession over her sir land, the suit for profits from sir land would have been dismissed. If he had pleaded adverse possession, over her sir, then also her suit for profits from sir land would have been dismissed. If, on the other hand, the suit for profits of suit land were decreed, it would follow that Shikharchand was held to be in permissive possession and not in adverse possession. In the result, we are of opinion that the first Appellate Court was wholly wrong in discarding the Khasra entries on the solitary statement in para 2 o her plaint. The High Court could, therefore, interfere with its finding under section 100 (1) (c ). ( 10 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury also drew attention of this Court the observations made by the learned Appellate Court below which comes to a finding that the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 taking advantage of the erroneous recording began to cut the branches of the tree. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that immediately preceding to the finding the learned Appellate Court admitted that the application under section 44 (1) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 for correction of the erroneous recording was rejected and according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, what more can be the example of perversity in this regard. ( 11 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury further submits that it would appear from the finding of the learned trial Judge when the learned Judge observes ?it appears from the compromise petition filed by the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 that in terms of the compromise the plaintiff has given up his claim of about 14. 2/3 decimals of land in respect of plot No. 368/534. The plaintiff got only 2/1/3 decimals of land in respect of plot No. 368/534 from the defendant No. 1 in terms of the compromise. The terms of ompromise are legal. The plaintiff will get a part decree in respect of. 2. 1/3 decimals of lands recorded in plot No. 368/534 and the Schedule of the plaint which is without any boundary and description shows that the plaintiff has claimed. 48 decimals of land out of. 72 decimals of land in plot No. 368. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the Court below overlooked it and decided the suit. According to Mr. 2. 1/3 decimals of lands recorded in plot No. 368/534 and the Schedule of the plaint which is without any boundary and description shows that the plaintiff has claimed. 48 decimals of land out of. 72 decimals of land in plot No. 368. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the Court below overlooked it and decided the suit. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, description of the suit property must not be vague when it is a suit for declaration of right, title and interest and if the suit property is not properly described, there cannot be any declaration in favour of any claimant. Therefore this suit must fail and should have been dismissed by the Appellate Court below. ( 12 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury then submits that the judgment of the Court below is not based on proper legal test inasmuch as admittedly the first Appellate Court did not apply the test as to what would be the consequence of rejection of any application under section 44 (1) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 and what would be the effect of non-rebuttal of the presumption made in favour of any party by virtue of recording of his or their names in the Record of Rights. In this regard Mr. Roy Chowdhury drew attention of this Court in so far as the observation of the learned Appellate Court below which is ?in the written statement of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 in paragraph 17 where the real facts have been stated it appears that the right title and interest have been asserted by the defendants on the basis of their alleged tenancy right as well as on the basis of adverse possession? and when the Appellate Court below observes it appears ?that the defendant is the sole witness of his own case and there is no corroboration about the story of adverse possession? and further when the Appellate Court below observed that the suit so far as the State of West Bengal is concerned stand dismissed and it may be noted further that if the plaintiff has already accepted the compensation on the role prepared in his favour involving the suit, it is a matter between the State of West Bengal and the plaintiff to get the payment back under due process of law. Mr. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that is it a test for ownership by way of adverse possession or is it a test for rebuttal of the presumption in so far as the Record of Rights is concerned, the answer must be in the negative. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted that one single evidence is sufficient to prove adverse possession if contrary is not proved and in this case the plaintiff failed to prove by way of contrary evidence that the defendants were not in possession adversely. Therefore, according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the Appellate Court below did not make a proper legal test when arriving at the decision. ( 13 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury relies on 2/3 more decisions in the case of (1) Iswar Das Jain (supra), (2) State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (supra), (3) Santosh Hazari v. Purusottam Tewari (supra ). Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that within the scope of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure the judgment impugned is to be tested and Harphool Singh's case observed that findings based on surmise and conjecture, perverse findings not based on legally acceptable evidence and which are patently contrary to law declared by Supreme Court, cannot have any impunity from interference in the hands of their Appellate Authority. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submits that in Santosh Hazari's case the Hon'ble Apex Court has detailed as to what are the substantial questions, of law and where the Court should interfere under section 100 CPC that is the scope of interference in an appeal and from the observations made in both the judgments of the Apex Court it will be clear that perversity, wrong tests in the matter of application of law and non-consideration of materials on record bring out the scope of interference of this High Court in a second appeal and here in the impugned judgment, the tests come out to be successful and according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, this Court should set aside the impugned judgment and decree under appeal and should dismiss the suit. ( 14 ) ON the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the Settlement Officer cannot record anybody's name on the basis of rent receipt given by other co-sharer. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that he filed ?b? ( 14 ) ON the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the Settlement Officer cannot record anybody's name on the basis of rent receipt given by other co-sharer. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that he filed ?b? Option Form and retained the land and if the defendant relies on the fact that the mother of the plaintiff granted permission then the possession must be permissive possession and the defendant cannot claim adverse possession. The learned counsel for respondents also submits that they have challenged the ROR in this suit and the ROR has been attested in 1958 and the suit has been filed in 1966 and therefore 12 years have not passed and the recording of entire plot in favour of the defendant is erroneous. The learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent relying on the decision reported in AIR 1970 Patna page 256 (supra) submits that for each of the years during which the rent was accepted from the tenant by the landlord the tenancy for that particular year was created in favour of the tenant and the tenant accordingly had no right to retain possession of land after lapse of the period during which he was allowed by the landlord to remain in possession by accepting rent from him. Learned counsel relied on the other decisions referred to above also and submitted that the possession of the appellants herein for more than 12 years could not be proved and Record of Rights is wrong and both the Courts found that there is no settlement. Concludingly, the learned counsel submits that the Appellate Court below rightly reversed the judgment of the trial Court. ( 15 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the respondents, on consideration of the plaint, written statement and the evidence on record, I respectfully disagree with the contentions made by the learned counsel for the respondent and agree with the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. In my opinion the judgment of the Appellate Court below is perverse and the trial Court applied wrong tests in the application of law. In my view, therefore, the appeal should be allowed and is allowed. The judgment impugned of the Appellate Court below is set aside and the suit stands dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs respectively. In my view, therefore, the appeal should be allowed and is allowed. The judgment impugned of the Appellate Court below is set aside and the suit stands dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs respectively. Let the decree be drawn up accordingly. The L. C. R. be sent down to the Court below forthwith. Appeal allowed