Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. In both the writ applications common questions of law and facts arise and as such they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. These applications have been filed for quashing the order dated 31.3.2003 (Annexure-1) whereby the petitioners promotion to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer Grade-II granted by order dated 30.9.1989 and 24.3.1990 with effect from 8.6.1980 has been cancelled. 3. Short facts giving rise to the present writ applications are that the Bihar State Food & Civil Supply Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) invited applications for appointment to the post of Senior Auditors. In pursuance of the said advertisement petitioners offered their candidature and on consideration of the inter-se merits of the candidates a list was prepared which contained the names of 36 persons. Out of 36 persons in the list, 16 were appointed to the post of Senior Auditor in the pay scale of Rs. 335-555, whereas the remaining 20 candidates, which included the petitioners appointed to the post of Assistant Accountants by order dated 3.6.1975 (Annexure-2) in the scale of pay of Rs. 260-498. Some of the persons who were appointed as Senior Auditors resigned and the vacancies occurring on account thereof were filled up by such of the Assistant Accountants who were higher in the list. However, some of the Assistant Accountants who were higher in the list and were not appointed to the post of Senior Auditor, although the vacancies existed filed representation praying for their appointment as such. 4. Thereafter the respondent Corporation took decision to down grade the post of Assistant Accounts Officer Grade- ll in the scale of pay of Rs. 580-840 to that of Rs. 335-555 and the petitioners were appointed on the said post. The matter in regard to grant of scale of Rs. 580-840 to the petitioners who were working on the post of Assistant Accounts Officer Grade- ll in the scale of pay of Rs. 335-555 was considered by the Establishment Committee of the Corporation in its meeting held on 20.4.1981 and it recommended that those of Assistant Accounts Officer Grade- ll who were appointed in the down graded scale of Rs. 335-555, be upgraded in the scale of Rs. 580-840. It is relevant here to state that the revised scales of pay of Rs. 335-555 and Rs. 580-840 were Rs. 335-555, be upgraded in the scale of Rs. 580-840. It is relevant here to state that the revised scales of pay of Rs. 335-555 and Rs. 580-840 were Rs. 725- 1210 and Rs. 880-1510 respectively. The respondent Corporation by its order dated 20.7.1984 (Annexure-5) promoted the petitioners to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer Grade-ll in the scale of Rs. 880- 1510 with effect from 1.4.1984. A copy of the said order was sent to the Chairman, Bureau of Public Enterprises. Petitioners filed representation dated 4.7.1989 (Annexure-6) for shifting the date of promotion and ultimately by order dated 30.9.1989 the Corporation shifted their date of promotion to 8.6.1980. Service books of the petitioners thereafter were sent for certification of pay scale by the Bureau of Public Enterprises which certified the same. Petitioners started getting the fruits of promotion with effect from 8.6.1980. 5. Audit objection was conveyed to the Managing Director of the Corporation by letter dated 9.12.2000 in which it was pointed out that during the audit for the years 1998-2000 it was found that the petitioners were promoted without the recommendation of the High Level Committee of the Bureau of Public Enterprises and without the approval/recommendation of the administrative department. It was pointed out that in view of the Memo no. 411 dated 22.11.1975, 152 dated 29.1.1981 and 459 dated 13.3.1981 of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, appointment as also promotion to the post whose maximum pay is Rs. 840/- has to be made on the basis of the recommendation of the High Level Committee of the Bureau of Public Enterprises but petitioners were promoted without any such recommendation. On receipt of the aforesaid objections by the audit the respondent corporation gave notice to the petitioners and on consideration of the same found that the petitioners promotion with effect from 8,6.1980 is illegal and accordingly by the impugned order dated 31.3.2003 same was cancelled and further direction was given to recover the amount paid in excess. 6. Mr. P.K.Shahi appearing on behalf of the petitioners made feeble attempt to contend that for promotion to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer in the scale of pay of Rs. 580-840 which was revised to 880-1510 no recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises was necessary. 6. Mr. P.K.Shahi appearing on behalf of the petitioners made feeble attempt to contend that for promotion to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer in the scale of pay of Rs. 580-840 which was revised to 880-1510 no recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises was necessary. Shri Sahi highlights that in view of the letter of Bureau of Public Enterprises dated 31.7.1986 (Annexure-9) recommendation of promotion for such of the employees was necessary whose maximum pay is Rs. 1510/-. It is pointed out that the scale of pay of the Assistant Accounts Officer Grade II was 580-840 at the relevant time which was revised to 880-1510, with effect from 1.4.1981. Mr. J. P. Shukla, Sr. Advocate however appearing on behalf of the respondent Corporation submits that the reliance of the petitioner on letter dated 31.7.1986 is apparently misconceived as the said letter is in respect of the promotion to Class-I and Class-II posts of the Public Sector Undertakings and petitioners not being in Class-I or Class-Il, the said circular does not govern the case of the petitioners. 7. Having appreciated the rival submission, I do not find any substance in the submission of Shri Shahi. From a perusal of the letter dated 31.7.1986 it is evident that the same relates to appointment/promotion of Class-I and Class-ll Officers of the public sector undertakings. Undisputedly petitioners are not Class I or Class II employees of the Corporation. Hence the petitioners shall not be governed by the said letter. 8. Later on Mr. Shahi had abandoned the said stand and contended that petitioners being eligible and having been promoted by the competent authority, the order cancelling their promotion only on the ground that recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises was not obtained shall be arbitrary. It has been pointed out that the order of promotion of the petitioners was forwarded to the Bureau of Public Enterprises and the latter being aware of the same and having never objected to the promotion of the petitioners it shall be inequitable to cancel the promotion after two decades. It has been pointed out that the order of promotion of the petitioners was forwarded to the Bureau of Public Enterprises and the latter being aware of the same and having never objected to the promotion of the petitioners it shall be inequitable to cancel the promotion after two decades. In support of his submission Shri Shahi has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Roshni Devi and others V/s. State of Haryana and others [ 1998 (8) S.C.C. 59 ] and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from the said judgment :- "However, as stated earlier, bearing in mind all the relevant facts and circumstances and bearing in mind the equity in favour of those who have already been appointed from out of the list prepared on 15.10.1989 and have served for more than 9 years, we issue the following directions in substitution of the directions made by the High Court in the impugned judgment:- (1) The appointments already made from out of the list prepared on 15.10.1989 will not be annulled." 9 Mr. J. P. Shukla however submits that the appointment of the petitioners having been made without the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, same is void and cannot be saved on the specious plea of equity. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.M. Latha and another V/s. State of Kerala and others [ 2003(3) S.C.C. 541 ] and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 13 of the judgment which reads as follows : "Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably but equity cannot override written or settled law. The Division Bench forgot that in extending relief on equity to BEd candidates who are unqualified and yet allowed to complete and seek appointments contrary to the terms of the advertisement, it is not redressing the injustice caused to the appellants who were TTC candidates and would have secured better position in the rank list to get appointment against the available vacancies, had BEd candidates been excluded from the selections. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is both illegal, inequitable and patently unjust. The TTC candidates before us as appellants have been wrongly deprived of due chance of selection and appointment. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is both illegal, inequitable and patently unjust. The TTC candidates before us as appellants have been wrongly deprived of due chance of selection and appointment. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench, therefore, deserves to be set aside and of the learned single Judge restored." 10. Another judgment on which reliance has been placed is the decision of this Court in the case of Sidheshwar Prasad & anr V/s. State of Bihar and Ors) 2003 (2) P.L.J.R. 259 and my attention has been drawn to paragraph-9 of the judgment which reads as follows:- "On the basis of the audit report, the District and Sessions Judge Nawadah. modified the notification, as contained in annexure-2, vide his order as contained in annexure 1 and directed the petitioners to pay the excess amount paid to them on account of promotion to junior selection grade only. The order impugned, as contained in annexure 1, is based on the resolution of the Finance Department, as referred to above, and at the same time, the petitioners had not put in five years of service to get junior selection grade promotion with effect from 3.8.1987. The selection grade promotion given to the petitioners, prima facie, appears to be ab initio void, as it was not permissible." 11. Neither on principle nor on precedent I am inclined to accept the submission of Shri Shahi. One of the requirements for promotion to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer Grade-II in pay scale in which petitioners were promoted was the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises. No such recommendation was either sought for by the Corporation nor was ever granted. Sending the orders of promotion in a routine manner as also sending the service book for fixation of the pay of the promoted employees shall not mean that the Corporation has either sought for the recommendation and the same cannot be construed to mean that the Bureau of Public Enterprises made recommendation for promotion of the petitioners. Thus the promotion of the petitioners have been made without the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises which is sine-qua-non. 12. Thus the promotion of the petitioners have been made without the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises which is sine-qua-non. 12. True it is that the petitioners are eligible for promotion and were promoted by the competent authority but the question is as to whether the defect of absence of recommendation by the Bureau of Public Enterprises can be ignored on the ground of equity. One may have inclined to ingore this requirement on the ground of equity had it happened in few cases, but the enormous number of cases in which promotions are made of a large number of people without obtaining the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, it becomes difficult for a court of equity to ignore the same all together. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of P.M.Latha (supra) the equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably but equity cannot override written or settled law. Recourse to principle of equity is taken to do justice between the parties when the field is open and no law covers that field. Here in the present case the requirements of consultation with the Bureau of Public Enterprises has all together been sidelined and promotions made. In a situation like this I am of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to the grant of reliefs by this Court on the plea of equity. 13. Now reverting to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Roshni Devi and ors. (supra) I am of the opinion that the same is clearly distinguishable. In the said case the appointment has not been found to be in breach of any rule and the only defect found in the appointment was that it was made after the expiry of the list. The Supreme Court taking into consideration the conduct of the State Government in not challenging the order of the High Court and also the plea that the employees continued in service for nine years did not quash the appointment. Further in the said case cancellation of appointment would have led to making those employees totally unemployed which is not the situation here. 14. I have found the promotion of the petitioners to be illegal only on the ground that the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises has not been obtained. Further in the said case cancellation of appointment would have led to making those employees totally unemployed which is not the situation here. 14. I have found the promotion of the petitioners to be illegal only on the ground that the recommendation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises has not been obtained. Keeping in mind the equity I direct that the case of the petitioners for promotion be sent to the Bureau of Public Enterprises for its post facto approval within two weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. The Bureau of Public Enterprises shall take a decision on this issue within two months from the date of receipt of its communication seeking post facto approval. In case the Bureau of Public Enterprises grants post facto approval, petitioners shall be allowed to continue on the promoted post and in that case promotion of the petitioners shall be deemed to be from the date it was granted to them unless and until the Bureau of Public Enterprises specifies any other date for promotion. The order impugned shall be kept in abeyance till the decision by the Bureau of Public Enterprises. 15. Mr. Shahi lastly submits that the amount already paid to the petitioners on account of their promotion is not fit to be recovered. He submits that no misrepresentation or fraud having been played by these petitioners, the direction given for recovery of the amount paid in excess on account of the promotion is not fit to be realised. Mr. Shukla however submits that in the facts of the present case respondent corporation is totally justified in directing for recovery of the amount paid in excess to the petitioners. 16. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter I am of the opinion that it shall be inequitable to ask for deduction of the amount already paid to the petitioners after such a long time. It is not the case of the respondents that petitioners are either ineligible to hold the promoted post or for that matter their promotion was made by incompetent person. Further no fraud or misrepresentation has been alleged. Hence that part of the impugned order, which directs for recovery of the amount already paid to the petitioners cannot be allowed to stand. 17. Both the writ applications stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No cost.