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2003 DIGILAW 998 (JHR)

Chandrama Singh v. State Bank Of India

2003-08-14

M.Y.EQBAL

body2003
JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner has challenged the Order of his dismissal from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority vide, order dated 26.9.1994 and also the order dated 9.5.1995 passed in departmental appeal affirming the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority, 2. Petitioner was in service of the respondent-State Bank of India as record- Keeper in Zonal Officer, Ranchi. By order dated 25.6.1991 he was put under suspension in anticipation of a departmental proceeding. Thereafter, petitioner was served with a charge sheet vide order dated 18.1.1992. The charges leveled against the petitioner are as under :-- "Charge No. 1.--That while you were working at Zonal Office, Ranchi, on 10th May, 1991 at around 2.45 p.m. you entered into the Chamber of the Administrative Secretary to the Dy. General Manager, S.B.I. Zonal Office, Ranchi in absolute drunken condition and thereafter you slumped into the vacant chair of Shri P.K. Bose, Steno-Typist with your foot on the table of Shri Bose. When you did not budge out on the request of the Administrative Secretary to the Dy. General Manager, the Asstt. Security Officer was called for the purpose and finally you were escorted out of the Chamber of the Ad-ministrative Secretary to the Dy. General Manager by the Asst. Security Officer. You were, thus, found guilty of drunkenness and indecent behavour in the premises of the Bank. Charge No. 2.--That on 26.6.1991 at 9.00 a.m. you were caught red handed in the act of filtching a Voltage Stabilizer, which was being used in the Talex Room on the 4th floor of the Zonal Office Building, by the Assistant Security Officer, SBI, Zonal Office, Ranchi, Shri N.K. Mishra, JMGSl. The above act on your part, besides casting serious aspersion on your integrity and bona fides, is highly prejudicial to the interest of the Bank." 3. Petitioner submitted his detailed show cause denying and disputing the charges leveled against him. The Inquiry Officer appointed by the respondent- Bank proceeded with the inquiry and submitted his inquiry report. The Inquiry Officer divided charge No. 1 in two sub-heads. First part of the charge is that at around 2.45 p.m. on May 10, 1991 the charged employee in drunken state was found seated on the vacant chair of Steno-typist Sri P.K. Bose. The Inquiry Officer appointed by the respondent- Bank proceeded with the inquiry and submitted his inquiry report. The Inquiry Officer divided charge No. 1 in two sub-heads. First part of the charge is that at around 2.45 p.m. on May 10, 1991 the charged employee in drunken state was found seated on the vacant chair of Steno-typist Sri P.K. Bose. The Inquiry Officer held that the prosecution failed to produce any evidence to prove that seat of Steno-typist was vacant. It was therefore, held that this part of the charge has not been proved. The second part of the charge was that the charged employee in a drunken state was escorted out of the Chamber. The Inquiry Officer found that the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution was not corroborated by pathological test as required and therefore this part of the charge stands partially proved. The Inquiry Officer further found that charge No. 2 has not been proved. 4. The Disciplinary Authority however, disagreed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and issued show-cause notice to the petitioner holding that charge No. 1 has been fully proved and the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer is ridiculous and perverse. However, the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the finding of the Inquiry Officer as against Charge No. 2 petitioner filed his show cause and stated that even part of the charge No. 1 has not been partially proved and therefore petitioner is bound to be exonerated from the charges. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the show cause of the petitioner passed the impugned order of punishment by way of dismissal of the petitioner from the service. Petitioner filed departmental appeal, which was ultimately heard by General Manager (Operations) who affirmed the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 5. I have heard Mr. Saurabh Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Kameshwar Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank. 6. Mr. Saurabh Arun, learned counsel assailed the impugned order of punishment by way of dismissal from service absolutely illegal and unsustainable in law. Learned counsel submitted that the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is perverse in law and based on no evidence. Kameshwar Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank. 6. Mr. Saurabh Arun, learned counsel assailed the impugned order of punishment by way of dismissal from service absolutely illegal and unsustainable in law. Learned counsel submitted that the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is perverse in law and based on no evidence. Learned counsel lastly submitted that in any view of the matter the impugned order of punishment is excessive and disproportionate to the charges leveled against the petitioner, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kishan v. Union of India and Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 157 , in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Sh. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 5 JT 548 : 1998 (6) Supreme 486 , and in the case of State Bank of India and Ors. v. K.P. Narayanan Kutry, (2003) 2 SCC 449 . 7. Mr. Kameshwar Prasad, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-Bank submitted that the Disciplinary Authority rightly came to the conclusion that the Inquiry Officer over-looked and ignored the evidence adduced by the prosecution side the therefore the Disciplinary Authority rightly arrived at its own conclusion. Learned counsel submitted that the appellate authority passed a reasoned order after re-appreciation of the entire evidence. The order of dismissal therefore needs no interference by this Court. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 . 8. As noticed above, there were two charges leveled against the petitioner. So far charge No. 2 is concerned, the Inquiry Officer found that the said charge was not proved. The Disciplinary Authority agreed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. The only charge therefore against the petitioner was charge No. 1, against which the Inquiry-Officer held that the said charge has been partially proved inasmuch as so far the charge against the petitioner that he in a drunken state was found seated in the vacant seat of the Steno-typist has not been proved. So far second part of the charge that the petitioner was in a drunken state was escorted out of the Chamber has been partially proved by oral evidence without any pathological test. So far second part of the charge that the petitioner was in a drunken state was escorted out of the Chamber has been partially proved by oral evidence without any pathological test. The Disciplinary Authority in the show cause notice deferred with the finding of the Inquiry Officer on the ground that Steno-typist was present on that date does not mean that he was occupying his chair throughout office hour and never vacated it. On consideration of the show cause the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order of punishment upheld that tentative punishment decided by him in the show cause notice and passed the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. 9. It is well settled law that if the Disciplinary Authority differs with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, it is necessary that its conclusion in that behalf should be satisfied in the second notice. The Disciplinary Authority should expressly states that it differs with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and then indicate nature of the action proposed to be taken against him. In the instant case, the Disciplinary Authority has complied the requirement of law and has recorded reasons holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. The appellate authority also after re-appreciation of entire facts and circumstances came to a finding that charge No. 1 has been proved. I do not find any reason to substitute my own finding as an appellate Court. The finding therefore, needs no interference. 10. Be that as it may, even assuming that charge No. 1 has been partially proved against the petitioner, the punishment by way of dismissal from service is harsh and totally disproportionate to the charges leveled against the petitioner. 11. In the case of Ram Kishan v. Union of India, (supra) their lordships while considering similar question observed "It is next to be seen whether imposition of the punishment of Dismissal from service is proportionate to the gravity of the imputation. When abusive language is used by anybody against a superior, it must be understood in the environment in which that person is situated and the circumstances surrounding the event that let to the use of abusive language. No strait-jacket formula could be evolved in adjudging whether the abusive language in the given circumstances would warrant dismissal from service. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. No strait-jacket formula could be evolved in adjudging whether the abusive language in the given circumstances would warrant dismissal from service. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. What was the nature of the abusive language used by the appellant was not stated." "On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the imposition of punishment of dismissal from service is harsh and disproportionate to the gravity of charge imputed to the delinquent constable. Accordingly, we set aside the dismissal order. We hold that imposition of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect would be an appropriate punishment. So, we direct the disciplinary authority to impose that punishment. However, since the appellant himself is responsible for the initiation of the proceedings, we find that he is not entitled to back wages; but, all other consequential benefits would be available to him." 12. Taking into consideration the entire facts of the case and the Principle of Law decided by the Supreme Court, in my opinion dismissal of the petitioner from service would be disproportionate to the nature of charges leveled against him. The Disciplinary Authority is required to reconsider the quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. This writ application is therefore allowed and the impugned order of punishment by way of dismissal from service is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority with a direction to reconsider the case of the petitioner relating to quantum of punishment other than dismissal from service and to pass fresh order of punishment which must not be disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner taking into consideration the observation made in this judgment.