JUDGMENT 1. - These five appeals have been filed against a common judgment of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Doongarpur dated 23.3.1996. All these claims arise out of the same accident, and therefore, they are being decided by this common order. 2. Facts of the case are that on 2.10.1990, the Mini Bus GQE 2295 was going from Udaipur Ahmedabad on National High Way No. 8, carrying passengers, being driven by defendant No. 1, belonging to defendant No. 2, and insured with defendant No. 3. This Bus is alleged to have been driven at a fast speed and negligently, as a result of which, at about 6.15 P.M., near Village Barothi the driver lost control, and the Bus overturned, as a result of which, various persons received injuries, and one Vasudeo died. Out of this accident as many as 12 claim petitions were filed, and later on the learned Trial Court vide order dated 7.5.1995 ordered all the claim petitions to be consolidated with claim Petition No. 49 of 1991. This consolidation order was passed before commencement of the evidence of the parties. After recording such of the evidence as were produced by the parties, the learned Tribunal decided issue No. 1 by holding that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the Bus by the defendant No. 1. Issue No. 2 and were also decided in favour of the claimants. However, while deciding issue No. 4, relating to quantum of compensation to be awarded in each claim, the learned Trial Court found, that the claimants in these five appeals have not at all appeared in the evidence, and therefore, they are not entitled to any compensation. 3. It may be observed here that while deciding issue No. 1 also, the learned trial Court had found ,that it is not proved, that the victim claimants in these five claims received any injuries. With the result that award for different amounts were passed in other seven claim petitions, while these five claim petitions have been dismissed. 4. Assailing the impugned judgment and award, only submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants is, that the claim petitions have been dismissed because the victim claimants in these cases did not appear to give evidence. 4. Assailing the impugned judgment and award, only submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants is, that the claim petitions have been dismissed because the victim claimants in these cases did not appear to give evidence. It is contended that the claim petitions were tried at Doongarpur, while these claimants were residents of Ahmedabad and Bombay, and since they did not get any information from the counsel, requiring them to appear for evidence they could not appear, and thus for the fault of lawyer, in not informing them, the claimants should not made to suffer. With this contention, it is prayed that the impugned judgment and award be set aside, and the matters be remanded back to the learned Tribunal, for giving adequate opportunity to the appellants to lead evidence, and then to decide the claim afresh on merits in accordance with law. 5. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, that in claim Petition No. 56 filed by Narhari Bhai, and Claim Petition No. 59 filed by Mannilal, even according to the memo of appeal, the to claimants had expired, way back on 10.4.1994, and 23.12.1991 respectively, and admittedly since their legal representatives had not been brought on record, the claim petitions stood abated. It is also contended, that in view of the claim petitions having abated, these appeals are not competent. It is next contended, that even on merits, the stand taken by the claimants cannot be accepted, as it is not shown that they ever made any efforts to find out the progress of the claim petitions, otherwise they would, very well have learnt about the requirement to appear in evidence. Thus, the claimants are guilty of gross negligence, and therefore, no interference is required to be made in these appeals. 6. I have considered the submissions, and have also perused the record, which has been requisitioned vide order dated 1.8.2001. 7. The question for determination, therefore, is as to whether the inability to lead evidence, on account of having not received any information from their counsel, can be accepted, and as to whether the Appeals No. 702 and 704 of 2001 are at all competent? 8. 7. The question for determination, therefore, is as to whether the inability to lead evidence, on account of having not received any information from their counsel, can be accepted, and as to whether the Appeals No. 702 and 704 of 2001 are at all competent? 8. A bare perusal of the memo of appeal in Appeals No. 702 and 704, and it does show, that therein it has clearly been averred that the respective claimants died in the year 1994 and 1991, and the only stand taken is, that the legal representatives were not knowing the fact of the death, the claim could not proceed on his behalf, and no evidence was led. 9. In substance, therefore, apart from pleading ignorance of the filiation of by the deceased, the stand again tantamount to be the same, i.e. no-: having received any information from the lawyer at Doongarpur. Therefore, I would better like to examine this aspect, as to whether this story projected on behalf of the appellants, in all the five appeals, is at all worthy reliance? 10. A perusal of the record shows, that the case was fixed for evidence on 5.8.1995, on which date adjournment was sought, and the case was fixed on 30.9.1995. On this date statements of two claimants Jyotindra and Natwarlal were recorded. Then the case was adjourned to 18.11.1995. On that date. again two more witnesses Shantilal and Ambalal were examined, and the learned counsel for claimants was directed to produce all witnesses on the next date of hearing being 6.1.1996. On this date again two witnesses Amarkant and Chinubai were examined, and the case was adjourned to 24.2.1996 with a direction to examine all the remaining witnesses. On 24.2.1996 again one witness Krishan Kant Dave examined, and certain documents were taken on record, and the case was still again adjourned for claimants' evidence to 16.3.1996. It is on this date, since no witness had appeared on behalf of claimants, looking to the fact that many opportunities had already been given, the evidence was closed. 11. This does show that the case went on for claimants' evidence for half a dozen hearings spread over a long time. In this sequence a look at the impugned judgment shows, that out of the claimants in all the 12 claim petitions, none of the claimants were residents of Doongarpur, or any area around that place. 11. This does show that the case went on for claimants' evidence for half a dozen hearings spread over a long time. In this sequence a look at the impugned judgment shows, that out of the claimants in all the 12 claim petitions, none of the claimants were residents of Doongarpur, or any area around that place. Rather all of them were residents of Ahmedabad or Bombay. It is also significant to note, that one lawyer, Mr. Srikant Jain, was engaged by all the claimants. In that view of the matter, when the claimants from the distant areas did appear to give evidence on different dates of hearing, it is obvious, that the lawyer had sent intimation to the claimants, to requiring them to appear in evidence. In the ordinary course of things, it cannot be conjectured, that the learned counsel was choosy in intimating some of the clients, and did not feel like informing other clients, or that there was any special reasons not to inform some of the claimants. Since various claimants appeared on various dates, in piecemeal, the obvious conclusion is that the learned counsel must have informed all the claimants, on such address that may have been given to him, and the learned counsel tried his best to obtain, as many opportunities as he could, to ensure that all claimants do appear to give evidence. Neither learned counsel for the appellants could point out, nor there is anything on record, to show, as to why the learned counsel Shri Jain would not have informed the claimants in these five appeals only. 12. Thus, the only conclusion, deducible from this sequence of circumstances of the case is, that it were the claimants, either did not pay any heed to the communication of the learned counsel, or did not find time to appear on the date, or may be, that looking to the injuries sustained, within their hearts of hearts, did not feel it worthwhile to travel, all the way of Doongarpur from their residence, and are now only trying to pass on the blame on the learned counsel Mr. Jain. 13. Jain. 13. In this view of the matter, it is also clear, that had the legal representatives of Narhari Bhai and Mannilal bothered, for the communication of the Advocate, at least at a belated stage, they could have moved requisite application for substitution of legal representatives, before the claim was decided, but then, they also stand at par with the other claimants, in the remaining three appeals. 14. Thus, the theory propounded by the appellants, about the learned counsel having not informed about the progress of the case or about their requirement to appear for evidence, cannot be believed. With the obvious result that, it cannot be said. that the appellants did not get sufficient opportunity to lead evidence, or the learned trial Court was in error in not giving adequate opportunity, to the claimants, to lead evidence. Likewise in view of the above findings, there does not appear any sufficient cause, for legal representatives of Narhari Bhai and Mannilal, in Claim Cases No. 56/1991 and 59/1991, for not taking steps for substitution of legal representatives, of the deceased claimants. 15. Thus, the net result is, that all the five appeals fail, and are hereby dismissed summarily.Appeal Dismissed. *******