B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE Singareni Collieries Company limited is in appeal before us assailing the order of the learned single Judge dated March 27, 2003 made in W. P. No. 12775 of 1995 whereunder the learned Judge dismissed the said writ petition filed by the appellant herein and accordingly confirmed the award passed by the Industrialtribunal in I. D. No. 16 of 1993. ( 2 ) THE facts now beyond the pale of controversy are few and may briefly be stated: the Second respondent-workman was appointed as Mazdoor in the appellant-company in Category-I with effect from 23/11/1964. Later, he was promoted to Category-IV in 1966 and category-V with effect from 1/06/1976. He became eligible for being promoted to category-VI. That he met with an accident on 14/12/1983 while working in the night shift of VI Incline, Godavarikhani. After recovery, the Medical Officer and Neuro surgeon issued a certificate of fitness dated 9/08/1984 certifying that he was fit for duty after taking rest for a period of one month. The Medical Board did not agree with the said certificate issued by the Medical Officer and declared him to be unfit to hold the post in category-V (underground) by its order dated 23/11/1984. ( 3 ) FOR whatever reasons, the services of the second respondent-workman were terminated on 17/03/1985 by the appellant company without even considering his case as to whether he was fit for being assigned any surface job. On the representation of the respondent workman the appellant company by an order dated 15/09/1985 reinstated him into the service and accordingly posted him as Fitter (category-IV) with effect from 16/09/1985 on surface for a period of two months. Thereafter his services were extended for another two months by an order dated November 29, 1985. On further extension, he remained and continued to discharge the same duties till 9/04/1986. Thereafter, he was regularly engaged from 15/04/1986 onwards on the surface job. He was even promoted to the post of Fitter (category-V) by an order dated 29/06/1989 with retrospective effect from 1/03/1989. Be that as it may, by an order dated 21/04/1988 the absence of the second respondent- workman from duties from 17/03/1985 to 10/09/1985 and intermittent artificial break up to 14/04/1986 were treated as leave on loss of pay for continuity of service and for the purpose of payment of gratuity. Be that as it may, by an order dated 21/04/1988 the absence of the second respondent- workman from duties from 17/03/1985 to 10/09/1985 and intermittent artificial break up to 14/04/1986 were treated as leave on loss of pay for continuity of service and for the purpose of payment of gratuity. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellant-Company, the second respondent-Workman raised a dispute and ultimately the matter was referred to the industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act ). ( 4 ) THE Government of India, Ministry of labour by its order dated 29/03/1993 referred the following dispute for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal: "whether the action of the management of Singareni Collieries company Ltd. Area-I, Ramagundam Division in denying continuity of service and pay protection to Sri Syed Khaja Pasha, Fitter, is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled to?" ( 5 ) THE second respondent-workman filed a detailed claim statement before the Industrial tribunal attacking the decision of the appellant-company dated 21/04/1988 treating the period of absence from M 17/03/1985 to September 10, 1985 and also intermittent breaks during temporary appointments up to 14/04/1986 as leave on loss of pay for continuity of service and for the purpose of gratuity. The second respondent-workman inter alia raised the contention that the appellant-company should have considered the said period for continuity of service and as well as for all purposes including the seniority, promotion, pay fixation and other consequential benefits. The case of the second respondent-workman was that his juniors who were working in category-V as on the date of his termination have been promoted to category-VI and further promoted to c grade charge hand and, therefore, he is entitled to be treated on par with his junior but for his illegal termination. ( 6 ) SHORN of all the details - The decision of the appellant-Company in not giving continuity of service and pay protection from date of the second respondent-Workman rejoining the duties after his recovery from illness has been challenged before the Tribunal. The decision of the appellant-company, according to the respondent-workman is illegal and arbitrary. ( 7 ) THE appellant-company opposed the claim of the respondent workman and filed a detailed counter. The decision of the appellant-company, according to the respondent-workman is illegal and arbitrary. ( 7 ) THE appellant-company opposed the claim of the respondent workman and filed a detailed counter. It was mainly contended that the respondent-workman himself submitted in writing that he was prepared to work in category-IV wages and accordingly he was appointed afresh at 18 M. W. power House, godavarikhani on 11/09/1985 on an initial basic pay of Category-IV and subsequently he was confirmed in that category on 15/07/1986. Though it was a fresh appointment given on the strength of the representation made by the second respondent-workman and the unions, as a special case, the appellant-management has granted continuity of service treating the intervening period i. e. from the date of unfitness to the date of reappointment as leave on loss of pay only for the purpose of gratuity. If at all, the respondent workman was aggrieved, he ought to have raised the dispute and agitated the issue in 1984 Itself. The appellant-management contended that the respondent-workman is not entitled for pay protection and so far as the continuity of service is concerned, it has already been given by the appellant-management. It is not necessary to refer to the other pleas raised by the appellant-management opposing the claim of the respondent-workman. ( 8 ) THE Industrial Tribunal having regard to the contents of the claim petition and counter framed the following points for its consideration:"the point for adjudication is whether the action of the respondent in denying continuity of service and pay protection to sri Syed Khaja Pasha, Fitter is legal and justified?" ( 9 ) THERE is no controversy whatsoever that both the appellant-management and respondent-workman have not adduced any evidence, nor any submissions were made by them before the Tribunal. The Tribunal having noticed the same observed that it has no other alternative except to record a finding from the claim statement and counter filed by the parties. ( 10 ) THE Industrial Tribunal after going through the claim statement and counter filed by the appellant-management found that the action of the appellant-management in not giving continuity of service and pay protection to the respondent- workman is arbitrary and unjust. ( 11 ) THE award passed by the Industrial tribunal is not supported by any reasons. ( 10 ) THE Industrial Tribunal after going through the claim statement and counter filed by the appellant-management found that the action of the appellant-management in not giving continuity of service and pay protection to the respondent- workman is arbitrary and unjust. ( 11 ) THE award passed by the Industrial tribunal is not supported by any reasons. The award does not disclose as if any records were made available by the appellant-management for the perusal of the Tribunal and the same were perused by it. There is no finding as such recorded by the Industrial Tribunal except granting relief as prayed for by the respondent-workman. It is not known as to on what basis the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the action of the appellant-management in denying continuity of service and pay protection to the respondent- workman is not legal and justified. ( 12 ) WE are really astonished to note that an Industrial Tribunal presided by a senior district Judge could have disposed of the lis in such a manner as it did in the instant case. We restrain ourselves and wish not to make further comment about the manner in which the reference has been disposed of by the Industrial tribunal. ( 13 ) THE appellant herein challenged the said award in this Court in W. P. No. 12775 of 1995 and accordingly prayed for issuance of a writ of Certlorari to call for the concerned records and quash the same. ( 14 ) IT was mainly contended by the appellant-company before the learned single judge as well as before us that the conclusion reached by the Industrial Tribunal cannot be equated to that of any finding as such recorded by the Tribunal. No relief could have been granted in the absence of any clear findings by the Tribunal. ( 15 ) THE learned single Judge observed that in the circumstances of the case "there was no necessity of leading any evidence by the parties except filing pleadings before the tribunal. " The learned single Judge went into the merits of the case and accordingly found that the respondent-workman is entitled for protection of his pay as was last drawn in the post held by him as on the date of declaration that he was unfit to hold the post. The learned judge accordingly confirmed the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. The learned judge accordingly confirmed the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. ( 16 ) SRI K. Srinivasa Murthy, learned counsel for the appellant herein, submitted that the award passed by the industrial Tribunal is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and it is eminently a fit case requiring this Court s interference in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. It was contended that the finding reached by the Tribunal without there being any evidence on record is perverse ( 17 ) THE short question that falls for consideration is as to whether an Industrial tribunal/labour Court can record findings and dispose of the industrial disputes without recording any evidence whatsoever, particularly in case where the claim of the workman is disputed by the management? whether the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court can dispose of the lis on the strength of mere pleadings without recording any evidence? ( 18 ) IN our considered opinion, the whole procedure adopted by the Industrial Tribunal in the instant case to dispose of the lis in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, is totally vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. Such dismissal has resulted in manifest injustice. It is not only contrary to the rules framed under the Act known as "the Industrial disputes (Central) Rules, 1957," but is also violative of principles of natural justice. ( 19 ) IN Bharat Bank v. Employees of bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950-LLJ-921, a Constitutional Bench of the supreme Court had an occasion to consider the nature, scope, functions and duties of the industrial Tribunal. The Court observed that the functions and duties of the Industrial tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions, although it is not a Court. "the rules framed by the Tribunal require evidence to be taken and witnesses to be examined, cross-examined and re-examined. The Act constituting the tribunal imposes penalties for incorrect statements made before the Tribunal. While the powers of the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from those of an ordinary civil Court and it has jurisdiction and powers to give reliefs which a civil court administering the law of the land (for instance, ordering the reinstatement of a workman) does not possess in the discharge of its duties it is essentially working as a judicial body. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Having considered all the provisions of the Act it seems to me clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near to those of a Court, although it is not a Court in the technical sense of the word. " ( 20 ) THE Supreme Court having referred to various provisions of the Act as well as the rules framed thereunder framed a question in the following manner for its determination: "it is now convenient to consider whether a tribunal constituted under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, exercises all or any of the functions of a Court of justice and whether it discharges them according to law or whether it can act as it likes in its deliberations and is guided by its own notions of right and wrong. " (Emphasis is added ). ( 21 ) IT is in that context the Court observed:"it is difficult to conceive in view of these provisions that the Industrial Tribunal performs any functions other than that of a judicial nature. The Tribunal has certainly the first three requisites and characteristics of a Court as defined above. It has certainly a considerable element of the fourth also inasmuch as the Tribunal cannot take any administrative action the character of which is determined by its own choice. It has to make the adjudication in accordance with the provision of the Act as laid down in section 7. It consists of persons who are qualified to be or have been Judges. It is its duty to adjudicate on a serious dispute between employers and employees as affecting their right of freedom of contract and it can impose liabilities of a pecuniary nature and disobedience of its award is made punishable. The powers exercisable by a tribunal of the nature were considered in a judgment of the Federal Court of India in western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1949 F. C. R. 321 : AIR 1949 FC 111 and it was observed that such a Tribunal can do what no Court can, namely, add to or alter the terms or conditions of the contract of service. The tribunal having been entrusted with the duty of adjudicating a dispute of a peculiar character, it is for this reason that it is armed with extraordinary powers. These powers, however, are derived from the statute. The tribunal having been entrusted with the duty of adjudicating a dispute of a peculiar character, it is for this reason that it is armed with extraordinary powers. These powers, however, are derived from the statute. These are the rules of the game and it has to decide according to these rules. The powers conferred have the sanction of law behind it and are not exercisable by reason of any discretion vested in the members of the tribunal. The adjudication of the dispute has to be in accordance with evidence legally adduced and the parties have a right to be heard and being represented by a legal practitioner. Right to examine and cross-examine witnesses has been given to the parties and finally they can address the tribunal when evidence is closed. The whole procedure adopted by the Act and the rules is modeled on the Code of Civil procedure. In my opinion, therefore, the industrial Tribunal has all the necessary attributes of a Court of justice. It has no other function except that of adjudicating in a dispute. It is no doubt true that by reason of the nature of the dispute that they have to adjudicate the law gives them wider powers than are possessed by ordinary Courts of law, but powers of such a nature do not affect the question that they are exercising judicial power. Statutes like the Relief of indebtedness Act, or the Encumbered estates Act have conferred powers on courts which are not ordinarily known to law and which affect contractual rights. That circumstance does not make them anything else but Tribunals exercising judicial power of the State though in a degree different from the ordinary Courts and to an extent which is also different from that enjoyed by an ordinary Court of law. They may rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because they are out of the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system but that circumstance cannot affect the question of their being within the ambit of Article 136. " ( 22 ) WHILE adverting to the question raised that the award of the Tribunal is based on no evidence whatsoever and the consequences thereof, the Apex Court held:"the next question raised by the learned counsel was that the award of the Tribunal is based on no evidence whatsoever. This contention requires serious consideration. " ( 22 ) WHILE adverting to the question raised that the award of the Tribunal is based on no evidence whatsoever and the consequences thereof, the Apex Court held:"the next question raised by the learned counsel was that the award of the Tribunal is based on no evidence whatsoever. This contention requires serious consideration. I have examined the proceedings of the tribunal and it appears that all it did was as required by Rule 17 at the first sitting it called upon the parties to state their cases. Mr. Parwana on behalf of the employees stated their respective cases and Mr. Ved vyas who represented the bank stated the bank s case and after the cases have been stated the proceedings terminated and both parties addressed arguments and the tribunal proceeded to give its award. Wheather the charge of victimisation in individual cases was proved or not depended on proof of certain facts which had to be established by evidence. The onus of proving victimisation clearly rested on the employees. No evidence whatsoever was led on their behalf. The statement of the case by Mr. Parwana was not on oath. There was no examination or cross-examination of Mr. Parwana. No affidavit supporting the facts stated by Mr. Parwana was filed by him or by any employee. Mr. Parwana produced an abstract of the correspondence but the original correspondence was not produced. The bank disputed the facts stated by Mr. Parwana by means of a lengthy affidavit. It seems no reference was made even to this affidavit by the Tribunal. No counter affidavit was filed in replay to the facts stated in this affidavit. The bank wanted to call some evidence. Particular reference was made in respect of a scurrilous letter issued by one Bhattacharya on behalf of the employees and distributed by them, which it is alleged considerably shook the credit of the bank. This opportunity was denied to it. It was contended before us that the bank wanted to lead evidence on certain matters and that the opportunity to lead it was denied. There is nothing on the record to support this contention. The result therefore is that the facts on the basis of which allegations of victimisation have been made are neither supported by an affidavit nor by any evidence and the award is based on no evidence whatsoever. There is nothing on the record to support this contention. The result therefore is that the facts on the basis of which allegations of victimisation have been made are neither supported by an affidavit nor by any evidence and the award is based on no evidence whatsoever. The Act as well as the rules framed under it contemplate a proper hearing, discovery and inspection of documents and production of evidence, etc. None of this procedure was followed by the tribunal. It is difficult to see on what material the Tribunal has given its award, as there is none existing on the present record and the respondents counsel could point out to any such material. At one time during the argument I was inclined to think that possibly both parties by agreement consented to treat the statement of case as evidence in the case and did not wish to produce any other evidence, but the affidavit filed on behalf of the bank disputes all the facts stated by Mr. Parwana. The only evidence on the record is bank s affidavit and if the facts contained in the affidavit are accepted, then the determination made by Tribunal cannot stand. It seems to me therefore that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal was against all principles of natural justice and the award is thereby vitiated and should be set aside. It happens that when the safeguard of an appeal is not provided by law the tendency sometimes is to act in an arbitrary manner like a benevolent despot. Benevolent despotism, however, is foreign to a democratic Constitution. The members of the Tribunal seem to have thought that having heard the statement of the cases of the parties they could proceed to a judgment on their own view of its right or wrong unaided by any material. That kind of procedure to my mind is unwarranted by the statute and is foreign to a democratic constitution. In these circumstances it is the- compelling duty of this Court to exercise its extraordinary powers and to quash such an award. " ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court has gone to the extent of observing that it is the compelling duty of the Courts exercising powers of Judicial review to exercise their extraordinary powers and to quash the awards, which are not based on any evidence and which have been passed without following the procedure prescribed. " ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court has gone to the extent of observing that it is the compelling duty of the Courts exercising powers of Judicial review to exercise their extraordinary powers and to quash the awards, which are not based on any evidence and which have been passed without following the procedure prescribed. ( 24 ) IN Shankar Chakravarthy v. Britannia biscuit Co. AIR 1979 SC 1652 : 1979 (3) SCC 3 : 1979-I-LLJ-194 the Supreme Court observed that the Labour Court or Industrial tribunal to which either a reference under section 10 or an application under Section 33 for permission to take an intended action or approval of an action already taken is made, would be exercising quasi-judicial powers, which would imply that a certain content of the judicial power of the State is vested in it and it is called upon to exercise it. "a quasi-judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves presentation of their case by the parties to the dispute and if the dispute between them is on a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of arguments by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence (See Cooper v. Wilson) 1937 (2) KB 309. Parties are arrayed before these quasi-judicial Tribunals either upon a reference under Section 10 or Section 33. There is thus a Us between the parties. There would be assertion and denial of facts on either side. . . . . . . . . . The system adopted by these Tribunals is an adversary system, a word as understood in contra-distinction to inquisitorial system. This also becomes clear from Rule 10-B (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which provides that when a reference is made to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, within two weeks of the date of receipt of the order of reference the parties representing workmen and the employer involved in the dispute shall file within the Labour Court or industrial Tribunal a statement of demands relying only upon issues which are included in the order of reference and shall also forward a copy of such statement to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute. Sub-rule (2) provides that within two weeks of receipt of the statement referred to in sub- rule (1) the opposite party shall file its rejoinder with the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal as the case may be and simultaneously forward a copy thereof to the other party. Sub- rule (4) provides that the hearing of the dispute shall ordinarily be continued from day-to-day and arguments shall follow immediately after the closing of the evidence. Sub-rule (6) casts a duty on the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal as the case may be, to make a memorandum of the substance of the proceedings of what the witnesses depose and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Presiding officer. " ( 25 ) IT is held by the Apex Court in categorical terms that the Labour Court or the tribunal would proceed, to decide the lis between the parties. It has to decide the lis on the evidence adduced before it. While it may not be hidebound by the rules prescribed in the evidence Act it is nonetheless a quasi- judicial tribunal proceeding to adjudicate upon a lis between the parties arrayed before it and must decide the matter on the evidence produced by the parties before it. It would not be open to it to decide the lis on any extraneous considerations. Justice, enquiry and good conscience will inform its adjudication. Therefore, the Labour Court or Industrial tribunal has all the trappings of a Court. If such be the duties and functions of the Industrial tribunal/labour Court or any party appearing before it must make a claim or demur the claim of the other side and when there is a burden upon it to prove or establish the fact so as to invite a decision in its favour, it has to lead evidence. The quasi-judicial Tribunal is not required to advise the party either about its rights or what it should do or omit to do. Obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be who would fail if no evidence is led. It must seek an opportunity to lead evidence and lead evidence. A contention to substantiate which evidence is necessary has to be pleaded. If there is no pleading raising a contention there is no question of substantiating such a non-existing contention by evidence. The test would be who would fail if no evidence is led. It must seek an opportunity to lead evidence and lead evidence. A contention to substantiate which evidence is necessary has to be pleaded. If there is no pleading raising a contention there is no question of substantiating such a non-existing contention by evidence. It is well settled that allegation which is not pleaded, even if there is evidence in support of it, cannot be examined because the other side has no notice of it and if entertained it would tantamount to granting an unfair advantage to the first mentioned party. . . . . . . . Can it for a moment be suggested that this elementary principle does not inform industrial adjudication? The answer must be an emphatic no . (Emphasis is ours) ( 26 ) IN British India Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, 1989-II-LLJ-319 (All), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the difference between onus of proof and burden of proof and observed at p. 322:"7. There is difference between onus of proof and burden of proof. Onus of proof is always fixed whereas burden of proof shifts. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of kalwa Devadattam v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 880 , the question of onus probandi is certainly important in the early stages of a case. In case no evidence at all is led on the question in dispute by either side, the party on whom the onus lies to prove certain fact must fail. Where however evidence has been led by the contesting parties on the mooted question, abstract considerations of onus are out of place and in such a situation truth or otherwise of the case must always be adjudged on the evidence let by the parties. In the present case the onus of proving that the nature of duties of checkers and perchers were the same, no doubt lay on the workmen. But after the evidence regarding the same has been led in the case, the workmen can rely on the evidence of the employers themselves for the decision of the said issue. Thus the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner regarding the onus of proof is devoid of substance. " ( 27 ) THE Supreme Court in Bareilly electricity Supply Co. Thus the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner regarding the onus of proof is devoid of substance. " ( 27 ) THE Supreme Court in Bareilly electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1972 SC 330 : 1971 (2) SCC 617 : 1971-II-LLJ-407 while considering the contention that the Evidence Act does not strictly apply to the proceedings before the tribunal held that even the observations of t. L. VENKATARAMA IYER, J. , in Union of India v. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 : 1958-II-LLJ-259 do not justify the submission that in labour matters where issues are seriously contested and have to be established and proved the requirements relating to proof can be dispensed with. It is observed:"even if all technicalities of the Evidence act are not strictly applicable except in so far as Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 and the prescribed therein permit it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witnesses who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced. Again if a party wants an inspection. it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection, in so far as that is relevant to the enquiry. The applicability of these principles are well recognised and admit of no doubt. " ( 28 ) IN the instant case, we have already noticed the nature and contents of the claim statement filed by the respondent-workman seeking relief as against the appellant-company and we have also noticed the reference made to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The appellant-company emphatically denied the claim put forth by the respondent-workman. It was specifically contended that the respondent-workman is not entitled for any relief whatsoever. Each of the facts alleged in the claim statement have been disputed by the appellant-company in its counter filed before the Tribunal. More than one issue had arisen before the Tribunal in order to dispose of the reference made to it by the Government. There is any amount of controversy between the appellant-company and the respondent- workman both on question of fact and law. More than one issue had arisen before the Tribunal in order to dispose of the reference made to it by the Government. There is any amount of controversy between the appellant-company and the respondent- workman both on question of fact and law. ( 29 ) NO relief as prayed for by the respondent-workman could have been granted by the Industrial Tribunal without adverting to the facts in dispute, which could be resolved only on the basis of the evidence let in by the parties. We have no doubt whatsoever in our mind that the initial burden is upon the respondent- workman to make out a case and satisfy the Tribunal as to how he is entitled for the relief claimed by him. It is a different matter altogether, as has been observed by the Apex court that the burden of proof may to some extent become insignificant provided there is some evidence available on record even let in by the management. Even the evidence let in by the management, if any, may provide requisite evidence enabling the Tribunal to dispose of the lis and in such an event the burden of proof may pale into insignificance. But, unfortunately, in the instant case, there is no evidence either by the respondent-workman or by the appellant-management. In the absence of any such evidence, the Tribunal could not have recorded any finding whatsoever. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal without assigning any reasons whatsoever in the absence of evidence cannot be equated to that of findings recorded upon appreciation of evidence available on record. Those conclusions reached by the Tribunal in the absence of evidence are totally unwarranted and unsustainable in law. We find it difficult to sustain the award passed by the Industrial tribunal. ( 30 ) WE make it clear that Industrial tribunal/labour Court cannot dispose of any lis between workmen and management solely basing upon the pleadings. Such a course is not permissible in law. Lis has to be adjudicated with reference to the evidence to be let in by the parties. Such of the party, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal fails to produce the evidence, has to face the consequences thereof. It is not for the Tribunal to invite the parties to lead evidence. The Tribunal has to simply reject the claim if no evidence is available on record. Such of the party, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal fails to produce the evidence, has to face the consequences thereof. It is not for the Tribunal to invite the parties to lead evidence. The Tribunal has to simply reject the claim if no evidence is available on record. ( 31 ) BUT we hasten to add that if a lis between the workmen and the Management can be disposed of on the strength of the evidence let in by one of the parties, the Tribunal is entitled to dispose of the same on the basis of available evidence and in such an event the burden of proof may pale into insignificance. But, at any rate, the lis cannot be disposed of in the absence of any acceptable evidence on record. ( 32 ) IN the view of the matter, we are unable to subscribe the view expressed by the learned single Judge as if a lis between the workmen and the Management can be disposed of purely on the basis of claim and counter claim. ( 33 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I. D. No. 16 of 1993, dated 23/05/1994 is set aside. The matter is remitted for fresh consideration and disposal by the Industrial Tribunal, in accordance with law. ( 34 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it appropriate to direct the Industrial Tribunal to dispose of the matter within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. ( 35 ) THE Writ appeal is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. ( 36 ) THE Registry is directed to transmit the records together with a copy of this order to the Industrial Tribunal within a period of ten days so as to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the I. D.