Judgment 1. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment dated 22.4.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge, by which he has held that the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer was vitiated on account of the fact that the enquiry officer was junior to the delinquent in the same time scale and, accordingly, quashed the order of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, which was upheld with modification by the appellate authority. 2. Shorn of all the details, the facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the writ petitioner-respondent, at the relevant time, was working as Manager (MMG Scale-II) at Tarapur Branch of the appellant-United Commercial Bank. Certain allegations were received against him in connection with discharge of his duty and, thereafter, he was suspended by order dated 30.7.1996. He was served with memo of charges dated 21.11.1996, in which there were six charges against the writ petitioner-respondent and they all related to misconduct in discharge of his official duty. On 25.1.1997, Mr. Atul Kumar Sinha, Manager, Bariarpur Branch, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, a supplementary memo of charges, dated 8.4.1997, containing two charges, was also served upon the writ petitioner-respondent. The said enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and held that the charges no. 1,2,4,5,6 and part of charge no.3 with regard to memo of charges dated 21.11.1996 were proved, with regard to the remaining two charges as contained in supplementary memo of charges dated 8.4.1997, he also held that the said charges were proved. 3. The delinquent-respondent was served with a copy of the enquiry report and after that he submitted his show-cause and on 2.3.1998, the disciplinary authority inflicted the punishment of reduction of initial position of JMC Grade Scale-11 for each of the two charges dated 8.4.1997. Same punishment was inflicted for each of charges no. 1. 2, 3 and 5 of the earlier memo of charges. An order for recovery of Rs. 23,219/- was also passed with regard to charge no.4 and Rs. 1 lac for charge no.6 of the earlier memo of charges. 4. The delinquent-respondent filed an appeal, which was disposed of by the appellate authority on 24.4.1999. The appellate authority exonerted the respondent with regard to charges no.4 and 6 of the earlier memo of charges. 5. 23,219/- was also passed with regard to charge no.4 and Rs. 1 lac for charge no.6 of the earlier memo of charges. 4. The delinquent-respondent filed an appeal, which was disposed of by the appellate authority on 24.4.1999. The appellate authority exonerted the respondent with regard to charges no.4 and 6 of the earlier memo of charges. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent challenged the said orders on several grounds but the learned Single Judge having come to the conclusion that the writ application was to be allowed on one point, namely, that the enquiry was conducted by an officer junior to the writ petitioner-respondent; quashed the enquiry as well as the orders imposing punishments. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Bank submitted that the relevant Regulation of the Bank does not provide that the enquiry should be conducted by an officer superior to the delinquent employee and in that view of the matter the learned Single Judge was not justified in law in holding that the enquiry was vitiated on the aforesaid account. He further submitted that the delinquent-respondent at no point of time raised any objection to the enquiry being conducted by an officer junior to him. The officer, who conducted the enquiry is junior to the delinquent respondent in the time scale but his position was far below and as such there was no question of his being benefited in any way by submitting an enquiry report against the delinquent-respondent. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that as admittedly the enquiry officer was junior to the writ petitioner-respondent, the enquiry is vitiated on account of it being biased and the learned Single Judge rightly held that the enquiry is vitiated on the aforesaid ground. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Prakash vs. Board of Directors, Mithila Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Darbhanga & Ors., reported in 1996 P.L.J.R. 469, wherein this Court quashed the order of punishment in a departmental enquiry on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted by an officer higher in grade than the petitioner of that case. 8. 8. Only point for consideration is as to whether the enquiry, which was conducted by an enquiry officer, who admittedly is junior to the writ petitioner-respondent in the time scale, is vitiated on the aforesaid ground or not. To decide the said question, the relevant provision of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short the Regulations) has to be looked into. 9. The law is well-settled that a departmental enquiry is to be conducted in a fair manner consistent with the rule of natural justice. Apart from giving a fair and reasonable opportunity to the delinquent-employee, the enquiry should be conducted in such a manner that it does not suffer from bias. In other words, the enquiry should not be conducted or an order should not be passed by a person, who is a Judge in his own cause and the justice should not be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. 10. To appreciate the point involved in the case, relevant regulation of the Regulations is to be looked into to find out as to whether the enquiry is vitiated on account of the aforesaid defect or not. Regulation 6 of the Regulations contains a procedure for imposing major penalties. Regulation 6(2) runs as follows :- "6. Procedure for imposing major penalities : (1) xx xx xx xx (2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an officer employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint any other public servant (hereinafter referred to as the inquiring authority) to inquire into the truth thereof." According to the said provision, the disciplinary authority either may enquire himself or appoint any other public servant to enquire into the allegation against the delinquent employee. The said Regulation does not provide that the enquiry is to be conducted by an enquiry officer superior to that of the delinquent employee. Thus, there is no violation of the Regulations of the Bank so far as the conduct of the enquiry is concerned. 11. The said Regulation does not provide that the enquiry is to be conducted by an enquiry officer superior to that of the delinquent employee. Thus, there is no violation of the Regulations of the Bank so far as the conduct of the enquiry is concerned. 11. In a disciplinary proceeding either the disciplinary authority will himself enquire into the matter or if the rule provides he may send the matter for enquiry to any other person and on the basis of the enquiry report he will take a final decision in the matter in accordance with the rules framed to meet the requirement of natural justice. The final authority to pass an order in the departmental proceeding is the disciplinary authority. The enquiry officer has to only collect the materials and express his opinion and submit the same to the disciplinary authority. His opinion is not final one and the disciplinary authority may take a different view from that taken by the enquiry officer. In such a situation, if the Regulation does not provided that the enquiry is to be conducted by an officer superior to that of the delinquent employee, the enquiry in this case cannot be held to be vitiated on that ground. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Pankajesh vs. Tulsi Gramin Bank, reported in (1997) 7 S.C.C. 68 . There, Regulation 30 provided that the enquiry is to be conducted by a person higher than the delinquent-officer. The order passed by the disciplinary authority was challenged in that case on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted by an officer higher in rank to that of the delinquent officer, though the Regulation provided that the enquiry officer has to be higher in rank than the delinquent officer. Dealing with the said matter, the Apex Court negatived the aforesaid contention and held that though it is always desirable that an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer should be directed to conduct an enquiry, the enquiry is conducted as a delegate of the disciplinary authority and the ultimate decision is taken by the disciplinary authority and in that view of the matter if enquiry is conducted by an enquiry officer of the same cadre than that of the delinquent-officer, it did not cause any material irregularity nor resulted in any injustice to the petitioner of that case. Paragraph no.6 of the said judgment runs as follows :- "6. Thus an enquiry, under the Regulation may be delegated to a person higher in rank than the delinquent officer, in the case of an officer. But in this case we donot find any substantial miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the petitioner for the reason that though it is always desirable that an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer should be directed to conduct an enquiry, the enquiry is conducted as a delegate of the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the ultimate decision is to be taken by the disciplinary authority. By mere delegating the enquiry whether the enquiry officer is of the same cadre or of the higher grade than that of the petitioner, it did not cause any material irregularity nor resulted in any injustice to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, we do not find any illegality warranting interference." Thus, the Apex Court has held that even though the Regulation provides that the enquiry should be conducted by an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer but if the enquiry is conducted by an officer junior to him, the same will not vitiate the order of punishment in view of the fact that the ultimate decision has to be taken by the disciplinary authority. 12 So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent is concerned, the same Regulation, which was considered by the Apex Court, was considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court and he held that if enquiry is not conducted by the officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer, the same is vitiated. However, in view of the said judgment of the Apex Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge relied upon by the writ petitioner- respondent is no longer a good law. Apart from this, other feature to be noticed is that the delinquent-respondent, during the whole period of the enquiry, did not challenge the jurisdiction of the authority of the enquiry officer, who conducted the enquiry. The position of the enquiry officer, though he is in the same time scale, is below to the delinquent officer by several places and as such in no case he can be said to be suffering from bias as he was not to gain anything by submitting a finding against the delinquent-respondent. 13. The position of the enquiry officer, though he is in the same time scale, is below to the delinquent officer by several places and as such in no case he can be said to be suffering from bias as he was not to gain anything by submitting a finding against the delinquent-respondent. 13. Thus, we are of the view that the ground taken by the learned Single Judge for interfering with the order of punishment is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside. As the learned Single Judge has not considered other points, we are of the view that the matter needs remittance for reconsideration of other points and, accordingly, it is so remitted. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.