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2004 DIGILAW 100 (GAU)

Trilok Chand Thakur v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

2004-02-13

AFTAB H.SAIKIA, P.P.NAOLEKAR

body2004
JUDGMENT A.H. Saikia, J. 1. Heard Learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ appeal has been directed against the judgment and order dated 13.6.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 3695/94. 3. The appellant while serving as a Constable of Arunachal Pradesh Police and posted at Hunli Police Station under Dibang Valley District in Arunachal Pradesh, was placed under suspension by the competent authority on 24.8.1993 contemplating departmental enquiry against him and accordingly by Memorandum dated 25.8.1993 containing a statement of articles of charge with a statement of the imputation of misconduct in support of each article of charge was forwarded to the appellant accompanied by a list of documents and a list of witnesses. The charges against the appellant were as under: (I) On 18.5.1993 from 21.30 hours to 20.00 hours (of 19.5.1993), the appellant forcibly entered into the room of H/C B. Pegu and threw away his belongings and other furnitures. He also threatened H/C B. Pegu and staff that he will kill them in case the matter is reported to the higher authority. (II) On 19.5.1993 the appellant uprooted the national flag post and broke the sign board of Hunli P.S. and threw it down. (III) On 20.8.1993 at about 22.00 hours the appellant in civil dress under influence of liquor checked the employees of PWD despite being stopped by H/CB.Pegu. 4. On completion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted report on 7.9.1993 holding all those three charges against the appellant to be proved. On the basis of the said enquiry report, the Asstt. Inspector General of Police, Arunachal Pradesh by his order dated 1.11.1993 dismissed the appellant from service. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the said dismissal order, a statutory appeal was filed before the competent authority which was rejected on 26.4.1994. Against such dismissal from the service, the appellant has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashment of the same. 6. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the said dismissal order, a statutory appeal was filed before the competent authority which was rejected on 26.4.1994. Against such dismissal from the service, the appellant has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashment of the same. 6. The learned Single Judge, after careful scrutiny and consideration of the materials available on record and also upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, has come to the conclusion that no illegality was committed by the Enquiry Officer as well as the appellant authority in dismissing the appellant from service inasmuch as the report of the enquiry in support of the charges brought against the appellant was found to be conducted in full compliance of the legal requirement and also by affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant in meeting the charges. It was further observed that the writ court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal to appreciate the evidence or materials on the basis of which the findings of the disciplinary authority had been arrived at. The learned Single Judge also found that both the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority had independently considered the said findings which had been arrived at on the basis of evidence on record and the both authorities had given adequate grounds and reasons for the impugned punishment of dismissal from service. 7. Mr. Paul, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the findings of the Enquiry Officer was based on no evidence to hold those charges to be proved. As regards the charges No. 1 and 3, it was argued that no complaint whatsoever was made by any person who had been allegedly assaulted by the appellant and such assault on those persons was never proved. That apart, in so far as the charge No. 2 was concerned, there was no eye witness to prove the said allegation and the same was entirely a circumstantial one. That being so, those charges cannot be said to be proved and accordingly the dismissal of the appellant from service was illegal and improper. 8. We have carefully perused the materials available on record. That being so, those charges cannot be said to be proved and accordingly the dismissal of the appellant from service was illegal and improper. 8. We have carefully perused the materials available on record. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and also on close inspection of the materials on record including the impugned judgment, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the findings of the disciplinary authority because the instant case cannot be said to be a case of no evidence as argued and accordingly we are of the firm view that no case has been made out for interference with the findings so arrived at by the disciplinary authorities. 9. Law on the scope of judicial review of the departmental proceeding has already been settled. If there is some evidence which can reasonably support the finding of the enquiry authority, the Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, would not reverse such finding on mere challenge of insufficiency of evidence. Where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings. The Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. reported in paragraph 16 at page 26 observed as follows : ".......... Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry of if the decision of the authority is vitiated by the considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry as has been properly conducted. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry as has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence in which the findings can be based, then adequate or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226F of the Constitution." 10. Reiterating the limited scope of judicial interference in case of disciplinary proceeding, the Apex Court in a recent decision of the Lalit Popil v. Canara Bank and Ors. reported in held as under : "While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority." 11. Keeping in view the above precedent and on overall consideration of the factual situation of the case, we are inclined to concur with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and find no valid or good reason to upset the impugned judgment. 12. Consequently, this writ appeal fails and stands dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.