Kamadhenu Super Market, represented by General Manager, Madras-18 v. Agurchand Manmull Jain College, managed by Sri S. S. Jain Educational Society represented by its General Secretary, Meenambakkam, Madras
2004-08-05
S.K.KRISHNAN
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT: The defendant is the appellant herein. As against the defendant, the plaintiff instituted a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs.17,000 with interest on Rs.15,000 at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of the plaint till the payment is made. 2. The XV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. In the appeal also, the defendant lost. As against the judgment passed by the learned Principal Judge, City Civil Court, present second appeal has been preferred. 3. The facts, leading to the filing of the second appeal are as follows: (a) The plaintiff is the College, which is situated at Meenambakkam and its General Secretary filed a suit. The defendant is the Kamadhenu Super Market running its business at Anna Salai, Madras-18. The plaintiff has deposited a sum of Rs.15,000 as trade deposit with the defendant on 2.11.1981. During the year 1985, the plaintiff had stopped buying provisions from the defendant. (b) The plaintiff stopped purchasing the provisions from the defendant during the year 1985 and consequently, the General Secretary of the plaintiff institution issued a letter dated 29.10.1985 calling upon the defendant to refund the said amount. No reply was received from the defendant. Again on 9.12.1985 another letter was sent by the General Secretary of the Institution to the defendant demanding the same. Despite the second notice, the defendant did not send any reply to the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the plaintiff sent a letter on 24.2.1986 demanding the defendant to return the said amount. (c) In this juncture the defendant sent a reply letter to the plaintiff informing that they would get necessary accounts from the head office and thereafter, they would inform the same to the plaintiff by stating that they have already supplied the provisions to the canteen of the said institution on two occasions on 27.1.1976 and 20.12.1977 and delivered the provisions to the value of Rs.14,901.45. Since no payment was made by the plaintiff to the above said supplied goods, the said amount was adjusted with the trade deposit amount. The said reply given by the defendant is a false one and on afterthought they issued such kind of a letter to the plaintiff institution in order to avoid the return of said amount to the plaintiff institution.
The said reply given by the defendant is a false one and on afterthought they issued such kind of a letter to the plaintiff institution in order to avoid the return of said amount to the plaintiff institution. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay the said deposit amount a sum of Rs.15,000 together with the interest of Rs.2,700. Altogether the defendant has to pay a sum of Rs.17,700. Hence, the suit. 4. The averments stated in the written statement are as follows: (a) The trade deposit amount of Rs.15,000 was deposited with the defendant only to adjust the unpaid bills in respect of the provisions supplied to the plaintiff institution. It is stated that on two occasions dated 27.1.1976 and 20.12.1977 the provisions of goods supplied through its sister concern T.U.C.S. Limited, Sastri Nagar Branch to the plaintiff canteen. Therefore, the plaintiff is liable to pay the said amount of Rs.14,901.45 together with interest at 18% p.a. (b) In fact, the defendant has already issued a lawyer notice dated 13.5.1980 demanding the above said amount. Since no reply was received from the plaintiff institution, another letter was sent to the plaintiff on 11.11.1982. However, the plaintiff sent a reply notice dated 17.12.1982 furnishing some also allegations. In such circumstances, the defendant sent a reply to the plaintiffs lawyer notice dated 9.9.1986 and informed the plaintiff that the defendant has already adjusted a sum of Rs.14,901.45 with the trade deposit. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay only the balance amount of Rs.901.45. The claiming of interest of Rs.2,700 is vexatious and no such reference has been made on the trade deposit. Further, the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit for the reason that the provisions of goods were sold and delivered only at Meenambakkam, which is situated outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, the claim made by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. 5. During the course of admission of the second appeal, the following question of law was framed. Whether the Courts below were right in the view they took that the suit is not barred by limitation? 6. As far as the jurisdiction point, the learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently contend that under Sec.20(b), C.P.C., i’t is clearly laid down about the jurisdiction.
Whether the Courts below were right in the view they took that the suit is not barred by limitation? 6. As far as the jurisdiction point, the learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently contend that under Sec.20(b), C.P.C., i’t is clearly laid down about the jurisdiction. It is pointed out that since the defendant is running the super market value within the city limits, the plaintiff taking into cognizance of the said jurisdiction, the suit was instituted. In this juncture, it is just and necessary for this Court to refer to Sec.20(b), C.P.C. “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises: Subject to the Institutions aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or part, arises. Explanation 1: (Omitted by Act 104 of 1976)Explanation: A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place”. 7. As per the provisions of the above said Section, the plaintiff has jurisdiction to file a suit against the defendant for the recovery of the said amount. Therefore, in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the suit was filed without jurisdiction. 8. With regard to period of limitation to institute the suit, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the suit instituted by the plaintiff institution is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim of the plaintiff for the recovery of the said sum of Rs.17,700 is not at all sustainable under law. 9.
8. With regard to period of limitation to institute the suit, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the suit instituted by the plaintiff institution is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim of the plaintiff for the recovery of the said sum of Rs.17,700 is not at all sustainable under law. 9. It is stated by the defendant that on two occasions dated 27.1.1976 and 20.12.1977, the provisions were already supplied to the plaintiff canteen. Altogether the provisions worth about Rs.14,901.45 was already delivered to the plaintiff canteen for their use. 10. It is contended by the plaintiff that to refund the said amount towards unpaid bills, the defendant initially issued a letter to the plaintiff under Ex.B-1 dated 13.5.1980. Since no reply was issued by the plaintiff, with regard to this demand, the defendant again sent another letter dated 14.12.1982 under Ex.B-5 informing the plaintiff to return the said amount. Since the said demand was made by the defendant with regard to unpaid bills on 13.5.1980 and no payment has been made by the plaintiff, as per the customs prevailed in the business transaction, the said amount was adjusted towards the trade deposit of the plaintiff. If at all any amount is payable by the defendant to the plaintiff, the plaintiff ought to have instituted the suit within three years of the said demand made by the defendant under Ex.B-4 dated 14.12.1982. 11. In such circumstances, it is argued that the plaintiff ought to have instituted the suit on or before 14.12.1985. Since the plaintiff has not come forward to institute the said suit within the prescribed time, that is, on or before, 14.12.1985, in such circumstances, the claim made by the plaintiff against the defendant for the recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000 is barred by limitation. In such circumstances the suit could not have been entertained. 12.Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would vehemently contend that if at all any amount unpaid by the plaintiff for the provisions received from the defendant, under Exs.B-2 and B-3, the defendant could have demanded such payment from the plaintiff within the stipulated time. However, the defendant demanded this amount from the plaintiff only in the year 1981 under Ex.B-1 dated 13.5.1980. However, such notice under Ex.B-1 was not at all received by the plaintiff.
However, the defendant demanded this amount from the plaintiff only in the year 1981 under Ex.B-1 dated 13.5.1980. However, such notice under Ex.B-1 was not at all received by the plaintiff. Therefore, no importance could be given to the said notice under Ex.B-1. Again, the defendant sent another notice to the Honorary Secretary of the Institution on 14.12.1982 under Ex.B-4. Even though the said notice under Ex.B-4 was sent to the plaintiff on 14.12.1982 no reference has been made is mentioned in the said letter with regard to the adjustment of a sum of Rs.14,901.45 towards the trade deposit amount. It is seen that the defendant demanded the plaintiff only to return a sum of Rs.14,901.45 towards the unpaid bills. 13. It is pointed out that for making such claim from the plaintiff, time was already barred. Further, it is pointed out that since the defendant claim was already barred by limitation, the defendant cannot make any claim to adjust the amount towards unpaid bills against the plaintiff under law for the reason that the time to claim the said amount due to the defendant towards unpaid bills already lapsed. In this juncture, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would point out that for returning the trade deposit amount the plaintiff issued a legal notice to the defendant under Ex.A-1 dated 29.10.1985. Since no reply was received from the defendant reminders were sent by the plaintiff under Exs.A-2 and A-4 dated 29.12.1985 and 24.2.1986. 14. In such circumstances, since the defendant failed to return the said amount, the plaintiff instituted the suit within the time prescribed and therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation. 15. In such circumstances, the arguments advanced by the appellant’s counsel with regard to limitation point is not at all sustainable under law. Since the suit was filed by the plaintiff within the period of limitation, the suit is sustainable under law. 16. It is seen that while deciding the issue with regard to limitation, considering the legal positions and the facts, the Courts below decided the issue in a proper perspective. In such circumstances, the view taken by the Courts below, with regard to the limitation issue is correct. Further, this Court does not find any illegality in the order of the lower appellate Court.
In such circumstances, the view taken by the Courts below, with regard to the limitation issue is correct. Further, this Court does not find any illegality in the order of the lower appellate Court. In such circumstances, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is not sustainable under law. 17. In the light of the discussions made above, this Court does not find any valid reasons to allow the appeal in favour of the appellant. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 18. In result, the second appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the C.M.P.No.7883 of 1993 is also dismissed.