L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed under Section 30 (1) of the Workmen s compensation Act, 1923 (for short the Act ), against the order, dated 28. 1. 2003, passed by the Commissioner for Workmen s compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Circle-I, Visakhapatnam (for short the Commissioner ), in W. C. Case No. 4 of 2002. ( 2 ) THE respondents submitted a claim before the Commissioner alleging that late Sk. Fakeet Ahmed Basha, the husband of the 1st respondent, and father of 2nd respondent, was employed with the appellant as Erector (Master Tradesman ). It is stated that he left his house on 25. 6. 2001, during early hours, to work in the first shift; reported to duty, and died in the course of employment, within the premises of the appellant. They prayed for award of compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The appellant resisted the claim alleging that the deceased was continuously absent from 20. 6. 2001 till 25. 6. 2001. It was urged that the shift starts from 7. 00 a. m. , and as per the instructional orders, dated 18. 1. 1991, marked as Ex. R. 2, an employee was entitled to report to duty thirty minutes before the commencement of the shift and remain in the premises thirty minutes after the shift, and that the entry of the employee into the premises before that time, cannot be construed as reporting to duty. It was further alleged mat though the deceased entered the premises in uniform on 25. 6. 2001, he did not report to the Supervisor, and thereby, it cannot be said that he died during the course of employment. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the respondents, pws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. A. l to a. 9 were marked. On behalf of the appellant, rws. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. R. l to R. 4 were marked. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence and on application of the provisions of the act, the Commissioner awarded a sum of rs. 2,85,960/-, as compensation, on account of death of the deceased employee and apportioned the same among Respondents 1 to 4. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. R. l to R. 4 were marked. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence and on application of the provisions of the act, the Commissioner awarded a sum of rs. 2,85,960/-, as compensation, on account of death of the deceased employee and apportioned the same among Respondents 1 to 4. ( 4 ) SRI P. Nageswar Sree, learned counsel for the appellant submits that though it is not in dispute that the deceased was in employment of the appellant, there is nothing on record to show that he died during the course of employment. He submits that the deceased was continuously absent for five days, preceding the day of accident, and even on that day, he entered the premises much before the scheduled time and did not report to duty. He contends that since there is no prohibition for an employee to enter the yard, it cannot be said that every entry needs to be taken, as the one, for discharging the duties or, during the course of employment. Placing reliance on ex. R. 2, learned Counsel submits that the entry of an employee into the yard, before the time stipulated therein, cannot be construed as the presence for discharge of duties. ( 5 ) SRI P. Pratap Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the deceased entered the yard, that too with uniform, for the purpose of discharging the duties, and the appellant cannot avoid its liability by pleading certain facts, which are not borne out by record. He further contends that even assuming that the deceased was absent from 20. 6. 2001, the same cannot constitute the basis for denial of the liability arising out of the act, as long as it is not disputed that the death occurred in the yard itself, that too after the deceased entered it, duly punching his card. ( 6 ) THE deceased was employed as erector (Master Tradesman) in the M/s. Hindustan Shipyard Limited, the appellant herein. His dead body was found in a water pool in the yard at 6. 15 a. m. The record discloses that he punched his card while entering the yard at 6. 04 a. m. It is not in dispute that the deceased was on uniform, when he died. His dead body was found in a water pool in the yard at 6. 15 a. m. The record discloses that he punched his card while entering the yard at 6. 04 a. m. It is not in dispute that the deceased was on uniform, when he died. ( 7 ) THE appellant pleads that the deceased cannot be said to be in employment or died during the course of employment, unless the death occurred during the exact shift hours, and unless it is shown that he reported to duty, to the concerned Supervisor. Reliance is placed on Ex. R. 2, which prescribes the conditions in relation to reporting to, and leaving from, the duties, by the employees. One of the conditions is that an employee can report to duty half an hour before the commencement of the shift and not earlier thereto. On the basis of this, it is urged that the relevant shift was to start at 7. 00 a. m. , whereas the deceased punched his card at 6. 04 a. m. , much earlier to the stipulated time. It is also contended that the death itself took place before the commencement of the shift and that the appellant cannot be held liable to pay compensation. ( 8 ) THE Act provides for payment of compensation for injuries caused to or death of a workman in accident arising out of, and in the course of, employment. The expression arising out of and in the course of employment occurring in Section 3 of the Act, has been the subject-matter of interpretation by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The purport of these decisions is that the liability arises if it is established that the workman was doing something, which was reasonably incidental to the employment; resulting in death or bodily injuries. If the accident has occurred within the premises of the factory or place of employment, Section 3 gets attracted without any doubt. The further question as to whether the employee was, in fact, discharging the duties after entering the premises, or whether he reported to his immediate superior or supervisor, becomes insignificant or irrelevant. ( 9 ) IF the appellant treated the time frame stipulated under Ex. R-2 as sacrosanct, it ought not to have permitted employees to enter the yard, before commencement of the shift, or permitted them to remain, after the shift ended. ( 9 ) IF the appellant treated the time frame stipulated under Ex. R-2 as sacrosanct, it ought not to have permitted employees to enter the yard, before commencement of the shift, or permitted them to remain, after the shift ended. Acceptance of the contention put forward by the appellant would amount to laying down a principle to the effect that an employee cannot be said to be in employment before or after the shift siren, irrespective of the fact whether he is discharging the duties, or is present within the premises of the factory. A logical extension of the same would be that an employee ceases to be so, during the tea or lunch break in a shift. Such a view, if taken, would defeat the very object of the Act. The work, in a factory or establishment, except where it is occasional, is a continuous activity, and shifts are evolved for change over of the personnel. Instances of employees being required to report to duty earlier than the commencement of shift, or to remain after the end of the shift, depending on the exigencies of the work, or to make up the absence of employees in the preceding or succeeding shifts, are not uncommon. ( 10 ) NORMALLY, employees, who attend to the duty, before the commencement of the shift, and continue to do work after the end of the shift, are rewarded. In no circumstances, such over-enthusiasm is treated as an act of discipline, or a factor, to disentitle statutory benefits to them. Being a legislation enacted for the benefit and welfare of the workers, the Act should receive liberal construction, which advances the intended object. ( 11 ) ANOTHER contention advanced by the appellant is that the deceased did not report to duty to the Supervisor. It is difficult to accept this contention also. Once an employee reports to duty, at the work place, the further question as to whether he reported to duty to his immediate superior or Supervisor, becomes irrelevant. For example, if such a supervisor is absent, on a particular day, the employee has to be treated as not on duty at all. It is difficult to accept this contention also. Once an employee reports to duty, at the work place, the further question as to whether he reported to duty to his immediate superior or Supervisor, becomes irrelevant. For example, if such a supervisor is absent, on a particular day, the employee has to be treated as not on duty at all. The easiest thing for an employer to escape from the liability, arising out of the death of, or accident to, an employee, would be to plead that the injured or deceased employee did not report to duty, though he was discharging the duties, or was present at the work place. The Act does not permit such devises, to defeat the objects underlying it. ( 12 ) PW. 1 is a Senior Assistant, who deposed to the fact that the deceased died on account of drowning in the water and that he entered the yard at 6. 04 a. m. RW. 2 is the Supervisor in Erection Department. Though he stated that the deceased did not report to him for duty, it was elicited through him that the documents produced by him are not conclusive proof in that regard. Once it is evident from the record produced by the appellant itself, that the deceased was employed with them, he punched his card at 6. 4 a. m. and died thereafter within the yard, it cannot avoid the liability to pay the compensation. This court does not find any basis to interfere with the order under appeal. ( 13 ) THE CMA is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.