Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 14.12.1996 whereby the service of the petitioner, while on probation has been terminated by paying him one months salary in lieu of notice. Further prayer made by the petitioner is to quash the order dated 31.3,1997 (Annexure-2) whereby the petitioners prayer to revoke the order of termination had been rejected. 2. Short facts giving rise to the present application are that by order dated 21.3.1996 (Annexure-5) petitioner was appointed as a Peon on probation for a period of six months. The order of appointment indicated that his service can be terminated during the period of probation by giving him one months notice in writing or salary in lieu thereof. In pursuance of the aforesaid order of appointment petitioner joined his duty at Saraiya Branch of the Respondent Canara Bank on 30th of March, 1996 on probation for a period of six months and during that period, his probation was extended to afford him an opportunity to improve the performance by another three months i.e. 29.12.1996. During the period of probation petitioner absented himself unauthorisedly for a period of 151 days. The Respondent/Bank found the work of the petitioner to be unsatisfactory and, accordingly, terminated his probation by giving him one months salary in lieu of notice and while passing the impugned order it observed as follows: "AND WHEREAS, Shri U.K. Sinhas probationary period was extended by further period of three months i.e., till 29.12.1996 in order to provide him an opportunity to improve his working/performance, in view of his (a) casual and indifferent approach to work and his work being found unsatisfactory (b) frequent unauthorized absence for an aggregate period of 110 days during the probationary period and (c) indiscriminate issuance of cheques without providing sufficient funds in his account. AND WHEREAS, he has failed to improve his working performance and his work performance continues to be unsatisfactory. NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the services of Shri U.K. Sinha (66488), Probationary Peon, be terminated in accordance with the Chapter V Regulation 7 Clause 5 of Canara Bank Service Code, by paying him one months salary in lieu of notice, which shall be paid to him. The DD no. 202944 dated 14.12.1996 for Rs. 2611.40 being one months salary is enclosed." 3. Mr. The DD no. 202944 dated 14.12.1996 for Rs. 2611.40 being one months salary is enclosed." 3. Mr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner refers to the aforesaid order terminating the probation of the petitioner and submits that ex facie the said order is stigmatic in nature and hence termination in sum and substance amounts to dismissal and the same, having been passed without any inquiry is arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice, which renders the same illegal in the eye of law. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V.P. Ahuja V/s. State of Punjab, (2000)3 S.C.C. 239 and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 8 of the judgment which reads as follows :- "The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also in this Court indicate the background in which the order, terminating the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order which, on the face of it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular inquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant." 4. There is no difficulty in accepting the broad submission of Mr. Mukherjee that in case the order terminating the probation is stigmatic in nature, same would amount to dismissal and before that a regular inquiry has to be held. Mr. Chitranjan Sinha, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent-Canara Bank submits that the very assumption of the petitioner that the impugned order is stigmatic and punitive in nature is misconceived and therefore before terminating the probation the Bank was not obliged to hold a regular departmental inquiry. 5. In view of the rival submission what falls for determinating is as to whether the order terminating the probation is stigmatic in nature or not but before that one is required to determine the tests which are necessary to term the order stigmatic and consequently the order terminating probation punitive. 6. I am of the opinion that no hard and fast rule can be laid to test as to whether an order terminating the probation is stigmatic or not. It shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. I am of the opinion that no hard and fast rule can be laid to test as to whether an order terminating the probation is stigmatic or not. It shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. As to what amounts to stigma came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case [B Kamal Kishore Lakshman V/s. Management of M/s Pan American World Airways Inc. and others, (1987)1 S.C.C. 146 ] wherein the meaning of the expression stigma was explained by the Supreme Court in the following words: "According to Websters New World Dictionary it is something that detracts from the character of reputation of a person, as mark, sign, etc. indicating that something is not considered normal or standard. The Legal Thesuras by Burton gives the meaning of the word to be blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame. The Websters Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning as a mark or label indicating a deviation from a norm. According to yet another dictionary stigma is a matter for moral reproach." 7. This question further came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in case of Allahabad Bank Officers Association and another V/s. Allahabad Bank and others [ (1996)4 S.C.C. 504 )] wherein in paragraph 19 of the judgment it has been observed as follows :- "Therefore, no inference can be drawn from the said statements that they cast a stigma on appellant 2 and that the real intention of the Bank was to punish him for some act of misconduct or lack of integrity. Whether the order of compulsory retirement attaches a stigma to the employee or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the context of the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be said that by including the aforesaid statement in the order of compulsory retirement any stigma has been attached to it." 8. On a review of its earlier decision on the question, the Supreme Court in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma V/s. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another [ (2002)1 S.C.C. 520 ] had observed that order of termination of a probationer finding the work and conduct to be unsatisfactory is not stigmatic in nature. On a review of its earlier decision on the question, the Supreme Court in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma V/s. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another [ (2002)1 S.C.C. 520 ] had observed that order of termination of a probationer finding the work and conduct to be unsatisfactory is not stigmatic in nature. In the said case in paragraph 21 of the judgment it has been observed as follows : "One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld." 9. In my opinion comment on the character or inherent incapability or specific misconduct in the order terminating probation shall be stigmatic but while assessing the suitability of a probation to continue in service beyond the period of probation, if it is found that the probationer is not suitable to remain in service after recording a finding of unsatisfactory work, same shall not amount to stigma. If without any reason probation is terminated same would suffer from the vice of arbitrariness as it is well settled that every action of the authority is to be guided by reason. Therefore when reason of unsatisfactory nature of work is stated, same would be stigmatic if accepted may drive the authority to terminate probation without any reason, which would also be illegal. This reminds me a proverb, head I win, tail you lose. The law cannot countenance this situation. 10. The relevant extract from the order impugned has been quoted in the preceding paragraph of the judgment and from that one is required to consider as to whether same is stigmatic or not. In the order impugned it has been observed that the petitioner has casual and indifferent approach towards his work, and the same has been found to be unsatisfactory. In the order impugned it has been observed that the petitioner has casual and indifferent approach towards his work, and the same has been found to be unsatisfactory. It has been further observed that the petitioner frequently absented himself unauthorisedly for a aggregate period of 110 days during the period of probation and had issued cheques without providing sufficient fund in his account and accordingly, the Bank came to the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to improve his working performance and his work continued to be unsatisfactory. Whether these expressions can be said to be stigmatic is the question, which requires consideration. 11. A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider this question in the case of State of Orissa V/s. Ram Narayan Das ( AIR 1961 S.C. 177 ) wherein the termination of probation of a public servant stating unsatisfactory work and conduct was found to be not stigmatic. In the said case the order terminating the probation read as follows :- "Probationary S.I. Ramanarayan Das of Cuttack District is discharged from service for unsatisfactory work and conduct with effect from the date the order is served on him". 12. The Supreme Court answered the question in the following orders : "We have carefully considered the evidence and the authorities to which our attention has been invited and we are definitely of the opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that the order discharging the respondent from service amounted to dismissal which attracted the protection of article 311(2) of the Constitution". 13. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider this question in the case of Kunwar Arun Kumar V/s. U.P. Hill Electronics Corporation Ltd. and others [ (1997)2 S.C.C. 191 ] wherein at paragraph 5 of the judgment it has been observed as follows : "During the period of probation, the authorities are entitled to assess the suitability of the candidates and if it is found that the candidate is not suitable to remain in service they are entitled to record a finding of unsatisfactory performance of the work and duties during the period of probation. Under these circumstances, necessarily the appointing authority has to look into the performance of the work and duties during the period of probation and if they record a finding that during that probation period, the work and performance of duties were unsatisfactory, they are entitled to terminate the service in terms of the letter or appointment without conducting any enquiry. That does not amount to any stigma." 14. Yet another decision in which this question has been considered is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H.F. Sangati V/s. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka and others [(2001 )3 S.C.C. 117)]. In paragraph 10 of the judgment it has been observed as follows : "In our opinion the impugned order does not cast any stigma on the appellants. All that has been said in the impugned order is that the appellants were unsuitable to hold the post of Munsifs. It is pertinent to note that Rule 6 contemplates a probationer being discharged from service on one or more of the following grounds : (i) in terms of condition imposed by the Rules, (ii) in terms of the order of appointment, or (iii) on account of unsuitability of the appointee for the service or post. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 requires the ground for the discharge. It also provides that such indicating of the grounds for the discharge in the order would not require any formal proceedings under the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 being held. The impugned order of discharge has been passed in strict compliance with the requirement of Rule 6. It does not cast any stigma on the appellants nor is it punitive. There was, thus, no requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice, much less to be preceded by any formal proceedings of inquiry before making the order". 15. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra) further in paragraph 31 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "Returning now to the facts of the case before us. The language used in the order of termination is that the appellants "work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory". These words are almost exactly those which have been quoted in Dipit Prakash Banerjee case as clearly falling within the class of non stigmatic orders of termination. The language used in the order of termination is that the appellants "work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory". These words are almost exactly those which have been quoted in Dipit Prakash Banerjee case as clearly falling within the class of non stigmatic orders of termination. It is, therefore safe to conclude that the impugned order is not ex facie stigmatic". 16. Bearing in mind the principle aforesaid, can it be said that the order impugned is stigmatic in nature. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) and Pavanendra Narayan Verrna (supra) expression "unsatisfactory nature of work and conduct" in the order of termination has been held to be non stigmatic in nature. Here in the present case, reasons have been assigned to come to the conclusion that the petitioners work continued to be unsatisfactory and in my opinion same cannot be said to be stigmatic in nature so as to call for a regular enquiry. In my opinion, tho order terminating the probation is neither stigmatic not punitive and it cannot be said that the same amounts to dismissal or removal from service. 17. To put the record straight, I may state that Mr. Sinha prayed for dismissal of the writ application also on the ground that the petitioner having accepted one months salary in lieu of the notice, he had waived his right to challenge the order terminating the service. I do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel. Mere acceptance of the salary for the period of notice shall not preclude the petitioner from challenging the same and such employee can very well contend that the order terminating the probation suffers from illegality. 18. There is yet another impediment in way of the petitioner. The order terminating the service of the petitioner was passed as back as on 14.12.1996 and his prayer to revoke the order of probation was rejected by order dated 31.3.1997, but the petitioner has chosen to file the present application on 24.3.2000. No explanation at all has been offered in the writ application but during the course of hearing, Mr. Mukherjee sought to explain the delay by saying that the petitioners father was ill and the petitioner was attending to him, delay had occurred in filing the writ application. No explanation at all has been offered in the writ application but during the course of hearing, Mr. Mukherjee sought to explain the delay by saying that the petitioners father was ill and the petitioner was attending to him, delay had occurred in filing the writ application. However he concedes that the petitioners father died on 14.12.1996 and there- after the petitioner filed application for revoking the order of termination on 4.3.1997 which was rejected by letter dated 31.3.1997. Thus the petitioner had approached this Court belatedly without any valid cause and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches also. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Oass V/s. Union of India and Ors. ( AIR 1977 S.C. 1979 ) wherein in paragraph 3 of the judgment it has been observed as follows: "It may perhaps be that the appellant was misdirected in regard to the remedies which he should have adopted, but what stares one in the face is that it was for the first time in September, 1970 that the appellant invoked the extra ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated December 21, 1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily". 19. For all these reasons I am of the opinion that no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 20. Application stands dismissed but without cost.