Judgment R. Balia, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The appellant by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4526/2001 had challenged the termination of services vide order dated 10.08.2001. 3. The impugned order reads as under:- jktLFkku & ljdkj dk;kZ y; v/kh{kd] vkS|ksfxd izf’k{k.k laLFkku] tkyksj ¼jkt-½ ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; e s] p-Js.kh deZpkjh }kjk nk;j fjO; q izkFkZ uk&Ik= la[;k 15@2001 fu.kZ; a ewy ;kfpdk [kkfjt gks pqsok lekfIr vkns fnukad 07-02-2001 ds Øe esdh gS ,lh fLFkfr esa ls’k fnukad 06-02-1989 izHkko esa ;Fkkor gSA vr% funs’kd ikzfof /kd f’k{kk funs’kky; jkt-tks/kiqj ds vkns’k Øekad Ik-l-4@4¼208½ iz&2@2001@30710 fnuakd 07-08-2001 dh ikyuk esa rFkk iwoZ lekfIr vkns’k fnukad 06-02-1989 ds vuqlj.k easJh tksxkjke p- Js-deZpkjh dks rqjUr izHkko ls jkT; lsokvksa ls eqDr fd;k tkrk gSA v/kh{kd] vkS|ksfxd izf’k{k.k laLFkku] tks/kiqj izfrfyfi %& fpukFkZk; Z okgh gsrq izsf"kr gS %& 1½ Jheku funs’kd iz/kd f’k{kk funs’kky; jkt-tks/kiqj dks Ik=kad Ik-l-4@4 ¼208½ iz-2@2001 30710 fnukad 07-08-2001 dh ikyuk esaA 2½ Jheku~ ftyk dysDVj] tkyksj A 3½ Jheku~ dks" f /kdkjh] dks"k dk;kZy;] tkyksjA 4½ Jheku~ lgk;d funs’kd] { S y; izf=; dk;kZkfof /kd f’k{kk funs’kky;] jkt-] tks/kiqjA 5½ Jheku~ lgk;d funs’kd] jkT; chek ,oa izko/kk; h fuf/k] tkyksjA 6½ Jh tksxkjke] p-Js- deZpkjhA 7½ futh Ik=koyh Jh tksxkjkeA 8½ jf {kr Ik=koyhA v/kh{kd 4. The respondent filed a reply and raised preliminary objection that since the services of the petitioner were terminated at the instance of the High Court vide order dated 06.09.1989 and because of the interim order passed by this Court in writ petition filed by the present petitioner challenging that order, the petitioner was continuing in service by dint of interim order and since the said Writ Petition No. 1693/1989 was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 07.02.2001, the termination order dated 06.02.1989 came to life as it was neither quashed or withdrawn at any time, therefore, the impugned order was merely giving effect to order dated 06.02.1989 and it was not a fresh termination order. 5. This contention found favour with the learned Single Judge on the ground that no party can be favoured by the interim orders passed by the Courts. 5. This contention found favour with the learned Single Judge on the ground that no party can be favoured by the interim orders passed by the Courts. Since, the petitioner has withdrawn the writ petition unconditionally and the petitioner has continued in service w.e.f. 30th June, 1989 in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court keeping the termination order in abeyance, the petitioner cannot take advantage of such continuation in service. Hence, this appeal. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellant urges that the preliminary objection and the order of the learned Single Judge founded on erroneous premise. This Court had at no point of time stayed the operation of the order dated 06.02.1989 nor has directed the respondents to take the petitioner back on duty. Looking to the order passed by the Court in Writ Petition No. 1693/1989 which has been placed on record by the respondents, it is clear that it was passed in consonance with the provisions of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act which provides for preference in giving appointment in the case of valid retrenchment if vacancies for like posts are likely to be filled in future. In its order dated 19.05.1989, the Court has directed as under:- “In the meantime, if there are any vacancies and appointments thereto are sought to be made, the petitioner shall be considered preferentially.” 7. It is stated by the learned Counsel that in furtherance of this direction when the vacancies arose, he was appointed against a vacancy of Class IV by order dated 12.06.1989. Therefore, it was a case of fresh appointment against new vacancy and was not a continuance in service after his services were terminated w.e.f. the order dated 06.02.1989, which had become effective. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents reiterated the contention raised before the learned Single Judge that the order dated 12th June, 1989 cannot be considered to be a fresh appointment but was an appointment in continuation of the earlier service, in view of the interim order passed by this Court on 19.05.1989. 9. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions and the material placed before us, it is apparent that the termination order dated 06.02.1989 was never stayed by this Court and it has become effective as soon as the petitioner was relieved. 9. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions and the material placed before us, it is apparent that the termination order dated 06.02.1989 was never stayed by this Court and it has become effective as soon as the petitioner was relieved. There was no direction by the Court that the petitioner be taken back on duty in spite of the termination order dated 06.02.1989. 10. Thedirection of this Court dated 19.05.1989 was clear and unequivocal that if any vacancy arises in future and the respondents decide to fill-in that post, the petitioner’s case be considered preferentially for such appointment. 11. Even there was no mandate to give fresh appointment as a matter of course. Preference only meant, if otherwise fit and qualified to be appointed, the petitioner may be preferred to a new hand. 12. The order dated 12.06.1989 was in furtherance of the said order. The new appointment order passed by the respondent asking the petitioner to join against vacant post, can be considered only in that light. It clearly speaks of coming into existence of vacant post of Class IV and speaks of putting the petitioner on that post. Apparently, in the light of the order dated 19.05.1989, it would amount to existence of a vacancy of Class IV caused by retirement of some personnel, which the respondent watned to fill by giving appointment to someone. 13. In view of the direction of this Court, case of the petitioner was considered and he was given preference in giving appointment because he was otherwise found to be eligible and suitable for such appointment. 10.14. If that be so, the termination from such fresh appointment could not follow automatically with the withdrawing of the writ petition. If the petitioner was satisfied with the fresh appointment and he did not think it desirable to continue with pending petition challenging the termination of his service vide order dated 06.02.1989, the withdrawal of the writ petition would not result in affecting the appointment which was given to him on 12th June, 1989. 115. The Judgment under appeal, in our opinion, proceeds on wholly erroneous premises and cannot be sustained nor for that reason, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents be sustained. 116. 115. The Judgment under appeal, in our opinion, proceeds on wholly erroneous premises and cannot be sustained nor for that reason, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents be sustained. 116. Taking the case at hand, if in spite of there being no order of the Court to that effect, the respondents on their own have decided to put the order of termination in abeyance, the withdrawal of the writ petition cannot come to their rescue for the purpose of resurrecting that order. If the respondent would have decided to keep the order in abeyance, notwithstanding there was no direction of the Court to that effect, it could not be said that the petitioner was still aggrieved with the order dated 06.02.1989. If he would have withdrawn his writ petition, the same could have been resulted in automatic recalling of abeyance order for revival of termination order. It would have needed a fresh order or that would have given the incumbent fresh cause of action. The writ petition challenging subsequent order in that event could not have been dismissed for the reason of withdrawal of earlier writ petition. 117. If considered from this aspect, it is nobody’s case before us that the termination order dated 06.02.1989 had never become operative prior to filing of the writ petition or before the order dated 12.05.1999 was passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1693/1989. Apparently, it was a case of fresh appointment vide order dated 12.06.1989 on existing vacancy or new vacancy which has fallen vacant on account of retirement of a person and the petitioner has been considered for fresh appointment when the respondent decided to fill the said vacancy after the first termination order dated 06.02.1989 had become effective. 118. We may recall here that Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act which governs the case of the petitioner, who otherwise falls within the definition of a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and if the retrenchment is found to be valid, thereafter in future, if any vacancy arises in the establishment of the employer and he desires to give appointment to any person, he is required to give a notice to the retrenched workman and give him option that if he is willing to return back to duty he may do so. That is a mandatory requirement. That is a mandatory requirement. Keeping in view this position of law, the order passed by this Court by way of interim relief was in consonance with the requirement of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The order passed by the respondents on 12.06.1989 considered in that light also satisfies the test of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, which could not have been set at naught, when the Writ Petition No. 1693/1989 was not pressed. The dismissal of Writ Petition No. 1693/1989 resulted in close of claim to validity of order dated 06.02.1989. The petitioner if he wants to claim continuity of service with effect from the order dated 06.02.1989, he could not have raised the issue after he has not pressed the earlier writ petition. But fresh appointment order on occurrence of vacancy or existing vacancy could not be affected by dismissal of earlier writ petition. 19. As a result, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment under appeal is set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned order Annex. 4 dated 10.08.2001 is quashed with all consequential benefits to the appellant.