JUDGMENT This is a writ petition under article 227 of Constitution of India preferred by the Defendant No.8 in the original suit. It is directed against the order dated 4.8.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class II, Narsinghgarh in Civil Suit No. 79-A/97. Plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 7 herein) have initially filed a civil suit for permanent injunction to restrain defendants 1 to 7 (respondents 8 to 13 herein), from alienating House No. 87 or part thereof (hereinafter referred to as 'the Suit House') situated in Ward No.7 in Narsinghgarh. The claim is based on allegations that the suit house is undivided Hindu family property. Defendants 1 to 4, who only represent the coparcenery interest of late Kanhaiyalal without severance of the joint status, are trying to alienate the suit house or a portion thereof. It was also pleaded that plaintiffs never recognized exclusive possession of defendants 1 to 4. Plaintiffs have also pleaded community of interest and unity of possession between the members of the joint family over the suit house. Plaintiffs also claim joint possession and enjoyment over the suit property. After filing of suit, defendants 1 to 4 by registered sale deed dated 11.9.1997 a portion of the suit house to petitioner. Thereafter plaintiffs amended the plaint and also claimed relief of declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant 1 with the consent of defendants No.2 to 4 and to which plaintiffs and defendants No.5 to 7 are not party, is null and void qua the plaintiffs' and defendants No.5 to 7's 1/7th share in the joint property and also impleaded petitioner as defendant No.8 in the civil suit. Petitioner filed written statement denying all material plaint allegations. It was alleged that plaintiffs have undervalued the suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction and as such suit itself was not maintainable before learned trial Court. According to petitioner, plaintiffs are required to value the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction on the sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,60,000/- (three lacs sixty thousand) as mentioned in the sale deed. Based upon pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court struck number of issues including issues whether proper court fees was paid or not and whether proper valuation for jurisdiction was done or not. Aforesaid two issues were framed as Issue No. 12 and 13 and were tried as preliminary issues. Based upon pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court struck number of issues including issues whether proper court fees was paid or not and whether proper valuation for jurisdiction was done or not. Aforesaid two issues were framed as Issue No. 12 and 13 and were tried as preliminary issues. By the order impugned learned trial Court found that proper court fees has been paid by the plaintiffs on the relief claimed in the suit and also found that the suit is not undervalued for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. It is against said order the present writ petition has been preferred by defendant No.8 under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India as mentioned hereinabove. I have heard Shri B.K. Joshi, learned counsel for petitioner and Shri R.C. Chazed, learned counsel for respondents 1-7 at length. Perused the material available on record. The only contention urged by Shri Joshi, learned counsel for petitioner is that as per section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (for short the Act of 1887), petitioner is required to value the suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction on the sale consideration as mentioned in the sale deed executed in favour of petitioner. He further submitted that plaintiffs have grossly under-valued the suit, therefore, learned trial Court erred in law in deciding issue No. 12 & 13 in affirmative i.e. in favour of plaintiffs and against the petitioner. On the other hand Shri Chazed, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 7 submitted that provisions of section 8 of Act of 1887 are inapplicable to the facts of the present case therefore no interference is warranted with the impugned order. Section 8 of the Act of 1887 provides that where in the suits Court fees are payable ad-valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for short the Act) other than the suit specified in section 7 (v) (vi) (ix) and (x) (d) of Act, the issue for purpose of payment of court-fees and valuation for purpose of jurisdiction, must be the same. The suits which excluded from operation of this section are: (i) suits for possession of land, houses and gardens [section 7 (iv)]; (ii) suits to enforce a right of pre-emption [section 7 (vi)]; (iii) mortgage suits [section 7 (ix)] and (iv) suits for specific performance of Award [section 7 (x)(d)]. The suits which excluded from operation of this section are: (i) suits for possession of land, houses and gardens [section 7 (iv)]; (ii) suits to enforce a right of pre-emption [section 7 (vi)]; (iii) mortgage suits [section 7 (ix)] and (iv) suits for specific performance of Award [section 7 (x)(d)]. For the purpose of determining the jurisdiction, valuation of suit may be classified in three categories namely: (1) Suits falling under section 7 (v) (iv) (ix) and (x)(d) of Act; (2) Suits falling under other clauses of section 7 of the Act, and (3) Suits in respect of which fixed court fees are payable. Suits falling under category (2) above do not admit of any definite or exact value and law allows the plaintiff to give his own value to the relief he seeks and court-fee is payable on the plaint according to the relief. In other words, suits falling in second category, the jurisdictional value must follow the value for purposes of payment of court-fee. Suits falling under category (1) above, the jurisdictional value will be the market value of the land subject to the provisions of section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1887 where the property is 'land' or an 'interest in land'. Suits falling under category (3) the jurisdictional value will ordinarily be determined according to the rules framed under section 9 of the Act. Once the category of suit is ascertained, the Court has to find out whether plaintiff has correctly valued the relief for the purposes of court-fee in the manner laid down in section 7 of the Act. This process also involves the examination of plaint allegations alone and, if there is nothing to indicate otherwise, the plaintiff's valuation prima-facie is accepted as correct at the first instance but if it transpires subsequently that an allegation of fact on the basis of the court-fee was computed, is not correct, then it is within the power of the Court to demand additional court-fee before judgment is pronounced. The Court's power to intervene and realize court-fee in such circumstances extends to any stage of the proceeding in the case. The Court's power to intervene and realize court-fee in such circumstances extends to any stage of the proceeding in the case. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (AIR 1958 SC 254) that the effect of the provision of section 8 of the Act of 1887 is to make the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the valuation determinable for computation of court-fee. Once the value for the purposes of court-fee is determined that decides the valuation for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. In such a case it is the amount on which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for purposes of court-fee that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. In the present case from plaint averments it is clear that plaintiffs are claiming constructive possession over the suit property and are seeking permanent injunction and declaration that the sale deed is null and void. Thus, according to plaint, plaintiffs are not executants of sale deed in question. It is not necessary for them to have sale deed cancelled or set aside. Plaintiffs have valued the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 200/and have accordingly paid the court-fee of Rs. 20/-. Similarly plaintiffs have valued the relief of each declaration at Rs. 600/- and have paid the Court fees of Rs. 120/-. Learned trial Court while deciding the issue No. 12 and 13 considering the plaint allegations, has held that plaintiffs are claiming permanent injunction and declarations without any consequential relief. Distinguishing Subhash Chand lain v. Chairman, MPEB & others, 2001 (1) JLJ 81 (FB) and Laxminarayan v. Dariyaobai, 1997 (1) MPWN 72 trial Court has held that plaintiffs have properly valued the relief and paid the adequate court-fee. Shri B.K. Joshi, learned counsel for petitioner during the course of arguments in addition to cases cited before the trial also placed reliance on 1997 (1) JLJ 136 = 1997 MPLJ 13 (Ambaram v. Pramilabai); 1999 (2) JLJ 218 = 1999 (1) MPLJ 37 (Mohd. Jameel v. Miththulal); 2002 (1) MPLJ 458 (Dharamraj v. Vaidya Nath). In fact, decisions reported in Ambaram's and Dharamraj's cases (supra) rather than helping the petitioner advance the case of plaintiffs. In both these cases, plaintiffs therein sought declaration without any consequential relief and permanent injunction. Similarly in Mohd. Jameel v. Miththulal); 2002 (1) MPLJ 458 (Dharamraj v. Vaidya Nath). In fact, decisions reported in Ambaram's and Dharamraj's cases (supra) rather than helping the petitioner advance the case of plaintiffs. In both these cases, plaintiffs therein sought declaration without any consequential relief and permanent injunction. Similarly in Mohd. Jameel's case learned Single Judge found that besides seeking declaration and permanent injunction, plaintiff therein also sought consequential relief of cancellation of sale deeds which is not the case of the plaintiffs in the present case. In considered opinion of this Court learned trial Court rightly distinguished Laxminarayan's case (supra) and it is also of no help because in that case Court was dealing with suit for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for possession. The question before Full Bench was altogether different which is not involved in the present case. In the considered opinion of this Court suit filed by the plaintiffs herein does not fall in any of the excepted paragraphs of section 7 Court-fees Act as mentioned in section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act therefore, plaintiffs herein are not required value the relief at Rs.3,60,000/- for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, this Court find that the order impugned does not suffer from any procedural infirmity or material irregularity or jurisdictional error so as to warrant interference in exercise of extra ordinary power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.