JUDGMENT S. U. Khan, J.—In this writ petition arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner were heard on 23.2.2004 and judgment was reserved. The Court did not have the advantage of hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents, as he did not appear even though the case was taken up in the revised list. 2. This is tenant’s writ petition arising out of a suit filed by landlord-respondent for his ejectment on the ground of default being S.C.C. Suit No. 588 of 1978 on the file of J.S.C.C., Bareilly. Suit was decreed on 23.2.1980. Tenant’s revision (S.C.C. Revision No. 75 of 1980) was dismissed by Vth A.D.J., Bareilly on 1.5.1982, hence this writ petition. According to the plaint allegations rate of rent of the shop in dispute was Rs. 19.50 till 15.7.1972 and w.e.f. 15.7.1972 it was enhanced by 25% amounting to Rs. 24.39 per month. Provision of enhancement of rent on the enforcement of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is provided for under Section 5 of the said Act. Under the said section it is provided that landlord may by notice in writing given within three months from the date of commencement of the Act (i.e., 15.7.1972) enhance the rent to an amount not exceeding the standard rent and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the Act. According to the plaint case notice under the said section was given by the landlord to one of the tenants Smt. Aziz Begum (petitioner No. 1) on 12.9.1972, under certificate of posting (U.P.C.) petitioner No. 1 denied receiving any such notice. 3. Regarding enhancement of rent w.e.f 15.7.1972 the trial court has recorded the following findings : (a) Notice under Section 5 of the Act sent under certificate of posting dated 12.9.1972 was served upon one of the tenants Aziz Begum petitioner No. 1. (b) Notice under Section 5 having been given only to one of the tenants was not binding upon other tenants. (c) There being no reasonable annual rent, standard rent under Section 3 (k) of the Act cannot be determined hence plaintiff failed to prove that he was entitled to enhance the rent w.e.f. 15.7.1972. (d) Defendants themselves admitted the enhancement of rent by their conduct as they remitted the rent demanded at the enhanced rate through Money Order and also deposited the rent at the enhanced rate without protest. (d) Defendants themselves admitted the enhancement of rent by their conduct as they remitted the rent demanded at the enhanced rate through Money Order and also deposited the rent at the enhanced rate without protest. 4. As far as finding (a) is concerned, tenant-petitioners apart from denying receipt of notice dated 12.9.1972 by tenant petitioner No. 1 also contended before the trial court that a notice was given by the landlord to them on 1.2.1973. In the said notice there was no mention of the alleged notice dated 12.9.1972 which was a very strong circumstance to show that no notice was sent on 12.9.1972. In this regard the trial court under point No. 1 held as under : “This circumstance alone is not sufficient to disbelieve the certificate of posting paper exhibit 31. Therefore, I believe that the notice dated 12.9.1972 was given by the plaintiffs-defendants under the certificate of posting.” 5. The notice dated 19.9.1978, terminating the tenancy and demanding the rent on the basis of which suit giving rise to the instant petition was filed was sent through registered post. The earlier notice dated 1.2.1973 was also sent through registered post. Some subsequent notices (discussed in latter part of this judgment) were also sent through registered post. When all other notices were sent through registered post, there was no reason for the plaintiff-landlord to send the notice dated 12.9.1972 under Section 5 of the Act under certificate of posting. Presumption of sending and service of notice may arise only when notice is sent through registered post on correct address. It is common knowledge that certificate of posting does not carry any sanctity. In any case certificate of posting may only be an evidence of posting the letter but not of its receipt by the addressee. The findings in this regard recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the revisional court are perverse and erroneous in law. No reasonable person can arrive at the finding of receipt of a letter merely on the basis of the fact that it was sent under certificate of posting. 6. Section 5 of the Act uses the words “notice given”. According to Section 27 of U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, where a document is to be served by post which term shall include the word “given”, the service shall be effected through registered post. 6. Section 5 of the Act uses the words “notice given”. According to Section 27 of U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, where a document is to be served by post which term shall include the word “given”, the service shall be effected through registered post. Section 27 of U. P. General Clauses Act is quoted below : “27. Meaning of service by Post.—Where any (Uttar Pradesh) Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 7. Decision on finding (b) is also not correct as in view of the Supreme Court authority in AIR 1995 SC 676 , after the death of the tenant all the heirs inherit the tenancy as joint tenants and notice to one joint tenant is sufficient. However, reversal of the finding (b) of the trial court will not make any difference as it has been held that no notice was served even upon petitioner No. 1. Similarly, it is also not necessary to decide the correctness of finding (c) as it has been held that no notice under Section 5 (k) was served upon any of the tenants. 8. Regarding finding (d) it may be stated that if a tenant by way of abundant precaution pays or deposits the rent demanded by the landlord, it does not mean that he has forfeited his right to question the rate of rent or period of default. Normally in order to avail the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act, rent demanded in the plaint is deposited even if defendant-tenant questions the correctness of the same. By making too much protest regarding rate and arrears of rent, tenant runs the risk of his deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act being treated as conditional deposit. 9. By making too much protest regarding rate and arrears of rent, tenant runs the risk of his deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act being treated as conditional deposit. 9. It was clear-cut case of the plaintiff that rent was enhanced not by mutual consent but by notice under Section 5 of the Act, hence there was no scope for the trial court to hold that payment of enhanced rent amounted to mutual agreement for enhancement of rent. The trial court was, therefore, wrong in holding in the concluding portion of the judgment under point No. 1 that “I hold that by implied consent and conduct the defendants agreed to enhance the rent to Rs. 24.38 per month from 15.7.1972.” 10. The point No. 2 framed by the trial court was regarding default. Rent from 11.5.1967 to 9.10.1969 was deposited in a case under Section 7C of old Rent Control Act (Misc. Case No. 79 of 1967). The said case was initiated by the original tenant Akhtar Yar Khan who died in October, 1968. Even after his death the substitution was not effected in the said case and rent was continued to be deposited in the name of deceased original tenant. The trial court held that the deposit of rent in the said case after the death of original tenant was illegal. Thereafter a fresh case under Section 7C of the old Rent Control Act numbered as Misc. Case No. 106 of 1970 was instituted by the petitioners and in this case rent was deposited for different periods on different dates. Meanwhile landlord gave two notices to the tenants asking for the rent dated 1.2.1973 and 15.4.1974 respectively. After receipt of notice dated 15.4.1974 tenants remitted the arrears of rent from 10.10.1969 to 9.5.1974 through three money orders which were refused by the landlord (even though the said rent or major portion thereof had already been deposited by the tenants in Misc. Case No. 106 of 1970). After refusal of three money orders by the landlord the tenants deposited the entire arrears of rent from 10.10.1969 to 4.5.1974 (demanded in the notice dated 15.4.1974) again in Misc. Case No. 106 of 1970 and thereafter tenants withdrew the rent which had been deposited by them in the said misc. case for the same period earlier. After refusal of three money orders by the landlord the tenants deposited the entire arrears of rent from 10.10.1969 to 4.5.1974 (demanded in the notice dated 15.4.1974) again in Misc. Case No. 106 of 1970 and thereafter tenants withdrew the rent which had been deposited by them in the said misc. case for the same period earlier. Thereafter rent from 10.5.1974 to 9.12.1975 was sent by the tenants and accepted by the landlord through three money orders. Thereafter rent from 9.12.1975 to 9.11.1977 was deposited by the tenants before prescribed authority under Section 21 of the Act. Release application under the said section filed by the landlord had been allowed by the prescribed authority. Tenants filed appeal against the said order in which stay order was granted subject to the condition that tenants deposited the arrears of rent before prescribed authority. The trial court has held this deposit from 9.12.1975 to 9.11.1977 to be valid. Thereafter rent from 10.11.1977 to 9.3.1978 (four months) was again deposited in Misc. Case No. 106 of 1970 on 22.2.1978. Thereafter notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent dated 19.9.1978 was sent by the landlord to the tenant (which was the basis of the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition). After receiving the said notice tenants remitted rent through money order to the landlord from 10.3.1978 till 10.10.1978 (seven months). The money order was of Rs. 541.50 (or Rs. 641.50). This money order also contained the difference of rent of Rs. 4.89 per month (24.39-19.50) from 15.7.1972 till 10.10.1978. This amount was accepted by the landlord. 11. The trial court has held the deposit from October, 1968 till October, 1969 in Case No. 79 of 1967 to be invalid on the ground that the said case had been instituted by Akhtar Yar Khan who had died in October, 1968 and deposits made in the said case thereafter (without substitution of petitioners at the place of Akhtar Yar Khan) were invalid. Regarding the deposit of the rent from 10.10.1969 to 10.5.1974 in Case No. 106 of 1970 on 16.5.1974 after notice dated 15.4.1974 and refusal of three money orders the trial court has held that refusal of three money orders gave a fresh cause of action hence a fresh case under Section 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 should have been instituted by the tenant and the deposit having been made in the old Case (No. 106 of 1970) was invalid. Regarding deposit from 10.11.1977 to 9.3.1978 on 22.2.1978 in Case No. 106 of 1970 the trial court has held the same to be invalid on the ground that a notice on 15.7.1975 had been given by the landlord. 12. It is settled that after receiving notice signifying willingness by the landlord to accept the rent, deposit cannot be made or continued to be made under Section 30 of the Act. However, deposits under Section 30 (or 7C of old Act) cannot be termed as illegal on other trivial defects. As far as the question of validity of deposit in Misc. Case No. 79 of 1967 after the death of the applicant Akhtar Yar Khan is concerned, same cannot be termed to be illegal or of no effect as landlord was fully entitled to withdraw the said amount. If the landlord had died and no substitution had been effected, then the deposit could be termed as invalid for the reason that heirs of landlord could not withdraw the amount vide 1999 (1) ARC 473. Deposit of rent in the old Misc. Case No. 106 of 1970 under Section 7C of old Rent Control Act after receiving notice dated 15.4.1974 and after refusal of money orders cannot be termed to be illegal only on the ground that notice and refusal of money order gave rise to fresh cause of action and fresh case under Section 30 should have been instituted. This view taken by the trial court is too technical to be sustained. In any case after refusal of money orders, tenant did not remain in arrears of rent even though rent remained in arrears (vide Full Bench authorities in 1968 AWR 167 and 2000 (1) ARC 652, Paragraphs 18 and 19. 13. The deposit made on 22.2.1978 was only of four months amounting to Rs. 78. In any case after refusal of money orders, tenant did not remain in arrears of rent even though rent remained in arrears (vide Full Bench authorities in 1968 AWR 167 and 2000 (1) ARC 652, Paragraphs 18 and 19. 13. The deposit made on 22.2.1978 was only of four months amounting to Rs. 78. In reply to the notice of the landlord dated 19.9.1978 tenant remitted more than Rs. 500 including the rent of seven months from 10.3.1978 to 10.10.1978. As it has been held in the earlier part of the judgment that rent continued to be only Rs. 19.50 hence an amount of more than Rs. 300 was sent in excess through the said money order. The said excess amount can very well cover the period of four months from 10.11.1977 to 9.3.1978. 14. It is, therefore, held that rate of rent continued to be Rs. 19.50 even after 1972 and at the time of filing of suit, tenant was not defaulter in terms of Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act as within one month from receipt of notice, he had paid entire due arrears of rent to landlord through money order. The contrary findings of the courts below being patently erroneous in law are set aside. Writ petition is allowed and judgment, order and decree passed by courts below are quashed. Suit is dismissed. 15. It has been held by me in Writ Petition No. 29498 of 2001, Smt. Khursheeda and others v. XVIIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, decided on 23.4.2004, that while granting relief to the tenant in writ petition writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent on the basis that “the tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.” 16. The property in dispute is a shop situate in Bara Bazar, Kuncha Sitaram, Bareilly, the rent of Rs. 20 for such a shop is virtually no rent. I accordingly direct that w.e.f. May, 2004, onwards tenant petitioner shall pay Rs. 1,500 per month as rent to the landlord.