JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter referred to as the Code) has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant (hereafter referred to as the plaintiff) against the judgment and decree dated 13.6.1994 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan camp at Nalagarh, in Civil Appeal No. 41-NL/13 of 1992/94 whereby the decree dated 30.9.1992 passed by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Nalagarh, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, has been affirmed. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of the present appeal are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 4,750 i.e. Rs. 4,000 on account of principal and Rs. 750 interest thereon till the institution of the suit and for future interest at the rate of 12-1/2% per annum till the realisation of the decretal amount. The case as made out in the plaint is that the respondent defendant (hereafter referred to as the defendant) took loan of Rs. 4,000 from the plaintiff vide loan receipt dated 24.9.1985 for domestic use, however, the defendant despite several demands failed to repay the amount. Hence, the suit. 3. The defendant resisted the suit. In his written statement he raised preliminary objections that the suit is not maintainable, the suit is not within time, that the plaintiff has no locus standi to institute the suit and is not a licensed money lender. On merits, the defendant denied the taking of any loan and it has been claimed that the facts as averred in the plaint regarding borrowing of the loan by the defendant from the plaintiff are false, concocted, baseless and the document basis of the suit is forged and had been prepared in connivance with the attesting witnesses. It has also been claimed that the document in suit is inadmissible in evidence. It has, therefore, been prayed that the suit be dismissed with special costs under Section 35-A of the Code. 4. Plaintiff filed replication wherein the averments in the written statement have been denied and the claim as made in the plaint has been reaffirmed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of suit amount alongwith interest @ 12-1/2% from the defendant, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit is not within time? OPD 3. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of suit amount alongwith interest @ 12-1/2% from the defendant, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit is not within time? OPD 3. Whether the plaintiff is not licence money lender if so, its effect? OPD 4. Relief. 6. On appreciation of the evidence led by the parties, the trial Court vide its judgment dated 30.9.1992 decided Issue No. l against the plaintiff, Issue No. 2 was decided against the defendant and Issue No. 3 was not pressed. As a consequence of findings on Issue No.1, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan. Hence, this appeal. 7. This appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law : 1. Whether Ex. PW-1/A was a receipt within the meaning of the Stamp Act? 2. Whether the courts below have erred in holding that Ex. PW-1/A was a Promissory note and was inadmissible in evidence being not properly stamped? 3. Whether the courts below have mis-read and mis-construed Ex. PW-1/A which was a simple writing wherein the respondent had agreed to repay the amount which fact was proved to hilt by evidence of PWs 1 to 4? 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW NOS. 1 TO 3. 9. Since all these questions are interconnected and relate to the construction, interpretation and admissibility of the document Ex. PW 1/A, the basis of the suit, therefore, all these questions are taken up together for consideration and decision. 10. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the document Ex. PW 1/A termed as a receipt in the plaint contains a condition to repay the amount received by the defendant, therefore, in fact, it is not a receipt but a bond and on a plain construction of PW 1/A it cannot be stated to be a promissory note as held by the courts below for the reason that it does not contain unconditional undertaking to pay the amount only to or order of the person or to the bearer of the instrument. 11. 11. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied on Ram Narayan Bhagat and another v. Ram Chandra Singh and others (AIR 1962 PATNA 325); Mst. Radha Devi and others v. Dhanik Lal Isser, AIR 1971 PATNA 378 and The Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Collector of Calcutta and others, AIR 1976 CALCUTTA 416. 12. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the defendant contended that the plaintiff in the plaint has described Ex. PW 1/A as a receipt. However, a mere receipt does not give a right to sue for recovery of money thereby received, therefore, the suit for recovery of money on Ex. PW 1/A is not maintainable. In the alternative, it was further contended that the courts below have held Ex. PW 1/A to be a promissory note. On the face of it, Ex PW 1/A is not stamped, therefore, being not admissible in evidence for want of proper stamp, no decree could have been passed in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the suit of the plaintiff has rightly been dismissed by the courts below. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel for the defendant relied on C.N. Shankaran Nambuduripad v. Vijayan and others, AIR 1988 KERALA 120 and Kochuthressia v. Devadas, AIR 1988 KERALA 282. 13. In view of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, the question for determination is whether the document Ex. PW 1/A is a receipt or a promissory note or a bond. The document Ex. PW 1/A when translated into English reads as follows : "I, Amar Nath Kaushal son of Briju, village Manlogkala, Pradhan Manlogkala, has today the 20th of September, 1985 borrowed a sum of Rs. 4,000 to meet my domestic requirements from Shri Brij Lal Sharma son of Gita Ram Sharma resident of Diggal. Therefore, I shall repay this borrowed amount within one year. The agreed rate of interest is 12-1/2% which I shall pay with the borrowed amount." 24. The document, Ex. PW 1/A is signed by the defendant, Bali Ram, scribe and marginal witnesses Hans Raj and Rattan Kumar. 15. As is evident on a bare perusal of the document Ex. PW 1/A that it is not mere acknowledgement of the receipt of the amount but contains a condition to repay the said amount with interest. The document, Ex. PW 1/A is signed by the defendant, Bali Ram, scribe and marginal witnesses Hans Raj and Rattan Kumar. 15. As is evident on a bare perusal of the document Ex. PW 1/A that it is not mere acknowledgement of the receipt of the amount but contains a condition to repay the said amount with interest. Therefore, describing this document as a receipt in the plaint will not make it a receipt. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the defendant that Ex. PW 1/A is a receipt simpliciter cannot be sustained. 16. The courts below have come to the conclusion that Ex. PW 1/A is a promissory note. 17. Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereafter referred to as the Act, which defines a promissory note reads as follows: 4. "Promissory note."—A "promissory note" is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument." 18. It is evident from a bare reading of the above definition that in order to be a promissory note, the document must conform to the following requirements: 1. It must be in writing and signed by the maker. 2. It must contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money only, and nothing more. 3. It must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time. 4. It must be payable to, or to the order of a specified person or to the bearer. 19. A perusal of the document Ex. PW 1/A reveals that the amount mentioned therein which was taken as loan by the defendant was not payable to order or bearer and it is attested by the witnesses. Further there is no evidence that at the time of execution of the document, the parties intended this document to be a promissory note. Therefore, the document Ex. PW 1/A is not a promissory note as defined in Section 2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which adopts the definition of promissory note as given in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the courts below have wrongly held it to be a promissory note. 20. Therefore, the document Ex. PW 1/A is not a promissory note as defined in Section 2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which adopts the definition of promissory note as given in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the courts below have wrongly held it to be a promissory note. 20. In C.N. Sankaran Nambuduripads case supra, the High Court of Kerala held as under : "4. Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 defines "promissory note" as an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person to the bearer of the instrument. The essential requisite of a promissory note is certainly as to the person to make the payment, the person to receive it, the time and place of payment, the conditions of liability and also as to the amount to be paid. No particular form of words is essential to constitute a promissory note. It may be in the form of a letter or in any other form of words which satisfy the requirements of Section 4 of the Act and from which the intention to make a promissory note can be discerned. A mere receipt with no such promise to pay is not a promissory note. The question whether an instrument is a promissory note or not has to be ascertained by the words used in the document. It cannot be said that the absence of the word "promise" is sufficient to declare that the document is not a promissory note. Any form of expression or recitals in the concerned document from which it can be deducted that there was an undertaking to pay a certain sum is sufficient to construe the document as a promissory note. It has to be ascertained whether the words used in an instrument import an unconditional undertaking to pay the amount. It is not enough that the substantial effect of the instrument is to make the executant liable to pay money. For instance, a letter containing a confirmation of an undertaking to pay unconditionally a specified sum to a person will not be a promissory note. It is not enough that the substantial effect of the instrument is to make the executant liable to pay money. For instance, a letter containing a confirmation of an undertaking to pay unconditionally a specified sum to a person will not be a promissory note. A document which contains a promise to pay on demand a certain sum to a specified person is a promissory note though there may be no words of negotiability. The unconditional undertaking to pay a specified amount is the sine qua non in a promissory note. It is essential that the note must be payable at all events. The promise to pay must not be dependent upon a contingency. If the payment is dependent upon a contingency it would definitely amount to uncertainty and the documents cannot be construed as a promissory note. 5. To consider whether a given document is a promissory note or not the following tests are helpful: (i) Is the sum to be paid a sum of money and is that sum certain? (ii) Is the payment to be made or to order of a person who is certain or to the bearer of the instrument? (iii) Has the maker signed the document? (iv) Is the promise to pay made in the instrument the substance of the instrument? and (v) Did the parties intend that the document should be a promissory note? In Ext. Al Rs. 6,000 is stated to be payable on 30th Makaram. The recitals in Ext. Al would show that the plaintiff had agreed to carry out the work of dewatering and watering of the paddy field and that there was not unconditional undertaking by the executants to pay the amount. It is apparent that the payment promised could be enforced by the plaintiff only if he had performed his part of the agreement. As there was no unconditional undertaking of the payment of the amount by the executants of Ext. A1 it is not possible to hold that it is a promissory note. Both the Courts have rightly rejected the Appellants contention that Ext. Al is a promissory note. As the recitals in Ext. Al would show that the parties have intended to construe Ext. Al only as a letter and as that intention is patently obvious from the document it is indeed difficult to treat Ext. Al as a promissory note." 21. Both the Courts have rightly rejected the Appellants contention that Ext. Al is a promissory note. As the recitals in Ext. Al would show that the parties have intended to construe Ext. Al only as a letter and as that intention is patently obvious from the document it is indeed difficult to treat Ext. Al as a promissory note." 21. In Kochuthressias case, supra, while interpreting Section 4 of the Act, Kerala High Court has held as under: "What the section requires is that the instrument should contain an undertaking to pay a certain sum of money to :— (i) a certain (or specified) person; or (ii) the order of such a person; or (iii) to the bearer of the instrument. The word "or" in the last part of the Section, denoting the person to whom payment is to be made, is evidently used in a disjunctive sense; and if there is any doubt in the matter, Illustration (b) should remove it. This is the view taken in Hameed Haji v. Appukutty, 1968 Ker. LT 869; (AIR 1969 Ker 189), though another part of the reasoning therein, based on Explanation (i) to Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, did not meet with the approval of a Full Bench in Santsingh v. Madandas, AIR 1976 Madh Pra 144. Section 13 probably indicates when a promissory note could be held to be negotiable, and the Explanation also is apparently more concerned with negotiability under the Act, than with the definition of promissory note. 4. The Court below was therefore right in placing reliance on Hameed Haji, 1968 Ker LT 869 : (AIR 1969 Ker 189) and holding that the absence of the expression "to the order" was not by itself sufficient to hold that the document in question was not a promissory note." 22. Since the document Ex. PW 1/A does not bear an unconditional undertaking to pay the amount to order or the bearer and is attested by two witnesses and it cannot be gathered from the circumstances of the case that the parties intended the document to be a promissory note, therefore, the law cited hereinabove is of no help to the defendant. 23. The document Ex. PW I/A seems to qualify the requisites of a bond. 24. 23. The document Ex. PW I/A seems to qualify the requisites of a bond. 24. A bond has been defined under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as amended by the Indian Stamp (H.P. Amendment) Act, 1952, as follows : "Bond". Includes (a) any instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be; (b) any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another; and (c) any instrument so attested, whereby a person obliges himself to deliver grain or other agricultural produce to another." 25. It is evident from the aforesaid definition of bond that any instrument attested by witnesses and not payable to order or bearer and whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, is a bond under Section 2(5)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act. As already stated hereinabove vide Ex. PW 1/A, the defendant apparently is under an obligation to pay money to the plaintiff and not to order or bearer and it is attested by witnesses. Thus, it clearly falls within the definition of bond. 26. In Ram Narayan Bhagats case supra, Patna High Court while dealing with a similar question, held as under: "14. On a careful consideration of the authorities, referred to above, my view is that the documents in question in these cases, having been attested by a witness, but there being nothing in them to show that the amounts covered by them were payable to order or to the bearer, come within the term "bond" as defined in Section 2(5)(b) of the Act. The view of the learned Additional Subordinate Judges in the two cases, therefore, is perfectly correct. There is thus no merit in these applications." 27. In Mst. Radha Devis case supra, Patna High Court held as under: "9. After having given due consideration to the arguments advanced before us by learned Counsel for the parties and the ratio for the decisions in Aiyappankuttys case, AIR 1955 Trav-Co 65 and Muthu Gounders case, AIR 1961 Mad 347, I respectfully agree with the view taken by Ramachandra Iyer, J. in the latter case. After having given due consideration to the arguments advanced before us by learned Counsel for the parties and the ratio for the decisions in Aiyappankuttys case, AIR 1955 Trav-Co 65 and Muthu Gounders case, AIR 1961 Mad 347, I respectfully agree with the view taken by Ramachandra Iyer, J. in the latter case. In both these decisions it has been held that when there is no stipulation postponing the payment, the expression payable on demand in the document means that the money becomes due forthwith at once on the execution of the document. In such a case the use of the expression "payable on demand" cannot be taken to be a condition; but where the payment cannot be enforced within a stipulated period and it is stated that the debt becomes payable after that period on demand, the use of expression on demand attaches a further condition and such a document is not a promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act. 10. As has already been observed, the definition of "bond" in Section 2(5) of the Stamp Act is not exhaustive. By the document under consideration the debtors do bind themselves to pay the amount. Learned Counsel for the petitioners was not able to show to us any other Article of the Schedule to the Stamp Act which expressly covers such a document. In the circumstances, I find no reason to differ from the view taken by the court below that the document is a bond and is chargeable under Article 15 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act." 28. In The Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd.s case supra, Calcutta High Court held as under : "47. Upon considering the plain meaning of the word bond, the legislative history of the definition of bond, and the above authorities, we are of the opinion that the document or the instrument in the instant case is a bond for the following reasons:— (1) It is an instrument by which the Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd., has obliged itself to pay the sum of Rs. 15,00,000 in three equal annual instalments of Rupees 5,00,000 each on May 31,1991, May 31,1992 and May 31, 1993; (2) It is not payable to order or bearer; and (3) It is not an agreement because the enforcement of this document does not involve quantification of damages by Court. Ltd., has obliged itself to pay the sum of Rs. 15,00,000 in three equal annual instalments of Rupees 5,00,000 each on May 31,1991, May 31,1992 and May 31, 1993; (2) It is not payable to order or bearer; and (3) It is not an agreement because the enforcement of this document does not involve quantification of damages by Court. (4) In default the obligation under the agreement can be enforced independent of any damages. 48. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion with reference to Question No. 2 that the Collector in the instant case was justified in assessing the duty of Rs. 18,000.10 P. on the document under reference under Article 15 of Schedule 1-A to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Our answers to the other two questions do not arise. There will be no order as to costs." 29. In Jaikumar Shivlal Shah and others v. Motilal Hirachand Gandhi and another, AIR 1973 Bombay 27, the Bombay High Court while dealing with a similar question as in hand, held as under : "9. I am of the view that the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel Mr. Sathe correctly lay down the legal position and it is this that Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after its amendment by the amending Act 8 of 1919, does not introduce any change in the definition of promissory note given in Section 4 of that Act or in the definition given in Section 2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, or in the definition of bond given in Section 2(5)(b) of that Act. It only makes every promissory note coming under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act a negotiable instrument for the purposes of that Act, unless it contains words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it shall not be transferable. But if a promissory note falling under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and therefore, under Section 2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, is attested and not made payable to order or bearer it would fall under Section 2(5)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and would, therefore, amount to bond for the purposes of that Act. For the purposes of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, a document as it appears on the face of it has got to be considered. I, therefore, hold that the document Ex. For the purposes of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, a document as it appears on the face of it has got to be considered. I, therefore, hold that the document Ex. I, is a bond falling under Section 2(5)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not a promissory note under Section 2(22) of that Act." 30. In view of the above position in law and the contents of the document Ex. PW 1/A, it is a bond and not a promissory note, as held by the courts below. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff could not be dismissed on the premises that Ex. PW 1/A being unstamped promissory note was inadmissible in evidence. 31. Though the defendant at the stage of leading evidence had disputed his signatures on the document Ex. PW 1/A, however, before the Appellate Court below counsel for the defendant did not dispute the genuineness of the signatures of the defendant on Ex. PW 1/A. Even otherwise Bali Ram (PW-2), scribe of the document, attesting witness Rattan Kumar (PW-3) and handwriting expert Satwant Puri (PW-4) have in their evidence fully proved that the document Ex. PW 1/A bears the signatures of the defendant. On this question of fact, the lower Appellate Court has also concluded that due execution of Ex. PW 1/A was proved in view of the aforesaid evidence and the genuineness of the signatures of the defendant on the document was not disputed and there is no reason to differ with the aforesaid findings of facts recorded by the lower Appellate Court. It is not the case of the defendant that he has paid the amount in question or any part thereof. 32. As a result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments and decree are set aside. A decree for the principal sum of Rs. 4,000 and Rs. 750 as interest at the agreed rate of interest i.e. 12-1/2% from the date of the execution of the document till the filing of the suit with future interest on the principal amount of Rs. 4,000 at the aforesaid agreed rate of interest from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of realisation of the decretal amount is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant with costs throughout.