Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. The defendants have approached this Court through the present regular second appeal. The challenge is to the judgments and decree passed by the learned Courts below whereby the suit of the plaintiff, Gurmej Singh for possession of the suit land by way of redemption has been decreed. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession by way of redemption of land measuring 16 kanals 74 marlas. It was claimed by him that the aforesaid land was mortgaged by him with the defendants on April 21, 1965 for a consideration of Rs. 6,000/-. In the aforesaid mortgage deed the period of mortgage was mentioned as 99 years. It was further stipulated in the mortgage deed that the produce and the interest as per the agreement between the parties would be equal and that the mortgagees would be entitled to effect improvements in the land in dispute and the aforesaid expenditure for improvements would be liable to be recovered by them along with interest at the rate of 1% per month at the time of redemption. The plaintiff claimed that the aforesaid clause as well as the period of redemption of 99 years was clog on the equity of redemption and, as such, was liable to be ignored and as such the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the land. Accordingly, the suit for redemption, as aforesaid, was filed by the plaintiff. 3. The defendants contested the suit filed by the plaintiff. In the written statement filed by them, they admitted the execution of the mortgage deed dated April 21, 1965 but claimed that the aforesaid mortgage was for a period of 99 years and, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff was premature. It was further claimed that the defendants had a right to make improvements on the land in dispute and the rate of interest on the aforesaid improvements was a matter of fact and did not constitute a clog on the equity of redemption. 4. It was further claimed that the defendants had a right to make improvements on the land in dispute and the rate of interest on the aforesaid improvements was a matter of fact and did not constitute a clog on the equity of redemption. 4. The learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence available on the record and on the perusal of the mortgage deed, Ex.D1, held that the period of 99 years provided in the mortgage deed coupled with the clause for recovery of the amount of improvements along with interest at the rate of 1% per annum was wholly unreasonable, oppressive and unfair and as such constituted a clog on the equity of redemption. On the basis of the aforesaid finding, it was further held that the plaint was decreed. 5. The defendants felt aggrieved and took up the matter in appeal. The learned first Appellate Court reappraised the entire evidence and also came to the similar conclusions as had been arrived at by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the defendants was also dismissed. 6. The defendants have still remained dissatisfied and have approached this Court through the present regular second appeal. 7. I have heard Shri J.S. Cooner and Shri R.S. Ghuman, Advocates, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri A.S. Jattana, Advocate, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants have argued that the judgments of the learned Courts below were not legally sustainable inasmuch as the clause contained in the mortgage deed Ex.D1 could not be termed to be a clog on the equity of redemption. According to the learned counsel, mere long period by itself could not be held to be clog on equity of redemption. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that as a matter of fact the plaintiff had agreed to sell his land at the time of creation of the mortgage and, therefore, for all intents and purposes the mortgage deed Ex.D1 was to be treated as a sale-deed. In support of the argument, the learned counsel relied upon the case of Sarjug Mahto and Ors. V/s. Smt. Devrup Devi, A.I.R. 1963 Patna 114. 9. In support of the argument, the learned counsel relied upon the case of Sarjug Mahto and Ors. V/s. Smt. Devrup Devi, A.I.R. 1963 Patna 114. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has contested all the aforesaid contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the period of 99 years mentioned in the mortgage deed coupled with the fact that the mortgage deed provided that the mortgagees had unfettered and unrestricted powers to effect improvements in the land in dispute and were entitled to recover the expenses incurred by them for effecting such improvements along with interest at the rate of 1% per month at the time of redemption itself showed that the said stipulation was totally unjust, unfair and inequitable. On that basis, the learned counsel states that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are totally justified under the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. From the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, the following substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal; "As to whether the long period of 99 years coupled with the other clause with regard to recovery of expenses for improvements alongwith interest can be treated to be a clog on the equity of redemption?" 11. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. I find that there is no merit in the present appeal. 12. Certain observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Pomal Kanji Govindji and Ors. etc. V/s. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit and Ors. etc., A.I.R. 1989 Supreme Court 436, may be noticed : "Though, long-term by itself as the period for redemption, is not necessarily a clog on the equity but in the changing circumstances of inflation and phenomenal increase in the prices of real estates, in this age of population-explosion and consciousness and need for habitat, long-term, very long-term, taken with other relevant factors, would create a presumption that it is a clog on equity of redemption. If that is the position then keeping in view the financial and economic conditions of the mortgagor, the clause obliging the payment of interest even in case of usufructuary mortgage not periodically but at the time of ultimate redemption imposing a burden on the mortgagor to redeem, the clauses permitting construction and reconstruction of the building in this inflationary age and debiting the mortgagor with an obligation to pay for the same as a ground for redemption, would amount to clog on equity." "It is a settled law in England and in India that a mortgage cannot be made altogether irredeemable or redemption made illusory. The law must respond and be responsive to the felt and discernible compulsions of circumstances that would be equitable, fair and just and unless there is anything to the contrary in the Statute, law must take cognizance of that fact and act accordingly. In the context of fast changing circumstances and economic stability, long-term for redemption makes a mortgage an illusory mortgage, though not decisive. It should prima facie be an indication as to how clog on equity of redemption should be judged." Following the law down in Pomal Kanji Govindjis case (supra), this Court in the case of Ajit Singh V/s. Kakhbir Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1992 Punjab and Haryana 193, held as follows: "7. The right of redemption is without doubt a statutory right which cannot be fettered by any condition which impedes or prevents redemption and any such, condition is void as a clog on the equity of redemption. The circumstances in which the mortgagor was compelled to secure the amount, terms and conditions on which the amount was in fact advanced, and the other alternative to which the mortgagor could have taken recourse for obtaining the sum advanced are relevant factors for determining whether particular term of redemption amounts to a clog on the equity of redemption because it is unreasonably long. The term as to the postponement of the right of redemption of mortgage for a period of 95 years read with the other conditions mentioned in the mortgage deed would amount to a clog on right of redemption." A perusal of the mortgage deed Ex.D1 shows that the duration of 99 years has been provided for the mortgage in question. The term as to the postponement of the right of redemption of mortgage for a period of 95 years read with the other conditions mentioned in the mortgage deed would amount to a clog on right of redemption." A perusal of the mortgage deed Ex.D1 shows that the duration of 99 years has been provided for the mortgage in question. It has further been provided in the mortgage deed that the mortgagees shall have a right to effect improvements, as desired and would be entitled to recover, the said expenses at the time of redemption along with interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month. The said stipulations clearly show that the aforesaid clauses operate unfairly and unjustly against the right of redemption of the mortgagor. Accordingly, on the face of it, the aforesaid clauses are liable to be termed as a clog on the equity of redemption. 13. The other argument raised by the plaintiff for the appellants, that the aforesaid mortgage deed was liable to be treated as a sale-deed, is also without any merit. A perusal of the written statement filed by the defendants shows that no such plea was ever taken by them in the written statement. The defendants merely contested the suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground of the same being pre-mature and also that the condition with regard to recovery of the expenses for improvements was not a clog on the equity of redemption. The plea of sale raised by the learned counsel for the appellants before this Court is a contention which is just totally beyond the pleadings of the defendants in the written statement. Accordingly, the aforesaid contention cannot be taken into consideration. 14. Faced with the aforesaid difficulty, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that no such improvements, which were unreasonable, have been effected by the defendant-mortgagees so far and as such no benefit of the aforesaid clause could be taken by the mortgagor. The learned counsel for the appellants contend that the aforesaid clause is not to be read in isolation but has to be seen under the facts and circumstances and since there was nothing on record to suggest that any large amount has been spent for making the improvements, therefore, the aforesaid clause could not be treated to be unfair under the circumstances of the case. 15. 15. I am afraid even the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is without any justification. Almost in similar circumstances in the case of Faujdar Khan V/s. Abdul Samad Khan, A.I.R. 1924 Lahore 129, a Division Bench of Lahore High Court had held as follows: "it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the mortgagees have not so far spent a very large sum in making improvements, but this contention is, in our opinion, beside the point. The authority to spend such amount as they may think fit has undoubtedly been conferred upon them, and the fact that they have not so far utilised that authority to the fullest extent is due to the dispute among themselves about the partition of their joint property. It appears that the bargain in question has now been allotted to two of the mortgagees and if the suit for redemption is dismissed they would be free to utilise to the fullest extent the extremely wide power given to them by the contract. The covenants in the mortgage deed referred to above including that of postponing redemption for a period of 51 years would certainly result in making redemption very difficult, if not practically impossible, at the end of the term; and the Sub-Judge in the exercise of his equitable jurisdiction was, therefore, justified in relieving the plaintiff against the oppressive terms of the contract and in granting redemption on reasonable terms before the mortgagees could render the equity of redemption practically nugatory." In view of the aforesaid law on the point and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the substantial question of law framed above, has necessarily to be answered against the appellants. Accordingly, the present appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.