Judgment : M. Y. EQBAL, J. ( 1 ) SINCE these two appeals arose out of common judgment and award, the same are being heard and disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) M. A. No. 22 of 2004 has been filed by the claimants for enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal, Latehar in M. V. Claim case No. 1 of 2003, whereas M. A. No. 78 of 2004 has been filed by the appellant, national Insurance Co. Ltd. challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the said case. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. ( 4 ) APPELLANTS in M. A. No. 22 of 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the claimants)tiled the aforementioned claim case under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 23,00,000 for the death of Rajshri nagesh in a motor vehicle accident. The claimants case is that on 20. 9. 2002 the deceased Rajshri Nagesh was going to chandwa to-offer Puja along with her husband, claimant No. 1 and bodyguard by their own vehicle bearing registration No. BR 18-9545 and when they reached near village Jagaldaga one tanker bearing No. JH 01-C 2766 was coming from opposite direction at high speed and dashed against the car of the deceased resulting in several grievous injuries to the occupants of the car. Deceased, Rajshri Nagesh, was shifted to hospital and in course of treatment she died. The claimants case is that claimant no. 1 is a judicial officer and his salary on 1. 9. 2002 was nearly Rs. 30,000 per month. Claimants also alleged that the deceased was looking after the cultivation work and her annual income from agriculture was approximately Rs. 1,25,000. The insurer of the tanker, namely, appellant National insurance Co. Ltd. contested the claim by filing written statement denying and disputing the income of the deceased and also the income of claimant No. 1. ( 5 ) THE Tribunal framed the following 9 issues for consideration: (i) Whether the claim case as framed is maintainable? (ii) Whether the appellants have valid cause of action for the case? (iii) Whether the accident took place on 22. 9. 2002 as alleged in the application for compensation? (iv) Whether death of Rajshri Nagesh, wife of applicant No. 1 was the result of aforesaid accident? (ii) Whether the appellants have valid cause of action for the case? (iii) Whether the accident took place on 22. 9. 2002 as alleged in the application for compensation? (iv) Whether death of Rajshri Nagesh, wife of applicant No. 1 was the result of aforesaid accident? (v) Whether the vehicles involved in the aforesaid accident were insured with o. P. Nos. 3 and 4 respectively during the period of accident as required under motor Vehicles Act, 1988? (vi) Whether opposite party members are liable to pay compensation jointly or severally? If so, whether the insurance company may be made liable to pay compensation to the applicants? (vii) Whether amount of compensation claimed is just and proper? What should be the quantum of compensation under the circumstances of the case? (viii) Whether applicants are entitled to interest from the date of accident/date of filing application? (ix) Are the applicants entitled to the reliefs as prayed for or any other relief? ( 6 ) WHILE deciding issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 the Tribunal held that the accident took place resulting grievous injuries to the deceased Rajshri Nagesh who died in apollo Hospital. The Claims Tribunal also answered issue No. 1 by holding that the claim application filed by the claimants is maintainable. In answering issue Nos. 7, 8 and 9 the Tribunal recorded a finding that deceased was 52 years of age and was a domestic lady who had no income prior to accident. The Claims Tribunal, therefore, proceeded to decide the quantum of compensation by applying Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, according to which notional income for compensation to those who had no income, then 1\3rd of the income of the earning/surviving spouse shall be the basis for compensation. Tribunal, therefore, calculated the compensation by taking 1/3rd of monthly salary of claimant no. 1 which comes to Rs. 8,700. Accordingly, the annual income was assessed at rs. 1,04,400 and applying multiplier of 11 compensation assessed at Rs. 11,48,000. Out of the aforesaid amount, 1/3rd was deducted being the expense which would have been incurred towards maintaining the deceased and finally the compensation was assessed at Rs. 7,66,000. The Tribunal has also awarded Rs. 2,000 as the funeral expenses, Rs. 5,000 against loss of consortium and Rs. 2,500 towards loss to estate. ( 7 ) MR. 11,48,000. Out of the aforesaid amount, 1/3rd was deducted being the expense which would have been incurred towards maintaining the deceased and finally the compensation was assessed at Rs. 7,66,000. The Tribunal has also awarded Rs. 2,000 as the funeral expenses, Rs. 5,000 against loss of consortium and Rs. 2,500 towards loss to estate. ( 7 ) MR. Alok Lal, learned counsel for the appellant insurance company assailed the impugned award mainly on the ground that the Tribunal has committed error of law in applying Second Schedule to the Act while computing compensation. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal also committed serious illegality in not appreciating the evidence available on record that the basic pay of the claimant No. 1 was Rs. 17,150 and not Rs. 26,118 and consequently the assessment of compensation on the basis of gross salary of the claimant No. 1, i. e. , rs. 26,118 is wholly unsustainable in law. Learned counsel submitted that deceased wife of the claimant No. 1 was having no independent earning and she was simply a housewife. In that view of the matter, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is wholly erroneous and exorbitant. ( 8 ) BUT on the other hand, Mr. Arvind kumar Lal, learned counsel appearing for the claimants submitted that the amount of compensation assessed by the Tribunal is on a very low side and is liable to be enhanced. According to learned counsel, the monthly income of claimant No. 1 is near about Rs. 29,633 and the amount of compensation ought to have been assessed taking this amount as the monthly earnings of claimant No. 1. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal has erred in law in not applying the provisions of section 163-A read with Second Schedule to the Motor vehicles Act, 1988, according to which multiplier of 13 has been prescribed for calculating the amount of compensation for the age group between 45 and 50 years. ( 9 ) BEFORE considering the rival submissions of learned counsel, I would first like to point out that the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the deceased was a housewife and she had no independent income prior to accident. Neither in the memo of appeal the said finding has been assailed by the claimants nor any argument was advanced by the counsel appearing for the claimants. Neither in the memo of appeal the said finding has been assailed by the claimants nor any argument was advanced by the counsel appearing for the claimants. Therefore, I shall proceed further on the basis of aforesaid finding which has attained its finality. ( 10 ) AS noticed above, the Tribunal had calculated compensation on the basis of guidelines provided in Second Schedule to the Act taking 1/3rd of the earnings of claimant No. 1 being the surviving spouse. ( 11 ) SECTION 163-A of Motor Vehicles act was inserted in the year 1994 by Act 54 of 1994, which came into force from 14. 11. 1994. The said provision has been inserted to provide for new pre-determined structured formula for payment of compensation to road accident victim on the basis of age and/or income of the deceased. ( 12 ) SECTION 163-A of the Act reads as under:"special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation as indicated in the second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. " ( 13 ) THE Second Schedule referred to in section 163-A of the Act provides for a structured formula for the purpose of grant of compensation to third party involved in fatal accident. According to this Schedule compensation amount is required to be calculated having regard to the age of the victim and his annual income. Clause 6 of Second Schedule, however, provides guidelines for calculating compensation in cases where deceased had no income prior to accident. According to this Schedule compensation amount is required to be calculated having regard to the age of the victim and his annual income. Clause 6 of Second Schedule, however, provides guidelines for calculating compensation in cases where deceased had no income prior to accident. Clause 6 of Second Schedule reads as under:"second SCHEDULE clauses 1 to 5: xxx xxx xxx clause 6: Notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident: fatal and disability in non-fatal accidents: (a) Non-earning persons - Rs. 15,000 p. a. (b) Spouse - Rs. 1/3rd of income of the earning/surviving spouse. " ( 14 ) IN the instant case, the Tribunal has applied sub-clause (b) of clause 6 of the second Schedule for the purpose of assessment of compensation. ( 15 ) SECTION 163-A and Second Schedule to the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of u. P. State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Trilok chandra, 1996 ACJ 831 (SC) and their lordships held that calculation of compensation and the amount worked out in the Second Schedule suffers from several defects. Their Lordships observed:"we must at once point out that the calculation of compensation and the amount worked out in the Schedule suffer from several defects. For example, in item No. 1 for a victim aged 15 years, the multiplier is shown to be 15 years and the multiplicand is shown to be rs. 3,000. The total should be Rs. 3,000 x 15 = Rs. 45,000 but the same is worked out at Rs. 60,000. Similarly, in the second item the multiplier is 16 and the annual income is Rs. 9,000; the total should have been Rs. 1,44,000 but it is shown to be Rs. 1,71,000. To put it briefly, the Table abounds in such mistakes. Neither the Tribunals nor the courts can go by the ready reckoner. It can only be used as a guide. Besides the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his dependants are his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant in the choice of multiplier. But these mistakes are limited to actual calculations only and not in respect of other items. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his dependants are his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant in the choice of multiplier. But these mistakes are limited to actual calculations only and not in respect of other items. What we propose to emphasise is that the multiplier cannot exceed 18 years purchase factor. This is the improvement over the earlier position that ordinarily it should not exceed 16. We thought it necessary to state the correct legal position as the courts and Tribunals are using higher multiplier as in the present case where the Tribunal had used the multiplier of 24, which the High Court raised to 34, thereby showing lack of awareness of the background of the multiplier system in Davies case, (1942) AC 601. " ( 16 ) IN the case of Oriental Insurance co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala, 2001 acj 827 (SC), again Second Schedule to the Act came for consideration before the apex Court and their Lordships reiterated that the Second Schedule suffers from serious defects and the Central Government was directed to make correction in the said schedule. It was held:"in addition, the learned counsel also pointed out that in case of fatal accident and disability in non-fatal accident, it has been provided that notional income for the claimant who had no income prior to accident shall be Rs. 15,000 per annum and still, however, the Second schedule provides the Table of income ranging from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 40,000 and the break-up also does not provide any calculation for Rs. 15,000 as the columns in the Schedule, inter alia, provide for compensation for a person having income of Rs. 12,000 and thereafter straightaway at Rs. 18,000. The learned counsel also submitted that despite the specific provision in section 163-A (3)that Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living, by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time amend the Schedule, nothing has been done so far. Further, by order dated 30. 8. 2000, this court again noticed number of anomalies in the Second Schedule and, therefore, thought it fit to have assistance of either the Attorney General of India or the Solicitor General of india. When the matter was called out on 15. 12. 2000, Mr. Further, by order dated 30. 8. 2000, this court again noticed number of anomalies in the Second Schedule and, therefore, thought it fit to have assistance of either the Attorney General of India or the Solicitor General of india. When the matter was called out on 15. 12. 2000, Mr. Altaf Ahmad, ASG stated before the court that the order passed by this court on 30. 8. 2000 has already engaged serious attention of the ministry of Surface Transport Department and the Government was considering the matter for bringing necessary correction in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. Thereafter, we again sought assistance of the Additional Solicitor General on the interpretation of section 163-A and also to verify whether there are corrections in the second Schedule. Learned Additional solicitor General stated that amendment might take some time. In this view of the matter, we think it would be appropriate if the Central Government takes necessary action as early as possible under section 163-A (3 ). ( 17 ) RECENTLY, in the case of Deepal girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance co. Ltd. , 2004 ACJ 934 (SC), while considering the provisions of section 163-A of the Act and the Second Schedule their lordships of the Supreme Court after considering the earlier decision finally held that since the provisions of section 163-A being the social security provisions, the benefit of which is available only to those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act. Their Lordships observed:"we, therefore, are of the opinion that kodalas case, 2001 ACJ 827 (SC), has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra), that if a person invokes the provisions of section 163-A the annual income of Rs. 40,000 per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000 can take the benefit thereof. All the other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act. 40,000 per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000 can take the benefit thereof. All the other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act. " ( 18 ) COMING back to the instant case, it has not been disputed by the claimants that claim application was filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the grant of compensation and not under section 163-A of the Act which is also evident from the impugned judgment which shows that the Tribunal decided the claim application of the claimants under section 166 of the Act. In my opinion, therefore, instead the Tribunal ought not to have assessed compensation on the basis of guidelines provided under clause 6 of the Second schedule to the Act, which applies in such cases where claim application is filed under section 163-A of the Act. Otherwise also, claim application can be considered under section 163-A read with clause 6 (b) of the second Schedule where the annual income of the claimant is up to Rs. 40,000 as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Deepal girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance co. Ltd. , 2004 ACJ 934 (SC ). In my considered opinion, therefore, the Tribunal has committed error of law in calculating compensation on the basis of the Second schedule to the Act in a claim application filed under section 166 of the Act. ( 19 ) NOW the question arose as to what should be the just and reasonable compensation for the death of housewife who had no independent earning. ( 20 ) ADMITTEDLY, the deceased Rajshri nagesh was the wife of claimant No. 1 who is a judicial officer in the Subordinate judicial Services. The deceased died leaving behind one son and three daughters. Because of the death of the deceased certainly all the claimants not only suffered mental pain and agony but also suffered loss on different accounts. In such circumstances, taking into consideration the status of the deceased and the status of her family members, claimants are entitled to get compensation for the pain and agony and loss of enjoyment as also for the loss of love and affection from the deceased. In such circumstances, taking into consideration the status of the deceased and the status of her family members, claimants are entitled to get compensation for the pain and agony and loss of enjoyment as also for the loss of love and affection from the deceased. It appears from para 8 of the judgment that a sum of Rs. 2,48,000 has been reimbursed to claimant No. 1 for the medical treatment of the deceased by the Health Department, government of Jharkhand, Ranchi. Hence, cost of treatment claimed by the claimant was not allowed by the Tribunal. ( 21 ) TAKING into consideration the entire facts of the case, we are of the opinion that a lump sum amount of Rs. 5,00,000 (rupees five lakh) would be just and reasonable compensation which the claimants are entitled on account of loss of love and affection, loss of consortium and for the death of the deceased. The claimants have already received Rs. 50,000 for the no fault liability from the respondent insurance company but the said amount shall not be deducted out of the final compensation assessed by this court as Rs. 5,00,000 (rupees five lakh ). ( 22 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, Misc. Appeal No. 78 of 2004 is allowed and the amount of compensation is reduced to rs. 5,00,000 (rupees five lakh) which shall be paid together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date fixed by Tribunal. Consequently, Misc. Appeal no. 22 of 2004 is dismissed. Orders accordingly. --- *** --- .