ORDER 1. Heard counsel for the petitioners and counsel appearing for complainant opp. party no. 2. 2. There are two petitioners before this court. One is M/s Exide Industries Limited (Standard Furukawa Division) and the other is M/s Exide Industries Limited. The petitioners seek quashing of the order, dated 1.10.2003 passed by a Judicial Magistrate of the 2nd class. Munger in Case No. 777C/2003. By the impugned order he took cognizance of offences under sections 420 and 463 of the Penal Code and sent back the record of the case to the C.J.M on the plea that the offence of which cognizance was taken were trible by a Magistrate of the 1st Class. The C.J.M. then referred the case to a judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class who on the basis of the earlier order of cognizance summoned the accused, including the petitioners, for facing trial. 2. On hearing counsel for the parties and on going through the materials on record, including the complaint and the order sheet of the Magistrate's court, it appears that the case, atleast in so far as petitioners are concerned, is a gross abuse of the process of the court. In the complaint, apart from accused no.1 who is described in his personal capacity, the remaining two accused are described as follows: "Proprietor, M/s. Standard Furukawa Automatice Batteries, B-25, Sri Krishnapuri, Patna. "Proprietor, M/s. Exide Industries Ltd. Regd. Office of Standard Furukawa Automotive Battries, Exide House, 59E, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta 800020” 4. It should be clear to anyone that the very description of the accused is wholly incorrect and in-appropriate and no order of cognizance-issuance of summon can be passed on such descritpion of the accused. 5. From a perusal of the complaint it further appears that the complainant opp. party had purchased one battery for his computer from accused no.1. The description of the battery is nowhere in the complaint and it is not even clear whether it was Exide battery or it was of any other make. The battery did not function to the complete satisfaction of the complainant. On his complaint accused no.1 repeatedly repaired/changed it. But when teh battery still did not function properly, the complainant demanded that it should be replaced by another battery. The battery did not function to the complete satisfaction of the complainant. On his complaint accused no.1 repeatedly repaired/changed it. But when teh battery still did not function properly, the complainant demanded that it should be replaced by another battery. The accused no.1 declined to oblige and this led the complainant to file the complaint naming as accused not only the seller of the battery but also the two petitioners. In the whole of the complaint petition which is drafted in the most general and vague terms, there is no allegation against the manufacturer of the battery, much less against the present petitioners, making out offences under sections 420 and 463 of the Penal Code. 6. Counsel for the complainant opp. party tried to defend the cognizance order in so far as the petitioners are concerned. He did not rely upon any allegations made in the complaint but referred to the guarantee card that was given with the battery. In reference to guarantee card the only statement in the plaint is contained in para 7 which is as follows: Yeh Ki is ke baad muddai ne guarantee card ko banriki se dekha to paya ki mudaluya no.1 (ek) ne guarantee card ke vivaran prist par bhari jalsaz kiya hai." 7. Counsel for the complainant opp. Party no 2 submitted that in the guarantee card it was stated that the battery was being purchased for a truck. This, according to him, amounted to forgery because the complainant opp. party no.2 had purchased it for his computer rod not for any truck when it was pointed out to him that even this allegation would not make out a case of forgery, he insisted that it was covered by the definition under section 463 of the Penal Code. I leave him to his own under-standing of section 463 I.P.C. but as seen above even the allegation in respect of the guarantee card is against accused no.1 alone and not against the two other accused. 8. On these materials it is amazing that learned Magistrate deemed fit to take cognizance of the offences as indicated above and to summon the petitioners for facing trial. It is debatable whether or not an offence is made out even against accused no.1 but I fail to see how an offence can be said to be made out against the two petitioners by any stretch of imagination. 9. It is debatable whether or not an offence is made out even against accused no.1 but I fail to see how an offence can be said to be made out against the two petitioners by any stretch of imagination. 9. The cognizance order and the order summoning the accused are, accordingly quashed in so far as the two petitioners are concerned. This quashing petition is allowed.