JUDGMENT M. Katju and Poonam Srivastava, JJ.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the “Uttar Pradesh Rural Engineering (Group ‘A’) Services (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 2003, whereby Rule 5 of the said Rule has been amended by means of Notification No. 85CM/62-3-2003-9Res/2003, in exercise of powers granted by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The old rule of 1991 wherein the criteria for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer has been amended. The old rule provided that the promotions to the post of Chief Engineer (Grade II) was to be made amongst the substantively appointed Superintending Engineer who had completed in the year of their recruitment at least six years service as Superintending Engineer and a total period of 25 years of service. This Rule has been substituted by the amending rule-the post of Chief Engineer (Grade II) will be filled by promotion from the substantively appointed Superintending Engineers. 3. The petitioner has challenged the amended rule on the ground that it has been enacted mala fide and with an intention to given promotion to respondent No. 3 on the post of Chief Engineer on regular basis defeating the judgment of this Court dated 11.3.2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4927 of 2003 and is motivated with mala fide reasons. It has also been challenged on the ground that amended rule is illegal, arbitrary and unfair and gives liberty to promote any person on pick and choose basis without adhering to the seniority and the existing Service Rule of 1991 shall stand frustrated. 4. The facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer after being selected by the U. P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad vide order dated 10.8.1983. He was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer as a result of a Departmental Promotion Committee (D.P.C.) which met on 14.7.1993. The respondent No. 3 was also promoted by same D.P.C. and in the tentative seniority list the petitioner was placed at serial No. 119 while the respondent No. 3 at serial No. 121. The vacancy for Superintending Engineer arose under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes quota and candidature of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 was considered. The respondent No. 3 was also promoted by same D.P.C. and in the tentative seniority list the petitioner was placed at serial No. 119 while the respondent No. 3 at serial No. 121. The vacancy for Superintending Engineer arose under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes quota and candidature of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 was considered. There was only one post of Superintending Engineer and since disciplinary proceedings were going on against the petitioner, the decision of the D.P.C. vis-a-vis the petitioner was kept in a sealed cover. The respondent No. 3 was given ad hoc promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer vide order dated 14.3.2001, on the recommendation of the D.P.C. held on 5.3.2001. When the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner came to an end, the sealed cover was opened and petitioner was exonerated. It appears that the D.P.C. was once again held on 9.9.2002 and a decision was taken promoting the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 to the post of Superintending Engineer. According to the petitioner he was shown at serial No. 1 and respondent No. 3 was at serial No. 2 as a result of the decision of the D.P.C. held on 9.9.2002. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 3 preferred a representation to the State Government challenging his ad hoc promotion on the basis of the recommendation of the earlier D.P.C. which had met on 5.3.2001. The State Government allowed the representation of the respondent No. 3 vide order dated 26.12.2002 and granted promotion to the respondent No. 3, w.e.f. 14.3.2001. The next promotional post is the Chief Engineer Grade II and since the vacancy for the post of Chief Engineer Grade II for the scheduled caste category was continuing, the respondent No. 3 was promoted to officiate as Chief Engineer Grade II since he was granted promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer, w.e.f. 14.3.2001. The two orders in favour of the respondent No. 3, i.e., dated 26.12.2002 and 10.1.2003 directing the respondent No. 3 to officiate on the post of Chief Engineer Grade II were challenged by the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4927 of 2003, Jai Ram v. State of U. P. and others. The two orders in favour of the respondent No. 3, i.e., dated 26.12.2002 and 10.1.2003 directing the respondent No. 3 to officiate on the post of Chief Engineer Grade II were challenged by the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4927 of 2003, Jai Ram v. State of U. P. and others. This writ petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on 11.3.2003 and a direction was given that the petitioner shall be treated to be promoted as Superintending Engineer simultaneously with the respondent No. 3 and also that the petitioner shall be treated senior to the respondent No. 3. The State Government and respondent No. 3 challenged the order of the High Court in S.L.P. vide S.L.P. No. 14305 of 2003, State of U. P. v. Jai Ram and others, and the Apex Court stayed the operation of the order of the High Court until further orders which has been annexed along with counter-affidavit in the present writ petition. The State Government amended the rule on 25.7.2003 by means of the impugned notification in the present writ petition. The writ petition was filed on 4.8.2003 and a Division Bench directed the standing counsel and respondent No. 3 to file their reply and till then restrained the D.P.C. from making any promotion to the post of Chief Engineer in pursuance to the impugned amended rules. 5. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and the writ petition has come up for final decision before this Court. 6. Sri T. P. Singh, senior advocate, assisted by Sri Swarn Kumar Srivastava and Sri Anil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsels for the petitioner argued that the impugned rules and amendment have been made giving vast arbitrary powers to the State Government for according promotion to its own men and is hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and also that the amended rule has been brought into force to set at naught the judgment of this Court dated 11.3.2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4927 of 2003. Learned standing counsel has appeared on behalf of the State Government and Sri S. C. Mishra senior advocate assisted by Sri Rakesh Tripathi and Sri D. R. Chaudhary for respondent No. 3 have vehementally opposed the writ petition. Writ Petition No. 4927 of 2003. Learned standing counsel has appeared on behalf of the State Government and Sri S. C. Mishra senior advocate assisted by Sri Rakesh Tripathi and Sri D. R. Chaudhary for respondent No. 3 have vehementally opposed the writ petition. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that experience has always played a vital role while determining the merit of a candidate. Previously the criteria for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer Grade II was fixed as total length of service of 25 years and atleast six years experience as Superintending Engineer. It has further been submitted that the eligibility criteria for the promotion of Superintending Engineer is total length of 15 years of service and six years of experience as Executive Engineer. Since the promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer is on the basis of seniority subject to rejection of unfit, it is submitted that the amended rule has created an anomalous situation inasmuch as any person entitled to be promoted after completing 15 years of service to the post of Superintending Engineer can be promoted to the post of Chief Engineer the very next day and as such the powers given to the State Government appears to be clothed with arbitrariness and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. However, a perusal of the writ petition shows that the main emphasis of challenge by the petitioners appears to be that the rule has been amended only with an intention to give promotion to the respondent No. 3 and is motivated with mala fide reasons and it is for this reason that the promotion rule to the post of Chief Engineer has been amended, whereas no amendment has been brought about in relation to the Rules for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer and Executive Engineer. Learned counsel for the respondent and standing counsel have submitted that the amended rule brought about on 25.7.2003 by which the criteria for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer Grade II from amongst Superintending Engineer has been amended in exercise of powers granted under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the respondent and standing counsel have submitted that the amended rule brought about on 25.7.2003 by which the criteria for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer Grade II from amongst Superintending Engineer has been amended in exercise of powers granted under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Sri S. C. Mishra has also submitted that the post of Chief Engineer Grade II is the post below the post of Head of the Department in the Rural Engineering Service Department as per the amendment dated 10.6.1998 made in U. P. Government Servant (Criteria for Selection by Promotion) Rules, 1994 (Second Amendment, 1998).The Rule 4 of the existing rules have been substituted and by the amendment a new rule has been introduced, which provides that the post of Head of the Department, one rank below the Head of the Department and post of all services of which pay-scale of Rs. 18,300 shall be filled strictly on the basis of merit. It has further been submitted that the amendment in the rule impugned in the present writ petition has been brought about to bring the rules at par with the rules made in the parent department, i.e., Public Works Department which provides merit as the sole criteria and not seniority in the Promotion Rules. It has also been brought to notice of the Court that since the post of Chief Engineer could not be filled for a considerable period as no candidate of the reserved category was available, the requisite length of service had to be altered. In this regard it is important to note that only because of the amended rule challenged by the petitioner, the petitioner has also come within the eligibility criteria for the promotion to the post of Chief Engineer. In absence of the amended rule neither the petitioner nor the respondent No. 3 could be said to be eligible even for consideration for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer. It appears that the petitioner’s grievance to the effect that the amendment has been made mala fide and with a view to grant promotion to respondent No. 3 is ill-founded and against his own interest. 7. We have given careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsels of the parties. It appears that the petitioner’s grievance to the effect that the amendment has been made mala fide and with a view to grant promotion to respondent No. 3 is ill-founded and against his own interest. 7. We have given careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsels of the parties. The objection of the petitioner to the effect that the amendment has been brought about only with a view to nullify the decision of this Court dated 11.3.2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4927 of 2003, is not correct as the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of the said order and as such till the interim order granted by the Apex Court is operative, the situation will not alter. The respondent No. 3 was already officiating as a stop gap arrangement on the post of Chief Engineer Grade II w.e.f. 26.12.2002. Till date no regular promotion has been given and the vacancy is still existing. The contenders for the regular promotion to the said post are the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 3. Another factor which is to be taken into consideration is that the post of Chief Engineer is to be filled on the basis of merit and merit alone and seniority is not a yardstick. By means of the impugned amendment, only the zone of candidature has been altered and it is not the case of the petitioner that he has been debarred from consideration. As such it does not amount to any discrimination and could not be struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. While granting promotion, it is the D.P.C. which looks into the entire service record and the State Government has only laid down the Rules framing guidelines and criteria. It is a wrong apprehension of the petitioner that the amended Rule is clothed with the vice of arbitrariness and that the State Government will appoint and promote a person of its own choice by adopting pick and choose. The amended Rules are statutory in nature and have been passed under the statutory powers of the State Government and is a question of policy decision. The amended Rules are statutory in nature and have been passed under the statutory powers of the State Government and is a question of policy decision. The petitioner has no right to challenge the policy decision taken by the State Government and a rule passed in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, cannot be struck down on the mere assertion of the petitioner that the amendment is mala fide and with a view to defeat the judgment of this Court. It is well-settled that in examining the validity of a statute or statutory rule, the question of motive is wholly irrelevant vide K. C. Gajapathi Narain Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375 . It was observed by the Supreme Court in that decision that : “The doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides of the Legislature. The whole question resolves itself into the question of competence of a particular Legislature to enact a particular law.” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in T. R. Kapur v. State of Haryana, 1986 (Supp) SCC 584, where it was held that the power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to make laws with retrospective effect was not to be used to nullify a right vested in a person under the Statute or the Constitution. Hence it is submitted that Rule 13 which brings appointment by promotion within the purview of reservation retrospectively, operated against the general category candidates already promoted under the pre-amendment rules and was liable to be struck down being unreasonable and arbitrary. This decision is of no help to the petitioner and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The amended Rule has not been made applicable retrospectively nor has it affected a right or claim of either of the parties. In fact under the old Rules neither the petitioner nor the respondent No. 3 were within the eligibility criteria and after the amendment both of them are in the same category. However, no substantive promotion has been made till date. As such the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are of no help. 9. In fact under the old Rules neither the petitioner nor the respondent No. 3 were within the eligibility criteria and after the amendment both of them are in the same category. However, no substantive promotion has been made till date. As such the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are of no help. 9. In a Full Bench decision of this Court, Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U. P., 2000 (3) UPLBEC 2553 , the validity of U. P. Public Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2000, was challenged on the ground that the provisions of the Act are inconsistent with rights granted under Part III of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench observed (vide paragraph 77) : “It is imperative upon the Courts while examining the scope of legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption of constitutionality of the legislation and the Court should endeavour to sustain the constitutionality of the legislation to the extent possible. However, the burden of proof that the impugned legislation is unconstitutional is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. Further while analytically examining the legislation the Court shall not be bound by the pleadings of the State to sustain the constitutional validity of the impugned legislation.” 10. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery, (1997) 2 SCC 453 , the Supreme Court had summarized the scope of judicial review of legislation as follows : (i) The Court will start with the presumption of constitutionality of legislation. (ii) The burden to prove that the legislation is unconstitutional is heavily upon the person who challenges it. (iii) The endeavour of the Court should be to sustain the constitutionality of a legislation to the extent possible. (iv) In order to sustain the presumption of constituti-onality the Court will take into consideration all the existing circumstances, matters of common knowledge, matter of common reports and history of times. (v) The Court will not be bound by the pleading of the State to sustain the constitutional validity. 11. A similar view was taken in Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 ; Madhu Limay v. S.D.A., AIR 1971 SC 2486 ; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 , etc. (v) The Court will not be bound by the pleading of the State to sustain the constitutional validity. 11. A similar view was taken in Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 ; Madhu Limay v. S.D.A., AIR 1971 SC 2486 ; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 , etc. It is settled that the basic cannon of statutory interpretation is first avoidance of redundancy by the Legislature and secondly, self restraint by the judiciary so as to avoid encroaching into the legislative or executive field. 12. In the present case, it is admitted by the petitioner that his rights are not affected by the impugned amendment but it is only an apprehension in his mind that it has been amended with the purpose to benefit one of the contesting parties whereas he has completely lost sight of the fact that if the impugned amendment is beneficial to one Superintending Engineer, it is equally beneficial to the petitioner as well. The power to enact, re-enact or revalidate provisions of law on any subject by the State Legislature is within its domain and this principle of law is an established one and has already been examined by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. 13. In Writ Petition No. 34022 of 2002, XL-IIT Forum v. State of U. P., decided on 27.5.2003, a Division Bench of this Court elaborately considered the doctrine of judicial restraint. 14. In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the power of the Governor and his satisfaction are within his competence and, therefore, the scope of judicial review is considerably narrow. The burden to establish the impugned amendment unconstitutional heavily lay upon the petitioner who has failed to establish the same. The apprehension shown on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore, ill-founded and the writ petition lacks merit and liable to be dismissed. The prayer made in the present writ petition to quash the Amended Rules, 2003, as ultra vires and unconstitutional cannot be allowed as they are without any foundation and cannot be granted. The impugned Amendment Rules are held to be valid and do not call for any interference. The writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.