( 1 ) THE appellant-sole accused in S. C. No. 249 of 1997 on the file of Sessions Judge, West Godavari, at Eluru was charged with Sections 302 and 309 IPC, but, however, appellant-accused was convicted for an offence under Section 304-Part-I IPC and was sentenced to undergo R. I. for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default, to undergo R. I. for six months; and also further convicted under Section 309 IPC and sentenced to undergo R. I. for six months, by judgment dated 28. 1. 1999. ( 2 ) THE learned Sessions Judge, West Godavari, at Eluru recorded the evidence of P. W. 1 to P. W. 16 and marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 11 and M. Os. 1 to 11 and recorded findings in detail regarding the findings of the guilt of the accused under Section 304 part-I and under Section 302 IPC. The accused was examined under Section 313 Cr. P. C. and the accused admitted that he stabbed the deceased to death and also stabbed himself with knife. ( 3 ) THE case of the prosecution is that appellant-accused is a resident of Eastern Street, Eluru and the deceased Kodi Rama Rao alias Christdas, who was a converted Christian was also resident of the same locality and he used to preach Christianity and hold prayers of faith healing at his house on Sundays. The further case of the prosecution is that the accused was suffering from chronic respiratory infection and the same could not be cured and he turned towards Christianity and sought the shelter of the deceased for curing his disease. The deceased baptized the accused and in spite of prayers the accused could not be cured and hence, the accused developed grudge against the deceased for violating his trust. The further case of the prosecution is that on 15. 3. 1996 in pursuance of his determination to kill the deceased, the accused entered the house of the deceased armed with knife, stabbed him on the left side of the chest indiscriminately with knife when the deceased was sleeping on a cot in the varandah of his house. The deceased died instantaneously. 3. 1996 in pursuance of his determination to kill the deceased, the accused entered the house of the deceased armed with knife, stabbed him on the left side of the chest indiscriminately with knife when the deceased was sleeping on a cot in the varandah of his house. The deceased died instantaneously. The son of the deceased by name Kodi Venkiata Durga Rao, who was also sleeping there, woke up and switched on the light in the varandah, while the other members of the family who also woke up, tried to catch hold of the accused. But the accused stabbed himself in his abdomen with the same knife with a view to commit suicide and ran away from the scene up to the end of the lane and fell down at the steps of the house of one Kanuguddi Venkata Rao with bleeding injuries. The accused was shifted to the hospital in his rickshaw and his dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate. Basing on the complaint of the son of the deceased, Crime No. 71 of 1996 was registered under Sections 302 and 309 IPC. After completing investigation, the accused was charge sheeted. ( 4 ) MRS. Naseef, Afshan, the learned counsel representing appellant-accused provided by way of legal aid, made the following submissions: the learned counsel would submit that this is an unfortunate case where the deceased made the accused to believe that if he is baptized and if the prayers are offered, he would be cured and in view of the violation of the trust, the accused developed grudge and out of frustration not only that the accused stabbed the deceased by virtue of which the deceased died, but also the accused also stabbed himself with a view to put an end to his life also. The learned counsel also would submit that inasmuch as the charge framed against the accused apart from 309 IPC, is also Section 302 IPC, instead of just convicting the accused straightaway on the strength of the admission of the guilt made by the accused himself, in all prudence, the learned Sessions Judge had exercised the discretion properly and had proceeded to record the evidence and ultimately came to the conclusion that the requisite intention necessary to establish the guilt of the accused under Section 302 had not been established and hence conviction was recorded under Section 304 part-I IPC. The learned counsel would further submit that this discretion was exercised in judicious manner by the learned Judge. While further elaborating her submissions, the learned counsel also pointed out that from the date of arrest, appellant-accused has been in custody for about eight years and hence, taking the over all facts and circumstances into consideration, it would be just and proper if the appellant-accused is set at liberty in the light of the period of imprisonment, which he had already undergone. ( 5 ) PER contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that this is a clear case falling under Section 302 IPC and also section 309 IPC, but however, the State had not preferred any appeal and in view of the same, the finding recorded by the learned Judge punishing the accused under Section 304-part-I and under Section 309 IPC as such had attained finality. In view of the seriousness and also the gravity of the charges, there cannot be any justification in reducing the sentence, which had been imposed by the learned Judge, any further by this Court. ( 6 ) AS can be seen from the material available on record, accused, no-doubt, in 313 Cr. P. C. examination admitted that he stabbed the deceased to death and also stabbed himself with knife. Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with trial before a Court of Session. Section 229 of the Code aforesaid dealing with conviction on plea of guilty specifically says that if the accused pleads guilty, the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. From the language of Section 229 of the Code, it is clear that the Judge is given the discretion to convict accused on plea of guilty or in prudence, to record evidence and also to record further findings in this regard. ( 7 ) IN Ramesan Vs. State of Kerala (1981 CRL. L. J. 451) a Division Bench of Kerala High Court held as hereunder: the rule of practice adopted by the various High Courts in not acting upon a plea of guilty in cases of serious offences of murder is a rule of caution and prudence. An offence of murder involves not only the physical act of violence but also the mental element of intention or knowledge. An offence of murder involves not only the physical act of violence but also the mental element of intention or knowledge. A lay accused, when he pleads guilty is likely to be more concerned with the physical act and may not advert to the various ingredients constituting the offence. As mentioned in Dalli v. Emperor, AIR 1922 All 233 (1): (1922-23 Cri LJ 283), whether act constitutes murder is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court while holding an accused guilty of murder should also enter a finding that he did the act with requisite intention or knowledge. For such a finding to be entered and to decide whether the offence is murder or a lesser offence, the Court should have before it the details of the occurrence, the circumstances under which the act was done and the motive if any and for this purpose it is desirable that the entire evidence is placed before the Court. ( 8 ) IN Hasaruddin Mohammad v. Emperor (AIR 1928 Calcutta 775) a Division Bench held that Section 271 of the Code though it directs that the plea shall be recorded, does not direct that the accused shall be convicted thereon, but only that he may be so convicted. It is left to the discretion of the presiding Judge in each particular case to determine whether in spite of the plea it is or is not desirable to enter upon the evidence. ( 9 ) THIS has been the view expressed even while interpreting the word may even Section 271 (2) of the old Code. In Abdul Kader V. Emperor (AIR (34) 1947 Bombay 345) Stone C. J. at paras 4 and 5 observed as hereunder: in my opinion the whole of this procedure was irregular. In the first place the appellant having asked the committing Magistrate for legal aid ought never to have been allowed to plead to a capital charge when he was unrepresented by counsel. This is all the more so, because it appears to be the practice of the Sessions Courts of this Province never to accept a plea of guilty to a capital charge, though the authorities on which this proposition is said to rest, viz, (1906) 8 Bom. L. R. 240, Emperor V. Chinila; and (1917) 19 Bom. L. R. 356: 4 AIR 1917 Bom. L. R. 240, Emperor V. Chinila; and (1917) 19 Bom. L. R. 356: 4 AIR 1917 Bom. 220:40 I. C. 699, Emperor V. Laxmya Shiddappa do not lay down that a plea of guilty can never be accepted; but that it is not in accordance with the usual practice to do so. Speaking for myself, I seen no reason why, if proper safeguards are taken, such a plea should not be accepted. Such safeguards must include the accuseds representation by counsel who must be in a position to answer the questions of the Court, with regard to whether the accused knows what he is doing and the consequences of his plea and also a medical report or medical evidence upon him: see (1935) 25 Cr. App. Rep. 55, R. v. Vent. Unless such safeguards are taken and unless the learned Judge is prepared to accept a plea of guilty, the proper course is to tell the accused that he should claim to be tried, and if he refuses to claim to be tried, to record the plea of does not plead (see S. 272, Criminal P. C. ). ( 10 ) IN In re Sundararaju (1964 (1) Crl. L. J. 457 where a charge under Section 304, part-II IPC was framed against the accused, after accepting the plea of guilty of the accused, the Judge referred to the evidence of prosecution witnesses in the committal Court though their evidence was not recorded in the Sessions Court and the Judge without referring to the evidence of the doctor relied on the post-mortem certificate issued by the Doctor, it was held that the procedure adopted by the Judge was not warranted by law and the Judge could only act upon the evidence that was tendered before him. It was necessary for the Judge to take evidence even though the accused pleaded guilty in grave offences like murder. The plea of guilty by the accused was only in relation to the facts charged and not as regards a particular offence. The Judge erred in proceeding on the basis that the accused pleaded guilty of an offence under Section 304 Part-II, IPC. ( 11 ) IN Tyron Nazarath v. State (1989 CRL. The plea of guilty by the accused was only in relation to the facts charged and not as regards a particular offence. The Judge erred in proceeding on the basis that the accused pleaded guilty of an offence under Section 304 Part-II, IPC. ( 11 ) IN Tyron Nazarath v. State (1989 CRL. L. J. 123 a Division Bench of Bombay High Court (Panaji Bench-Goa) while dealing with conviction on the basis of plea of guilty and Sections 229 and 225 of the Code, held that the same is not barred merely because serious offence providing grave sentence is involved, but however, rule of prudence is involved that a man should not be convicted without recording the evidence. This view expressed in the above decisions are well supported by the views expressed in the under-noted cases: netai Luskar v. Queen Empress, (1885) ILR 11 Cal 410; Queen Empress v. Bhadu, (1896) ILR 19 All 120; Emperor v. Chinia Bhika Koli, (1906) 2 Cri LJ 337; Queen-Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi, (1900) ILR 23 Mad 151; Dalli v. Emperor, AIR 1922 All 233 (1): (1992-23 Cri LJ 283); Mt. Sukhia v. Emperor, AIR 1922 All 266: (1923-24 Cri LJ 609); Lahori v. Emperor, AIR 1925 All 647: (1925-26 Cri LJ 1316); Sirkar v. Pathu, 9 Cochin LR 397 (FB); Sirkar v. Raman Nayar, 27 Cochin LR 557; Sirkar v. Kurumba, 28 Cochin LR 132; Achar Sanghar v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 204: (1935-36 Cri LJ 324); Laldin v. The State, AIR 1952 Himpra 3: (1952 Cri LJ 133); In re Gavisidappa, AIR 1968 Mys 145: (1968 Cri LJ 762); State v. Moideen Batcha Alapicha, 1953 Ker LT 547: (1953 Cri LJ 1814); State of Mysore v. Bantra Kunjanna, AIR 1960 Mys 177: (1960 Cri LJ 965), In re Nallayee, 1961 (2) Cri LJ 581 (Mad); and State v. Gopinatha Pillai, 1978 Ker LT 779: (1980 Cri LJ NOC 39 ). ( 12 ) THE ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions and also in view of the language employed in Section 229 of the Code, the learned Judge had exercised the discretion and proceeded to record the evidence, appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the findings in accordance with law. The learned Judge recorded findings in detail at para 10. Apart from the admission made by the accused as such in relation to both charge Nos. The learned Judge recorded findings in detail at para 10. Apart from the admission made by the accused as such in relation to both charge Nos. 1 and 2, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 5 is available on record in relation to the incident as to what actually had transpired just after the incident and P. W. 6 is the witness, who deposed in detail the motive for the commission of offence or why the accused had developed grudge as against the deceased. P. W. 7 deposed about finding accused lying with bleeding injury on his abdomen and identifying the accused. P. W. 8 deposed about the details and also the deceased baptizing the accused and the accused attending to prayers and the other aspects. P. W. 9 was examined in relation to Ex. P. 2, the observation report. P. W. 10, no doubt, is a formal witness. P. W. 11 is the doctor, who conducted post-mortem examination. Ex. P. 8 is the post-mortem report. P. W. 12 examined the accused and issued Ex. P. 9 wound certificate. P. W. 13 is the police constable, P. W. 14 is the head constable and P. W. 15 is the S. I. of police. P. W. 16 is the Inspector of Police, who filed the charge sheet. The details of investigation had been deposed by these witnesses. However, taking the facts and circumstances into consideration, and also the fact that out of frustration since the deceased by offering prayers could not cure the disease of the accused, the accused had perpetrated this crime as against the deceased and also stabbed himself to put an end to his life also. The nature of injuries as deposed by P. W. 12, the doctor, who examined the accused also would disclose that the intention of the accused was to put an end to his life also. In the peculiar facts and circumstances and also in the light of the findings recorded in detail by the learned Judge, the conviction under Sections 304, Part-II and 309 IPC no-doubt, are hereby confirmed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances and also in the light of the findings recorded in detail by the learned Judge, the conviction under Sections 304, Part-II and 309 IPC no-doubt, are hereby confirmed. But, it is pertinent to note that this act was perpetrated by the accused out of frustration as can be seen from the very version of the prosecution and hence, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, the sentence imposed is modified as hereunder: 1) The accused is sentenced to undergo R. I. for a period of seven years instead of R. I. for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default, to undergo R. I. for six months under Section 304, Part-I IPC; and 2) The sentence of R. I. for six months for offence under Section 309 IPC is hereby modified to a period of three months and both the sentences referred to supra shall run concurrently. It is brought to the notice of this Court that in all probability, the appellant-accused might have completed as on to this day the serving of the modified sentence imposed by this Court. If that be so, on calculation of the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellant-accused, if he had already completed the modified sentences referred to supra, the appellant-accused shall be set at liberty forthwith. In all other respects, the findings are hereby confirmed. The appeal shall stand dismissed subject to the modification of sentences as specified above.