JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant-petitioner is a registered society and is running a school at Udaipur. It challenges the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 29.3.2001 dismissing its Writ Petition No. 4084/94. 2. Chequered history of the case shows that a piece of land situated at Udaipur, near Delhi Gate, was allotted to the petitioner under license for use and occupation by the Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur on 19.2.85. Another piece of land was transferred through outright sale in favour of the petitioner by the Municipal Council, Udaipur vide registered sale deed dated 26.12.89. The land which was sold vide sale deed dated 26.12.89, contains the following terms to its user, namely : (1) that the land shall not be used for any commercial purpose; (2) the land shall be used only for education purposes of the school run by the Society; & (3) if the buyer commits breach of any of the aforesaid conditions the land along with the constructions thereon shall vest in the Municipal Council. 3. The license issued by the Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur refers to the land as strip of land and its dimensional map was annexed along with the license.Both the transactions came through with the previous approval of the State Government. 4. In the first instance, it appears that the State Government became desirous of cancelling the said allotments which, according to the learned counsel for the parties, was initially allotted to the petitioner, after obtaining the sanction from the Government. 5. A communication dated 10.4.91 was issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government to the Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur and the Municipal Council, Udaipur, requiring both the authorities to appear before the Minister, Urban Development and Housing Department. It was also ordained in the communication that the two local authorities shall ensure that land, allotted under the order of the Municipal Council dated 1.2.84 and Urban Improvement Trust dated 23.1.85, referred to in reference to context of the letter, be not subjected to any construction. The subject of the communication was stated to be 'about the cancellation of allotment made to Madrsah Taiyabiah School'. 6. Agreeing with the aforesaid communication, action was taken by the respondents for stopping the petitioner for making use of the land allotted to it for construction. 7. Aggrieved with said action, the petitioner filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No 1901/91 before this Court. 6. Agreeing with the aforesaid communication, action was taken by the respondents for stopping the petitioner for making use of the land allotted to it for construction. 7. Aggrieved with said action, the petitioner filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No 1901/91 before this Court. On 18.4.91, while issuing notice on the stay application, this Court directed that the petitioner may not be dispossessed from the land in question. It was also observed that the petitioner may appear before the Secretary and raise all those objections which he wants to raise before him and it is expected that the State Government will consider all those objections in accordance with law. 8. The aforesaid order was confirmed on 13.4.93 in the presence of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the UIT. 9. Thereafter, vide letter Ex.11 dated 4th March. 1994, the petitioner was directed to file his objections within 15 days from the date of receipt of the letter, in pursuance of the directions made by the Court in its order dated 8.4.91, to the Secretary to the Government, Urban Development and Housing Department, so that the same may be enquired into and disposed of in accordance with the aforesaid directions of the Court. 10. Vide Ex.12, the petitioner raised a number of objections to the proposed cancellation of allotment made in its favour. Along with the objections, a copy of the writ petition was also annexed as a part of the objections to the proposed action, for cancellation of license and sale. 10. Vide Ex.12, the petitioner raised a number of objections to the proposed cancellation of allotment made in its favour. Along with the objections, a copy of the writ petition was also annexed as a part of the objections to the proposed action, for cancellation of license and sale. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 19th July, 1994 was made by the State Government which reads as under : " jktLFkku ljdkj uxjh; fodkl ,oa vkoaVu foHkkx dz0i0 311981 ofovk] 88 t;iqj] fnukad 19 tqykbZ] 1994 1- lfpo] uxj fodkl U;kl] mn;iqjA 2- vk;qDr uxj ifj"kn] mn;iqjA fo"k; & rS;fc;k Ldwy fnYyh xsV] mn;iqj dks fnYyh xsV ds fudV vkoafVr Hkwfe fujLr djus lEcU/k esaA egksn;] mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr funsZ'kkuqlkj ys[k gS fd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fnukad 18-4-91 ds funsZ'kkuqlkj rS;fc;k Ldwy dk;Zdkfj.kh ds lnL;ksa dks lquokbZ dk iwjk volj fn;k tk pqdk gS] muds nLrkost] dFku ij Hkh fopkj fd;k x;k gSA jkT; ljdkj us izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr lHkh vk{ksiksa ij fopkj djus ds i'pkr~ ;g fu.kZ; fy;k fd tufgr esa bu Hkw[k.Mksa dk vkoaVu fujLr dj mudh tek jkf'k C;kt lfgr okfil ykSVkbZ tkos] D;ksafd mDr Hkwfe dk vkoaVu tufgr esa ugha gS] lM+d NksVh gksus ls nq?kZVuk,sa gksrh jgrh gSaA nks O;fDr;ksa dh nq?kZVuk esa tku Hkh tk pqdh gS rFkk Ldwy dks bl Hkwfe ds ugha gksus ls dksbZ izHkko ugha iM+rk gSA brus le; ckn Hkh bl Hkwfe dk dksbZ mi;ksx ugha gqvk gSA vr% vius vf/koDrk ds tfj;s ,slh fLFkfr mPp U;k;ky; esa izLrqr djrs gq, mDr ;kfpdk dks fujLr djokus dh dk;Zokgh dh tkosA U;k;ky; esa mDr rF;ksa dks vafdr djrs gq, izkFkZuk&i= nk;j fd;k tkos ,oa U;k;ky; ls mDr ;kfpdkvksa dks fujLr djk ds rqjUr jkT; ljdkj dks lwfpr fd;k tkosA ;g dk;Zokgh 'kh?kz iw.kZ gh tkosA Hkonh; n% ( ds0ds0 fla?ky ) 'kklu mi lfpo izfrfyfi Jh deydqekj esgrk] v/;{k tu lsok lfefr] egkohj dkWEiysDl nsgyhxsV] mn;iqj dks lwpukFkZ izsf"kr gSA n% 'kklu mi lfpo 11. It appears from the aforesaid order that it has been endorsed to one Shri Kemal Kumar Mehta, President, Jan Seva Samiti, Mahaveer Complex, Delhi Gate, Udaipur, betraying that the proceedings were initiated on a complaint lodged by the endorsee about the allotment made to the Taiyabiah school. It appears from the aforesaid order that it has been endorsed to one Shri Kemal Kumar Mehta, President, Jan Seva Samiti, Mahaveer Complex, Delhi Gate, Udaipur, betraying that the proceedings were initiated on a complaint lodged by the endorsee about the allotment made to the Taiyabiah school. It is also common ground before us that neither the UIT nor Municipal Council has requested the State Government to cancel the grant of license or sale of land in question made in favour of the petitioner for any reason. 12. Subsequent to the order dated 19th July, 1994, the writ petition No. 1901/91 was dismissed as having become infructuous when the learned counsel for the respondent made a statement at the bar that the matter has been reconsidered, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner vide order dated 19.7.94, which has beer, placed on record and the same has been marked as Annex.C.1. The allotment has been cancelled. 13. It may be pertinent to notice here that this order specifically recalls that the notice given to the petitioner which was subject-matter of challenge in writ petition No. 1901/91, calling upon it as to why the allotment made may not be cancelled. Contrary to it, the petitioner has stated that the notice was issued to the two local authorities, petitioned thereto and also, the action has been taken without diving him any opportunity of hearing. 14. Be that as it may, when the order dated 19th July, 1994 was issued, the present petition was filed. It appears that when the matter came up before the Court for hearing on 2.9.94, it was represented by the respondents that the land in question is a public road and has been used as such which has since been blocked by the petitioner after its allotment. It was also contended that the public road could not be allotted or sold to the petitioner. The petitioner had contended that the road on one side does not lead to any other place and is closed. The Commissioner was appointed to make a report about the site. After receipt of the Commissioner's report, on 21.9.94 the learned Single Judge made an interim order for maintaining status quo as it existed on that day, till the decision of the writ petition. The Commissioner was appointed to make a report about the site. After receipt of the Commissioner's report, on 21.9.94 the learned Single Judge made an interim order for maintaining status quo as it existed on that day, till the decision of the writ petition. The Municipality was directed to keep the site neat and clean as it was seen from the photographs that rubbish, filth and mud etc. are lying on the disputed land. 15. On 8.2.2000, the matter was heard for a considerable time and the interim relief was continued till the next date of hearing. On 2.3.2003, when none was present, the petition was dismissed and it was ordered that the interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated forthwith. When the restoration application was moved, a request was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for adjourning the matter, as arguing counsel was not available on that day. This request rejected. It was noticed by the Court that when the matter was adjourned earlier, it was made clear that restoration application would be granted, provided the petitioner is ready to go on with the writ petition. 16. Thus, rejecting the request of adjournment, the learned Single Judge found that in his opinion, the writ petition, challenging the impugned order dated 19.7.94 (Annex. 13) is not maintainable. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that the main writ petition was maintainable then on merits also, it has no substance because it is clear from the order Annex. 13 that the land which was allotted to the petitioner by the State Government was a public land which could not have been allotted by any one including the State Government. It is clear that because of small width of the road, many accidents were taking place at the site. Not only that, two persons lost their valuable lives and considering all these aspects, if the State Government has decided in public interest to cancel the allotment of land, then it can never be questioned. Challenge to such type of order must fail. It is also clear that after allotment, till the passing of the cancellation order, the land in question was never utilised by the petitioner, therefore, such an order of cancellation can never be interfered with by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. Challenge to such type of order must fail. It is also clear that after allotment, till the passing of the cancellation order, the land in question was never utilised by the petitioner, therefore, such an order of cancellation can never be interfered with by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. The conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge that the order dated 19.7.94 (Annex. 13) was passed in the public interest, can never be interfered with by this Court and can never be questioned, cannot, with great respect, be accepted as an absolute principle of law nor as a matter of expediency without reference to merits of the case and without reference to procedural fairness adopted in affecting adversely the existing rights. As a matter of law, every action of the State is amenable to judicial review in extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court or where the violation of fundamental rights are alleged by the Supreme Court. The grounds on which the action can be challenged and are likely to be interfered with by way of are well settled by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and have to be decided in the light of those principles. The discretion vesting in High Court for exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction cannot be founded on assumptions and presumptions by assuming that any particular order can never be questioned and can never be interfered with, without examining the merits of it in the light of the grounds of challenge raised before it on substantive as well as procedural fairness of decision making process. In our opinion, such broad statements in absolute, betrays non-application of mind and injudicious exercise of discretion vested in the Court. The Court may agree or may not agree with any submission of the petitioner, that absolutely falls within the discretion of the Court. But the Court cannot refuse to hear the ground raised before it or without hearing the parties, as is in the present case, raise a China wall of un-questionability of the order and un-questionability of the opinion framed by the State Government about the public interest which has weighed with it in making the order.Such a result has followed demonstrably In the present case. 18. 18. The presumption which arises in favour of the order passed by any authority of competent jurisdiction is about regularity of official acts, but that is not a conclusive proof of such regularity, nor it takes it beyond scrutiny by the Court. From such aspect, there exists a presumption in favour of the petitioner-appellant. about orders passed in its favour while issuing license or executing sale deed in its favour by UIT and Municipal Council respectively. Such orders could be set aside or cancelled only in accordance with law, substantive as well as procedural. 19. In the background of the facts noticed by us above, about which there is no dispute, and the order which we have quoted in extenso here in above, shows that the order is a non-speaking order. It does not give any reason which has a nexus with reaching the conclusion about the cancellation of allotment. If the allotments were valid, the existence of public interest by itself cannot be a reason for cancellation, unless by any other device the land can be retrieved back by the State Government, by cancellation. In that event, acquisition of vested right is the only mode. by which land validly vested in favour of petitioner could be divested. if the allotments were not valid for any reason, that needed to be cancelled, the order does not say so. 20. Therefore, when the State Government cancelled the allotments made in favour of petitioner and the cancellation order is challenged, one cannot start with presumption that initial orders of allotments were without jurisdiction or erroneous. The enquiry, that really need to take place, is whether the ground that is made out for cancellation of earlier allotment are germane, relevant and can form the basis of cancellation of allotments earlier made by respective authorities after obtaining approval of the State Government. 21. However, order under appeal as well as impugned order takes the course quite opposite by commencing enquiry, as if the petitioner was to establish that allotments initially made in its favour were valid. This has seriously prejudiced the petitioner whose rights were adversely affected by the impugned order dated 19.7.1994. 22. 21. However, order under appeal as well as impugned order takes the course quite opposite by commencing enquiry, as if the petitioner was to establish that allotments initially made in its favour were valid. This has seriously prejudiced the petitioner whose rights were adversely affected by the impugned order dated 19.7.1994. 22. The principle hardly needs elaboration that any order passed by any authority which affects civil rights of any person, the order must follow adherence to minimum requirement of principles of natural justice, by affording a fair and adequate opportunity to affected person, by informing him of grounds on which proposed action is taken against him and it must culminate in a speaking order that is to say disclosing the grounds on which end conclusion is founded. 23. The opinion about purported public interest is not backed by any reason or material nor the order informed us of any provision under which the allotment of land made in accordance with the law can be cancelled, only on the ground of new found public interest without there being any infirmity in the allotment. Nor learned counsel for the respondents could show any provision on the basis of which an allotment made in favour of any person by competent authority could be cancelled on the ground of some public interest, which itself is not specified in the order. Even assuming that for any public interest, the allotment can be cancelled if the authority is satisfied, but it is not specified in the order. 24. The right to hold the property may not be the fundamental right any more since omission of Article 31 from Part III of the Constitution, yet the Constitution protects the deprivation of property without authority of law. Article 300-A mandates that no one shall be deprived of his property except by authority of law. Therefore, mere satisfaction about the allotment being not in the public interest without backing of law, does not permit the authority to cancel that allotment. Such order cannot be sustained. 25. The State Government had not filed any reply to deny the fact that vide its letter dated 3.1.85, the Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur allotted the land measuring 6861 sq.ft. at the rate of Rs. 19/- per square ft. and simultaneously it also directed the Municipal Council, Udaipur for allotment of land measuring 6756 sq. ft. also at the rate of Rs. at the rate of Rs. 19/- per square ft. and simultaneously it also directed the Municipal Council, Udaipur for allotment of land measuring 6756 sq. ft. also at the rate of Rs. 19/- per sq. ft. In consequence to these allotments, under the directions of the State Government, a registered sale-deed was executed by the Municipal Council, Udaipur in favour of the petitioner on 25.12.1989. The learned counsel for Municipal Council was at pains to explain and urge that the allotment made in favour of the petitioner was not valid and could not have been made for the reasons stated in its reply. Those reasons do not find place in the impugned order dated 19.7.94. 26. The respondent No. 2 -UIT, Udaipur, in its reply, like respondent No. 3- Municipal Council, Udaipur was also eloquent to say that the allotment made in favour of the petitioner, under the directions of the State Government, was not in accordance with the law. It also alleged that the land In question was a part of the public road for the reason that originally, it was part of this city wall which has been demolished and, thereafter, width of the wall which was demolished, was considered as part of a public road. Whether it is so or not, no details have been furnished. Such reason also does not find place in the order of the State Government. 27. No reply has been submitted by the State Government. We have already noticed above that neither the UIT, nor the Municipal Council, prior to filing the reply, has raised any objection about the validity of allotment made by them with the approval of State Government and the proceedings have been started on a complaint of private organisation represented by one Kamal Kumar Mehta. It is rather strange, that they now support the order passed by the State Government on the reasons which do not find place in the order itself and such reasons are sought to be supplied by the local bodies who have allotted the land under the directions of the State Government and are not the author of the order under challenge. How could they support and supplement the reason to sustain the order passed by the State Government is not answered by them. 28. How could they support and supplement the reason to sustain the order passed by the State Government is not answered by them. 28. It may be noticed that ground which urged now by learned counsel for the UIT that allotment of land was invalid, neither finds support from show cause notice, nor from the order of State Government under challenge. We have noticed above that State Government has not chosen to file any reply to this writ petition. Since the matter has earlier come up before this Court by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1901/91 against the order of State Government dated 10.4.91 and present writ petition has arisen as a result of impugned order passed by the State Government in pursuance of directions contained in Writ Petition No. 1901/91 that petitioner be heard and State Government may pass orders in accordance with law, thereafter. We deemed it appropriate to summon the record of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1901/91 decided as having become infructuous vide order dated 8.8.94. 29. From the record of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1901/91, we find that no reply to writ petition had been filed by the State Government or the Municipal Council who were impleaded as Nil-petitioners along with U.I.T., Udaipur as respondent No. 2. in reply submitted by UIT also, invalidity of allotment had not been pleaded. In fact, specific averments about allotment were made that the land in side the city wall has been given to the petitioner by the Municipal Council. The land outside the city wail is subject land, given by the U.I.T. Though no notice of alleged violation of terms of license was issued by the U.I.T., the order dated 10.6.C1 passed by the State Government was sought to be supported on the ground that petitioner had not raised constructions within two years as per terms of license and that since land was allotted to the petitioner under approval from the State Government, State Government had jurisdiction to cancel the allotment made by U.I.T. 30. Apparently, these grounds are neither spelt out in notice to show cause nor in the ultimate order that has been passed by State Government. Nor any opportunity to meet these grounds was given to petitioner before cancelling the allotment made by the U.I.T or the Municipal council. 31. Apparently, these grounds are neither spelt out in notice to show cause nor in the ultimate order that has been passed by State Government. Nor any opportunity to meet these grounds was given to petitioner before cancelling the allotment made by the U.I.T or the Municipal council. 31. The respondents may not be estopped from challenging the order of allotment made by the authorities under the directions of the State Government. The aforesaid details, we have noticed only to observe that validity of the public orders made by the public authorities may be tested on their own term and they cannot be supplemented or substituted by other materials. The principle was stated succinctly by the Supreme Court as early as in the case of Commissioner of Police Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16 , where, while construing the administrative order passed by the Police Commissioner, the Court said : "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 32. The same principle was reiterated and reinvigorated in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others 1978 1 SCC 405 , wherein while laying down that the expanding area of the application of principles of natural justice has made the distinction between the administrative and quasi-judicial functions as no longer relevant for the purpose of examining their validity. The Court observed referring to the Gordhandas Bhanji's case (Supra) : "When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may by the time it comes to Court on account of the challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." 33. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may by the time it comes to Court on account of the challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." 33. Thus, the reasons of any invalidity attached in the allotment now sought to be contended by respondents No. 2 and 3, cannot be read in support of sustaining the order dated 19.7.94 (Annex. 13) which is not founded on such ground. Moreover, these reasons are not being supplemented by the authority who has passed the order, but are sought to be supplemented by other authorities who had neither sought such orders to I be cancelled nor who had authority to pass the same.Accordingly, the order on its own reading cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. 34. It appears that the learned Single Judge was influenced by the site inspection note and the site inspection carried out by himself to hold that the allotment made in favour of the petitioner was not in accordance with the law. In our opinion, this Court cannot substitute itself as an authority to examine the validity of the allotment, when in the first instance, the petitioner was not called upon to defend the validity of his allotment on the ground, now sought to be raised for sustaining the cancellation of allotment. 35. As a result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal is set aside. As we have noticed earlier, in our order dated 21.7.2004 that this appeal is treated as dismissal of writ petition on merits by the consent of both the parties by deeming it to be a restoration of the writ petition dismissal on merits by the learned Single Judge, for the reasons stated above the order dated 19.7.94 is found to be non-speaking and cannot be supported by reasons, nor supplemented by respondents No. 2 and 3 for explaining which no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner, hence the same cannot be sustained. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order (Annex. 13) dated 19.7,94 is quashed and set aside.There will be no order as to costa *******