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2004 DIGILAW 1073 (PNJ)

Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana

2004-09-18

G.S.SINGHVI, VIRENDER SINGH

body2004
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. - This appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against judgment dated 14.9.1987 vide which the learned Single Judge dismissed Regular First Appeal No. 886 of 1985 filed by the appellants for enhancement of the compensation awarded by Additional District Judge (I), Jind. 2. The facts :- The Government of Haryana acquired 57.43 acres of land situated in Jind including 8.17 acres of land belonging to the appellants for construction of Sub Jail. For this purpose, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) was issued on 11.7.1980. Vide award No. 34 of 1980-81, the Land Acquisition Collector assessed the value of the land at Rs. 22,000/- per killa (chahi) and Rs. 10,000/- per killa (gairmumkin) for the purpose of compensation. On a reference made under Section 18 of the Act at the instance of the landowners, Additional District Judge (I), Jind passed award dated 16.3.1985 for payment of compensation at a flat rate of Rs. 12/- per square yard. He further held that the landowners will be entitled to solatium of 30% on the enhanced amount and interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of dispossession till the payment of enhanced amount including solatium. 3. Feeling dissatisfied with the award of the Additional District Judge, the appellants and other landowners filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act. Regular First Appeal No. 886 of 1985 filed by the appellants was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in terms of judgment dated 9.7.1986 passed in Regular First Appeal No. 778 of 1985. 4. Shri J.S. Dahiya, learned counsel for the appellants relied on judgment dated 5.4.1989 passed by another learned Single Judge in Regular First Appeal No. 644 of 1986 - Siri Chand v. Sate of Haryana, and other connected appeals vide which compensation awarded to the landowners, whose land had been acquired by the same notification was enhanced to Rs. 27/- per square yard and submitted that this appeal may be disposed of in the similar terms. 27/- per square yard and submitted that this appeal may be disposed of in the similar terms. He pointed out that award dated 25.10.1985 passed by Additional District Judge (I), Jind in Land Acquisition Case No. 46 of 1985, which was subject-matter of challenge in Regular First Appeal No. 644 of 1986 and other connected appeals, was based on award dated 16.3.1985 passed by his predecessor in the appellants case and submitted that the compensation awarded to them should be enhanced so as to bring them at par with other landowners. 5. Shri Jaswant Singh, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana fairly conceded that the land which was subject-matter of Regular First Appeal No. 644 of 1986 and other connected appeals was acquired by the same very notification vide which the land of the appellants was acquired. He also conceded that in Regular First Appeal No. 644 of 1986 and other connected appeals, the learned Single Judge enhanced the compensation payable to the landowners from Rs. 12/- per square yard to Rs. 27/- per square yard, but submitted that the appellants are not entitled to additional benefits in terms of amended Section 23(1-A) read with Section 30 of the Act. In support of this contention, Shri Jaswant Singh relied on the judgment of the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs., AIR 1989 SC 1933 and K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012. 6. We have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments/submissions and perused the record. 7. Since the learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that the land which was subject-matter of Regular First Appeal No. 644 of 1986 and other connected appeals and the land belonging to the appellants was acquired by one notification dated 11.7.1980 for construction of Sub Jail at Jind and that vide judgment dated 5.4.1989, the learned Single Judge enhanced compensation payable to the landowners, who were appellants in Regular First Appeal No. 644 of 1986, we feel that it will be in the interest of justice of enhance the compensation payable to the appellants in similar terms. 8. 8. However, we find merit in the contention of the learned Senior Deputy Advocate General that the appellants are not entitled to the benefit of the amended Section 23(1-A) of the Act because the Land Acquisition Collector had passed the award before the cut off date i.e. 30.4.1982, specified in Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 and Additional District Judge, Jind had passed the award after the cut off date. In K.S. Paripoornans case (supra), majority of the Constitution Bench overruled an earlier judgment of the three Judges Bench in Union of India v. Zora Singh, (1992)1 SCC 673 and held as under :- "In respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the date of commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984, the payment of the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the said Amending Act. The said amount is not payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the reference Court on September 24, 1984 (i.e. the date of commencement of the Amending Act) irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. Under Section 23(1-A) an obligation to pay an additional amount by way of compensation has been imposed. Such an obligation did not exist prior to the enactment of the said provision by the Amending Act. If the said provision is applied to the acquisition proceedings which commenced prior to its enactment and an additional obligation in the matter of payment of compensation is imposed for such acquisition the effect would be that the said provision would be operating retrospectively in respect of transactions already past. Parliament has given a clear indication of its intention in Section 30(1) of the amending Act regarding the extent of retrospective operation that Section 23(1-A) will have since express provision is contained in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act indicating the intention of Parliament as to the extent to which the provision of Section 23(1-A) would apply to pending proceedings, there is no scope for speculating about the said intention of Parliament by reading Section 23(1-A) in isolation without reference to Section 30(1) of the amending Act. A perusal of the various amendments that have been introduced in the principal Act by the amending Act shows that the approach in relation to acquisition proceedings which had commenced prior to the date of commencement of the amending Act is not identical. In relation to some of the amendments provision for their applicability is contained in the amended provision itself (Section 6(1) Proviso (i) : Section 11-A Proviso) while in respect of the other amendments separate provision is made in Section 30 of the amending Act. Merely because the provision regarding scope of the retrospectivity in regard to pending matters is contained in a separate provision and is not found in the amended provisions would not justify treating the said provisions independent of each other. The provisions contained in Section 30 of the Amending Act are to be treated as an integral part of the amended provisions in the principal Act to which they relate. Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1) are so inter-connected that for construing sub-section (1-A) of Section 23, it is not possible to ignore the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act. If sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1-A), by itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enactment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. Merely because sub-section (1) of Section 30 only refers to award made by the Collector while sub-section (2) of Section 30 also refers to an award made by the Court as well as the order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award does not mean that Section 23(1-A) was intended to have application to all proceedings which were pending before the civil Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. The difference in the phraseology in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 under Section 30(2)." 9. The difference in the phraseology in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 under Section 30(2)." 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The appellants are held entitled to enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 27/- per square yard. They shall also be entitled to other benefits on the enhanced compensation except the benefit under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. Appeal allowed.