SHRIMAL, MEMBER – This is a review petition under Section 229 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (in short to be called ``the Act) against the order of this Court dated 29.10.2002 passed on stay application in appeal No. 187/2002. The applicant in this review petition is the respondent in the appeal. (2). In the present case the point for consideration is, as to whether the review petitions deserve admission or not? (3). Two revenue suits was filed before Asstt. Collector, Suratgarh, one by Vijendra Kumar and Ramesh sons of Dashrath and other by Vinod Kumar son of Prithvi. The trial Court by its judgment dated 15.12.2000 decided issue No. 10 with regard to the competence of revenue Court to grant relief in the suit. This issue was decided against plaintff. Against this judgment, the plaintiff filed an appeal before Revenue Appellate Authority, Hanumangarh, who by his judgment and decree dated 17.8.2002 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Against the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority, Hanumangarh, second appeal was filed by the defendants. After hearing on the admission of the second appeal, two Honble Members of the Board of Revenue had difference of opinion with regard to the admission of the appeals, therefore, this was referred to third member. The Honble third member of the Board by his order dated 1.10.2002 admitted the appeal and issue notice. Subsequently, after service of notice on 29.10.2002, the two members of the Board heard the stay application in the appeal and by the order dated 29.10.2002 allowed the stay application. Against this order of this Court, present review petition along with seven other review petitions of similar nature have been filed. (4). Since in all the petitions the parties are same and the legal question to be decided is also same. Therefore, the arguments were heard in all the review petitions and are being decided by a common judgment, copy of which may be placed in each file. (5). (4). Since in all the petitions the parties are same and the legal question to be decided is also same. Therefore, the arguments were heard in all the review petitions and are being decided by a common judgment, copy of which may be placed in each file. (5). Before dealing with the arguments of learned counsel for the applicants, it is worthwhile to reproduce the order on stay application dated 29.10.2002:- ^^vfHkHkk"kd vihykUV Jh ,y-ds- ik.M;k o vfHkHkk"kd jsLiks.MsUVl Hkh ts-ih- ekFkqj mifLFkr gS] ftUgsa izkFkZuk i= LFkxu ij lquk x;kA vfHkHkk"kd vihykUV Jh ,y-ds- ik.M;k dk rdZ gS fd pwafd izdj.k vf/k"BkbZ izd`fr dk gSA tc izdj.k izFke n`"V;k xzg.k ;ksX; ik;k x;k gSA rHkh izdj.k dks fopkjkFkZ xzg.k fd;k x;k gSA ;fn ekSds o jsdkMZ dh ;FkkfLFkkfr ugha j[kh xbZ rks mUgsa viw.kZuh; {kfr gksxh rFkk mudk vihy izLrqr dj U;k; izkIr djus dk gh mn~ns; lekIr gks tk;sxkA blds vykok mUgsa vuko;d eqdnesackth esa my>uk iM+sxkA jsLiks.MsUV ds fo}ku vfHkHkk"kd dk rdZ gS fd flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk dk vknsk 41 fu;e 5 ds ijUrqd 3 esa vkKkid izko/kku gS fd ;fn i;kZIr dkj.k ugha gks rks LFkxu vknsk ikfjr ugha fd;k tkosA vihykFkhZ dh vksj ls dksbZ Bksl vk/kkj LFkxu vknsk izkIr djus ckcr izLrqr ugha fd;s x;s gSA nksuksa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; ds ,d nwljs ds foijhr gS vkSj vihy vf/kdkjh ds }kjk viuk fu.kZ; iw.kZ foys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij gh fn;k x;k gSA vr% LFkxu izkFkZuk i= [kkfjt fd;k tkosA izR;qRrj esa odhy vihykFkhZ dk rdZ gS fd 23 o"kZ iwoZ Ø; dh xbZ vkjkth ds ckcr ;fn LFkxu ugha fn;k x;k rks dkfct O;fDr csn[ky gks tk;saxsA tc izdj.k dks fopkjkFkZ xzg.k dj fy;k x;k gS rks izFke n`"V;k ;g vnkyr }kjk eku fy;k x;k gS fd izdj.k esa fookn ,oa nknjlh ckcr Bksl eqn~ns fufgr gSA ,sls esa ;fn ;FkkfLFkfr ugha j[kh tkrh gS rks bu eqn~nksa ij fu.kZ; gksus ls iwoZ gh nhxj i{k }kjk vihyk.V ds fgr ds izfrdwy rcnhfy;ka dh tk ldrh gSA ftlls fd izdj.k dks izHkkoghu ,oa vFkZghu gks tk;sxkA vr% okafNr LFkxu vknsk ikfjr djuk U;k; fgr es ,d vfuok;Z vko;drk gSA geus mHk; i{k ds fo}ku vfHkHkk"kdx.k dh cgl ij euu fd;k ,oa v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa ds fu.kZ;ksa dk voyksdu fd;kA izLrqr vihy esa e.My }kjk lkjHkwr dkuwuh fcUnq fufgr gksus ls vihy dks fopkjkFkZ xzg.k fd;k tk pqdk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa ekeys ds rF;ksa dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, LFkxu izkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;k tkuk U;k; fgr esa mfpr izrhr gksrk gSA ;fn jktLo vihy izkf/kdkjh guqekux<+ ds fu.kZ; o fMØh fnukad 17-8-2002 esa vafdr fookfnr vkjkth dks ekSds o jsdkMZ dh ;FkkfLFkfr ugha j[kh xbZ rks vihykUV dks viw.kZuh; {kfr gks ldrh gS vkSj vko;d fookn mRiUu gksus dh laHkkouk gks ldrh gSA vr% jktLo vihyh izkf/kdkjh guqekux<+ ds fu.kZ; ,oa fMØh fnukad 17-8-2002 esa vafdr fookfnr vkjkth dh ekSds o jkTkLo vfHkys[k dh vkt fnukad 29-10-2002 dh tks fLFkfr gS ml fLFkfr dks e.My ds vU; vknsk gksus rd ;Fkkor j[kk tkosA bl vknsk dh izfr lEcfU/kr U;k;ky;ksa dks ikyukFkZ nLrh Hksth tkosA ijh{k.k U;k;ky; dk vfHkys[k izkIr fd;k tkosA i=koyh fnukad 27-12-2002 dks isk gksA** (6). Heard the learned counsel for the applicants on admission of the review petition. The learned counsel for the applicants has advanced the same arguments, which were raised by him at the time of hearing of the stay applications, which were dealt with by the learned members of the Board and decided. His main emphasis in these review petitions is that Order 41 Rule 5(3) CPC requires that before granting stay by the appeallate Court, it is mandatory to pass order with regard to the security as provided under Order 41 Rule 5(3) CPC. On perusing the order dated 29.10.2002, it is clear that this very argument was raised by the applicants before this Court while arguing the stay applications and the learned members in the order have specifically mentioned that if the status quo with regard to the disputed land mentioned in judgment and decree dated 17.8.2002 is not maintained then the appellant will suffer irreparable loss. The contention of learned counsel for the applicants is that these review petitions deserves admission because while deciding the stay applications, learned members of this Court have not considered the effect and the mandatory nature of Order 41 Rules 5(3) CPC, which provides the provisions for stay of proceedings of execution of decree. Order 41 Rule 5 CPC is reproduced as under :- ``Stay by Appellate Court-(1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree, but the Appellate Court may be sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree. (2) Stay by Court which passed the decree - Where an application is made for stay of execution of an appealable decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing thereform, the Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed. (2) Stay by Court which passed the decree - Where an application is made for stay of execution of an appealable decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing thereform, the Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed. (3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied- (a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made; (b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. (7). In above provisions clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC provides that the appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of the decree and sub-clause (c) of clause (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC makes provisions for security by the applicant for due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. Similarly, Rule 6 Order 41 CPC makes a provision for security in case of appeal against order of execution of decree. The counsel for the applicants want to convince us that unless the conditions provided in clause (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC are satisfied, the appellate Court has no right to grant stay under clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC. Usually, whenever tere is a money decree the stay is not granted unless the judgment debtor deposits the decretal amount in court and on such deposit the successful party is permitted to withdraw the money on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court. Even in case of money decree the rule for depositing the security even in case of money decree is considered to be a rule of prudence and not a principle of law of universal application. We agree that this practice in a money decree passed on rule of prudence should be followed by the appellate Court but notin granting a stay in order deceree. The basis for the rule of purdence provided under sub-clause (c) of clause (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC. We agree that this practice in a money decree passed on rule of prudence should be followed by the appellate Court but notin granting a stay in order deceree. The basis for the rule of purdence provided under sub-clause (c) of clause (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC. The condition that a security be deposited in Court cannot be a universal rule. When there is a specific provision in CPC 1908 with regard to grant or refusal of stay of execution of the decree by appellate Court. Therefore, the only questionin this matter is that the practice which is provided in sub-clause (c) of clause (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC, and applicable in money decree which is based on the rule or prudence and should be applied to all cases other than the money decree. Without having regard to substantial affect on particular case, particulary where depositing of secutiry is not at all going to serve any purpose in the event of the decision of the appeal is necessary or not. In our opinion the condition of depositing security provided in sub-clause (C) of clause (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC cannot be applied in all case and the reading of provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 CPC makes it clear that as and when the court thinks necessary for sufficient cause to be shown stay orders can be granted by appellate Court without asking the appellant to deposit a security. (8). In this regard, it is also relevant and necessary to go through the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual, 1956 Part-I. Under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 in the matter of appointment of receiver, the provisions have been made that the cases where court appoint receiver and the person in possession request to keep the possession then the Court may allow such possession on cash security. On appeal the appellate Court can also ask the appellant to deposit the cash security while granting stay with regard to possession. On appeal the appellate Court can also ask the appellant to deposit the cash security while granting stay with regard to possession. Similarly, where the Court feels that it is necessary for the cause of justice to grant stay for keeing the land in possession of a particular party and the matter has already been decided by lower Courts, the appellate Court can ask for depositing the cash security but in each and every case where appeals are filed the depositing of cash security cannot be made as a universal law or condition in view of the provisions stated above. (9). The learned counsel for the applicants has relied on AIR 1993 Orissa 171 (1), and has argued that the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC required furnishing of security for the stay of execution of a decree is mandatory while passing any interim order as envisaged in sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC. While going through the judgment cited by the learned counsel it comes out that this was a case in which the Honble High Court has made the application of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC by holding that furnishing of security mandatory while passing any interim order, as envisaged under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of order 41 CPC. It was a case of passing ex-parte ad interim order while in the present case the stay order has been granted after hearing both the parties moreover, this was a case of withdrawal of compensation granted by civil Court deposited by the State. In such a case when the withdrawal of money was involved the Court thought it proper that such withdrawal by interim order should not be allowed without getting security from a person who on the basis of stay order wants to withdraw the compensation amount. Therefore, this case is absolutely different on facts and not at all applicable to the present case. (10). Learned counsel for the applicants has also relied on AIR 1970 AP 210 (2). This was a case of divorce decree in which respondent sought recovery of her `Mehar, dahej and some articles or other valuable and also a maintenance amount for the period of `iddat. So in this case also some recoveries were to be made from the appellant. Learned counsel for the applicants has also relied on AIR 1970 AP 210 (2). This was a case of divorce decree in which respondent sought recovery of her `Mehar, dahej and some articles or other valuable and also a maintenance amount for the period of `iddat. So in this case also some recoveries were to be made from the appellant. Therefore, on filing appeal Court made applicable the provision of Order 41 Rule 5(3)(c) CPC at the time of granting of stay asking the appellant to furnish security. But facts and circumstances of the above case is absolutely different from the present case adn the rulling cited by the learned counsel is also not applicable in the present case. (11). For the purpose of understanding the application of Order 41 Rule 5 CPC with regard to granting of stay, it is also necessary to go through the other relevant provisions of Order 41 as a whole. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 41 CPC provides that whenever there is appeal against a decree for the payment of money the appellant shall within such a time as the appellat Court may allow, deposits the amount disputed in appeal or furnish such security in respect thereof as court may think fit. Sub-rule 3 of Rule (1) of Order 41 CPC was inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure by amendment Act of 1976, Section 87 (w.e.f. 1.2.1977). It is relevant to mention here that sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 of order 41 CPC provides that notwithstanding anything contained in foregoing sub-rules where the appellant fails to make the deposits or furnish security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 the Court shall not make any order staying execution of the decree. Reading all these provisions of Order 41 it is clear that in case of a money decree, it has been made mandatory to deposit the amount disputed in appeal or furnish the security in respect of money decree. (12). Reading all these provisions of Order 41 it is clear that in case of a money decree, it has been made mandatory to deposit the amount disputed in appeal or furnish the security in respect of money decree. (12). So far as in cases other than money decree granting stay in appeal the provisions made in clause (c) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC is to be interpreted in the present matter in clause (c) provides that ``no order for execution of stay shall be made under sub-rule (1) or (2) unless the Court making it satisfied that security has been given by the applicant fro the due performance of said decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. Meaning thereby that the appellate Court while granting stay shall ask for either security to be given by the applicant in due performance of decree or may pass such order as may be ultimately binding upon him. It is not necessary that in each and every case the Court will blindly ask the appellant to give security before granting the stay. The Court can also pass any such order as may be ultimately binding upon him. In the present case, while passing order on stay application dated 29.10.2002, the Court has passed the order for maintaining the status quo with regard to possession of the disputed land and also status quo with regard to revenue records. This order of maintaining status quo not only binds the respondent but also equally it binds the appellate and the state authorities not to change the present position of the land and also the entires made in revenue records. So that ultimately when the decision of appeal is made the status of the land and the revenue record may remain intact so as to satisfy the finding given in the judgment and the decree for its execution. The provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 CPC therefore, provides that the appellateCourt while granting stay of execution of the decree must be satisfied that either a security has been given or the Court may pass an order as may ultimately be binding upon him. Therefore, it cannot be said that on they stay order cannot be passed by the appellate Court without asking security. (13). Therefore, it cannot be said that on they stay order cannot be passed by the appellate Court without asking security. (13). In the present case, the applicants want us to rehear on the stay order granted by this Court. After hearing both the parties, during the arguments on stay application the counsel for the applicants also raised the grounds with regard to provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 CPC. This Court after hearing all the grounds of both the parties has decided the stay application. The learned counsel for the applicants has also tried to raise other grounds for reviewing the order dated 29.10.2002. It is well know concept of law that the scope of review is very limited. The review is permitted only under the circumstances of discovery of new and important matters which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge or could not have been produced/raised at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistakes or error apparent on the face of the record. (14). The series of the decision have crytallized the position that palpable and mainfest errors on the face of the record reveals review is permitted. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC provided that the scope of review is very limited and and the review of the judgment can be allowed on three grounds; (i) discovery of new and important matters of evidence, i.e., fresh facts which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowloedge of the applicant and could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made, (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, (iii) for any other sufficient reasons, which are analogous to the reasons specified above. (15). An error can be said to be apparent on the face of the record only when it may be noticed without going deep in record an trying to find circumstances in which it was given. The Court deciding the review petition is also not required to go into correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the lower Court to examine the question of exercise of jurisdiction by those Court, therefore, the scope of present application for reviewing the order pronounced in the stay application cannot be wider than that of appeal. (16). The Court deciding the review petition is also not required to go into correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the lower Court to examine the question of exercise of jurisdiction by those Court, therefore, the scope of present application for reviewing the order pronounced in the stay application cannot be wider than that of appeal. (16). The power of review should be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases and it should not be used indiscriminiately to avoid justice and when thse is no error apparent on the face of the record and the material irregularity there review deserves to be rejected. Subsequent happending is also not a ground for review nor subsequent change of law or decision of the same of the superior Court uphold such ground. A subsequent admission of the party in the matter of the litigation cannot be ground for review. (17). The Honble Supreme Court in Smt. Meera Bhanja vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary (3), has clearly held that the error apparent on the face of the record should be such which should strike immediately looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points. While considering review, the Courts are not supposed to re-appreciate the entire evidence and reverse the findings. In Ajit Kumar Rath vs. Orissa State (4), the apex Court held that the power is not absolute and is subject to restrictions indicated in Order 47 CPC. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier. i.e., the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the fact without any elaborate argument being needed inestablishing it. The expression ``any other sufficient reason used in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC means a reason sufficiently analongous to those specified in the rule. Any other attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given t the Court under the Act to review its judgment. The expression ``any other sufficient reason used in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC means a reason sufficiently analongous to those specified in the rule. Any other attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given t the Court under the Act to review its judgment. Similarly, in Nilkanthan Das vs. Dhruba Charan Sahu (5), the Court has held that when there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record and the Court is convinced, it would be appropriate for the Court to correct the same, but there is a distinction which may not always be capable of exposition between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which coulod be characterised as visited by error apparent. The mistake or error apparent on the fact of the record is one, which is self evident and does not require a process of reasoning and it is distinct from erroneous decision. Rehearing the matter of determing an error in the earlier decision and then correcting the same do not fall within the ambit of review jurisdiction. Review jurisdiction cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction in disguise. (18). As already stated hereinabove, the scope of review is very limited and keeping in view the aforestated legal position in mind and also after going through the order of Division Bench dated 29.10.2002, we do not find that there is nay error apparent on the face of order dated 29.10.2002, which requires interference in this review petition. Consequently, the review petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The appeal be listed for final hearing on 14.9.2004 before any Division Bench. (19). Pronounced in Open Court.