JUDGMENT Hari Shankar Prasad, J. 1. This appeal at the instance of appellant is directed against the judgment dated 13.4.2000 and decree dated 20.4.2000 passed in Money Suit No. 176 of 1987 whereby and whereunder the 2nd Sub-Ordinate Judge, Bokaro at Chas decreed the suit. 2. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that plaintiff is a Government Undertaking Company which was entrusted with a large number of construction work within the Bokaro Steel Plant. The plaintiff was required to engage different types of machineries, cranes, tractors, shovels, etc. These machineries always remained engaged in the premises of Bokaro Steel Plant and they were never used on any public road. The Government of Bihar after due consideration, exempted certain type of vehicles from road tax which are engaged only within the enclosed premises of mines and tractors and issued a circular under letter No. AZ3030/66 PT.-4830, dated 31.8.1966 of Bihar Political Department to all the taxing authorities. It is stated that the defendant Nos. 3 through Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad (at that Lime Bokaro was under the jurisdiction of Dhanbad Division) insisted upon plaintiff to pay road tax of all the vehicles which were plying within the B.S.L. Plant. Further case of the plaintiff is that plaintiff wrote a letter to the State Transport Commissioner and Superintendent of Police. Bokaro for deferring the realization of road tax for such vehicles which were exempted from road tax but defendant did not accept request and the plaintiff under compulsion deposited altogether Rs. 4,77,852.25 paise towards road tax of those vehicles vide different challans as detailed in annexure of the plaint and thereafter plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 in the Court of Sub Judge, Dhanbad of declaration that the action of defendant for insisting payment of road tax in respect of the vehicles as described in the schedule of the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 is illegal, unjust arid arbitrary. The defendants appeared and contested the , suit which was decreed in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 27.4.1982 by the learned Sub Judge-II, Dhanbad which was further confirmed in Title Appeal No. 45 of 1982 vide judgment and decree dated 9.2.1985/26.3.1985 by the learned ADJ, 7th, Dhanbad, thus the payment of Rs. 4,77,852.25 paise under different challans towards road tax was under duress and not a voluntary gratuitous payment. 4,77,852.25 paise under different challans towards road tax was under duress and not a voluntary gratuitous payment. Further case of the plaintiff is that plaintiff under letter No. HSCL/ARE/ 58 WS/6-V/05/83-206 dated 19/21.1.1983 requested the defendants to refund the said amount but instead of refunding the amount the Special Transport Officer of the defendant asked the plaintiff to continue to pay the road taxes. Thereafter, the plaintiff served a legal notice under Section 80, CPC to the defendant for refund of the said amount and thereby also intimated that in case of failure on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff will file suit for realization of the said amount. 3. On the basis of the above pleadings, the plaintiff brought this suit for recovery of the amount of Rs. 4,77,852.25 paise illegally realized by the defendant as road tax with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum. 4. The defendants appeared and filed joint written statement on behalf of the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 denying the claim of the plaintiff. It is stated that the suit as framed is not maintainable as plaintiff has no cause of action or Locus standi to file the suit and the suit is barred by law of limitation and principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. The suit is also barred by law of res judicata, provisions of Specific Relief Act, provisions of M.V. Act and for want of notice under Section 80, CPC. 5. It is stated that the plaintiff is a contractor carrying on construction business within the premises of Bokaro Steel Plant and the vehicles and machines are supposed to be engaged for the construction work are personal vehicles owned and possessed by the plaintiff which are kept in the Registered Office, Garage and parking place in Bokaro Steel City which is far away from Bokaro Steel Plant and vehicles are brought to the site of construction through several public roads. So far as Government letter No. referred to in the plaint of exemption of certain vehicles from road tax is concerned, it is submitted that above letter does not help the plaintiff because vehicles always ply on the public road and thus the plaintiff is liable for registration and payment of road tax for those vehicles under the provisions of Bihar and Orissa M.V. Act. The judgment and decree of Title Suit No. 69 of 1976 ought to have been dismissed on merit is not binding upon present defendants. It is also stated that the learned trial Court of Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 has wrongly relied upon AIR 1975 SC, judgment and gave wrong judgment. 6. It is further submitted that the plaintiff out of voluntary and free will deposited the amount of road tax and there was no threat or duress from the side of the defendants. In Title Suit No. 69 of 1979, the plaintiff neither prayed for refund of the amount nor the Court passed any decree to that effect as such the present suit is not maintainable. Besides the above Title Suit No. 69 of 1979, the plaintiff Brought Title Suit No. 54 of 1972 against the present defendants in the Court of Sub-Judge-I, Dhanbad for the same cause of action and the plaintiff unconditionally withdrew the suit and the Court also did not grant liberty to file a fresh suit and as such the present suit is barred by res judicata. 7. Further case of the defendant is that defendant No. 3 is not the competent authority to refund the amount of tax realized from the plaintiff. The plaintiff should have filed appeal before M.V. Commissioner within the time, but instead of that, the plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 in the Civil Court. The jurisdiction Civil Court is barred as it relates to revenue of the State of Bihar. The Special Transport Officer has rightly refused to refund the amount of tax already realized because those vehicles of the plaintiff used public road and came within the definition under Section 2(18) of the M.V. Act and are liable for registration and payment of road tax and vehicles are under the control and possession of the plaintiff and thus plaintiff is liable to pay the road tax under Section 6(1-A) and (2) of amended M.V. Act. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed for determination. (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (ii) Is there any cause of action for in a suit? (iii)-Is the suit barred by law of limitation? (iv) Whether the plff is entitled for refund of Rs. 4,77,852.25 deposited to the account of defendant vide challans of different dates? (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (ii) Is there any cause of action for in a suit? (iii)-Is the suit barred by law of limitation? (iv) Whether the plff is entitled for refund of Rs. 4,77,852.25 deposited to the account of defendant vide challans of different dates? (v) Is the plff entitled for any other relief or reliefs as claimed? 9. All the issues framed in the suit on the basis of pleadings of the parties were decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 10. The ease of the plaintiff is that in course of construction work, plaintiff was maintaining vehicles which according to the plaintiff so far as payment of road tax or registration of those vehicles is concerned, they were exempted by a particular letter of the Government of Bihar from payment of road tax on the ground that these vehicle remained in the premises and did not ply on the road. 11. On the other hand, case of the defendants is that the vehicles which are not Government vehicles, are owned and possessed by the plaintiff and in course of construction work they ply on the road and, therefore, these vehicles are not entitled to exemption as claimed by the particular letter of the State of Bihar and the road tax which has been realized, no illegality in realization of that road tax has been committed and plaintiff has voluntarily and out of free will deposited the road tax and further that suit is barred by res judicata. 12. Now the issues which arises for determination in the appeal are; whether appeal is maintainable or not and, whether the suit of the plaintiff is maintainable or is barred by principle of res judicata or not? 13. Admitted case of the parties is that the plaintiff- respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 12. Now the issues which arises for determination in the appeal are; whether appeal is maintainable or not and, whether the suit of the plaintiff is maintainable or is barred by principle of res judicata or not? 13. Admitted case of the parties is that the plaintiff- respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 4,77,852.25 paise towards road tax of the vehicles owned and possessed by the plaintiff- respondent through different challans, although plaintiff- respondent claimed that vide letter No. AZ-3030/66 PT 4830 dated 31.8.1966 of Bihar Political Department, the vehicles of the plaintiffs were exempted from payment of the road tax as vehicles were used within the premises of the plaintiff-respondent and did not ply on public road, but the registered authority through Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad (at that time Bokaro was under the jurisdiction of Dhanbad Division) pressurized the plaintiff- respondent for depositing the road tax of the vehicles through various challans and the plaintiff-respondent deposited the amount under protest. Soon thereafter, plaintiff-respondent brought Title Suit No. 54 of 1972 for declaration that defendants have got no right to realize road tax from the plaintiff- respondent as these vehicles are exempted from road tax by the aforesaid circulars of the State of Bihar, but that suit was unconditionally withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff-respondent filed another Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 and decree was drawn up and, against the judgment and decree, the defendant-appellant preferred Title Appeal No. 45 of 1982 before District Judge, but appellant-defendant lost in the appeal in the Court of 7th Additional District Judge, Dhanbad and thereafter plaintiff-respondent has filed this Money Suit which has been decreed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and thereafter this first appeal has been preferred before this Court. 14. The discussion of oral and documentary evidence in this Money Suit will not be of any avail because that point is in favour of the plaintiff-respondent that plaintiff-respondent has deposited a sum of Rs. 4,77,852.25 paise towards road tax and it is also admitted fact that in the Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 case was decreed in their favour and decree was drawn up but appellants-defendants preferred Title Appeal No. 45 of 1982 and the appeal preferred by the defendant- appellant was dismissed and, therefore, on the basis of the decision rendered in Title Appeal No. 69 of 1979 and Title Appeal No. 45 of 1982, this Money Suit has been filed. 15. The question that has been raised in this appeal is that this money suit, out of which this money appeal has arisen, is not maintainable because the same is barred by principle of res judicata. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that when the plaintiff-respondent had filed Title Suit, the plaintiff-appellant should have made alternative prayer for refund of the amount deposited with the defendants towards road tax after paying proper Court fee as alternative prayer but no such prayer was made and, therefore, this subsequent suit on the same facts and issues cannot be brought by plaintiff-appellant as it is barred by principle of res judicata. In this connection, Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with the principle of res judicata is quoted herein below :- "11. Res judicata.-No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I.-The expression "former suit" shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation II.-For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. Explanation III,-The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. Explanation IV.-Any matter above which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation. V.-Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation. V.-Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation VI.-Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. Explanation VII.-The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised." 16. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant defendant was that amount deposited towards road tax was an issue for which Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 was filed; whether defendant had any right to realize road tax from the plaintiff-respondent in view of the aforesaid claim of State of Bihar and whether the issue directly or indirectly involved question of refund of the amount already deposited by the plaintiff-respondent towards road tax which plaintiff-respondent paid under protest and duress, but no such prayer of refund of the amount was made as alternative prayer in Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 and, therefore, the money suit is not maintainable and consequently this appeal may be allowed holding that the money suit filed in the case is hit by principle of res judicata. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that money suit is not barred by principle of res judicata as this money suit has been filed for realization of money deposited towards road tax which has been illegally and arbitrarily realized by the defendant under duress and, therefore, this money suit is not barred by principle of res judicata. Learned counsel further pointed out that Title Suit was filed for declaration that in the facts and circumstances of the case, defendants were not entitled to realize road tax from the plaintiff-respondent for the vehicles which were used within the premises of Bokaro Steel Plant and were not plying on the public road but under pressure and duress of the defendants, the plaintiff-respondent had to deposit Lax amounting to Rs. 4.77,852.25 paise and when the plaintiff- respondent succeeded in the Title Suit, then plaintiff-respondent requested several times to defendants to refund the amount already realized towards road tax, but defendants did not refund the amount, hence this money suit for realization of the money with interest thereon was filed and, therefore, the issue of realization of road tax illegally and arbitrarily realized by the defendants-appellants is not directly or indirectly involved with the issue in between the parties and no principle of res Judicata will apply. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff placed reliance upon 2004 AIR,SCW 894 wherein it has been held that earlier suit seeking a decree for declaration of right and title of the plain-tills to plaint schedule property and their possession and subsequent suit of recovery of possession was held to be not barred by principle of res judicata. In this connection, he drew my attention towards Para 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow :- "19. In Inacio Martins (deceased through LRs.) v. Narayan Hari Naik and Ors., 1993 (3) SCC 123 ,-an almost identical question arose. In that ease, the plaintiff had prayed for protection of his possession by a prohibitory injunction. That prayer was refused. Subsequent suit was for recovery of possession. This Court held that in the former suit the only relief that the Court could have granted was in regard to the declaration sought for which the Court could not have granted in view of the provisions of Specific Relief Act. The cause of action for the first suit was based on the apprehension about likely forcible dispossession. The cause of action of the suit was not on the premise that he had, in fact, been illegally and forcefully dispossessed and needed the Courts assistance for restoration of possession. The cause of action for the first suit was based on the apprehension about likely forcible dispossession. The cause of action of the suit was not on the premise that he had, in fact, been illegally and forcefully dispossessed and needed the Courts assistance for restoration of possession. In that background this Court held that subsequent suit was based on a distinct cause of action not found in or formed the subject matter of the former suit. The ratio of the decision has lull application to the facts of the present ease. 20. In Deva Rams case (supra) it was held that where the previous suit was for recovery for loan which was dismissed on the ground that the document on the basis of which the suit was filed was not a sale deed but agreement for sale, subsequent suit for recovery of possession on the basis of title was not hit by Order II. Rule 2 as the cause of action in the two suits were not identical or one and the same. 21. The Courts below were, therefore justified in holding that Order II, Rule 2 of the Code had no application to the facts of the case. Consequently, the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession shall stand affirmed and the appeal to that extent shall stand dismissed." and submitted that this money suit is maintainable and is not barred by principle of res jadicata and this appeal should fail. 18. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, picture which emerges is that the plaintiff-respondent was directed to pay road tax for the vehicles which the plaintiff-respondent possessed and utilized them in the construction work. Although, plaintiff-respondent claimed that vehicles did not ply on public road but defendants-appellants did not consider their claim and forced the plaintiff-respondent to pay the road tax and plaintiff-respondent paid road tax under protest and thereafter filed Title Suit No. 54 of 1972, taut later on unconditionally withdraw title suit, although no liberty was given to the plaintiff-respondent to file fresh suit However, the plaintiff-respondent again field Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 and the suit was decreed in their favour and the appeal preferred by the appellant-defendant was dismissed. Thereafter, plaintiff- respondent filed money suit out of which this appeal has arisen and in the money suit, decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. Thereafter, plaintiff- respondent filed money suit out of which this appeal has arisen and in the money suit, decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The money suit was filed on the basis of judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 69 of 1979. But the question is that the issue involved between the parties are directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the parties or between parties and as per Order 11, Rule 2, the suit should have included the whole claim. The Order 11, Rule 2 is quoted herein below :- "2. Suit to include the whole claim.- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action : but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.-Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.--A. person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs : but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation.-For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action." 19. As per Order II, Rule 2 the plaintiff-respondent should have included claim for refund of sum of Rs. 4,77,825.25 paise which has been realized from the plaintiff-respondent as road tax in the Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 as alternative relief after paying requisite Court fee, but the plaintiff- respondent did not include that claim because the suit was actually brought only for direction that the appellant-defendant had no right to collect road tax in the circumstances and not for refund of the amount realized as road tax, although both the issues were directly and substantially in issue between the parties and. when the plaintiff-respondent filed Title Suit No. 69 of 1979, plaintiff- respondent should have included the claim for refund of the amount realized as road tax as alternative relief, but plaintiff- respondent did not include that claim and as such, the plaintiff- respondent as per Order II, Rule 3 failed to include this relief and thereby omitted other relief and as per Order 11, Rule 3, plaintiff-respondent cannot be afterwards be allowed to claim those reliefs and the subsequent suit shall be hit by the principle of res judicata because parties in this suit are the same and issue in the matter directly and substantially in issue has. been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the parties as plaintiff-respondent had filed Title Suit No. 69 of 1979 against the appellant-defendant and in this money suit also, both the parties are the same. So far as case laws which has been cited on behalf of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent is concerned, that is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case because in both the suits, points in issue were different. But here in the instant case, the points in issue are the same in between the parties and those issues have already been decided in former suit and claim which the plaintiff -respondent has made through this money suit, should have been included in the former suit as an alternative relief after paying proper Court fee and failure on the part of the plaintiff-respondent to include that relief stands hit by the principle of res judicata in this money suit. 20. In that view of the matter, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed in Money Suit No. 176 of 1987 is hereby set aside, as the same is hit by the principle of res Judicata. 21. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.