R. B. MISRA, J. Heard Sri Vikash Budhwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. In this petition prayer has been made for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 15- 11-1998 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) passed by the Chief Engineer, Public Works Department (in short called "p. W. D. "), Varanasi Kshetra, Varanasi, whereby the representation of the petitioner was considered, however, she was not regularised and an indication was given that the petitioners candidature may be considered in accordance with law while making recruitment against future vacancies to the post of Stenographer. Further prayer has been made for issuance of the direction to the respondents to ensure the regularisation of the petitioner to the post of Stenographer and to pay her regular salary as admissible under the law and to quash the advertisement No. 6/98 dated 10-8-1998 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition), whereby the appointment to the post of Lower Division Clerk/junior Clerk, Stenographer and Store Incharge were to made. 2. According to the petitioner, she is Intermediate and had obtained diploma certificate in Stenography from Rajkiya Mahila Polytechnic, Lucknow on 12-2-1992 and has also completed apprenticeship training as Stenographer from the office of Chief Engineer (East), Public Works Department, Varanasi for a period of one year (9-7-92 to 8-7-1993 ). The petitioner after being appointed as Stenographer on daily wage basis on 1-9-93 had submitted representations dated 3-10-96 and 17-10-96 for regularisation and when no heed was taken by the respondents, she preferred writ petition No. 36268 of 1996, which was disposed of on 25-3-1998 with a direction to consider the representation of the petitioner. In compliance thereto the representation of the petitioner was considered and rejected on 15-11-1998 by the Chief Engineer, against which the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. 3. According to the petitioner on seeking clarification whether the petitioner had worked in Ircon International Ltd. the Deputy General Manager of Ircon International Ltd. , clarified on 21-8-1999 that the petitioner had not worked in Ircon International Ltd. . According to the petitioner without passing the regularisation order, the advertisement No. 6/98 dated 10-8-1998 was issued for making recruitment to the post of Stenographer in P. W. D. . According to the petitioner without passing the regularisation order, the advertisement No. 6/98 dated 10-8-1998 was issued for making recruitment to the post of Stenographer in P. W. D. . According to the petitioner the impugned order dated 15-11-1998 is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and has been passed on non-existent ground inasmuch as vide Annexure-8 the letter issued by the Deputy General Manager Ircon International Ltd. on 21-2-1998, the petitioner had not worked in their organisation then no scope available to the respondents but to admit and held that the petitioner had been continuously discharging his duties in Public Works Department. 4. A letter dated 16-6-1997 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) indicates that the petitioner had been working continuously w. e. f. 1-9-1993, thus the petitioner is entitled to be regularised to the post of Stenographer. 5. The finding in the order dated 15-11-1998 that the petitioner had been absent from June, 1995 is misconceived. According to the letter dated 16-6-1997 the petitioner had been working w. e. f. 1-9-1993 as narrated in para 18 of the writ petition, where the petitioner had specifically stated that the petitioner was continuously working from 1-9-1993 as is apparent from the letter dated 16-6-1997, which are admitted in para 18 of the counter affidavit, quoted as below: - "18. That in case petitioners working in the department continuously w. e. f. 1993 is required to be establish a letter dated 16-6-1997 of the respondent No. 4 advertised to the respondent No. 2 which shows that the petitioner has been working continuously in the department without any break. A true copy of the letter dated 16-6-1997 is being filed herewith and the same is marked as Annexure No. 9 to this writ petition. 18. That the contents of Para 18 and 19 of the writ petition as stated are not admitted. The reply has already been given in the preceding paras. However, after 16-11-98, the petitioner is not serving the PWD in any capacity neither on muster-roll of PWD nor as contractors labourers supplied to PWD ). " 6. According to the petitioner, she is also entitled to protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution being a daily wager, also inasmuch as, first of all, allegation has been levelled to the effect that the petitioner has been unauthorisedly absent from duty. " 6. According to the petitioner, she is also entitled to protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution being a daily wager, also inasmuch as, first of all, allegation has been levelled to the effect that the petitioner has been unauthorisedly absent from duty. This Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Regional Manager, Garhwal Region, 1996 Vol. (IV) U. P. L. B. E. C. , Page-2301 in Para 32 to 34 has observed as is being quoted below:- "32. Before parting with, this Court would like to refer a Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of termination of appointment of a Public Prosecutor. In Satyabroto Mahapatra v. State of West Bengal, 1981 (2) Calcutta High Court Notes 20, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, let by Honble Mr. Justice P. K. Banerjee (as His Lordship then was, and, later became the Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court) held that a probationer has right to invoke provisions or Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in the event of termination of service from the post of Public Prosecutor. 33. Aforesaid view was followed by me sitting in Division Bench in Devdas Ganguli v. Director, Zoological Garden, 1991 (2) Calcutta Law Times 353. In the aforesaid case, Calcutta High Court interfered with the order of termination of petitioner, who was a Darban in the Calcutta Zoo. 34. In the light of foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that though the petitioners were reasonable employee, working on daily wages, their services could not be terminated in the manner it has been done. Further there was no justification for passing the impugned order since the alleged strike from 7-12-1992 never took place. " 7. Once the basis and the foundation on which the impugned order is passed is itself erroneous, contrary to law and perverse and stand on non-existent ground that one the petitioner was working after June, 1995 as it is apparent from the letter dated 16-9-1997 issued by the respondents, then the impugned order is wholly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. In these circumstances, the impugned orders are patently illegal, contrary to law and are liable to be set aside as it is in direct teeth of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and furthermore they are perverse contrary to material on record and is liable to be set aside. 8. According to paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit, the petitioner had earlier filed writ petition No. 36268 of 1996 praying for her regularisation to the post of Stenographer, which was finally disposed of by this Court on 25-3-98 (Annexure-3 of writ petition) authorising Chief Engineer East Zone, P. W. D. , Varanasi to consider and take decision on her representation, whereas the Chief Engineer, Varanasi Zone, P. W. D. , Varanasi after considering had rejected the representation on 15-11-1998. 9. The petitioner had ceased to be on muster roll of P. W. D. because neither any sanction of the competent authority existed nor any muster rolls were at all issued for the petitioner after 27-6-95. According to the contract bond for execution of Varanasi-Shaktinager Road Works, the contractor M/s IRCON International Ltd. (a Govt. of India undertaking) under specified "provisional" item of work were required to provide the services of a typist to P. W. D. after 27. 06. 1995. The said firm M/s Ircon International Ltd. provided Smt. Sunita Singh, the service of a typist through their licensee Labour Supplier Contractor S/s Anilendra Kumar Singh, who had engaged her and paid her salary. The letter dated 03-11-1998 issued to this effect and the copy of the said contractors labour wage records, on which the petitioner had accepted her salary/payment, has been annexed herewith as Annexure C. A.-6 to the counter affidavit. 10. Since regular Stenographers are appointed inviting applications through advertisement or inviting names from the employment exchanges, where the candidates are required to pass the prescribed tests and on results of tests the selected candidates are issued appointment orders. 11. The petitioner was deployed from time to time on muster roll from 1-9-1993 to 27-6-1995 with many break in between she was paid @ Rs. 50/-per day for the days she had worked. The period for which she worked in departmental muster rolls are shown in the list enclosed as Annexure C. A.-7. 12. 11. The petitioner was deployed from time to time on muster roll from 1-9-1993 to 27-6-1995 with many break in between she was paid @ Rs. 50/-per day for the days she had worked. The period for which she worked in departmental muster rolls are shown in the list enclosed as Annexure C. A.-7. 12. Two aspects are necessary to be considered; firstly, whether the petitioner is entitled for regularisation, and secondly, whether the petitioner is entitled for payment of salary equivalent to the regular employee. For this purpose it is necessary to analyse further submissions as advanced on behalf of petitioner as well as respondents, hereinafter. 13. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the petitioner had been engaged for such a long period and had been working for more than 240 days in each calendar year, then the respondents must regularise his services and that he should not be thrown on roads. In support, he has placed reliance upon JT 1996 (8) SC 1 (Central Welfare Board and others v. Ms. Anjali Bepari and others) and 2000 (3) LBESR 1 (SC) : (2001) 3 SCC 574 (Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and others ). 14. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that the policy decision adopted by the respondents is unconscionable in nature and the petitioners had to accept the said appointments, as they have no power to bargaining. It was submitted that appointments having been made according to the prevailing norms and services of the petitioners are entitled to be regularised and the petitioners are entitled to the same scale of pay which were being paid to the permanent employees. 15. It has been contended on behalf of petitioners that since the petitioners were deployed as daily wagers irrespective of the fact where there was any vacancy, but their continuous deployment should be reckoned with merits consideration that there is regular need for their service and they are being made to work on daily wage basis with the specific purpose and they are performing duties quay the regular employees and by virtue of the continuous deployment irrespective of the fact whether they are having minimum eligibility criteria and qualification and they are entitled for regularisation and for equal pay and equal salary quay regular employees in the Government department. 16. 16. To strengthen the submission of the cause learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgement of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, JT 1992 (5) SC 179; Khagesh Kumar and others v. I. G. Registration and others, 1996 (1) LBESR 113 (SC) : JT 1995 (7) SC 545 and State of U. P. and others v. Putti Lal, (1988) 1 UPLBEC 313. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Khagesh Kumar (supra), the petitioners are entitled to be considered for regularisation under the provisions of the U. P. Regularisation of Adhoc Appointments (On Posts outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 as amended upto date. Learned Counsel for petitioner pressed for regularisation and equal pay for equal work especially on the dint of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharvad District P. W. D. Literate Daily Employees Association and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (1990) 3 UPLBEC 2151 and the decision of this Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Putti Lal (supra ). 17. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that there is an element of public interest created by the Government in matters of appointment on daily wages for or in connection with the affairs of the State and consequently the daily-rated employees get an element of public interest in the performance of their duties. The element of public interest being so pronounced, it cannot be repudiated, set of rules to be framed in consonance with tile imperatives of Articles 14, 16, 38, 39, 41 and 43 of the Constitution and compatible with the reservation policy of the State in the matters governing appointment on daily wages for on in connection with the affairs of the State. The appointments of daily-rated employees might be referable to contingent establishment but payments of wages would nonetheless be the payment charged in the public fund and the State or its authority cannot be allowed to have a carte blanche of lending out favour or bestowing benevolence on a chosen few on extraneous consideration and at the express of public exchequer. The appointments of daily-rated employees might be referable to contingent establishment but payments of wages would nonetheless be the payment charged in the public fund and the State or its authority cannot be allowed to have a carte blanche of lending out favour or bestowing benevolence on a chosen few on extraneous consideration and at the express of public exchequer. The daily-rated employees engaged in Government departments, do acquire, in the course of time, a status and certain rights and privileges lending justification to interference by the Courts in order to protect such rights and privileges qua the provisions contained in Articles 38, 39, 41 and 43 of the Constitution. A constitutional duty/obligation is cast upon this Court to ensure that the laudable objectives sought to be achieved by the constitutional provisions aforestated are not overreached by those whose duty it is to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice-social economic and political-informs all the institutions of the National Life; to strive to minimize the inequality in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities amongst individuals; to direct its policy towards securing equal pay for equal work, health and strength of workers; and, within the limits of its economic capacity, to make effective provisions for securing the right to work. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the practice of appointment of daily- rated employees that is in vogue in Government departments, cannot be abandoned except on pains of imperiling the public interest. The daily-rated employees if allowed to continue for a considerable length of time, acquire a status and regard being had to directive principles of state policy enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution, the Courts very often intervene in the matter with a view to doing justice to such employees and granting them full-fledged status of a Government servant. I would not scruple to say that the daily-rated/casual employees constitute themselves a Class of Government servants. In Chief Conservator of Forest v. Jagannath Maruti Kon Bhare, AIR 1996 SC 967, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Industrial Court holding that employment of casual/temporary basis for several years (5 to 6 years in that case) amounts to unfair labour practice. 18. In Chief Conservator of Forest v. Jagannath Maruti Kon Bhare, AIR 1996 SC 967, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Industrial Court holding that employment of casual/temporary basis for several years (5 to 6 years in that case) amounts to unfair labour practice. 18. The daily wagers may be regularized, provided vacancies, posts are existing and in consonance to rules, regulations, scheme or Government order, for the purpose compatible with the constitutional provisions particularly those embodied in Articles 14, 16, 38, 39, 41 and 43 of the Constitution with particular reference to the doctrine of "social justice which the Supreme Court as expatiated upon in Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377 , as under: "social justice, equality and dignity of persons are cornerstone of social democracy. Social justice is a dynamic device to mitigate the suffering of the poor, weak, Dalits, tribals, and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live their lives with dignity of person. . . . . . . . . . Social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure of workman are part of his meaningful right to life and to achieve self-expression of his personality and to enjoy the life with dignity. " 19. The learned Counsel in support of the aforementioned contentions has relied upon the decision of Surinder Singh v. The Engineer in Chief, CPWD & Ors. , AIR 1986 SC 584 , Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1636 , Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority & Ors. , AIR 1990 SC 2228 and Karnataka State Private College Stop Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karanataka & Ors. , AIR 1992 SC 677 as well as the decision of A. K. Jain v. Union of India, 2 S. C. Service Law Journal 203 (Sic) and Rajbinder v. State of Punjab & Ors. , 2 S. C. Service Law Journal 521 (Sic.): 20. The references were made on behalf of the petitioner on Daily-rated Casual Labour through Bharatiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India & Ors. , AIR 1987 SC 2342 ; Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, 1990 (1) SCC 361 , Bharat Petroleum Management v. Bharat Petroleum Co. Ltd. , 1990 (2) SCC 356 , Dhirendra Chamon & Anr. , AIR 1987 SC 2342 ; Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, 1990 (1) SCC 361 , Bharat Petroleum Management v. Bharat Petroleum Co. Ltd. , 1990 (2) SCC 356 , Dhirendra Chamon & Anr. v. State of U. P. , 1986 (1) SCC 637 . 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has claimed petitioners regularisation on the strength of judgement of this Court (Honble Om Prakash, J.) in (1991) 1 UPLBEC 401, Tejpal and others v. Director of Education and others, where this Court has observed that regularisation is imperative under Constitutional philosophy when the daily wagers have put in deployment for several years, however, the decision of this Court in Tejpal (supra) cannot be a binding precedence in view of large number of subsequent decisions of this Court and Supreme Court. 22. In view of three Judges Bench decision of the Supreme Court in (1990) 1 SCC 361 , Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the writ petitioners were having relevant educational qualification and were serving for long period with artificial breaks in service, could be considered for regularisation in phases in accordance with seniority by ignoring the artificial breaks of three months while purpose of computing their past service, however, this case shall have no binding precedence and has not decided any law and only under the facts and circumstances has directed the respondent authorities to consider the case of regularisation. 23. The petitioner has claimed regularisation on the strength of a judgement of this Court (Honble O. K. Seth, J.) in 1997 (2) LBESR 980 (All) : 1998 (78) FLR 100, Ram Sundar Yadav and another v. The Regional Sports Officer, Sports Stadium, Meerut and others, where the writ petitioners after having worked about 7-8 years in the sports stadium were directed for being considered for regularisation following the decision of Bhullar Nath Yadav and others v. Mayo Hall Sports Complex Allahabad and others, 1990 (61) FLR 68. The facts of Ram Sundar Yadav (supra) are different and distinguishable and the decision is in per enqurium as the same is not taking upto date decision of the Supreme Court on the subject of regularisation while passing above judgement. 24. The facts of Ram Sundar Yadav (supra) are different and distinguishable and the decision is in per enqurium as the same is not taking upto date decision of the Supreme Court on the subject of regularisation while passing above judgement. 24. In 2001 (1) LBESR 1029 (SC) : (2001) 3 SCC 574 , Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and others, the Supreme Court observed that daily rated labourers engaged dehors the rules as plumbers, carpenters, sweepers, pump operators, helpers and masons by fully State-aided University were allowed to continue as such for a long period of 10 years, therefore, non-regularising the services of such daily wagers by university was held as an unfair labour practice and the daily rated labourers were indicated to be considered for absorption against existing vacant posts in accordance with the rules and if necessary by relaxing qualification and creating necessary number of posts. 25. The Supreme Court in (1997) 11 SCC 396 , Ratan Singh v. Union of India and another, has held that the service of a daily rated workman, who had continuously served for the requisite statutory minimum period in a year, cannot be terminated without complying the requirement of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and a lump sum amount of Rs. 25,000 was directed to be paid to the workman in lieu of reinstatement of back-wages. 26. 25,000 was directed to be paid to the workman in lieu of reinstatement of back-wages. 26. In 2001 (1) LBESR 227 (SC) : (2000) 7 SCC 741 (Hindustan Machines Tools and others v. M. Rangareddy and others) the Supreme Court following the decisions of Piara Singh (supra); Raj Naram Prasad v. State of U. P. , (1998) 8 SCC 473 and Niadar v. State (Delhi Administration), (1992) 4 SCC 112 , where the casual labourers deployed (3 to 10 years) in such multi unit public sector undertaking of Central Government claiming regularisation while undertaking was facing great financial difficulties, the direction of the High Court to prepare an absorption scheme to such undertaking in the light of the provisions of Article 38 (1), 39 (e) and 43 of Constitution was not interfered with, however, the liberty was granted to such undertaking, while framing the scheme, to assess the requirement of regular work force and necessity to alleviate the suffering of such workers and then to fix the strength of force to enable the workers to get the benefit of regularisation within a reasonable time and only those, who were fulfilling the conditions of eligibility with relaxation of age in prevailing rules, were directed to be considered for regularisation. 27. Unfortunately, however, in none of the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court considered its earlier binding precedents on the question of manner of regularisation, that is, State of Mysore v. S. V. Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071 and R. N. Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 2 SCR 799 . The aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court were followed by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in B. N. Nagrajan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 . 28. In R. N. Nanjudappa (supra), the Supreme Court held that if an appointment is made in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, such appointments being illegal, the same cannot be regularised. It was further held that ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but here has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. It held-regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. It was further held that ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but here has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. It held-regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules. The Supreme Court in that case negatived the contention that regularisation in employment is possible by taking recourse of Article 162 of the Constitution of India in the following words. : - "in the present case, the contention on behalf of the respondents that the regularisation was itself a mode of appointment under Article 162 of the Constitution is unsound. The Rules came into existence in the present case in 1964. The regularisation was made in the year 1967. The regularisation was made with effect from 1958. Therefore, the Rules became applicable. The regularisation in the present case was also bad because even without specific methods of requirement appointments could be made only by selection or promotion or transfer from equivalent grade. The method of recruitment and qualification for each State Civil Service was to be set forth in the rules of recruitment of such service specially made in that behalf. " 29. The Supreme Court held that Article 162 does not confer power to regularise nor does it confer power on the Government to make rules for recruitment or conditions of service. It was further held: 0 "all that the Public Service Commission did was to regularise the appointment to the post of the Principal. The regularisation by the State of the appointment is with effect from 1958. This regularisation is bad for the following reasons. First, regularisation is not itself a mode of appointment. Secondly, the modes of appointments are direct recruitment or selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to be recorded in writing an officer holding a post of an equivalent grade by transfer from any other service of the State. " 30. In B. N. Nagrajan & Ors. First, regularisation is not itself a mode of appointment. Secondly, the modes of appointments are direct recruitment or selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to be recorded in writing an officer holding a post of an equivalent grade by transfer from any other service of the State. " 30. In B. N. Nagrajan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 , it was held: - "it was argued that the regularisation of the promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointments of the promotees as Assistant Engineers must, therefore, be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st of November, 1956, The argument, however, is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly the words `regular or `regularisation do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to care only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments. " 31. Articles 16 of the Constitution of India provides that all citizens of India are entitled to get equal opportunity for the purpose of obtaining employment in State Service. 32. In order to fulfil such a condition, it is necessary to consider the cases of all citizens who are eligible to be appointed. For that purpose, it is not only necessary to call for the names from the Employment Exchange, but the fame is some cases also required due advertisement of posts in Newspapers by notifying the vacancies and the requisite qualifications therefor so that all eligible candidates may apply for their appointment in the said posts. 33. Right to work is not a fundamental right but a right to be considered appointment is as enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 34. It cannot, thus, be stated that the petitioners had been appointed upon compliance of the recruitment process as envisaged under the Education Code or upon compliance with the principles enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 1 35. 34. It cannot, thus, be stated that the petitioners had been appointed upon compliance of the recruitment process as envisaged under the Education Code or upon compliance with the principles enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 1 35. From the decisions of the Supreme Court as also of this Court, as referred to hereinbefore, it will thus be evident that any appointment which was made by a person having no authority to do so or the appointments which have not been made following the mandatory provisions of the Recruitment Rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, such appointments should be held to be a nullity. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot direct regularisation of the services of the employees when the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 36. In Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors. , JT 1992 (1) (SC) 394: (1992) 4 SCC 99 , it was observed:- "we may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction of regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they have put in works for 240 or more days, has been leading. Although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the employment exchange and the person registered in the employment exchange, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered or are lower in the long waiting list in the employment register. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal consideration including money. The employment is given for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchange for years. Not all those who gain such back door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchange for years. Not all those who gain such back door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere. They join the job for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the Courts are of employment in Government Departments, Public Undertaking or Agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect to indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests thus jeopardised on both Courts. " 37. In Karnataka State Private Colleges Stop Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka & Ors. , 1992 (2) SCC 29 , the Supreme Court again held: 2 "adhoc appointments, a convenient way of entry usually from backdoor, at times even in disregard of rules and regulations, are comparatively recent innovation to the service jurisprudence. They are individual problems to begin with, become a family problem in Court of law. It is unjust and unfair to those who are lesser fortunate in society with little or no approach even though better qualified more meritorious and well deserving. The infection is widespread in Govt. or semi-Government departments or State financed institutions. It arises either because the appointing authority resorts to it deliberately as a favour or to accommodate someone or for any extraneous reason ignoring the regular procedure provided for recruitment as a pretext under emergency measure or to avoid loss of work etc. or the Rules or circulars issued by the department itself empower the authority to do so as a stop-gap arrangement. The former is an abuse of power. It is unpardonable. Even if it is found to have been resorted to as a genuine emergency measure the Courts should be reluctant to grant indulgence. Latter gives rise to equities which have bothered Courts every now and then. The former is an abuse of power. It is unpardonable. Even if it is found to have been resorted to as a genuine emergency measure the Courts should be reluctant to grant indulgence. Latter gives rise to equities which have bothered Courts every now and then. " 38. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Surinder Kumar & Ors. , 1992 (1) SCC 489 : AIR 1992 SC 1593 , it has been held: "there is still another reason why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court. The Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition, is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decisions, and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge. " 39. In Sandeep Kumar v. State of U. P. , AIR 1992 SC 713 , the Supreme Court held:- "from the facts placed before us, it appears that the scheme under which the petitioners are working is of a very specific nature. There is no permanent need for the work and since it is a project for a particular purpose, it will not be possible to direct that the petitioner may be regularised in service. " 40. The Supreme Court again reiterated aforementioned view in Karnataka State Private College Stop- gap Lecturers (supra ). 41. The Supreme Court in J. K. Public Service Commission etc. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan & Ors. etc. , 1993 (4) SCC 597, it was held: - "existence of Statutory Rules is not a condition precedent to appoint an eligible and fit person to a post. The executive power is co-extensive with legislative power of the State and under Article 162 the State can create civil posts and fill them up according to executive instructions consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is settled law that once statutory rules have been made, the appointment shall be only in accordance with the rules. The executive power could be exercised only to fill in the gaps but the instructions cannot and should not supplant the law, but would only supplement the law. It is settled law that once statutory rules have been made, the appointment shall be only in accordance with the rules. The executive power could be exercised only to fill in the gaps but the instructions cannot and should not supplant the law, but would only supplement the law. " The Court proceeded to observe: "a little leeway to make ad hoc appointment due to emergent exigencies does not clothe the executive Govt. with power to relax the recruitment or to regularise such appointment nor to claim such appointments to be regular or in accordance with rules. Back door ad hoc appointments at the behest of power source or otherwise and recruitment, according to rules are mutually antagonistic and strange bed partners. They cannot coexist in the same sheath. The former in negation of fair play. The latter are the product of order and regularity. Every eligible person not necessarily be fit to be appointed to a post or office under the State, selection according to rules by a properly constituted commission and fitment for appointment assures fairness in selection and inhibits arbitrariness in appointments. " 42. In Jacob M. Puthuparambil (supra), there existed statutory rules for regulartsation of the services of the writ petitioners. 43. In case of Karnataka State Private College Stop Gap Lecturers Association (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the practice of the management of the Private Colleges to appoint teachers for a fixed period and then break their services for one day and again reappoint them. In that situation the Supreme Court gave certain directions. The situations in these cases are not the same, inasmuch as herein the petitioners were appointed for a fixed period, their services were terminated for a considerably long time and they were later on appointed in different schools. The circular letter issued by the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan clearly stated that such appointments were made on contractual basis. 44. In Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1636 , the question arose for consideration was whether the writ petitioner appointed to a temporary post as post graduate teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan terminated after three years, after becoming re-appointee would be entitled to the benefit of break in his services. In the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union (supra), the Supreme Court held that back-door appointments are made on various considerations including monetary consideration. 45. In the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union (supra), the Supreme Court held that back-door appointments are made on various considerations including monetary consideration. 45. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, JT 1995 (5) SC 179: AIR 1992 SC 2130 , the question regarding regularization of adhoc appointees came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. It was held that normal rule would be regular appointment through the prescribed agency but exigency of administration may sometime call for an adhoc and/or temporary appointment to be made. Such adhoc or temporary appointee, the Supreme Court held, if allowed to continue for a fairly long span, the authorities must consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and service record and appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. Direction given by the High Court in that case for regularization of every adhoc or temporary employees who had been continued for one year was held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. In the case of Piara Singh (supra) the Court noted that the normal rule is recruitment through the prescribed agency but due to administrative exigencies, an ad hoc or temporary appointment may be made. In such a situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such ad hoc or temporary appointment by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. The temporary employees also would get liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he is not selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. Appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc or temporary employee. Ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee, he must be replaced by only regularly selected employee. The ad hoc appointment should not be a device to circumvent the rule of reservation 46. Recently in Vs. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Govt. Ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee, he must be replaced by only regularly selected employee. The ad hoc appointment should not be a device to circumvent the rule of reservation 46. Recently in Vs. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Govt. of A. P. , JT 1994 (6) (sic) 461, the Supreme Court indicated as below: - "it is now well settled law that that appointment/promotion must be in accordance with the Rules, direct recruitee takes his seniority from the date on which he starts discharging the duty of the post borne on the cadre while a temporary appointee appointed dehors the rules or on ad hoc basis or to a fortuitous vacancy gets seniority from the date of regular appointment. " It also held:- "in A. K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 544 this Court while deprecating the practice of the Government giving a go-by to the statutory rules or regulations, framed under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution making large scale departure, expressed thus: - on more than one occasion this Court has indicated to the Union and the State Government that once they frame rules, their action in respect of matters covered by rules should be regulated by the rules. The rules framed in exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution are solemn rules having binding effect. Acting in a manner contrary to the rules does create problem and dislocation. Very often Government themselves get trapped on account of their own mistakes or actions in excess of what is provided in the rules. We take serious view of these lapses and hope and trust that the Government both at the Centre and in the States would take note of this position and refrain from acting in a manner not contemplated by their own rules. 47. We take serious view of these lapses and hope and trust that the Government both at the Centre and in the States would take note of this position and refrain from acting in a manner not contemplated by their own rules. 47. This Court (D. B.) in Bhullar Nath Yadav and others v. Mayo Hall Sports Complex and others, 1990 A. C. J. Page 429, following the judgement of the Supreme Court in The Dharwad District P. W. D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and others v. State of Karnataka and another, (1990 J. T. 343 : 1990 SCC (2) 396) has held that by virtue of petitioners working for last several years on daily wages in Mayo Hall Sports Complex cannot be denied regularisation even in absence of sanctioned post and the respondents were expected to devise ways and means to absorb the writ petitioners on permanent basis, specifically those writ petitioners, who had put three years or more in service on daily wages, were entitled to be absorbed and regularised. This Court in Bhullar Nath Yadav (supra) has further observed that paucity of funds and absence of posts cannot be a ground for denying the benefit of regularisation to the writ petitioners. 48. In The Dharwad District (supra) it was observed by the Supreme Court that it would be untair on the part of the State to keep an employee on daily wages for indefinite period and such a treatment is violative of equality clause of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 49. 48. In The Dharwad District (supra) it was observed by the Supreme Court that it would be untair on the part of the State to keep an employee on daily wages for indefinite period and such a treatment is violative of equality clause of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 49. In 1999 (82) F. L. R. 76 (Channey Lal and others v. Director, Malaria Research Centre, New Delhi and another), where the petitioners deployed on daily wages were orally asked not to come to work even after more than three years of deployment and on their claim for regularisation on the ground that the writ petitioners have acquired right to be considered for regularisation by virtue of having worked more than 240 days without any break in a calendar year and they were entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, this Court following the decision of Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar, 1997 (76) F. L. R. 237, has held that the daily wagers working as a workman deployed in a project does 6 not hold civil post under the State and have no right to the post, these daily wagers cannot be said to work on temporary or permanent basis and are not entitled to the protection of provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, and since the daily wagers have no right to the post as such the concept of retrenchment cannot be extended to such daily wage employee and disengagement of such daily wager can not be said to be arbitrary in view of Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi (supra ). The disengagement of deployment of daily wager, who is engaged for a day, is not a termination of service. Since the daily wage labour is engaged only on the basis of a contract lasting for a day and each engagement is a fresh, non-engagement or disengagement is not held to be arbitrary. In view of Pushpa Agarwal v. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Meerut, 1995 (70) F. L. R. 20, the principle of retrenchment as provided under Central Industrial Disputes Act and Rules framed there under is also attracted in respect of a workman governed under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and the Rules framed there under. 50. In view of Pushpa Agarwal v. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Meerut, 1995 (70) F. L. R. 20, the principle of retrenchment as provided under Central Industrial Disputes Act and Rules framed there under is also attracted in respect of a workman governed under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and the Rules framed there under. 50. In A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 884, (State of Assam and others v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, the Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) has also held that casual labourer is not holder of civil post. 51. This Court (D. B.) in 1992 (2) A. C. J. 1366, Zakir Hussain v. Engineer-In-Chief, Irrigation Department, U. P. Lucknow, has held that daily wager has no right to the post and there must be regular or permanent post and funds must be available for payment of salary and the daily wagers are to be qualified for appointment to the post and by virtue of only having worked for three years they cannot claim regularisation as a matter of right and the regularisation cannot be made as a thumb of rule, and this Court relegated the matter for adjudication and avail the alternative remedy for claiming the relief in reference to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 52. In State of U. P. v. Labour Court, Haldwani and others, 1999 (1) LBESR 312 (All) : 1999 (81) FLR 319 , it was held that the engagement of daily wager in the Irrigation Department comes to an end every evening. Refusal to employ him from a particular day, his disengagement was not under the provision of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. It was observed in para 6 of the above case as below:- "employment to Government service in the Irrigation Department is regulated by statutory rules. Presently, the respondent No. 2 was not employed in accordance with the rules. For engaging a person casually on day to day basis the statutory rules are not required to be followed under which the posts have to be advertised and only the best from the market have to be picked up keeping in view reservation provided from certain classes. Thus, every eligible person has an opportunity to participate in the recruitment process. This is not so in the case of daily wager in whose case even regularisation regarding age, medical fitness, character roll etc. are not observed. Thus, every eligible person has an opportunity to participate in the recruitment process. This is not so in the case of daily wager in whose case even regularisation regarding age, medical fitness, character roll etc. are not observed. Therefore, daily and casual workers who are engaged in disregard of all rules cannot be allowed to enter Government service through the 7 back door and the Labour Court cannot be allowed to be used as a legal means for such back door entry. The anomalous situation that the impugned award creates can be seen from the fact that till before his alleged retrenchment the respondent No. 2 was on engagement from day today. The impugned award makes him a permanent employee with the necessary consequence that he would have to be paid salary for all the 365 days as regular employee and the other benefits of regular employment can also not be denied to him. Thus, the award put him, in as much better position that he was before the alleged retrenchment. Such a result is not conceived. " 53. Non-renewal of contractual employment and dispensation of engagement at any stage without any reason in terms of appointment does not amount to retrenchment under Section 2 (oo) of Industrial Disputes Act as held by the Supreme Court in (1997) 11 SCC 521 , Escorts Ltd. v. Presiding Officer and another, while following an earlier decision of Supreme Court in (1994) 2 SCC 323 , M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, L. I. C. Later on it was considered and followed when similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in (1996) 1 SCC 595 , State of Rajasthan and others v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot, where termination of appointment after expiry of specified period held valid and not attracting Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 unless the termination was found to be mala fide or in colourable exercise of powers. Similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in 2002 (9) SCC 622 , Executive Engineer, CPWD, Indore v. Madhukar Purshottam Kolharkar and another. 54. Undisputedly, the petitioner was a daily wager. Similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in 2002 (9) SCC 622 , Executive Engineer, CPWD, Indore v. Madhukar Purshottam Kolharkar and another. 54. Undisputedly, the petitioner was a daily wager. The daily wagers have no right to the post in view of 1997 (4) SCC 391 , Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar, and 1993 (1) AWC 172, Bipin Bihari Srivastava v. District Judge, Basti, because appointment of daily wagers are made by not complying or observing the procedural formalities in consonance to any rules, regulations or by observing the procedures prescribed for the recruitment. The engagement of daily wager commences in the morning and comes to an end in the evening of every day. There is a contractual deployment for every day. It is upto the employer to allow to continue the employment or disengage the daily wager at any time in absence of work. The daily wager has no right or protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. AIR 1967 SC 884 , State of Assam v. Chandra Dutta; 1998 LIC 1088 (AP) para 16 (Jagdev v. State of U. P. and 1999 (82) FLR 76 para 8 & 10 (Channey Lal v. Director Malaria Research Centre, New Delhi ). 55. The daily wagers engaged without any written appointment order could be terminated without any written order also in view of Magarsen v. State of U. P. and others, 2002 (2) AWC 1712 (Paras 3 & 7) 56. The daily wagers/muster roll employees cannot be regularised unless the posts are in existence or the vacancies are available. To entertain the claim for regularisation means to provide appointment to a post after regularising the service of an employee. The position of daily wager is entirely different 8 inasmuch the daily wager holds no post in view of 2003 AIR SCW 3382 (State of Haryana and another v. Tilak Raj and others); AIR 1994 SC 1638 (Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra) (para 4 & 6); 1996 (9) SCC 34, (State of U. P. v. U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and others) (para 3 and 4); as well as 1995 (Supp) (4) SCC 49, (State of Orissa v. Dipti Malapatra) (para 4 ). 57. 57. The daily wagers are deployed on temporary assignment only and not on sanctioned post and completion of 240 days work by daily wager cannot attribute status of a casual workman under Industrial Disputes Act and as such does not create a right to regularisation in view of AIR 1994 SC 1638 (Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra and others ). 58. In 1997 AIR 1628, Ashwini Kumar v. State of Bihar, it was observed by the Supreme Court that if initial entry is itself unauthorised and not against any sanctioned vacancy, the question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existent vacancy does not arise and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. 59. In 1993 (2) SCC 486 , State of Orissa & others v. Sukanti Mohapatra & others, the Supreme Court held that services of the candidates appointed irregularly in total disregard of the rules, cannot be regularised in exercise of such powers under the departmental rules. 60. Similarly in case of Dr. Narinder Mohan (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated that having made the rules, the executive cannot fall back upon its general power under Article 162 to regularise the ad-hoc appointments under rules. 61. In 2000 (3) LBESR 290 (SC) : JT 1996 (6) SC 725, Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal & another v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others, the Supreme Court has held that the ad hoc appointments made dehors the rules without following proper procedure of recruitment, would not confer any right of regularization merely on the basis of the length of the service. 62. In 1997 (1) SCC 350 , P. Ravindran and others v. Union Territory of Pondicherry and others, the Supreme Court held that regularization of ad hoc appointees by passing the process of recruitment through open competition to be held by the Public Service Commission, is not permissible. 63. In 1997 (2) SCC 713 , Santosh Kumar Verma and others v. State of Bihar, through Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of Bihar and others, the Supreme Court held that the posts temporarily filled in contravention of law, cannot be regularized. 64. 63. In 1997 (2) SCC 713 , Santosh Kumar Verma and others v. State of Bihar, through Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of Bihar and others, the Supreme Court held that the posts temporarily filled in contravention of law, cannot be regularized. 64. In case of JT 1992 (1) SC 394, Delhi Development Authority Horticulture Employees Union (supra) the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of saying that a good deal of illegal appointment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting registered in the Employment Exchange for the years. 65. In (1995) 1 UPLBEC 93, Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra and another, the Supreme Court has held that the post was one, which was to be filled up through Public Service Commission, therefore, the claim of regularisation was not worth accepting. 66. In 1997 (4) SCC 88 , State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar, it has been held by the Supreme Court that there must exist a post and there must be Statutory Rules or administrative instructions for appointment to the post and the High Court was in error in directing regularisation of service of the respondents. 67. In 1997 (11) SCC 228 , Union of India v. Uma Maheshwari, the Supreme Court has held that the claim of regularisation by a daily wager is not sustainable if no regular work or regularisation scheme is in operation. 68. In 2004 (54) ALR 85 this Court (D. B.) relying on various judgements the Supreme Court rejected the claim of regularisation of daily wage employees of P. W. D. and Minor Irrigation Department holding that public posts are to be filled up after due advertisement. For seeking regularisation, must exist a post and there should be statutory rules or administrative instructions, in absence of which, the claim of regularisation is unsustainable. 69. Learned counsel for the respondents has, however, submitted that the rulings cited by the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case because the case in hand is a case of the nature, where the petitioner was engaged for a particular Project and when the Project itself is over then naturally the question of his regularisation does not arise. In support, reliance has been placed upon a recent ruling of the Supreme Court in 2003 (3) AISLJ 147, Surendra Kumar Sharma v. Vikas Adhikari and another, where the services of the petitioner engaged for a short duration under a scheme known as Rural Employment Programme were terminated, the Supreme Court had held that "when the scheme itself was over and it was known to him that his requirement was only during the currency of the scheme, then no relief could be granted". The Supreme Court while deciding the aforesaid Surendra Kumar Sharmas case (supra) had the occasion to deal with the following rulings of the Supreme Court on the subject: (i) Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union (supra) and JT Supreme 2003 (3) SC 436: (2003) 4 SCC 27 , S. M. Nilajkar and others v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, where the Court while dealing- with such scheme for project employees observed as under:- "it is common knowledge that the Government as a Welfare State floats several schemes and projects generating employment opportunities, though they are short-lived. The objective is to meet the need of the moment. The benefit of such schemes and project is that for the duration they exist, they provide employment and livelihood to such persons as would not have been able to secure the same but for such schemes or projects. If the workmen employed for fulfilling the need of such passing-phase- projects or schemes were to become a liability on the employer-State by too liberally interpreting the labour laws in favour of the workmen, then the same may well act as a disincentive to the State for floating such schemes and the State may opt to keep away from initiating such schemes and projects even in times of dire need, because it may feel that by opening the gates of welfare it would be letting in onerous obligations entailed upon it by extended application of the labour laws. " (ii) (1999) 2 SCC 317 , Rajendra and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, where the termination of the employment had been caused by abolition of posts consequent upon the schemes having been abolished for non-availability of funds, it was held as under:- "that when posts temporarily created for fulfilling the needs of a particular project or scheme limited in its duration come to an end because the need for the project comes to an end either because the need was fulfilled or the project had to be abandoned wholly or partially for want of funds, the employer cannot by a writ of mandamus be directed to continue employing such employees as have been dislodged, because such a direction would amount to requisition for creation of posts though not required by the employer and funding such posts though the employer did not have funds available for the purpose. " (iii) (1998) 3 SCC 354, Jaipal and others v. State of Haryana, where also the employees of the project of adult and non-formal education, a temporary project, which was a time bound project to last till 1990, were held not entitled for regularising of their services. 70. This Court (Honble Sunil Ambwani, J.) in (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1554, Chandra Prakash Gupta v. Additional District Magistrate (Project), Hamirpur and another, has observed that when the writ petitioner initially appointed as a typist on daily wages in integrated rural development programme had served 34 months with short breaks on the strength of the interim order of this Court, was not said to be holder of appointment letter by virtue of interim order of the Court and the deployment of such daily wager could be terminated as his initial deployment was made without following the procedure and was by way of back-door entry. In Chandra Prakash Gupta (supra) this Court has observed as below; - "6. The question of regularization of daily wages employees has been subject matter of judicial scrutiny for a long time. In a developing country various schemes are implemented. These schemes are supported by limited financial allocation. The employees appointed on daily wages in such schemes are fully aware of its temporary nature, and also the nature and terms of their appointment. The question of regularization of daily wages employees has been subject matter of judicial scrutiny for a long time. In a developing country various schemes are implemented. These schemes are supported by limited financial allocation. The employees appointed on daily wages in such schemes are fully aware of its temporary nature, and also the nature and terms of their appointment. In Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P & T Department v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCC 122 , the Supreme Court considered the rights of the daily rated casual labour and directed for submission of a scheme to extend permanent status of the workmen. State of Haryana and others v. Piara Singh and others, 1992 (4) SCC 118 , was a case of ad hoc temporary Government employees and consider the validity of the orders of regularisation made by State of Haryana, in which Supreme Court held that eligible and qualified continue in service satisfactorily for a long periods raises presumption of need of regular posts Later on there has been a marked changed in law relating to regularisation of daily rated employees. In Ghaziabad Development Authority & others v. Vikram Chaudhary, 1995 (5) SCC 210 , it was held that in the absence of availability of posts for regular appointment, regularisation cannot be directed and that the daily rated employees should be given minimum wages under the Statute, if any, or the prevailing wages in the locality. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nodha Ram, JT 1996 (1) SC 220, it has been held that where a project is completed, and closed due to non-availability of funds, the employees have to go along with its closure. No vested right is created in temporary employments. Directions can not be given to regularise their services in the absence of any existing vacancies, nor can directions be given to the State to create posts in a non-existing establishment. In this case Supreme Court found that the directions issued by Court for regularisation were illegal warranting interference. " 71. In JT 1996 (1) SC 220, State of Himachal Pradesh through the Secretary Agriculture to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Shimlalant v. Nodha Ram and others) the Supreme Court has held as under: - "it is seen that when the project is completed and closed due to non-availability of funds, the employees have to go along with its closure. In JT 1996 (1) SC 220, State of Himachal Pradesh through the Secretary Agriculture to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Shimlalant v. Nodha Ram and others) the Supreme Court has held as under: - "it is seen that when the project is completed and closed due to non-availability of funds, the employees have to go along with its closure. The High Court was not right in giving the direction to regularise them or to continue them in other places. No vested right is created in temporary employment. Directions cannot be given to regularise their services in the absence of any existing vacancies nor can directions be given to the State to create posts in a non-existent establishment. The Court would adopt pragmatic approach in giving directions. The directions would amount to creating of posts and continuing them despite non-availability of the work. We are of the considered view that the directions issued by the High Court are absolutely illegal warranting our interference. The order of the High Court is, therefore, set aside. (Para 4)" 72. This Court (Honble Sudhir Narain, J.) in 2001 (2) LBESR 631 (All) : (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1448 , Arvind Kumar Rai and others v. State of U. P. and others, held that the daily wagers cannot be treated as ad hoc appointees in view of Rule-4 of the U. P. Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 as the daily wagers are not better than the work- charge, ad hoc or temporary employees and in absence of statutory provisions or rules none of them can be regularised. 73. This Court (Honble M. C. Jain, J.) in 2001 (2) LBESR 307 (All) : (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1267, Vinod Singh and another v. State of U. P. and others, has observed that by virtue of working for 240 days in a calendar year a right is not accrued in favour of the writ petitioner for his absorption in the Government department as for absorption the existence of vacancy or post is necessary. 74. 74. This Court (Honble A. K. Yog, J.) in 2001 (2) LBESR 618 (All) : (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1429 , Santosh Kumar Sonkar v. State of U. P. and others, has observed that the daily wagers deployed in the year 1986 in stop gap arrangement to meet temporary work load and discontinued in the year 1987 on extinction of the work load, however, on their claim could not be regularised or absorbed as they have not vested right for regularisation or absorption. 75. In 2003 (2) LBESR 1043 (SC) : (2004) 1 UPLBEC 60, State of U. P. and another v. Rajendra Prasad and others, this Court (D. B.) while relying above judgement of State of U. P. and others v. U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and others (supra) has held that the daily wagers cannot be regularised in absence of scheme or rules, neither the State could be directed to frame rules for regularisation as giving direction to State to frame rules is the function of legislature. 76. In Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 1627, the Supreme Court held that the question of confirmation or regularization of an irregularly appointed candidate could arise if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or an ad-hoc basis against a possible vacancy which is already sanctioned but if initial entry is itself unauthorized and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, the question of regularizing the incumbent on such non-existent vacancy could never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularization or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. The Supreme Court held that regularization of such appointment would amount to decorating a still-born baby. In Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others, JT 1992 (1) SC 394, the pernicious consequences of the direction of regularization of workmen on the only ground that they have put in works for 240 or more days, has been pointed out as under: "although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the Employment Exchange and the person registered in the Employment Exchange, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered or are lower in the long-waiting list in the employment register. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal consideration including money. The employment is given for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules and is continued for 240 days or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularization knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 days or more days are directed to the automatically regularized. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchange for years. " 77. In State of U. P. v. Ajay Kumar, (1997) SCC 88, it has been held that there must exist a post and either administrative instructions or statutory rules must also be in operation to appoint a person to the post. Daily wage appointment, it was further held, would obviously be in relation to contingent establishment in which there cannot exist any post and it continues so long as the work exists. 78. In 1999 (1) LBESR 152 (All) : 1999 (1) UPLBEC 454 , Rajendra Prasad and another v. State of U. P. and others, this Court (Honble S. R. Singh, J.) held that in absence of legally vacant post and scheme wholesale regularization cannot be directed, however, direction was made to the State Government to frame rules and schemes for regularization. This Court in Rajendra Prasad (supra) held as under: "i am of the considered view that `wholesale and `unconditional orders cannot be issued by this Court directing the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioners, and in no case such direction can be issued in the absence of posts and a scheme rules visualizing regularization on certain principles and norms framed in consonance with the related constitutional provisions for `regularisation has not been claimed herein in the above sense of the term. Rather it comprehends induction into the cadre of the service which in the absence of posts and a legally framed scheme cannot be allowed except on pains of violating the Constitution and relevant service Rules. " (Para 7) "in the conspectus of the above discussion. Rather it comprehends induction into the cadre of the service which in the absence of posts and a legally framed scheme cannot be allowed except on pains of violating the Constitution and relevant service Rules. " (Para 7) "in the conspectus of the above discussion. I am persuaded to the considered view that the service conditions of the Daily rated employees must be modulated refixed by making appropriate rules compatible with the constitutional provisions particularly those embodied in Articles 14, 16, 38, 39, 41 and 43 of the Constitution with particular reference to the doctrine of "social justice. " (Para 11) 79. The issue of regularisation has been considered by the Supreme Court from time and again and the law has been laid down in very clear terms in the cases, i. e. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Piara Singh & Ors. (supra); Jacob M. Puthuparambil & Ors. v. Kerala Water Authority & Ors. , 1991 (1) SCC 28 ; J & K. Public Service Commission etc. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan & Ors. , 1993 (6) (JT) 593 ; Dr. A. K. Jain v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCR 335 ; Ek. Ramakrishnan & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. , 1996 (10) SCC 565 ; and Ashwani Kumar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. , 1997 (1) JT 243 ; and the ratio of all those judgements can be summarized to the extent that the question as to whether the services of certain employees appointed on ad-hoc basis should be regularised relates to the condition of service. The power to prescribe the conditions of service can be exercised either by making Rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India or any analogous provision and in the absence of such Rules, under the instructions issued in exercise of its executive power. The Court comes into the picture only to ensure observance of fundamental rights and statutory provisions, Rules and other instructions, if any, governing the conditions of service. The main concern of the Court in such matters is to ensure the Rules of Law and to see that the executive acts fairly and gives a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16. The main concern of the Court in such matters is to ensure the Rules of Law and to see that the executive acts fairly and gives a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16. It also means that the State should not exploit its employees nor should it seek to take advantage of the helplessness and misery of either the unemployed persons or the employees, as the case may be. As is often said, the State must be a model employer. It is for this reason, it is held that equal pay must be given for equal work, which is indeed one of the Directive Principles of the Constitution. It is for this very reason it is held that a person should not be kept in a temporary or ad hoc status for long. A perusal of the authorities would show that appointments are as a rule to be made in accordance with statutory rules, giving equal opportunity to all the aspirants to apply for the posts and following the prevalent policy of reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes/scheduled Tribes and other backward classes. Whenever the employees are appointed on ad hoc basis to meet an emergent situation, every effort should be made to replace them by the employees appointed on regular basis in accordance with the relevant rules as expeditiously as possible. Where the appointment on ad hoc basis has continued for long and the State has made rules for regularisation, regularisation has to be considered in accordance with the rules. Where, however, no rules are operative, it is open to the employees to show that they have been dealt with arbitrarily and their work position has been exploited by keeping them on ad hoc for one spell of time. However, it is a question of fact whether in the given 5 situation, they were treated arbitrarily. In Khagesh Kumar v. Inspector General of Registration, U. P. & Ors. However, it is a question of fact whether in the given 5 situation, they were treated arbitrarily. In Khagesh Kumar v. Inspector General of Registration, U. P. & Ors. , AIR 1996 SC 417 , the Supreme Court did not issue direction for regularisation of those employees, who had been appointed on ad hoc basis or on daily wages after the cut off date, i. e. , 1-10-1986 as was mandatorily required by the provisions of U. P. Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointment ( On posts outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 and those who were not eligible under the said Rules were not given regularisation. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Inspector General of Registration and another v. Awadhesh Kumar & Ors. , 1996 (2) LBESR 718 (SC) : 1996 (9) SCC 217 . Moreover, the above referred cases further laid down that for the purpose of regularisation, various pre-requisite conditions are to be fulfilled, i. e. , the temporary/ad hoc appointment of the employee should be in consonance with the statutory rules, it should not be a back door entry. The service record of the petitioner should be satisfactory, the employee should be eligible and/or qualified for the post at the time of his initial appointment. There must be a sanctioned post against which the employee seeks regularisation and on the said sanctioned post, there must be a vacancy. Moreover, regularisation is to be made according to seniority of the temporary/ad hoc Employees. The regularisation should not be in contravention to the State policy regarding reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes/scheduled Tribes and other backward classes and other categories for which state has enacted any Act or framed rules or issued any Government Order etc. 80. Similar view has been taken in Union of India v. Vishamber Dutt, 1996 (11) SCC 341 ; and State of Uttar Pradesh v. U. P. Madhyamik Parishad Kshrimik Sangh, AIR 1996 SC 708 . 80. Similar view has been taken in Union of India v. Vishamber Dutt, 1996 (11) SCC 341 ; and State of Uttar Pradesh v. U. P. Madhyamik Parishad Kshrimik Sangh, AIR 1996 SC 708 . In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ashwani Kumar, 1996 (2) LBESR 24 (SC): 1996 (1) SCC 773 , the Supreme Court has held that if an employment is under a particular Scheme or the employee is being paid out of the funds of a Scheme, in case the Scheme comes to closure or the funds are not available, the Court has no right to issue direction to regularise the service of such an employee or to continue him on some other project, for the reasons that "no vested right is created in a temporary employment. " 81. It the workmen appointed without following any procedure prescribed under the Act or the Rules by such authority, who had no competence to appoint them, and their appointment was not in accordance with law, the provisions of the Act, 1947 are attracted for the reason that provisions of Section 25-J of the Act have over-riding effect on other laws because the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought that the rights and liabilities arising out of the law and retrenchment should be uniform throughout wherever the Act was in force and every State should have its own law in consonance with the Central Law. This view stands fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Vmidhachalam Ors. v. Management of Lotus Mills & Anr. , 1998 (1) LBESR 313 (SC) : (1998) 1 SCC 650 ; Krishna District Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. v. N. V. Puranchandra Rao & Ors. , (1987) 4 SCC 99 ; and Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal & Anr. , AIR 2001 SCW 310 . 6 82. In Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank, 1991 Lab. & I. C. 944, the Court considered the case of an employee, whose services stood terminated on the ground that he had been appointed without any authorisation of law. This Court held that even in that case the provisions of the Act were attracted. 83. 6 82. In Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank, 1991 Lab. & I. C. 944, the Court considered the case of an employee, whose services stood terminated on the ground that he had been appointed without any authorisation of law. This Court held that even in that case the provisions of the Act were attracted. 83. On the contrary, in Sita Ram Mali v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 (2) WLC 177, Rajasthan High Court held as under: "making appointment on daily wages without the availability of the post and without following the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 suffers from patent illegality. Apparently for the reasons which are only extraneous, the Officers of the Department have given appointments on daily wages to few favoured. Those who have waited in queue at the employment exchange have been altogether ignored. In fact, while the length of the queue continuously increase, the back-door entrants got the entry in service as daily wages employee and got the order of appointment on salary in the regular pay scale and ultimately the order of regularisation on the service. " The Court depricated the practice of making appointments on daily wages and held that even the appointment on daily wages without advertising the vacancy or calling the names from Employment Exchange violates the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence it is violative of the fundamental rights of other eligible persons and, thus, the relief of regularisation cannot be claimed. 84. The question of appointment dehors the Rules has been considered by the Supreme Court from time and again and the Court held that such appointments are unenforceable and inexecutable. It is settled legal proposition that any appointment made dehors the Rules violates the Public Policy enshrined in the rules and, thus, being void, cannot be enforced. (Vide Smt. Ravinder Sharma & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors. , (1995) 1 SCC 138 ; Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions, 1995 (Suppl) 4 SCC 706; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyama Pardhi, (1996) 7 SCC 118 ; State of Rajasthan v. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, 1997 (2) LBESR 872 (SC) : (1997) 6 SCC 574 ; Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. S. S. Modh & Ors. , AIR 1997 SC 3464 ; Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. , AIR 1997 SC 3464 ; Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. , (1999) 9 SCC 573 ; and Chancellor v. Shankar Rao & Ors. , (1999) 6 SCC 255 . 85. Appointment dehors the Rules violates the mandate of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration (supra); and Piara Singh (supra ). In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. , Mazdoor Congress & Ors. , (supra) the Supreme Court recognised the public employment as public property and held that all persons similarly situated have a right to share in it thought its enjoyment is subject to the recruitment rules which must be in consonance with the Scheme of the Constitution of India. 86. In Dr. M. A. Haque & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. , (1993) 2 SCC 213 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "we cannot lose sight of the fact that the recruitment rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution have to be followed strictly and not in breach. If a disregard of the rules and by passing of the Public Service Commissions are permitted, it will open a back-door for illegal recruitment without limit. In fact this Court has, of late, been witnessing a constant violation of the recruitment rules and a scant respect for the constitutional provisions requiring recruitment to the services through the Public Service Commission. It appears that since this Court has in some cases permitted regularisation of the irregularly recruited employees, some Governments and authorities have been increasingly resorted to irregular recruitments. The result had been that the recruitment rules and the Public Service Commissions have been kept in cold storage and candidate dictated by various considerations are being recruited as a matter of course. " 87. Depricating the practice of making appointment dehors the Rules by the State or other State instrumentalies in Dr. Arundhati A. Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 962 , the Court rejected the claim of the petitioner therein for regularisation on the ground of long continuous service observing as under: "nor the claim of the appellant, that she having worked as Lecturer without break for 9 years on the date the advertisement was issued, she should be deemed to have been regularised appears to be well founded. Eligibility and continuous working for howsoever long period should not be permitted to over- reach the law. Requirement of rules of selection cannot be substituted by humane considerations. Law must take its course. " 88. The Supreme Court in State of U. P. & Ors. v. U. P. State Law Officers Association & Ors. , AIR 1994 SC 1654 , has observed as under: "this being so those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the backdoor have to go by the same door. . . . . . . . The fact that they are made by public bodies cannot best them with additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office, howsoever made, is not. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them. " 89. Even if there are no Statutory Rules or Bye-laws of the society providing a mode of appointment, the Executive Instructions/policy adopted by the respondent society must be there providing for a mode of appointment. Even if no such Executive Instructions Policy/guidelines/circular etc. is in existence then a fair procedure for appointment has to be adopted in consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Vide Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbhare, ( 1998) 8 SCC 99.) 90. In Ramesh Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. Rajashtan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal & Ors. , AIR 2000 SCW 4206, the Supreme Court held thai expression service Rules cannot be given a restrictive meaning in the absence of the definition of the said terms and, therefore, it would include within its sweep, the necessary Government order providing the method recruitment. " 91. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in B. R. Kapoor v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 7 SCC 231 , (Jayalalita case) observed that it is the duty of the Joint to examine whether the incumbent possesses qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted was fair, just and reasonable and if not appointment should be struck down. 92. 92. The Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab & Ors. , 2000 (1) LBESR 43 (SC) : (1999) 7 SCC 209 , has held that Articles 14 and 16 (1) are basic features of the Constitution. The same view has been reiterated in Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U. P. and Ors. , (1997) 5 SCC 201 ; and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India & Ors. , (2000) 1 SCC 168 . Thus, strict adherence is required thereto. 93. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidhyarthi etc. v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1991 SC 537 , and A. P. Agarwal v. Government (NCT) of Delhi & Ors. , (2000) 1 SCC 600 , the Supreme Court held that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to vice the arbitrariness which is a crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and the very basis of the Rule of Law. 94. Therefore, any appointment made by a Statutory Authority, which may be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, if found to have been made by a person without any 9 competence or without following the procedure prescribed by law and in case the procedure is not prescribed and the procedure adopted by the Authority is not in consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the incumbent cannot claim any benefit as in such a case the contract of service becomes unenforceable and inexecutable. If the view contrary to the above is accepted, the same would override the mandate of the Constitution also, it will take away the powers of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto, wherein the appointment of an incumbent can be challenged not only by an aggrieved persons but a stranger also. 95. Invalidity of an appointment may arise not only from want of qualification, but also from the violation of such legal conditions or procedure for appointment as mandatory and as a result of which the appointment becomes void. (Vide M Pantiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors. , AIR 1961 SC 1107 ; University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 ; and P. N. Lakhanpal v. A. N. Roy, AIR 1975 Del 66 ). (Vide M Pantiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors. , AIR 1961 SC 1107 ; University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 ; and P. N. Lakhanpal v. A. N. Roy, AIR 1975 Del 66 ). There can be no quarrel to issue that the Board is an Authority, which is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, Thus, question of saving such an illegal appointment did not arise. 96. The instant cases are squarely covered by the judgement of the Supreme Court in Factory Manager, Cimmco Wagon Factory v. Virendra Kumar Sharma & Anr. , (2000) 6 SCC 554 , wherein the Supreme Court, while deciding the similar case, has observed as under: - "assuming that the respondent was asked to work in a factory in anticipation of securing appointment, that too by an officer who was not competent to give appointment, that did not make the respondent a workman or regular employee of the appellant company. " 97. This Court (Honble Dr. B. S. Chauhan, J.) in 2003 (1) LBESR 1105 (All) : (2003) 2 ESC (All.) 1007, State of U. P. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut, has held that the appointment should be made at initial stage in accordance with rules. Incumbent must possess the requisite qualification for the post on the date of appointment and if appointment had been made on temporary ad hoc basis, the workman should not be permitted to continue for long rather the vacancies should be filled up on permanent basis in accordance with law only if the statutory provision or executive instruction provides for regularisation after completing a particular period only then regularisation is permissible. In special circumstances, Court may give direction to consider the case for regularisation provided continuation on ad hoc basis is so long that it amounts to arbitrariness and provisions of Article 14 are attracted. There must be sanctioned post against which regularisation is sought. At the same time policy of the State enforcing the reservation for particular classes like S. C. , S. T. , O. B. C. etc. and further for women, handicapped and ex-service men cannot be ignored. 98. There must be sanctioned post against which regularisation is sought. At the same time policy of the State enforcing the reservation for particular classes like S. C. , S. T. , O. B. C. etc. and further for women, handicapped and ex-service men cannot be ignored. 98. Following 1996 (1) LBESR 215 (SC) : (1995) 5 SCC 653 , Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kishan, the Supreme Court in Anil Bapurao Kanase v. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and another, 1998 (1) LBESR 96 (SC) : (1997) 10 SCC 5999, observed that the termination/disengagement of seasonal worker deployed in Chemistry section of sugar factory when the work was over could not be treated as retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of the claim that such employee had rendered more than 180 days service in such situation Section 25-F said act was not attracted. 99. While referring decision of 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316, Moot Raj Upadhyaya v. State of H. P. , the Supreme Court in (1997) 1 SCC 269 , (H. P. Housing Board v. Om Pal and others, had held that the administrative tribunal without holding termination of retrenched daily wage workers as invalid and holding them to be continuing in service, could not direct their regularisation and payment of enhanced wages to them. 100. 100. After considering its own judgement in Piara Singh (supra) and decision in Satyanarayan Sharma v. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. , (1990) 4 SCC 163 , the Supreme Court has observed in (1998) 9 SCC 258 , Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur and another v. Veer Singh Rajpur and others, that the direction of High Court to regularise the service of casual labourer was unwarranted, being contrary to the administrative directions, instructions, circulars and orders of Government when the Municipal Corporation found that the administrator had made deployment of daily rated/muster roll/casual labour irregularly and on extra political consideration and municipal corporation intended to reduce the establishment expenditure and the Government had prohibited to fill up the vacant posts and creation of new posts including regularisation, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged the liberty for the municipal corporation, in case, it was making further appointment of casual or daily rated workers and to consider the said retrenched persons on daily wages in preference by waiving age bar if necessary, provided they were otherwise qualified and eligible to the post. 101. The Supreme Court in (1998) 9 SCC 709 , (State of Punjab and others v. Sardara Singh, held that the High Court could not direct regularisation of daily wager, however, a direction could be given to the State Government to frame scheme of regularisation and if the scheme is already framed, a direction may be given to the State for considering the matter of regularisation in accordance with the scheme. 102. Following its own decision in 1990 (Suppl) SCC 191, M. M. R. Khan v. Union of India) and (1996) 3 SCC 267 , Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen and in reference to decision of Parimal Chandra Raha v. 1 L. I. C. . 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 611, the Supreme in (1999) 6 SCC 439 , Indian Petrochemical Corporation Ltd. and another v. Shramik Sena and others, has held that relation of workmen of statutory canteen managed by contractor with the establishment maintaining such canteen are question of fact on the basis of material on record and such persons were said to be workmen of the establishment for the purpose of Factory Act only and not ipso facto workmen of the establishment for the other purposes, like, recruitment, seniority, promotion, retirement benefits etc. , however, on their claim direction of High Court granting relief of regularisation was held to be justifiable in the light of provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in that undertaking was not as a matter of statutory right of the workmen but to eradicate unfair labour practice and to undo social unjust and as a measure of labour welfare and imposition of certain conditions as to eligibility for the benefit of the relief 103. The Supreme Court in (1997) 5 SCC 434 , Executive Engineer State of Karnataka v. K. Somasetty and others, relying on its earlier decisions in Union of India v. Jai Narain Singh, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 672; State of H. P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma (supra) has held that State while discharging public welfare function cannot be said to be an Industry and the decision of the labour Court made in reference to Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reinstating the daily wagers discharged from the project was said to have been no right to the post and the reinstatement of such daily wagers was held unjustifiable. 104. The Supreme Court in (2002) 5 SCC 654 , Haryana State F. C. C. W. Store Ltd and another v. Ram Niwas and another while following its earlier decisions in Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, 1999 (1) LBESR 35 (SC) : (1998) 6 SCC 538 and Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen Ambala Cantt. (2001) 5 SCC 540 , has observed that disengagement of workers deployed on a particular project in terms of contract of service when the work and procurement and supply of wheat in the said project was over, then the deployment of such daily wager as watchman/chaukidar on contractual basis, could not be said to be retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) (bb) and 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. 105. 105. Following its own decision in (2002) 9 SCC 693, Sufal Jha v. Union of India, the Supreme Court in another decision of Ircon International Ltd. v. Daya Shankar and another, 2002 (1) LBESR 864 (SC) : (2002) 9 SCC 691 , has observed that the work-charge employee appointed on a particular Railway Ballast Project as a Khalasi for the duration of continuation of project could not attomatically continue in deployment thereafter when the project is over and the work-charge employee became surplus and was retrenched after being paid compensation under Industrial Disputes Act and the direction to High Court to consider such retrenched employee as permanent employee was said to be erroneous, however, in peculiar facts and circumstances the said retrenched employee could be considered in accordance with the seniority vacancy arising in future. 2 106. The Supreme Court in (2002)9 SCC 739 (A. P. S. R. T. C. , Cuddapah v. K. Bajjanna) observed that the workman under the same employer at the time of reinstatement at the direction of the labour Court are to be treated harmoniously in respect of payment of back-wages and the burden shall be on workman to show that he was not gainfully deployed during the period of non-employment. 107. The Supreme Court further in (2002) 9 SCC 749 , Employer in relation to the Management of G. C. of BCCL v. Workmen represented by Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union has observed that disability of workman/employee being underage at the time of appointment does not stand subsequently removed and regularisation based on-such appointment could not be upheld, more so, when there was specific provision barring underage persons from working in mines. 108. The Supreme Court relying on its earlier decisions of Gammon India Ltd v. Union of India, (1974) I SCC 596; B. H. E. L Workers Assn. 108. The Supreme Court relying on its earlier decisions of Gammon India Ltd v. Union of India, (1974) I SCC 596; B. H. E. L Workers Assn. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 630 ; Mathura Refinery Mazdoor Sangh v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1991) 2 SCC 176 , and Dena Nath v. National Fertilisers Ltd, (1992) 1 SCC 695 , in (1994) 5 SCC 304 , R. K. Panda and others v. Steel Authority of India and others has indicated that regularisation of contract labour engaged at Rourkela Plant of Steel Authority of India on the ground that they continued for long periods (10 to 20 years) through contractor shall involve question of fact, therefore, normally assessment of period could be determined by the labour Court and industrial tribunal on evidence and not by the High Court or Supreme in writ jurisdiction or under Article 136 of Constitution respectively, however, on the basis of the interim orders of Supreme Court many contract labourer had continued in employment for several years, were directed to be considered for absorption or for voluntary retirement by the management under a guideline. 109. The Supreme Court in 1996 (4) SCC 195 , Union of India and others v. Dharma Pal and others, directed for enforcement of a scheme for regularisation in absence of any existing rules of casual/daily wagers/workcharge employees engaged in construction/execution of maintenance work under Chandigarh Administration, whereas, the Supreme Court way back in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 338, V. B. Rao v. Steel Authority of India Limited and another, had indicated that reinstatement of an employee cannot be insisted upon where the employer had lost confidence in the employee owing to his involvement in criminal cases in connection with appropriation of certain funds, however, the High Court was said not to be incorrect in substituting reinstatement by compensation to cover both backwages and entitlement for loss of future services. 110. 110. S. M. Nilajkar (supra) in special facts and circumstances when the burden of deployment was on the employer to show that the deployment of workman in Government project or scheme was under a stipulated contractual manner and the workman/employee was made aware of such stipulation at the 3 commencement of his deployment otherwise mere prove of employment of casual worker or daily wager in a project or scheme and termination of service from the project or scheme coming to an end was not enough to attract the Section 2 (oo) (bb) of Industrial Disputes Act and the termination was said to be retrenchment. 111. Following Union of India v. K. V. Baby, (1998) 9 SCC 252 ; Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments, (1974) 3 SCC 498 and Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264 , the Supreme Court In (2001) 3 SCC 36 , Indian Banks Association v. Workmen of Syndicate Bank and others, has held that commission agents/deposit collectors of banks though not regular employees nonetheless were having relationship of master and servant between the bank and such workmen, could be deployed on commission basis and not entitled to absorption as regular workmen and not entitled to pay scale, allowances and service conditions of regular bank employees. 112. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not always easy to apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organisations or even in the same organization. In Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others v. Union of India and others, 1988 (3) SCC 91 , the Supreme Court explained the principle of "equal pay for equal work" by holding that differentiation of pay scales among Government servants holding the same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less-it varies from nature and culture of employment. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less-it varies from nature and culture of employment. It was further observed that judgement of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the posts and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the Court. 113. In Harbans Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 (4) SCC 459 , it was held that a mere nomenclature designating a person as a person as a carpenter or a craftsman was not enough to come to a conclusion that he was doing the work as another carpenter in regular service. A comparison cannot be made with counterparts in other establishments with different managements or even in the establishments in different locations though owned by the same management. The quality of work, which is produced, may be different even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the Principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job requires may differ from job to job. 114. In Harbans Lals case (supra) and Vikram Chaudharys case (supra) the daily rated workmen were entitled to be paid minimum wages admissible to such workmen as prescribed and not the minimum in 4 the pay scale applicable to similar employees in regular service unless the employer had decided to make such minimum in the pay scale applicable to the daily rated workmen. 115. In Secretary, Finance Department v. West Bengal Registration Service Association, AIR 1992 SC 1203 , it was observed: "it is well settled that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judiciary and therefore, ordinarily Courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies. " 116. In Dr. " 116. In Dr. Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. , 1997 (2) LBESR 726 (All) : 1997 (3) AWC 1476, a Division Bench of this Court observed: "from the conspectus of views taken in the aforementioned decided cases, the position is clear that to substantiate a claim of higher scale of pay/salary on the basis of the principle equal pay for equal work the petitioners will have to establish that they are equally placed in all respects with the person or persons whose scale of pay/salary they claim. They must allege and prove, that the mode of recruitment eligibility qualifications prescribed, the nature of duties, responsibilities discharged and the service rules if any applicable to the two posts are similar. They cannot succeed in the case merely by showing that they have been discharging the same duties which are being discharged by persons holding the other class of posts. " The above decision has been approved by a Full Bench of this Court in Ajai Kumar Jaitly v. State of U. P. , 1999 (1) LBESR 232 (All) (FB) : (1999) 1 UPLBEC 388 . 117. In Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, JT 1994 (1) SC 574, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the nature of work may be more or less the same but the scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. 118. In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj and others, (2003) 6 SCC 123 :2003 AIR SCW 3382. the Supreme Court pointed out that the principle for equal pay for equal work is not always easy to apply. Then are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organisations or even in the same organisation. In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj (supra), the Supreme 5 Court observed that a scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily wager, he holds no post, hence he cannot be compared with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay for equal allowances. Equal pay for equal work is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scale and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. Equal pay for equal work is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scale and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. In Tilak Raj (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the claim of equal pay for equal work by a daily wager quay the regular and permanent staff are not tenable. Since the daily wager holds no post and scale of pay is attached to a definite post, however, the State Government as directed to ensure that minimum wages are prescribed for daily wagers and the same to paid to them. While reversing the judgement of 2002 (2) SCT 349 (Punj & Har.), it was held in Tilak Raj (supra) as below:- "a scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily wager, he holds no posts. The respondent workers on daily wages in Haryana Roadways cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and allowances. To claim a relief on the, basis of equality, it is for the claimants to substantiate a clear cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination before becoming eligible to claim rights on a par with the other group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination. No material was placed before the High Court as to the nature of the duties of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the principle of `equal pay for equal work is an abstract one. However, the appellant-State has to ensure that minimum wages are prescribed for such workers and he same is paid to them. "equal pay for equal work is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scale. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. " 119. "equal pay for equal work is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scale. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. " 119. In State of U. P. v. J. P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that the principle of equal pay for equal work requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job requires may differ from job to job. It must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. The Supreme Court further observed that the principle of equal pay for equal work has no mechanical application in every case of similar work. In service matters merits and experience could be the proper basis for classification. The same view was expressed in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary, (1995) 5 SCC 210 . 120. In State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, 1997 (1) LBESR 479 (SC) : (1996) 11 SCC 77 , the Supreme Court observed that daily rated workmen could neither be equated with regular employees for the purpose of wages nor could, they claim the minimum pay scale of the regular employees. In paragraphs 10 and 11, it was noted as under: "10. The respondents, therefore, in the present appeals who are employed on daily wages cannot be treated as on a par with persons in regular service of the State of Haryana holding similar posts. Daily rated workers are not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers, nor do they have to fulfil the requirement relating to age at the time of recruitment. They are not selected in the manner in which regular employees are selected. In other words the requirements for selection are not as rigorous. There are also other provisions relating to regular service such as the liability of a member of the service to be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authorities as prescribed, which the daily-rated workmen are not subjected to. They cannot therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed. 11. They cannot therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed. 11. The High Court was, therefore, no right in directing that the respondents should be paid the same salary and allowances as are being paid to regular employees holding similar posts with effect from the dates when the respondents were employed. If a minimum wage is prescribed for such workers, the respondents would be entitled to it if it is more than what they are being paid. " 121. In State of Orissa v. Balram Sahu and others, 2003 (1) LBESR 993 (SC) : (2003) 1 SCC 250 , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of Jasmer Singh, (supra ). 122. In State Bank of India and another v. M. R. Ganesh Babu & others, JT 2002 (4) SC 129 : (2002) 4 SCC 456 : (2002) UPLBEC 1680, the Supreme Court observed that the principle of equal pay for equal work must depend upon the nature of work done arid it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. The functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion, which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. The Supreme Court in Para-16 has expressed that: "the principle of equal pay for equal work has been considered and applied in many reported decisions of this Court. The principle has been adequately explained and crystallized and sufficiently reiterated in 7 a catena of decisions of this Court. It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount. to discrimination. The principle is not always easy to apply as there are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations, or even in the same organization. Differentiation in pays scales of persons holding same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the post, and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value, judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the Court. " 123. In State of Tamil Nadu v. M. R. Alagappan, 1997 (2) LBESR 126 (All) : JT 1997 (4) SC 515, the Supreme Court observed that the Deputy Agricultural Officers cannot be given the same pay scale as the Agricultural Officers although they may be substantially discharging the same type of duties and their place of work may be interchangeable. The Deputy Agricultural Officers are recruited by promotion from the lower category of Assistant Agricultural Officer. They remain non-gazetted employees in the subordinate service while the Agricultural Officers are directly recruited to a gazetted service. The qualifications are different and though substantially they carry out the same type of work and duties, the important assignments are exclusively entrusted to Agricultural Officers. 124. They remain non-gazetted employees in the subordinate service while the Agricultural Officers are directly recruited to a gazetted service. The qualifications are different and though substantially they carry out the same type of work and duties, the important assignments are exclusively entrusted to Agricultural Officers. 124. In Chandigarh Administration v. Anita Sood, 1995 (Supp.) 3 SCC 613, the Supreme Court observed that even though the lecturers may be teaching the same subject as Professors the quality and standard of teaching by a Professor is bound to be a much higher standard than that of a lecturer and hence, a lecturer cannot claim the same pay scale as a Professor. Similarly, Teaching Assistant is a different class of Teacher as compared to Lecturer. 125. In State of West Bengal v. Manirujjaman Mullik and others, 1996 (2) LBESR 968 (SC) : (1996) 10 SCC 56 , the Supreme Court observed, that where the method of appointment, the source of recruitment, etc. are different the principle of equal pay for equal work will not apply. 126. In State of West Bengal v. D. K. Mukherjee, AIR 1995 SC 1889 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that even though the duties performed by the Inspectors in two grades may be the same no fault can be found with the classification, since the classification in the cadre on the ground of selection based on merit is permissible. 127. In State of Haryana v. Surendra Kumar, 1997 (2) LBESR 150 (SC) : (1997) SCC 633, the Supreme Court observed that the daily wagers were appointed, on contract basis and hence they cannot have any right to a post as such until they are duly selected and appointed, or they are able to manage to have the posts interchanged, they cannot become entitled to the same pay scale, which the regular clerks are holding by claiming that they are discharging their duties as regular employees. The very object of selection is to test the eligibility and then to make selection in accordance with the rules. Since, the respondents recruitments were not made in accordance with the rules they cannot claim equal pay. 128. The very object of selection is to test the eligibility and then to make selection in accordance with the rules. Since, the respondents recruitments were not made in accordance with the rules they cannot claim equal pay. 128. In Union of India v. P. V. Hariharan, 1997 (2) LBESR 684 (SC) : JT 1997 (3) SC 569, the Supreme Court observed, that the Tribunals are often interfering with pay scales without proper reason and without being conscious of the fact that fixation of pay is not their function. It is the function of the Government which normally acts on the recommendation of a Pay Commission. Change of pay scale of a category has a cascading effect. Several other categories similarly situated, as well as those situated above and below will put forward their claims on the basis of such change. The Tribunal should realise that interfering with the prescribed pay scale is a serious matter. The Pay Commission goes into the problem at great depth and it is the proper authority to decide upon the issue. Very often the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is also being misunderstood and misapplied freely revising and enhancing the pay scales across the board. 129. In State of U. P. v. Ramashraya Yadav, AIR 1996 SC 1188 , the Supreme Court observed that the employees appointed to temporary posts are not entitled to pay scale equivalent to the regular employees. 130. In Union of India v. Dharampal, 1996 (2) LBESR 75 (SC) : (1996) 4 SCC 195 , the Supreme Court gave of approval to the scheme framed by the authorities for regularization of Daily rated workers/casual workers and held "daily rated workers/casual workers who are not regularized and work is taken from them, are entitled to minimum of scale of pay prescribed for that post and in addition to that, they are also entitled to 60% of the D. A. on Punjab Pattern which is being followed in all others cases". 131. In A. Krishnamacharyulu v. Dr. Venketshwar Hindu College (Engineering), 1997 (3) SCC 571 , the Supreme Court was considering the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in respect of parity claimed by teachers, who were imparting education in non-Government institutions with the teachers of Government institutions. 131. In A. Krishnamacharyulu v. Dr. Venketshwar Hindu College (Engineering), 1997 (3) SCC 571 , the Supreme Court was considering the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in respect of parity claimed by teachers, who were imparting education in non-Government institutions with the teachers of Government institutions. The ratio of the decision in that case is that teachers, who impart education, get an element of public interest in performance of their duties and me element of public interest calls for regulating the conditions of services of those employees in juxtaposition with a Government employee. 132. To enforce his submissions, the learned Counsel for the petitioner placed credence on a decision in The Dharwad District P. W. D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and anothers v. State of Karnataka and another, 1990 (2) SLR 43 and State of U. P. v. Putti Lal, (2002) 2 UPLBEC 1595 (SC ). In Putti Lals case, the Supreme Court has directed to consider the case of regularization according to the relevant prevailing rules and for payment of minimum of the pay scale as applicable to their counter part in the Government until service of such daily wage employees are regularized. The other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel are Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar, 2001 (1) LBESR 1029 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 706 ; Jayanta Biswas v. University of Calcutta and others, 2001 (1) LBESR 253 (SC) : (2001)1 UPLBEC 74 and Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&t Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Majdoor Manch v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2342 , to hammer home the submissions aforestated. 133. In State of West Bengal and others v. Pantha Chatterjee and others, (2003) 6 SCC 469 , the Supreme Court was seized of the claim Part Time Border Wing Home Guards vis-a-vis regular Boarder Wing Home Guards of the West Bengal and the Border Security Force personnel. In the matter, it was claimed that the part time Border Wing Home Guards were performing similar duties and discharging same responsibilities. It was contended in that petition that the part time Border Wing Home Guards are entitled to the honorarium and they are to be paid only as and when their services are required and utilised. In the matter, it was claimed that the part time Border Wing Home Guards were performing similar duties and discharging same responsibilities. It was contended in that petition that the part time Border Wing Home Guards are entitled to the honorarium and they are to be paid only as and when their services are required and utilised. It was further claimed in opposition in that case, that their appointment was not to exceed for a period of more than three months except in cases where it was recommended otherwise by the authorities of the Border Security Force. It was noticed by the Supreme Court that duties of the permanent Border Wing Home Guards and part time Border Wing Home Guards are the same and performed under the same situation and circumstances but there has been disparity in their emoluments and other facilities, necessities for performing their duties. In the background of the facts of that case, it was held by the Supreme Court that the part time Border Wing Home Guards cannot be treated as volunteers engaged in casual nature of work so as to be termed as part time staff of Government of West Bengal and as such they cannot be treated differently from the permanent staff and are to be accorded parity with them. 134. In the case of Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&t Department v. Union of India and others, (1988) 1 SCC 122 , the Supreme Court reckoned with issue in question and indicated as order: "it may be true that the petitioners have not been regularly recruited but many of them have been working continuously for more than a year in the department and some of them have been engaged as casual labourers for nearly ten years. They are rendering the same kind of service, which is being rendered by the regular employees doing the same type of work. Clause (2) of Article 38 of the Constitution of India, which contains one of the Directive Principles of State Policy provides that the State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities s in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged indifferent vocations. Even though the above Directive Principle may not be enforceable as such by virtue of Article 37 of the Constitution of India, it may be relied upon by the petitioners to show that in the instant case they have been subjected to hostile discrimination. It is urged that the State cannot deny at least the minimum pay in the pay scales of regularly employed workmen even though the Government may not be compelled to extend all the benefits enjoyed by regularly recruited employees. We are of the view that such denial amounts to exploitation of labour. The Government cannot take advantage of its dominant position and compel any worker to work even as a casual labourer on starvation wages. It be that the casual labourer has agreed to work on such low wages. That he has done because he has no other choice. It is poverty that has driven him to that state. The Government should be a model employer. We are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the classification"of employees into regularly recruited employees and casual employees for the purpose of paying less than the minimum pay payable to employees in the corresponding regular cadres particularly in the lowest rungs of the department where the pay scales are the lower is not tenable. India is a socialist republic. It implies the existence of certain important obligations which the State has to discharge. The right to work, the right to free choice of employment, the right to just and favourable conditions of work, the right to protection against unemployment, the right of everyone who works to just and favourable remuneration ensuring a decent living for himself and his family, the right of every one without, discrimination of any kind to equal pay for equal work, the right to rest, leisure, reasonable limitation on working hours and periodic holidays with pay, the right to form trade unions and the right to joint trade unions of ones choice and the right to security of work are some of the rights which have to be ensured by appropriate legislative and executive measures. It is true that all these rights cannot be extended simultaneously. But they do indicate the socialist goal. It is true that all these rights cannot be extended simultaneously. But they do indicate the socialist goal. The degree of achievement in this direction depends upon the economic resources, willingness of the people to produce and more than all the existence of industrial peace throughout the country. Of those rights (the question of security of work is of utmost importance. If a person does not have the feeling that he belongs to an organization engaged in production he will not put forward his best effort to produce more. That sense of belonging arises only when he feels that he will not be turned out of employment the next day at the whim of the management. It is for this reason it is being repeatedly observed by those who are in charge of economic affairs of the countries in different parts of the world that as far as possible security of work should be assured to the employees 1 as that they my contribute to the maximization of production. It is again for this reason that managements and the Governmental agencies in particular should not allow workers to remain as casual labourers or temporary employees for an unreasonably long period of time. . . . . . " 135. The ratio flowing from the Dharwad case as followed in the case of Pantha Chhatterjee and others (Supra) can usefully be applied for the facts of the present case as contended for and on behalf of the petitioner (s ). The aforesaid decision was rendered noticing a three Judges Bench decision in Ranahir Singh v. Union of India and others, (1982) 1 SCC 618 ; Dhirendra Chamoli and another v. State of U. P. , (1986) 1 SCC 637 ; Surinder Singh and another v. Engineer in Chief, C. P. W. D. and others, (1986) 1 SCC 634 ; Bhagwan Dass and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1987) 4 SCC 634 and Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&t Department (supra ). Yet another case noticed in this decision in U. P. Income Tax Department contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India and others, (1987) Suppl SCC 668. It is in the above conspectus that the Supreme Court gave directions of paying minimum of the pay scale. It is a well considered decision after analyzing all the aspects on the point. It is in the above conspectus that the Supreme Court gave directions of paying minimum of the pay scale. It is a well considered decision after analyzing all the aspects on the point. This three Judges Bench decision held good the ratio by applying the principles of equal pay for equal work that those daily wagers discharging duties similar to those in the regular employment of the Government should at least be entitled to receive the minimum of the pay scale. In Putti Lals case, the ratio in that case flowed from the background that the State of Uttaranchal had framed a scheme for regularization of daily wagers. 136. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Supreme Court has noticed in its decision the case of Jasmer Singh (supra), where the direction was that pending regularisation, the daily wage employees are entitled to get minimum of the wages and also referred to various other cases including Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary (supra) in fortifying his stand that the petitioners are not entitled to minimum of the pay scales. The learned Counsel in reference has submitted that the aforestated decisions being the latest in the series could be followed for application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel again harking back to the decision in Tilak Raj (supra) canvassed that in this decision, all the earlier authoritative pronouncements including one rendered in Jasmer Singhs case has been noted in which the Supreme Court has analyzed the ratio decidendi flowing from all the earlier decisions. It was further canvassed that there is noticeable difference between the functions being performed by daily wage employees and regularly appointed persons and by this reckoning, threadbare formula cannot be applied and therefore, it was submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to get minimum of the pay scales. The learned Counsel also drew attention of the Court to a decision in M. R. Ganesh Babu (supra), which is a three Judges Bench decision in which the Supreme Court reiterated the principles that the equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done and it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. It was further observed that functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. 137. It was further observed that functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. 137. Three Judges Bench decisions in Putti Lal (supra), Randhir Singh (supra) and in Dharwad case (supra) cases referred by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The Randhir Singhs case has been followed in number of cases and has been affirmed by yet another Constitution Bench in D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 2 SCR 165 and subsequently, the principles laid down in Randhir Singhs case were observed with approval in Dharwad case. The two Judge Bench decision in Jasmer Singh (supra) has been rendered in conflict with Randhir Singhs case, which was followed by Constitution Bench in D. S. Nakaras case and subsequently in Dharwad and Putti Lals case on the point whether the daily rated employees are entitled to minimum of the wages or minimum of the pay. In Randhir Singh (supra) it was observed as under:- "it is true that principles of `equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims `equal pay for equal work for both men and women as a Directive Principle of State Policy. `equal pay for equal work for both men and women means equal for pay and equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter, of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular, governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people; of this country untouched. Question concerning wages and the like, munhdane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality, clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. Construing Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d), we are of the view that the principle `equal pay for equal work is deducible for those articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. " 138. In U. P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India and others, (1987) Suppl. SCC 668, the Supreme Court having regard to the principles as laid down in P&t Department case aforestated, gave following relief in the ultimate analysis. 3 "we accordingly allow this writ petition and direct the respondents to pay workmen who are employed as the contingent paid staff of the Income Tax Department throught out India, doing the work of Class IV employees at the rates equivalent to the minimum pay in the pay scale of the regularly employed workers in the corresponding cadres. . . . . . "139. The Dhanvad case (supra) has been rendered noticing the principles in the aforestated case. . . . . . "139. The Dhanvad case (supra) has been rendered noticing the principles in the aforestated case. It was a three Judges Bench decision dealing with the case of confirmation of daily rated and monthly rated employees as a regularly Government servants and for payment of normal salary at the rates prescribed for the appropriate categories of the Government servants and other service benefits. It was pleaded in that case that about 50,000 such workers were employed in the different Government establishments and though many of them have put in 16 to 20 years of continuous service which is proof of the fact that there is permanent need for the jobs they perform they have not been regularized in their service and were not being paid equal pay for equal work as has been mandated by this Court by way of implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy. 140. In Jaipal and others etc. v. State of Haryana and others etc. , (1998) 3 SCC 354, the Supreme Court held it to be a constitutional obligation to ensure equal pay for equal work where the two sets, of employees discharge similarly responsibilities under similar working conditions. According to Dhirendra Chamoli (supra) casual workers could not be denied same emoluments and benefits as admissible to temporary employees on the premises that they had acquiesced to the employment with full knowledge of their disadvantage. In Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of India and others, (1991) 1 SCC 619 , the Supreme Court has held that though on facts no discrimination was found but the principle of equal pay for equal work was upheld and recognized where all were placed similarly and discharging same duties and responsibilities irrespective of casual nature of work. This right had been held to have assumed status of a fundamental right of equality in Articles 14 and 16. In Daily Rated Casual Labour through Bhamya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India and others, (1988) 1 SCC 122 , the substance of what was held by the Supreme Court was that right of daily rated casual workers in the P&t Department was recognized and they were directed to be paid in minimum of the scale as was admissible to the regular workers as both discharged similar work responsibilities. 141. 141. In 2004 (1) LBESR 391 (All) : (2004) 1 UPLBEC 721 , Praveen Kumar v. The State of U. P. through the Secretary, Nagar Vikas Government of U. P. Lucknow and others, this Court (Honble S. N. Srivastava. J.) has observed that daily wage employees, who had worked for more than 12 years in various Nagar Nigams/nagar Palika Parishads, are entitled for regularisation and minimum of pay scales pending their regularisation qua regular employees and directions were issued for creation of posts for regularisation. 4 142. In 2003 (2) LBESR 217 (SC) : (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1755, Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology and another v. Manoj K. Mohanty, the Supreme Court relying on the decisions in Jasmer Singh (supra), M. R. Ganesh Babu (supra) and Pradip Kumar Dey (supra) has held that the writ petitioner employed in the university on temporary basis as a typist continued for more than five years with an artificial break while working as Junior Assistant was not entitled for regularisation by applying principle of equal pay for equal work and in the said case the Supreme Court in para 11 observed as under: - "11. This Court in Union of India and others v. Pradip Kumar Dey, 2001 (1) LBESR 556 (SC) : (2000) 8 SCC 580 : JT 2000 (S2) SC 449, after referring to various decisions dealing with the similar question in Para 8 has held thus- "in our considered view, the Division Bench of the High Court was not right and justified in straightway giving direction to grant pay scale to the respondent when there was no material placed before the Court for comparison in order to apply the principle of "equal pay for equal work" between the radio operators of CRPF and the radio operators working in civil side in the central water commission and the directorate of police wireless. In the absence of material relating to other comparable employees as to the qualifications, method of recruitment, degree of skill, experience involved in the performance of job, training required responsibilities undertaken and other facilities in addition to pay scales, the learned Single Judge was right when he stated in the order that in the absence of such material it was not possible to grant relief to the respondent. No doubt, the directorate of CRPF made recommendation to the Pay Commission for giving higher pay scales on the basis of which claim is made by the respondent for grant of pay scale. The factual statements contained in the recommendation of a particular department alone cannot be considered per se proof of such things or then cannot by themselves vouch for the correctness of the same. The said recommendation could not be taken as a recommendation made by the Government. Even otherwise a mere recommendation did not confer any right on the respondent to make such a claim for writ of mandamus. " 143. This Court (D. B.) in (2004) 1 UPLBEC 77 , (State of U. P. and others v. U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and others, has held that writ petitioners while working as daily wagers for several years could not claim same pay scale as regular Class-Ill employees nor other benefits admissible to other regular employees and for regularisation the daily wagers have to face regular selection in accordance with the rules as they cannot be regularised without such selection, and in said case this Court in para 47 has held as under:- "47. No doubt in certain decisions the Courts have given directions for regularising daily wagers or casual/temporary employees but in our opinion such directions do not amount to a precedent vide Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Raja Balwant Singh College, 2003 (1) ESC 424; Delhi Administration v. Manoharlal, AIR 2002 SC 3088 , etc. What is a binding precedent is a principle of law, which has been laid down in a decision of the Court and a mere direction without laying down any principle of law not a precedent. A case is an authority for what it actually decides vide Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781 ; Sreemvasa General Traders v. State of A. P. , AIR 1983 SC 1246 (Para 29); Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 (Paragraphs 9 and 10); M/s Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1985 SC 218 , etc. Everything in a decision is not a precedent vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080. " 144. I have heard learned Counsels for the parties. Everything in a decision is not a precedent vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080. " 144. I have heard learned Counsels for the parties. The existence of posts and vacancies are necessary and for making appointment the candidates are to be invited from the open market and proper selection committee has to be constituted and after undergoing the procedure prescribed for selection, if necessary by written test, type/steno-typing test and interview the selection, list has to be prepared keeping in view the reservation policy and a proper order has to be issued in writing after medical verification. However the appointment of a daily wager is made by back door entry and it is not made against any post and the same is made on contractual basis without observing norms, rules and regulations prescribed for daily wagers. The deployment of daily wager commences in the morning and comes to an end in the evening. The contractual deployment of daily wager is for each day and the daily wagers, who have been continuously working for a considerable number of years, may be considered for regularisation only when the rules or scheme are provided by any department of the State Government or the employer. In the present case, undisputedly there is no rule for regularisation and the petitioner like other cadidates was not participate in the recruitment/selection of the Stenographer as indicated in the advertisement No. 6/98 published on 10-8-1998. Since the petitioner had failed to participate, she cannot turn back and claim for regularisation and cannot challenge the advertisement and is not entitled to any show cause notice for observance of principle of natural justice and the inquiry shall not be necessary while discontinuing the deployment of the daily wager. The observance of the provisions of Article 311 (2), the Constitution is not of applicable in absence of fund and non-renewal of the contractual deployment of daily wagers is not retrenchment or fatal or illegal. In view of the above observations, no relief as prayed for can be granted to the petitioner, therefore, writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .