Judgment 1. The appellant filed this appeal in person. By order dated 13.9.2004, Mr. Abbas Haider was appointed as counsel Amicus Curiae to appear for the appellant in the present case. He appears alongwith the appellant in person in support of the appeal. 2. The defendant is the appellant against a judgment of affirmance in an eviction suit. It is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.2003, passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Ara, in Title Appeal No. 31 of 2002 (Mastan Khan V/s. Mohammad Islam), whereby the appeal preferred by the defendant (the appellant herein) was dismissed, and upheld the judgment and decree dated 2.5.2002, passed by the learned Munsif III, Ara, in Eviction Suit No. 3 of 1994 (Mohammad Islam V/s. Mastan Khan). The suit for eviction was decreed and upheld in appeal. We shall go by the description of the parties occurring in the plaint. 3. According to the plaint, the defendant (the appellant) was inducted as a tenant in November 1992 on monthly rental of Rs. 150/- per month. The defendant fell in arrears regarding payment of rent which led to institution of the suit on the twin grounds of default in payment of rent and personal necessity. On the other hand, the case of the defendant as per the written statement was that he was not inducted by the plaintiff, but was in fact inducted by one Nizamuddin in 1990 on monthly rental of Rs. 50/-. He, therefore, denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff defendant. The defendants further case was that he never fell in arrears regarding payment of rent and also denied the plaintiffs case based on personal necessity. The learned trial court framed the following issues for adjudication: LOCAL LANGUAGE 4. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. The suit, as stated hereinabove, was decreed on contest. The learned trial court held that the defendant had fallen in arrears, and also held that the plaintiff needs the suit property reasonably and bona fide for personal necessity. Aggrieved by this judgment, the defendant appealed which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. The learned court of appeal below has recorded its findings to the aforesaid effect. Hence this appeal at the instance of the defendant. 5. Aggrieved by this judgment, the defendant appealed which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. The learned court of appeal below has recorded its findings to the aforesaid effect. Hence this appeal at the instance of the defendant. 5. While assailing the validity of the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the defendant (the appellant) submits that the learned court of appeal below has rested his judgment entirely on the first information report lodged by the defendant against the plaintiff in so far as the question of title to the property is concerned. The question raised by learned counsel for the defendant is entirely in the domain of appreciation of evidence. On a consideration of the materials on record, the learned court of appeal below has rejected the defendants case and has held that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Learned counsel for the defendant (appellant) submits that the suit can be instituted only by the owner of the property which, according to the defendant, the plaintiff is not. The contention also overlooks the definition, of landlord occurring in Section 2(f) or the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction Control Act, which is set but hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "2. (f) "landlord" includes the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant." It is manifest from a plain reading of the definition of landlord that it is very wide and includes the person who receives rent of a building on his own account or on behalf of another. 6. No other contention has been advanced on behalf of the defendant (appellant). 7. The issues are concluded by concurrent findings of facts which bind this Court in second appellate jurisdiction. Reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3325 (Hari Singh V/s. Kanhaiya Lal). 6. No other contention has been advanced on behalf of the defendant (appellant). 7. The issues are concluded by concurrent findings of facts which bind this Court in second appellate jurisdiction. Reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3325 (Hari Singh V/s. Kanhaiya Lal). The following portion of paragraph-16 of the judgment may be usefully quoted: "Similarly, the High Court interfered with the concurrent finding of facts that nuisance was created by the respondent by obstructing the passage leading to the appellant house by keeping onion bags leaving out of space of 11 feet to 3 feet only. The fact of this obstruction is also supported by the Commissioner report submitted in the present proceedings. The finding recorded on sub-letting and nuisance by both the courts below being based on evidence on record its setting aside by reappraisal of evidence, and in any case without framing any substantial question of law by the High Court cannot be sustained and further we also do not find any substantial question of law arising therein. Learned counsel for the respondent tried to submit with force by attempting to take us to the evidence of the witnesses to show their unworthiness for reliance. It is neither a case of no evidence nor perverse finding. All these submissions are within the realm of appreciation of evidence which should not have been interfered by the High Court far less for us to examine." 8 Reference may also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1999)3 S.C.C. 722 (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam V/s. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others), paragraph 5 of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous, being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence." 9. It is manifest from the foregoing discussion that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The issues which may be taken to be a substantial question of law in second appellate jurisdiction fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 965 (Santosh Hazari V/s. Purushottam Tiwari), the relevant portion of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference. "A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any list." 10. I had the occasion to apply the same in my judgment reported in 2003(3) P.L.J.R. 100 (Sheo Chand Choudhary Alias Sheochan Choudhary V/s. Adalat Hussain and others). The judgment of the Supreme Court in {1999)3 S.C.C. 722 (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam V/s. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others) is illuminating and is to the same effect. 11. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 12. As stated hereinabove, the appellant had appeared in person on 13.9.04 and it had appeared to me that he may not be able to render effective assistance to this Court, his cause may suffer and needs legal aid. Therefore, Mr. Abbas Haider, learned counsel, was appointed Amicus Curiae who has today rendered assistance to this Court. In that view of the matter, the Secretary, Patna High Court Council of Legal Aid & Advice, is directed to pay a sum of Rs.5000/- (five thousand) to Mr. Abbas Haider for having rendered assistance to this Court in this appeal. 13. Let a copy of this order be handed over to Mr. Abbas Haider, Advocate. Forward copy of the order to the District Judge.