ORDER T. Vaiphei, J. 1. These two applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed by the State-Appellants for condoning a delay of 70 days in presenting the connected writ appeals based on identical facts are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. It may be noted that the impugned judgment and order was delivered on 21.3.2003, a certified copy whereof was obtained by the State-Appellants on 27.3.2003 and that the period of limitation for filing the writ appeal got expired on 27.4.2003. Yet, the Appellants managed to present the appeal only on 4.7.2003. At the very outset, we are constrained to observe that of late, there is a tendency on the part of the Government Departments to take for granted the matter of condonation of delay in view of the liberal approach made by the superior Courts on the ground of the impersonal nature of functioning of the Government. No urgency appears to have been accorded to Court cases perhaps on the misconceived notion on the part of the concerned officials that even inordinate delay would be condoned at the mere asking. This is unfortunate. The very object of enacting the Law of limitation is being frustrated. 3. It is against the backdrop of the above observations that we now proceed to examine the case of the Appellants. According to the Appellants, after obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment, the matter was sent to the Finance Department for examination on 28.3.2003. On 29.3.2003, the Finance Commissioner referred the File to the Law Department for its opinion on the feasibility of preferring an appeal from the judgment and order. On 3.4.2003, the Law Department gave its opinion and sent the File back to the Finance Department, which ultimately placed the File before the Minister of Finance on 21.4.2003. The Hon'ble Minister on 21.4.2003 directed that the matter be placed before the learned Advocate General for his opinion on the matter. The Ld. Advocate General gave his opinion on 5.5.2003 advising that an appeal be preferred. Thereafter, the File was placed again before the Hon'ble Minister, who gave the approval for appeal. On 15.5.2003, the File was eventually made over to the learned Counsel for preferring the appeal. It is stated that since two appeals were being preferred against a common judgment, the Ld. Counsel had to prepare two memos of appeal and 4 connected Misc. Thereafter, the File was placed again before the Hon'ble Minister, who gave the approval for appeal. On 15.5.2003, the File was eventually made over to the learned Counsel for preferring the appeal. It is stated that since two appeals were being preferred against a common judgment, the Ld. Counsel had to prepare two memos of appeal and 4 connected Misc. applications and took considerable time for preparing the same. However, it is again stated that their Counsel and his family were ill due to viral fever between 19.5.2003 and 27.5.2003, which incapacitated him from studying the File. On 9.6.2003, the draft Memos were sent to the Finance Department for completing the formalities such as vetting by the Law Department. It would appear that from 9.6.2003 to 18.6.2003, the matter was pushed back and forth within the Secretariat. Thereafter, the Joint Secretary took his own time in modifying the memos of appeals as per the advice of the Law Department and managed to send the File to their Counsel only on 30.6.2003 this Court was obviously closed on vacation from 21.6.2003 to 1.7.2003. So, according to the Appellants, delay inevitably occurred in the process, and the appeals could be filed only on 4.7.2003. The Appellants contend that they have satisfactorily explained the delay and as such, the delay ought to be condoned. 4. The Respondents filed their written objection against the said application and seriously disputed the claim made on behalf of the State-Appellants. The Respondents contend that no satisfactory explanation was given by the Appellants as to why it took 18 long days i.e. from 3.4.2003 to 21.4.2003 to place the matter before the Hon'ble Minister of Finance. They also submitted that no explanation was offered by the Appellants as to why it took another 15 days for referring the matter to the Ld. Advocate General. They also questioned the necessity for moving the File from one office to another simply for referring the matter to the Ld. Advocate General. The Respondents also, in particular, questioned the explanation of delay for the following periods viz. 19.5.2003 to 27.5.2003, 27.5.2003 to 9.6.2003, 9.5.2003 to 4.7.2003. Accordingly, they prayed that the application be dismissed for lack of sufficient cause. 5. The scope of discretion of Court in condoning delay in filing appeal by Government was enunciated by the Apex Court in G. Ramegowda v. Spl. 19.5.2003 to 27.5.2003, 27.5.2003 to 9.6.2003, 9.5.2003 to 4.7.2003. Accordingly, they prayed that the application be dismissed for lack of sufficient cause. 5. The scope of discretion of Court in condoning delay in filing appeal by Government was enunciated by the Apex Court in G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition (1988) 2 SCC 142 , which reads thus: The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities, Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for the purposes of Section 5 it might be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, those factors which are peculiar to and somewhat characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Implicit in the nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning of course, within a reasonable limit-is necessary. It would be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. (emphasis ours) From the above para, it is thus obvious that in a particular factual scenario such as fraud or bad faith, Courts are expected to and must give somewhat liberal consideration to the Government in their prayer for condonation of delay. But this does not mean that the Government is given the licence to ignore the law of limitation, for the Apex Court also held in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (1997) 7 SCC 556 , that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. In other words, the State is not exempted from showing sufficient cause for condonation of delay. However, it is not necessary that the discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. In other words, the State is not exempted from showing sufficient cause for condonation of delay. However, it is not necessary that the discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat (1981) 1 SCC 495 , the Apex Court held that where a party allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some events or circumstance arising before limitation expired, it is not possible to file the appeal within time and that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. 6. The period of limitation for filing a writ appeal is 30 days from the date of judgment. Therefore, the State-Appellant must file the appeals within this period. They obtained a certified copy of the judgment on 27.3.2003. The Law Department gave its opinion promptly on 03.04.2003 but it is not understood as to why the matter reached the Hon'ble Minister of Finance only on 21.4.2003 when all concerned are functioning within the same Secretariat even though it is a common knowledge that the writ appeals were to be filed on or before 27.4.2003. Apart from making omnibus statement, no satisfactory explanation was offered by the State-Appellants. The State-Appellants are not expected to fall into slumber and wait for the expiry of the period of limitation. Lack of serious efforts to file the writ appeals looms large. Again, no evidence of promptness is also found in the activities of the officials of the Appellants for the period between 5.5.2003 and 27.5.2003. No evidence was produced to show that the Counsel for the Appellants was ill during that period. Though this Court cannot and do not insist upon day to day explanation of the delay of 70 days, so-called day to day explanations offered by the Appellants in these Cases only unmask a desperate attempt to sweep their patent lapses under the carpet. The draft memos of appeals, etc. were ready by 9.6.2003 but it again took 25 more days to file the appeals. The draft memos of appeals, etc. were ready by 9.6.2003 but it again took 25 more days to file the appeals. As observed earlier, no urgency or due importance appeared to have been given to Court cases on the mis-conceived and ill-conceived notion that as a repository of public interest, help would be on the way from Court. It appears that no attempt was ever made for inter-departmental meetings or conference for a case of this nature to shorten the decision making process or to finalise the matter on table. The explanations offered by the Appellants are superficially attractive but do not hold water on deeper consideration. If these applications for condonation are allowed on such superficial explanations, it will have the effect of obliterating the Law of limitation from the statute book. 7. For what has been stated above, we are of the view that the Appellants have not furnished satisfactory explanation for the delay. In the result, both the applications for condonation of delay stand dismissed. No order as to cost. Petition dismissed