Judgment ( 1. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, I am of the considered opinion, that petition has no substance. ( 2. ) INDEED, the issue involved in this case has to be decided keeping in view the general observations made by Their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1236 , which reads as follows :- "para 10. Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is not launched upon an ambitious programme of all round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as "asian Tigers", e. g. , South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognized on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is owe fully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernization. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in Courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 - indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even by open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceeding is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the Courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings. " ( 3. ) WHEN I examine the facts of the case and challenge made to notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act then I find absolutely no merit in the challenge so made. The impugned Notification (Annexure P-l) issued by the State on 4-4-2003 under Section 4 of the Land acquisition Act is sought to be assailed essentially or rather only on the ground of vagueness. In other words, the grievance of the petitioner whose land is sought to be acquired alongwith several others is that the Notification in question does not give the description of land and other information in relation to public purpose in detail and hence in view of law laid down by Supreme court in the case of Mohammad Shaft, 1992 JLJ 331 , the impugned Notification is liable to be quashed on the ground of vagueness. As observed supra, I find no merit in this submission. ( 4. ) MERE perusal of impugned Notification (Annexure P-l) would indicate that it does contain the necessary details as required under Section 4 ibid. As observed supra, I find no merit in this submission. ( 4. ) MERE perusal of impugned Notification (Annexure P-l) would indicate that it does contain the necessary details as required under Section 4 ibid. Indeed, learned Counsel could not point out to me the exact material which is needed to be mentioned in the Notification when issued under Section 4 and the same being not present in the Notification assailed in this petition except to use the expression "vagueness" in his submission. In order to assail a particular Notification issued under Section 4 ibid successfully on the strength of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Shaft, it is necessary rather obligatory upon the writ petitioner, i. e. , a person affected by the Notification to specifically point out an infirmity in the Notification which renders the Notification bad in law or in violation of requirement of section 4 ibid. In other words, the infirmity sought to be relied on for quashing the Notification must be such that it goes to the very root of the Notification. ( 5. ) THE infirmity must be fatal to the very existence of Notification. Mere technical infirmity which does not in substance affect the very existence of Section 4 Notification can not be made a ground to strike down the notification. In my humble view the law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Shafi has to be understood and applied with this approach because it was laid down on the facts as involved in that particular case. In other words, the law laid down in Shafts case will have application only in relation to those cases where the Notifications which fell for consideration in that case and that the one assailed are almost same. Since in Shafts case Their lordships on facts found several infirmities in the acquisition which eventually culminated in issuance of Section 4 Notification, it in the opinion of Their lordships was not sustainable in law. In my considered opinion, the impugned notification which is subject matter of this writ can not be equated with the notification that fell for interpretation in Shafts case. ( 6. ) THE impugned Notification mentions the public purpose. The purpose mentioned in the Notification is public purpose for the purpose of acquiring any land. It is needed for expansion of Mandi. ( 6. ) THE impugned Notification mentions the public purpose. The purpose mentioned in the Notification is public purpose for the purpose of acquiring any land. It is needed for expansion of Mandi. It then mentions the approximate land needed for acquisition (8. 682 Hectares ). It then resides the place where the land is situated, i. e. , Biaora. What more information is needed while issuing a Notification under Section 4 of the Act than the one mentioned in the impugned Notification for its sustaining. ( 7. ) IN my opinion, thus, the challenge made in the petition is for the sake of making having no merit whatsoever. It is much more so when I keep the aforementioned observation in mind. The public cause has to prevail as against the individual injury in the larger interest of public. The technical issues even though successfully made out can not be upheld to strike down any notification though in the facts of this case no technical issue exists. ( 8. ) TO conclude, the petition has no merit. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Writ Petition dismissed.