Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 20.9.1993 (Annexure-3), passed by the Principal, Consolidation Training Institute, Patna, in Revision Case No. 248 of 1988 (Shrikant Pandey and others V/s. Shyam Dulari Devi and others), and Revision Case No. 249 of 1988 (Shrikant Pandey and others V/s. Shyam Dulari Devi and others), in purported exercise of powers under Section 35 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (herinafter referred to as the Act), whereby he allowed the revision applications of respondent nos. 4 to 6 herein, has set aside the orders of the learned first authority and the appellate authority, and held that the petitioner is not the daughter of Hari Narain Tiwari and Pawdhari Devi. 2. According to the writ petition, the following genealogy of the parties is relevant in the present context : 3. Hari Narain Tiwari and Jeev Narain Tiwari were the two sons of Mani Tiwari. The petitioner claims to be the daughter of Hari Narain Tiwary and Pawdhari Devi. He (Hari Narain Tiwari) is said to have died in the year 1956. It is further stated in the writ petition that Jeev Narain Tiwari was a reasonable and considerate person and there was no problem in the family so long he was alive. After death in 1986, respondent no. 6 (Most. Asharfi Kuer, widow of Jeev Narain Tiwari) started alienating the properties. Soon thereafter the petitioner had taken steps for mutation of the lands in question which was allowed and maintained up to the level of Commissioner as per his order dated 27.6.1989, passed in Revision Case No. 119 of 1989. The consolidation operations were going on in the area and the petitioner submitted her claim with the prayer to record the lands in question in her name, being the sole surviving heir of her parents. The same was allowed by order dated 27.6.1987, (Annexure-1), passed in Case No. 2 of 1987-88 under Section 10(B) of the Act. This gave rise to two appeals at the instance of the private respondents which were rejected by order dated 2.12.1987 (Annexure-2/1), passed on Appeal No. 471 of 1987-88 (Most. Asharafi Kuwar V/s. Shyam Dulari Devi), and order dated 30.11.1987 (Annexure-2), and the analogous Appeal No. 472 of 1987-88 (Most, Asharfi Kuwar V/s. Shyam Dulari Devi). This gave rise to two appeals at the instance of the private respondents which were rejected by order dated 2.12.1987 (Annexure-2/1), passed on Appeal No. 471 of 1987-88 (Most. Asharafi Kuwar V/s. Shyam Dulari Devi), and order dated 30.11.1987 (Annexure-2), and the analogous Appeal No. 472 of 1987-88 (Most, Asharfi Kuwar V/s. Shyam Dulari Devi). Aggrieved by the orders, the private respondents preferred two revision applications which were allowed by the impugned order dated 20.9.1993 (Annexure-3), the orders of the learned first authority and the learned appellate authority have been set aside and it has, inter alia, been held that the petitioner is not the daughter of Hari Narain Tiwary and Pawdhari Devi. Hence this revision application at the instance of the petitioner. 4. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Principal of the Consolidation Training Institute cannot ex-ercise revisional powers under Section 35 of the Act in view of the scheme of the Act and the judgment reported in 2002(3) P.L.J.R. 633 (Rajdeo Rai and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others). He next submits that the learned first authority and the appellate authority have held that the petitioner is the daughter of Hari Narain Tiwari and Pawdhari Devi which, being issue of facts, cannot be set aside by the learned revisional authority in view of the scope of Section 35 of the Act. He relies on the following judgments: (1) 1994(3) J.T. 341 =1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 198 (Ram Dular V/s. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others); (2) 1974 P.L.J.R. 27 (Nand Kumar Rai and others V/s. State of Bihar and others); (3) 2001 (1) P.L.J.R. 266 (Ramotar Yadav and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others); (4) 1996(2) P.L.J.R. 890 (Kailash Rai and others V/s. The Joint Director of Consolidation, Bihar, Patna and others); (5) 1996(2) P.L.J.R. 924 (Jagu Mallah and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others); (6) 1978 B.B.C.J. (SC) 12 (Thakur Das (dead) by R.Rs V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh); (7)1989 P.LJ.R. 1203 (FB) Kalika Kuar alias Kalika Singh V/s. The State of Bihar and others); (8) A.I.R. 2003 SC 2443 [: 2003(3) PLJR (SC)76] (State of Bihar V/s. Kalika Kuer alias Kalika Singh and others); (9) 1979 BBCJ 259 (FB) (Ram Krit Singh and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others). 4.1) He next submits that the record of rights neither creates nor extinguishes rights. He relies on the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1974 P.LJ.R. 27 (Nand Kumar Rai & others V/s. State of Bihar and others. (supra). Relying on the provisions of Section 19 of the Bihar Tenants Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, he submits that mutation of the land in question has been made in favour of the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 4 to 6 has supported the impugned order. 6. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. In so far as the petitioners first contention is concerned, Section-35 of the Act provides for the forum of revision which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "35. Revision and reference.-The Director of Consolidation may of his own motion or on the application of any party or on reference being made by any subordinate authority, call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by such authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceeding; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, and may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. The Director of Consolidation is defined in Section 2(4) of the Act and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "2(4) "Director of Consolidation" means the officer appointed as such by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the duties of Director of Consolidation under this Act or the rules made thereunder and shall include an Additional Director of Consolidation and a Joint Director of Consolidation" 6.1) These provisions have been the subject matter of a number of judgments of this Court one of which has been relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has been held in Rajdeo Rai V/s. The State of Bihar (supra) that the power of revision is primarily that of the Director of Consolidation which includes the Additional Director of Consolidation and Joint Director of Consolidation. It has further been observed that an appeal or revision lies before a superior authority, and a review lies before the same authority. It has further been observed that an appeal or revision lies before a superior authority, and a review lies before the same authority. It is, however, nowhere stated in the writ petition that the Principal of the institute in question is an officer below the rank of Joint Director of Consolidation. The requisite factual foundation has not been laid in the writ petition. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that he is Coram Non Judice in so far as the revisional power under Section 35 of the Act is concerned. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 7. It appears to me that the primary issue in this writ petition is whether or not the petitioner is the daughter of Hari Narain Tiwari and Pawdhari Devi. It, therefore, calls for declaration of status, whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the legal character that she claims. In my view, this is covered by Section-34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation.A trustee of property is a person interested to deny" a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee. 7.1) Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act or the previous enactment has been the subject matter of a large number of judgments. The expression "legal character, and "right to any property" have been used in the section disjunctively and not conjunctively so as to entitle the plaintiff to declaration on the exclusive basis of either the one or the other. Again the word "legal" before the word "character" is also not without significance. It signifies the status in society of the person seeking declaration. Again the word "legal" before the word "character" is also not without significance. It signifies the status in society of the person seeking declaration. Whether a man is a legitimate son of another, whether he is the adoptive father of another, whether he has legally married a particular woman or whether by virtue of his relationship with a particular family he is entitled to a certain privilege and concession are instances of questions involving his "legal character" within the meaning of the section and if he finds a danger or entertains any fear of a challenge to his status as such, he may surely seek relief in a court of law (Bhoop Singh V/s. Tarif Singh, A.I.R. 1952 All. 392 at p. 395). The legal character and position of each may be differentiated. According to Holland, the Chief varieties of status among natural persons may be referred to the following causes: (1) sex, (2) minority, (3) Patria Potestas and Manus, (4) coverture, (5) celibacy, (6) mental defect, (7) bodily defect, (8) rank, caste and official position, (9) slavery, (10) profession, (11) civil death, (12) illegitimacy, (13) heresy, (14) foreign nationality, and (15) hostile nationality (Dr. Banerjis Tagore Law Lectures, 2nd Ed., pp. 490-91; Hollands Jurisprudence at p.309). The conditions which would justify the Court in granting a declaration under this section are: (1) the plaintiff must be entitled to a legal character at the time of the suit, or (2) to a right to property, (3) the defendant should have denied these, or be interested in denying this character of right, and (4) the plaintiff should not be in a position to ask for relief consequential upon the declaration sought. Even if the plaintiff has had a present existing right, no cause of action accrues to him until there is some infringement or threatened infringement of his right. In other words, a cloud must be cast on his title before he can ask for its removal. He must allege and prove hostility on the part of the defendant, for no court will move on merely speculative grounds. 8. Section-37A of the Act provides that the authorities under this Act shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction while hearing objection or appeal or deciding disputes under this Act. He must allege and prove hostility on the part of the defendant, for no court will move on merely speculative grounds. 8. Section-37A of the Act provides that the authorities under this Act shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction while hearing objection or appeal or deciding disputes under this Act. Section-40 of the Act gives to the State Government to make rules for effective implementation of the aims and objects of, and proper exercise of the powers conferred by, the Act. Section-37 of the Act is non- obstante clause and provides that no civil court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Section-39 of the Act provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being inforce. 9. Section-9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except either expressly or impliedly barred. Law is well settled by a long line cases of high authority that civil suit is the basic remedy of a citizen in this country for adjudication of civil disputes unless barred by a specialised enactment. The circumstances under which a particular issue can be agitated in a civil court in view of such non-obstante clause has been the subject-matter of a long line cases of high authority. I had the occasion to deal with this issue in my judgment reported in 2003(3) P.L.J.R. 100 (Sheo Chand Chaudhary alias Sheochan Chaudhary V/s. Adalat Hussain and others), wherein I recapitulated the leading judgments of the Supreme Court and other High Courts. 10. The leading judgment of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. V/s. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and others reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2238 : (1976)1 S.C.C. 496 is illuminating, paragraph 23 of which is relevant in the present context and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "23. 10. The leading judgment of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. V/s. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and others reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2238 : (1976)1 S.C.C. 496 is illuminating, paragraph 23 of which is relevant in the present context and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "23. To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute may be state thus: (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." 11. In the present case, the question whether or not the petitioner is the daughter of Hari Narain Tiwary and Pawdhari Devi is entirely a question of declaration of legal character and status within the meaning of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Such a legal character does not flow from the provisions of the Act. It is not a dispute which arises under the provisions of the Act, nor does it involve enforcement of any other right under the Act. It is obviously covered by the first clause of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. (supra). Therefore, the petition- ers remedy lies in the civil court. In that view of the matter, the only remedy for the petitioner is to move the civil court for declaration of her status and legal character. I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 12. Therefore, the petition- ers remedy lies in the civil court. In that view of the matter, the only remedy for the petitioner is to move the civil court for declaration of her status and legal character. I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 12. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. It goes without saying that the civil suit, if instituted by the petitioner, shall be disposed of in accordance with law completely ignoring the observations made hereinabove on the merits of the matter which are made exclusively for the disposal of the present writ petition.