A. LALA, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision case arises out of an order being Order No. 35 dated 14th May, 2001 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) in Misc. Case No. 18 of 1998. By making this application one Smt. Bina Roy, respondent-opposite party No. 2 herein contended before the Court below that the compromise of the appeal was obtained by practicing fraud and mis-representation which was extensively heard by the learned Judge and ultimately he held in favour of such petitioner-opposite party No. 2 herein. The application was allowed on contest without imposing any cost. The compromise decree affected on 6th December, 1996 was set aside. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, originally one Sri Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) executed a will giving the property in favour of two sons which includes the petitioner herein. They obtained their probate. On the basis of the probate when they have called upon the postal authority to get encashment of the Postal Savings Certificate in which either the said Smt. Bina Roy has been shown as nominee or joint-holders, the same was refused. As a result whereof, a title suit was filed in the appropriate Court below for the purpose of declaration about the ownership of such certificate. Such suit was dismissed ex parte and from where an appeal was preferred. In the appeal, an application for compromise was filed. The appeal ended with the compromise petition. ( 3 ) IN the said suit there was two defendants. One was the said Smt. Bina Roy and another was the Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Department of Communication, Post Master General, West Bengal. Upon going through the compromise petition, I find that two sons of Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) as well as the said Smt. Bina Roy are the parties to such compromise. From the signature I find that Sohanlal Chakraborty, brother of the petitioner was represented by his constituted Attorney, Subhra Chakraborty. Madanlal Chakraborty, petitioner herein, himself signed therein along with his Advocate and also Smt. Bina Roy and her Advocate. The name of the learned Advocate of the said Smt. Bina Roy is one Sri Panchanon Khatua. In the affidavit part of such compromise petition I find Smt. Bina Roy, deponent was identified and explained by the learned Advocate. From the Schedule-A of such Postal Savings Certificate etc. The name of the learned Advocate of the said Smt. Bina Roy is one Sri Panchanon Khatua. In the affidavit part of such compromise petition I find Smt. Bina Roy, deponent was identified and explained by the learned Advocate. From the Schedule-A of such Postal Savings Certificate etc. I find that the number are as follows: a)   Monthly Income Scheme being No. MIS Account No. 861720 for Rs. 1,25,000. 00 b)   MIS Account No. 861861 for (Both at Tollygunge Post Office Cal-33) Rs. 25,000. 00 c)   MIS Account No. 920274 for Rs. 1,00,000. 00 d)   MIS Account No. 920365 for Rs. 15,00. 00 e)   MIS Account No. 920367 for Rs. 10,000. 00 (All at Regent Park Post Office, Cal-40) Total - Rs. 2,75,000. 00 ( 4 ) UPON going through the Schedule of the Will, I find that those postal deposits were bequeathed by the testator in favour of both the sons. It is categorically specified under the Will that the money lying in the aforesaid account shall be devolved upon the two sons i. e. Sohanlal and Madanlal in equal share and Smt. Bina Roy cannot have any right or claim on the money. Such Will was probated. Therefore, unless the probate is set aside, the devolution of property in favour of both the sons cannot be extinguished. However, for the purpose of setting aside the compromise decree passed by the first Appellate Court, an application was made by the said Smt. Bina Roy in respect of certain categorical statements with the support of the affidavit. In paragraph 4 of such application, she contended that Sri Panchanan Khatua, learned Advocate, was engaged by her to contest the case. She signed over a petition as told by the learned Advocate. According to her, such Advocate told her that the petition was made for withdrawal of the said appeal. She further alleged that the learned Advocate told and explained her that for withdrawal of the appeal, the consent of the petitioner was necessary. On good faith and confidence she signed the same without going to the context and recitals of the alleged petition for compromise. It is specifically mentioned that it was neither read over nor explained to her by the petitioner and another son of Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased ). Such lady being an illiterate lady cannot write and read anything excepting her name. It is specifically mentioned that it was neither read over nor explained to her by the petitioner and another son of Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased ). Such lady being an illiterate lady cannot write and read anything excepting her name. The alleged compromise petition has not been acted upon at all and she is not bound by the compromise decree. She has got a compromise decree as well as a copy of Power of Attorney from the Post Office. When she attended for withdrawing some money from the Post Office, she came to know about the compromise decree and Power of Attorney. Immediately thereafter, such Power of Attorney was cancelled and sent the copy of such cancellation under the Registered Post with A/d. Therefore, the compromise decree which has been obtained by the petitioner is the outcome of fraud and misrepresentation in between the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and her learned Advocate. The terms and conditions in the compromise petition are given as follows:?a)That it is declared that the money lying in deposit in the name of the deceased Sailendra Nath Chakraborty the father of the Appellants either justify with the defendant/respondent or in the name of the defendant/respondent No. 2 as his nominee as mentioned in the schedule of the plaint in details mentioned hereunder are absolutely self acquired money of the said Sailendra Nath Chakraborty and as such in view of the Probate in respect of the Will left by the said Sailendra Nath Chakraborty since deceased, granted in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants covering the said sum as described in Scheduled herein below mentioned, the Appellants/plaintiffs are entitled to get the same in equal share. b) That as the Respondent/defendant No. 2 used to look after the said Sailendra Nath Chakraborty who was widower, in his old age, appellants/plaintiffs are agreed to pay a total sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only to the said respondent/defendant No. 2 after realisation of the said entire amount as described in the schedule hereunder written as also described in the schedule of the plaint. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only to the said respondent/defendant No. 2 after realisation of the said entire amount as described in the schedule hereunder written as also described in the schedule of the plaint. c) That the appellants/plaintiffs and the respondent No. 2/defendant No. 2 have agreed that the entire amount as described in Schedule of the Plaint as mentioned hereunder with accumulated interest will be withdrawn/realised by Sri Panchanon Khatua learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 and Sri Madan Lal Chakraborty the appellant No. 2/plaintiff No. 2 jointly. d)That the respondent/defendant No. 2 shall execute a Power of Attorney jointly in favour of the said Mr. Panchanon Khatua the learned advocate and the said Sri Madan Lal Chakraborty for withdrawal of the said amount with accumulated interest from the Post Office, if required. e)That after realisation of the said amount from the said Post Office with accumulated interest, the said Sri Panchanan Khatua Advocate and Sri Madan Lal Chakraborty the Appellant No. 2 shall jointly open a Bank Account in any Nationalised Bank and shall deposit the said amount in the said Bank. From the said Joint Account Mr. Panchanan Khatua learned advocate and Sri Madanlal Chakraborty will distribute the said amount amongst the parties in accordance with the terms and conditions of this compromise petition. f)That on payment of the said sum, the respondent/defendant No. 2 shall file an application in the trial Court recording the said payment in her favour towards full satisfaction of the said total sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only. g) That the instant appeal will be allowed and the said Title Suit No. 81 of 1992 of 8th Assistant District Judge would be decreed in terms of the petition for compromise filed before the learned Appellate Court. h)That your petitioners submit that the instant appeal be allowed in terms of this petition of compromise otherwise your petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and injury. It is therefore prayed that your Honour will be pleased to pass necessary order allowing the instant appeal and passing a decree in Title Suit No. 81 of 1992 of 8th Assistant District Judge at Alipore in terms of the petition of compromise filed before the Appellate Court which do form part of the decree and to pass such other order or orders as your Honour may deem fit and proper. And your petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray. ? ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner herein, the learned Advocate of such opposite party acted under the instruction and consent. Such learned advocate read over and explained the contents. The opposite party on coming to know the contents herself signed the petition of compromise having full knowledge thereto and an elaborate discussion at the time of signing the compromise petition was held and after having been satisfied. The opposite party signed the compromise petition. She also adduced her evidence to that effect before the learned Court after taking oath in her presence. So the question of 'not knowing' the contents and/or recitals being not read over and explained or not acted upon is false. With regard to such paragraph, the opposite party said that the Postal Department received an objection from the opposite party denying the genuineness of compromise decree etc. In examination-in-chief, the said opposite party stated that Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) treated her as his wife and awarded the maintenance money. She did not personally engaged any Advocate. Thereafter, she stated that Khatua Babu was her lawyer. She can sign in Bengali only. She is tolerably literate. The said advocate along with many others took her to a room in the Court premises and asked her to sign assuring her for full payment of money. Nobody interpreted the contents of the paper which was asked to sign. She signed the paper as per their request. The money is lying with the Post Office. She never withdrew any money. She is exclusively the owner of such money. When the Court bailiff visited her house then she came to know the compromise. She did not admit the terms of the solenama petition. she never authorised the learned advocate to withdraw the amount on her behalf. She never agreed to accept Rs. 50,000/- as terms of compromise. She further stated that the petition for compromise was not read over and explained to her before obtaining her signature. It was not interpreted to her in lucid Bengali (Vernacular) so that it could be understandable. She inherited such property from her husband, Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased ). In cross-examination, she identified her signature in the witnesses-sheet dated 6th December, 1996. She also said that previously she was examined by the Court on that date. It was not interpreted to her in lucid Bengali (Vernacular) so that it could be understandable. She inherited such property from her husband, Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased ). In cross-examination, she identified her signature in the witnesses-sheet dated 6th December, 1996. She also said that previously she was examined by the Court on that date. She is not aware of the contents of the petition filed for the Miscellaneous case. She did not record any signature on the other previous documents as well as on this petition (petition made by her) after realisation of purports and contents of the petition. ( 6 ) THE learned Judge under the order impugned observed that the opposite party's specific case is that the petition for compromise never incorporated to her. She signed a paper as per request of Mr. Panchanon Khatua and the other opposite parties. Now, the question arises how the petitioner being an old lady of 82/83 years who has nothing to lose in the appeal preferred against an ex parte order of dismissal by her advisors, would record her signature in a compromise petition where her privilege and right were manifestly curtailed. According to me, from where the learned Judge has come to know that the age of the petitioner-opposite party No. 2 herein is 82/83 years, is unknown to this Court. From the affidavit in support of the application for recalling and/or setting aside the compromise decree dated 6th December, 1996, I find that she has described her age as 60 years. The date of filing of such application is 22nd June, 1998. The date of the order is 14th May, 2001. Therefore, such observation by the Court below is grossly unjust as apparent from the face of the record. In coming to a conclusion to establish a fraud, the learned Judge had taken into account in respect of an illicit connection of the deceased with one Ashalata Pramanick and awarded her some property. Therefore, it is clear that Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) was benevolent by nature and was in the habit of rewarding the person who rendered service to him. Following the example of providing permanent subsistence to Ashalata, he nominated the name of Smt. Bina Roy, opposite party No. 2 herein to the Postal Monthly Scheme etc. Therefore, it is clear that Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) was benevolent by nature and was in the habit of rewarding the person who rendered service to him. Following the example of providing permanent subsistence to Ashalata, he nominated the name of Smt. Bina Roy, opposite party No. 2 herein to the Postal Monthly Scheme etc. The sons of Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) obtained a property from their father which was subsequently disposed of. Therefore, Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) was never ungrateful to the women either in the case of Ashalata or Sm. Bina Roy and thereby rewarded them to their full satisfaction. There was no doubt in regard to the nomination of the said Smt. Bina Roy. Therefore, the compromise petition cannot be free from suspicion. The concerned opposite party No. 2 is tolerably educated woman having no understanding with the laws and English. She could record her signature with much efforts in Bengali. The Court was pleased to raise a question about the relinquishment of lion share lying with the Post Office. In any event, it was further held that other sons of Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) did not record their signatures in the compromise petition nor any of them came to the Court to contest the petition. only the petitioner has come to contest the case. In fact, such petitioner being the opposite party therein has no leg to stand against the nomination done by his father in favour of the said Smt. Bina Roy, opposite party No. 2 herein. Thereafter, it was held that it is a fit case where the petition under Order 23 Rule 3a of the Code of Civil Procedure is required to be allowed. ( 7 ) UPON going through the order impugned I find that there are two parts of the matter for coming to the conclusion by the first Appellate Court. One part is fraud and another part is entitlement of the petitioner to claim the corpus against the nomination of Smt. Bina Roy, opposite party No. 2 herein. Both the points are segregated by the learned Court below. Therefore, the inference is said to be drawn on the basis of both the accounts. ( 8 ) SO far as the question of fraud is concerned, unless it is established beyond doubt with the cogent reasons, the same can not said to be a fraudulent action. Both the points are segregated by the learned Court below. Therefore, the inference is said to be drawn on the basis of both the accounts. ( 8 ) SO far as the question of fraud is concerned, unless it is established beyond doubt with the cogent reasons, the same can not said to be a fraudulent action. The observation of the Court below is the out-come of surmises and conjecture. As because Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased) gave certain property to one Ashalata, the other lady, there might be a reason for giving reward to the opposite party No. 2 herein can not be established ground of fraud. Past activities of Sailendra Nath Chakraborty (since deceased), if any, can not be the criteria for drawing inference about fraudulent activities amongst the existing parties to the compromise. It can, at best be an assessment of the testator's mind in appropriate proceeding. The Court was not called upon to verify the cause of execution of the Will, which had already been probated by the appropriate Court about ten (10) years back. The Court had proceeded on wrong track leaving aside the right one. Both Sohanlal and Madanlal are the parties to the compromise. Sohanlal was the signatory through the Power of Attorney, when Madanlal was himself the signatory. Sohanlal never came forward to challenge the compromise. As against this, the evidence of the opposite party are to be taken into account. It is crystal clear that in the petition, she stated that she signed over a petition which, according to her, is a petition for withdrawal of the appeal whereas in the Examination-in-Chief, she stated that she signed on a paper on the assurance of full payment of money. If it is so, her statements about the signature over a petition for withdrawal of the appeal simplicitor cannot stand. Similarly, again in the petition, she stated that when she attended the Post Office for withdrawal some money, she came to know for the first-time about the compromise and Power of Attorney. Immediately thereafter, she said that the attempted to cancel the Power of Attorney dated 21st June, 1997 and on 22nd May, 1998. She sent the copies of the said cancellation under the registered Post with A/d. On the other hand, she stated in the Examination-in-Chief that when the Court bailiff visited her house, she came to know about the compromise. Immediately thereafter, she said that the attempted to cancel the Power of Attorney dated 21st June, 1997 and on 22nd May, 1998. She sent the copies of the said cancellation under the registered Post with A/d. On the other hand, she stated in the Examination-in-Chief that when the Court bailiff visited her house, she came to know about the compromise. I am sorry to say that the learned Court below failed to assess the case on the basis of the pleading and corroborative evidence. Moreover, the signature was put by the lady in Bengali (Vernacular) and it was not at all the case that she is fully illiterate lady to understand A, B, C of the cause. Unless one can understand the import of the compromise, she cannot apply for cancellation of Power of Attorney, if any. Above all, she adduced her evidence at the time of compromise and verified the signature in such evidence. Even thereafter, why the Court disbelieved the compromise is unknown to this Court. Had it been the case that her advocate surreptitiously obtained her signature to induce himself as an agent before the Post Office to withdraw the amount, the allegation could have been sustainable, but, with utter surprise I see from the compromise petition that both the parties wanted to act jointly as per the compromise decree by protecting the interest of each other. No amount got released even thereafter by them so that element of suspicion can be found out. Therefore, how the Court below became so definite in respect of the conclusion of fraud, is not known to this Court. The sympathy towards the lady who worked in the family of the deceased and behaved like his wife has to be held mis-placed sympathy. In other words, sympathy can not be a cogent ground for the purpose of establishing a fraud. There are other materials, which are required to be establish the same. Unfortunately, those are not available here. Thereby, fraud is not established under the order impugned. ( 9 ) THE second part of the order is the legal necessity. Such legal necessity is required to be answered once for all, otherwise a dispute in the similar circumstances will affect perpetually and each and every point of time, the Court of law will be over-burdened with such type of litigations. ( 9 ) THE second part of the order is the legal necessity. Such legal necessity is required to be answered once for all, otherwise a dispute in the similar circumstances will affect perpetually and each and every point of time, the Court of law will be over-burdened with such type of litigations. Such legal necessity is the right of the nominee and/or joint-holders of the Postal Account and/or Certificate vis-a-vis the right of beneficiaries under the Will particularly, which had been probated. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party made certain submissions before this Court in this regard, which are germane for the purpose of due consideration. Section 3 of the Government Savings Banks Act, 1873 speaks that 'depositor' means a person by whom or on whose behalf money has been heretofore, or shall hereinafter, deposited in a Government Savings Bank, and 'deposit' means money so deposited. Sections 4, 4a and 5 of the aforesaid Act are relevant for the purpose of due consideration. Such sections are in relation to deposits belonging to the estate of deceased persons. Such sections are set out herein as follows : ?4. Nomination by depositor: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any disposition whether testamentary or otherwise, by a depositor in respect of his deposit, where any nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the deposit on the death of the depositor, the nominee shall, on the death of the depositor, become entitled to the exclusion of all the other persons, to be paid the deposit, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner. (2) Any nomination referred to in sub-section (1) shall become void if the nominee predeceases, or where there are two or more nominees all the nominees predecease the depositor. (3) Where the nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the depositor to appoint in the prescribed manner any person to receive the deposit in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. 4a. Payment on death of depositor :- (1) If a depositor dies and there is in force at the time of the death of the depositor a nomination in favour of any person, the deposit shall be paid to the nominee. 4a. Payment on death of depositor :- (1) If a depositor dies and there is in force at the time of the death of the depositor a nomination in favour of any person, the deposit shall be paid to the nominee. (2) Where the nominee is a minor, the deposit shall be paid - (a)in any case where a person has been appointed to receive it under sub-section (3) of section 4, to that person, and (b)where there is no such person, to the guardian of the minor for the use of the minor. (3) Where a deposit is payable to two or more nominees and either or any of them is dead, the deposit shall be paid to the surviving nominees. (4) If the depositor dies and there is no nomination in force at the time of his death and probate of his Will or letters of administration of his estate or succession certificate granted under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925) is not, within three months of the death of the depositor, produced to the Secretary of the Government Savings Bank in which the deposit is, then: - (a)if the deposit does not exceed such limit as may be prescribed, the Secretary may pay the some to any person appearing to him to be entitled to receive it or to administer the estate of the deceased; and (b)within the limit prescribed under clause (a), any officer employed in the management of Government Savings Bank who is empowered in this behalf by a general or special order of the Central Government, may, to the extent to which he is empowered by a general on special order of the Central Government, may, to the extent to which he is empowered by such order and subject to any general or special orders of the Secretary in this behalf, pay the deposit to any person appearing to him to be entitled to receive it or to administer the estate. (5) Noting contained in this section shall be deemed to require any person to accept payment of a deposit which is a Time Deposit, before it has become due. (Para 4) amended vide the Gazette of India Extraordinary, No. 69 dated 4. 9. 1985 ). 5. (5) Noting contained in this section shall be deemed to require any person to accept payment of a deposit which is a Time Deposit, before it has become due. (Para 4) amended vide the Gazette of India Extraordinary, No. 69 dated 4. 9. 1985 ). 5. Payment to be discharge :- (1) Any payment made in accordance with the foregoing of this Act shall be a full discharge from all further liability in respect of the money so paid. (2) Saving of right of executor :- But nothing herein contained precludes any executor or administrator, or other representative of the deceased, from recovering from the person receiving the same the amount remaining in his hands after deducting the amount of all debts or other demands lawfully paid or discharged by him in due course of administration. (3) Saving or right of creditor :- And any creditor or claimant against the estate of the deceased may recover his debt or claim out of the money paid under this Act to any person, and remaining in his hand unadministered, in the same manner and to the same extent as if the latter had obtained letters of administration of the estate of the deceased. ? ( 10 ) UPON going through the sections, it can be said that a nominee is entitled to receive the deposit on the death of the depositor in exclusion of all other persons notwithstanding any deposition whether testamentary or otherwise. Side by side, if I go through section 5 (2) as above, nothing herein contained precludes any executor or administrator, or other representative of the deceased, from recovering from the person receiving the same the amount remaining in his hands. Hence, the right of the executor or administrator is saved under the law. Therefore, it cannot be clearly said that a nominee is no more than a receiver unless he is otherwise a successor-in-interest. He is not the owner of the corpus if dispute arises. Who is the owner of the corpus in a dispute like this, the appropriate Civil Court of law is the appropriate forum to decide the title and parties will be governed by the same. In Post Office (Monthly Income Account) Rules, 1987 formed under the said Act. Rule 20 says that if one of the two depositors dies, the account will be treated as single account in the name of the surviving depositor. In Post Office (Monthly Income Account) Rules, 1987 formed under the said Act. Rule 20 says that if one of the two depositors dies, the account will be treated as single account in the name of the surviving depositor. But, such Rule relates to operation of the Account can not decide the title of corpus. This is left open for the law Courts to decide. According to me, there are two types of succession. One is testate and the other is intestate. In case of intestate succession, title of the properties (both movable or immovable) flows to the natural successor/s. Similarly, in case of testate successor, the documents will govern the field. It is a common feature that near relations are made nominees and/or joint-holders so that there cannot be any embargo to the nominees and/or joint-holders to withdraw the amounts from the Bank, Post Office etc. In normal circumstances, such near relations are beneficiaries by following the rule of succession. Therefore, nobody question at the time of withdrawal whether such nominee and/or joint-holder is entitled to enjoy the corpus or not. But, if any, abnormal circumstances, like the present one, arises then obviously the amount will go to the title holder subject to proof of the same before the Civil Court. How it will be proved? It will be proved on the documents creating such right to the owner of the holder. The nominee and/or joint-holders can not be said to be beneficiary of the fund but, custodian of such deposits subject to finalization of the dispute in the Civil Court. The Court of first instance totally misconstrued the law and held that the plaintiffs could not get anything in respect of the deposits. However, at present, I have to consider legal necessity arises out of the compromise decree passed by the Appellate Court and the consequences in connection thereto and, as such, I am restricting myself on that score. But, in doing so, definitely the Court will consider whether there was initially any cause of action of instituting the suit or not. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, the Will was made on 7th December, 1989. The testator expired on 26th January, 1990. From the deposition of said Smt. Bina Roy, in the Examination-in-Chief in early 2000, it appears that she never withdrew any amount from the Post Office. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, the Will was made on 7th December, 1989. The testator expired on 26th January, 1990. From the deposition of said Smt. Bina Roy, in the Examination-in-Chief in early 2000, it appears that she never withdrew any amount from the Post Office. Long before that, the Will was probated on 28th September, 1991. Neither the Act of 1873, nor the Rules of 1987 is very much categorical about applicability of the probate towards the recipient under joint holding. From the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2002) 1 SCC 33 (Gulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors.), it appears that when a probate is granted, it does not decide the question of entitlement or existence of the property mentioned therein. But, it establishes conclusively as to the appointment of executor and the valid execution of the Will. Therefore, when the Will validly executed and probated, it gives power to the executor to recover the amount as was directed under the Will to be given to the beneficiaries therein. It is a question of passing of the legacy to them. Therefore, the executors have no others alternative, but, institute a civil suit to recover the sum goes in favour of the surviving holder of the joint account. In the instant case, both the executors are the beneficiaries. The Will is specific in respect of the right of the money lying with the account in the Post Office even where Smt. Bina Roy is the nominee or joint holder. Such Will was neither revoked nor any step was taken for cancellation of the probate and Will. It continued for last 10 years. The executors/beneficiaries filed a Title Suit, which ought to be done in accordance with law for declaration of title in respect of such corpus. The Title Appeal was compromised in between the parties. Right method was adopted for receiving the corpus. By virtue of the Appellate Court's order in compromise, the title of the corpus vested upon the beneficiaries leaving aside Rs. 50,000/- which will be given to the custodian, i. e. joint holder of the Postal Account Money receipt etc. Therefore, title of the corpus is established beyond doubt. Now the question is compromise was lawful or not. By virtue of the Appellate Court's order in compromise, the title of the corpus vested upon the beneficiaries leaving aside Rs. 50,000/- which will be given to the custodian, i. e. joint holder of the Postal Account Money receipt etc. Therefore, title of the corpus is established beyond doubt. Now the question is compromise was lawful or not. The claim of the petitioner and the proforma respondent is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy if at all rule of section 23 of the Contract Act applies on that score. According to me, from the explanation, it is clear that there is no bar in instituting a suit of such nature to decide the title. Therefore, Court can entertain, try and determine such such suit. Hence, the only question left whether determination can be made by the Court by way of compromise or not. The simple answer is which can be decided by contest that can be decided by compromise. Therefore, when the right of the corpus is a decidable issue before the Court any compromise in this regard cannot be said to be forbidden by law or against any public policy. Neither any law said that ownership of the corpus can not be claimed by the owner/s nor the aforesaid Act and Rules have any authority to decide such question. Such law is restricted only to the extent of holder/s. Holder does not necessarily mean the owner when the dispute existable unless such right is decided by the appropriate Court of law. If any compromise is arrived at that is only to avoid legal complication and by adopting live and let live policy. Judicial scrutiny as to the facts and law does not say that the same is illegal. ( 12 ) AN incidental question arose in respect of making the University of India as a party-defendant in the suit and a part-respondent in the appeal: The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party contended that as because the Union of India is not a party to the compromise decree, the same can not be effective. According to me, such submission suffers from a mis-conception of law. This is a dispute as regards title between the beneficiaries under the Will and the nominee and/or joint-holder of the postal money deposits etc. The Union of India can not be a party to such title. It is the executing authority. According to me, such submission suffers from a mis-conception of law. This is a dispute as regards title between the beneficiaries under the Will and the nominee and/or joint-holder of the postal money deposits etc. The Union of India can not be a party to such title. It is the executing authority. Possibly, it has made party herein to give effect of the decree. It has no role to play in the dispute. The learned counsel appearing for it said so. It is at best a proforma. Making it partly appears to be superfluous. In the common parlance, we see that in receiving order of the Court sometimes governmental authority take plea that as because it is not party to the proceedings in the order cannot have binding effect. To avoid such complication possibly Union of India was made party to the suit. The Court rightly examined the parties and passed the compromise decree to avoid future litigation. What is wrong in it? Nominee is also party to the withdrawal. Such withdrawal cannot be said to be a fraudulent action. Even it would have been thought to be surrepticious, but not fraudulent, if any compromise decree is sought for appointing an Advocate of the beneficiaries under the Will to withdraw the same and to distribute it amongst the beneficiaries ignoring the nominee. It would have been opposed to public policy. But, the situation is not so. When the nominee and/or joint-holder and its authorised representative representing the case before the Court of law is directed to discharge certain obligations under the compromise decree, the same cannot be said to be unusual, inconsistent and/or illegal. If it would have been the case that single nominee and/or joint-holder after his physical incapacitation requested his/her representatives to withdraw the amount under the scheme of the Post Office, the postal authority will refuse the same? When the authorised person of a nominee and/or joint-holder with the appropriate release such sum, will it not be treated as discharge of the duties under the Act and Rules? Of course, it will discharge the duty. Therefore, when in the terms of settlement, the nominee and/or joint-holder was directed to execute the Power of Attorney in favour of her Advocate along with the petitioner herein to step in the shoes of the depositor for the purpose of withdrawal what is the wrong in it. Of course, it will discharge the duty. Therefore, when in the terms of settlement, the nominee and/or joint-holder was directed to execute the Power of Attorney in favour of her Advocate along with the petitioner herein to step in the shoes of the depositor for the purpose of withdrawal what is the wrong in it. Such action is not to by-pass the law, but, to give proper effect of it under seal and signature of the Court. Not a single penny has been withdrawn by any one from such accounts as yet. It is to be remembered that in the Court of law, lawyers are much better representatives than any other because the Court has exclusive control over them. The entire judicial procedure stands on faith and allegiance between the Judges and lawyers thereby the lawyers are Minister of the Court equally with the Judges. If we loose faith very often, it will shake the entire system. In the rarest of the rare case and on the established fraud only conduct of a lawyer can be questioned. This is not such a case. Therefore, no further explanation is required. ( 13 ) HENCE, upon considering all pros and cons, I am of the view that the order impugned passed in Misc. Case No. 18 of 1998 arising out of Title Appeal No. 345 of 1994 cannot be allowed to be sustained. Therefore, the order passed setting aside the compromise decree dated 6th December, 1996 stands set aside. As a result whereof, there cannot be any embargo upon the parties to proceed in view of the compromise decree and all parties will be governed by the same. The revisional application, thus, stands allowed. Interim order, if any, stands merged with the final order. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Later: prayer for stay of operation of the order is made, considered and rejected. Appeal allowed