Judgment :- M.Chockalingam, J. Aggrieved over the judgment by recording a finding of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment by the Court of Sessions, i.e., II Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai, the sole accused, in a case of murder, has brought forth this appeal. 2. Necessary facts for the disposal of this appeal can be stated thus:- (a) P.W.2 is the husband of P.W.3. They were living with their eight months old child, by name, Ayesha Begum. P.W.5 and the appellant/accused are the brothers of P.W.2 and P.W.1 is their sister. All were living under the same roof situate in Door No.53, Thiruvengadasamy Street, Pulianthope, within the Pulianthope police limits. On the day of occurrence, viz., 5.2.99, at the morning hours, P.Ws.2 and 3 went to the market leaving the eight months child in the house. At that time, the appellant/accused and P.W.1 were present. The appellant/accused asked P.W.1 to fetch tiffin for him and thus, P.W.1 went outside and returned after ten minutes. During that interval, the appellant/accused poured kerosene on the eight months old child and set fire. When P.W.1 came back, she found the appellant/accused just coming out of the house at the step door. The appellant/accused went out silently. P.W.1 went inside the house and found the child with burn injuries. When P.Ws.2 and 3 were returning from the market, they found the appellant/accused coming in the opposite direction. He told them "You did not give me money, you go to the house and see the fate of the child" and went away. In the meanwhile, P.W.1 took the child to the Medical College Hospital, where the child was admitted for treatment. The child succumbed to the burn injuries at about 1.50 p.m. Ex.P.5 is a copy of the accident register, wherein it was stated that the child died out of the stove burst. An intimation was given to the Pulianthope police station by the ward doctor. P.W.13, Sub-Inspector of Police, on receipt of the information, went to the hospital and obtained a complaint from P.W.1. The signature of P.W.1 in the complaint is marked as Ex.P.1. On the strength of the compalint, the police officer, P.W.13, registered a case in Crime No.232 of 1999 under Section 302 I.P.C. Ex.P.14, F.I.R. was despatched to Court. (b) On receipt of a copy of the F.I.R., P.W.14, Inspector of Police, took up investigation. The signature of P.W.1 in the complaint is marked as Ex.P.1. On the strength of the compalint, the police officer, P.W.13, registered a case in Crime No.232 of 1999 under Section 302 I.P.C. Ex.P.14, F.I.R. was despatched to Court. (b) On receipt of a copy of the F.I.R., P.W.14, Inspector of Police, took up investigation. He received the complaint from P.W.13, which is marked as Ex.P.15 in the case. He then proceeded to the hospital, conducted inquest in the presence of witnesses and panchayatdars on the dead body of the child and prepared Ex.P.16, report. Following the same, he proceeded to the place of occurrence, made an observation in the presence of two witnesses and prepared an observation mahazar, Ex.P.3 and a sketch, Ex.P.19 and also recovered under Ex.P.11 mahazar, M.O.1-stove, M.O.2-match box and M.O.3, partly burnt cloth piece. He gave a requisition to the doctor for conduct of the autopsy on the dead body of the child, Ayesha Begum. (c) On receipt of the requisition, P.W.10, Dr.N.A.Govardhan, Civil Surgeon and Tutor in Forensic Medicine, Government Kilpauk Medical College, conducted the autopsy on the dead body of the child Ayesha Begum and found the following burn injuries:- "Epidermis and Dermoepidermal Burns seen on the face, neck, chest, abdomen, both upper limbs fully front of both thighs, sides of the trunk and outer aspect of right thigh." The doctor has issued Ex.P.10, the post-mortem certificate and opined that the deceased would appear to have died of shock due to burns. (d) During investigation, the accused was arrested on 6.3.99. All the material objects were sent to Court to be subjected to chemical analysis and accordingly, subjected to. On completion of the investigation, a final report was filed and the case was taken cognizance of. 3. In order to prove the charge levelled against the appellant/accused, the prosecution marched 14 witnesses and relied on 19 exhibits and 3 material objects. On completion of the evidence on the side of the prosecution, the Court questioned the appellant/accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to the incriminating circumstances found in the evidence, which he denied as false. No defence witness was examined. On a careful consideration of the submissions made and scrutiny of the materials, the trial Court found him guilty as per the charge and awarded life imprisonment, which is the subject matter of this appeal. 4. No defence witness was examined. On a careful consideration of the submissions made and scrutiny of the materials, the trial Court found him guilty as per the charge and awarded life imprisonment, which is the subject matter of this appeal. 4. Advancing his arguments on behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel raised the following submissions. According to the prosecution, P.W.1 has given the report, on the basis of which, a case came to be registered by the respondent police. P.W.1 has not spoken to anything about the report and the report was not marked through her, but through the police officer. Thus, the contents of the report were not proved by the prosecution and the prosecution has not treated her as hostile, which is fatal to the prosecution case. P.W.1 has, in her evidence, spoken to the fact that she found the appellant/accused coming out of the house and thus, she cannot be termed as an eye witness to the crime. Similarly, P.Ws.2 and 3, who are the parents of the deceased child, also reached the house after some time after the occurrence and thus, they are also not competent to speak about the occurrence. But, the trial Court has relied on the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 to the effect that the appellant/accused was coming in the opposite direction and he informed them that they did not give money to him and so that, they could go to the house to see the fate of their child. This would be nothing but improbable. Had it been proved by the prosecution that the accused has done such a crime, he would not have informed so to P.Ws.2 and 3. Thus, P.Ws.2 and 3, who are the parents of the deceased, have come forward to give such a false version. It is further submitted that P.W.1, at the earliest, has taken the child to the hospital and has informed to the doctor that the burn injuries on the child had happened on account of the burst of stove and it has also been recorded by the doctor in Ex.P.5, the accident register copy. But, subsequently, the case has been developed to one of murder. Hence, the trial Court should have outright rejected the testimony of P.W.1. But, subsequently, the case has been developed to one of murder. Hence, the trial Court should have outright rejected the testimony of P.W.1. Further, the appellant/accused was arrested, according to the prosecution, on 6.3.99, i.e., long after the occurrence and his alleged confessional statement was of no avail to the prosecution case factually as well as legally. Apart from that, added further, the learned counsel that even from the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 5, the appellant/accused suffered from temporary insanity from time and again and hence, even assuming that the offence has been committed by the appellant/accused, due to his insanity he had the defence under Section 84 I.P.C. and considering the same, the trial Court should have accepted such a defence and acquitted him, but it had not done so. Hence, under the circumstances, he is entitled for an acquittal at the hands of this Court. Heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the above contentions. 5. The Court paid its full attention on the submissions made on either side and had a thorough scrutiny of the available materials. In the instant case, the eight months old child, Ayesha Begum died out of burn injuries, which fact is proved through the medical evidence. That factum is also not disputed by the appellant/accused either before the trial Court or before this Court and thus, the fact remained proved. 6. The specific case of the prosecution was that it was the accused, who poured kerosene on the child and killed her by setting fire. It is true that no one has witnessed the occurrence and thus, the prosecution rested its case on the circumstantial evidence exclusively. But the Court also reminded of the caution that in a case where it rests upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should be complete, make a chain in such a way pointing to the hypothesis that none else except the accused who has committed the offence. In the instant case, the Court is able to see that through the circumstances available, the prosecution has proved the same by proper evidence. 7. At the first instance, it has to be pointed out that the appellant/accused is none else than the brother of P.W.2, the father of the child. It is not the case of the appellant/accused before the trial Court that any enmity, ill-will or strained-relationship prevailed between the parties. 7. At the first instance, it has to be pointed out that the appellant/accused is none else than the brother of P.W.2, the father of the child. It is not the case of the appellant/accused before the trial Court that any enmity, ill-will or strained-relationship prevailed between the parties. It is also not in dispute that P.Ws.1, 2, 3, 5 and the appellant/accused were living under the same roof. From the evidence of P.W.1, it could be seen that on the day of occurrence, she was requested by the appellant/accused to fetch tiffin for him and in view of the same, P.W.1 left the house. When she came after ten minutes, she saw the accused just going out of the house without telling anything; but when P.W.1 entered the house, she found the eight months child with burn injuries. At this juncture, it has to be pointed out why the appellant/accused requested P.W.1 to fetch tiffin and when the tiffin was also brought, the appellant/accused had no occasion to go out without telling anything. This circumstance would clearly indicate that he wanted to send out P.W.1 on the guise of getting some tiffin in order to commit the offence. 8. The next circumstance is the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3. According to them, the appellant/accused came in the opposite direction and informed that "You refused to give money, go to the house and see the fate of the child". It cannot be, in the ordinary course of evidence, that P.Ws.2 and 3 should come forward to a Court of law to speak any falsity and there are no circumstances also noticed or shown by the appellant/accused as to why the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 should be seen with doubt. At this juncture, it has to be pointed out that on the earlier occasion, the appellant/accused has demanded money and when it was not given, he has damaged the T.V. and other articles. There is evidence available in that regard. This would be clearly pointing to the fact that in the earlier occasion, there was a demand for money by the appellant/accused and it was refused. 9. The next circumstance would be that at the time of investigation, the Inspector has secured M.Os.1 to 3 under Ex.P.4 mahazar. M.O.1 is a stove, M.O.2 is a match box and M.O.3 is partly burnt cloth piece. 9. The next circumstance would be that at the time of investigation, the Inspector has secured M.Os.1 to 3 under Ex.P.4 mahazar. M.O.1 is a stove, M.O.2 is a match box and M.O.3 is partly burnt cloth piece. The contents of Ex.P.4 mahazar or the recovery of M.Os.1 to 3 was not disputed by the appellant/accused. Thus, it would be clear that M.O.1, the stove was recovered from the place. At the time of recovery from the place of occurrence and when produced before the Court, the stove was intact and thus, the defence theory of the appellant/accused that the child died out of the stove burst was the one invented for to suit the defence case. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that it was P.W.1, who reported to the doctor at the time of admission of the child that the child sustained burn injuries due to the burst of stove and it is also recorded by the doctor in Ex.P.5, the accident register copy. At this juncture, it has to be pointed out that P.W.1, to start with could not have suspected that it was the act of the appellant/accused either or she was in the urge to save the child. From the evidence available, it would be very clear that there was only one stove available in the house and that was also found intact at the time of recovery, which would be indicative of the fact that the burn injuries could not have been caused by the bursting of the stove. Thus, the contention put forth by the appellant's side as above has got to be discountenanced. 10. The next contention put forth by the appellant's side is that the appellant/accused was actually suffering from insanity and even assuming that he had committed the offence, he should be given the benefit of defence of insanity as contemplated under Section 84 I.P.C. The Court is at a loss to understand as to how under the circumstances of the case and in the absence of any proof adduced by the appellant/accused to prove that he was suffering from insanity at the crucial point of time, namely, at the time of the offence, such a defence could be accepted. If, in order to have the defence under Section 84 I.P.C., two essential ingredients have got to be taken into account, considered and proved also, viz., 1) the accused must, at the time of the commission of the act, be of unsound mind; and 2) the unsoundness of mind must be such as to make the accused, at the time when he is doing the act charged as an offence, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1987 L.W.(Crl.) page 170 (MOORTHY, In re). The Court is of the considered opinion that the above judgment of the Division Bench of this Court squarely applies to the present facts of the case. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show that the appellant/accused was actually, at the time of the commission of the act, of unsound mind or he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. In the absence of any evidence to the effect of either of the essential ingredients to claim the defence under Section 84 I.P.C., we find it difficult to accept the said claim and thus, that ground raised by the appellant's side also falls to the ground. 11. The further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that even assuming that the act of the appellant/accused was proved by the prosecution, it would not fall within the ambit of Section 300 I.P.C., murder, by no stretch of imagination, can be accepted for the simple reason that he has committed a heinous crime of killing an eight months old child by pouring kerosene and setting ablaze. Such a gruesome act cannot but be treated under the circumstances and termed only as murder warranting the punishment of life imprisonment as awarded by the trial Court. Hence, the judgment of the trial Court has got to be sustained and accordingly, it is sustained. The appeal is dismissed.