B. PRAKASH RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS matter is coming up before us for consideration on a reference made by one of us (bpr, j.) On the question as to, whether in an appeal filed at the instance of defendant against a decree obtained by the plaintiff for recovery of money, though not awarding interest, the appellate court can award interest in exercise of powers under Rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. in the absence of any appeal preferred by the plaintiff. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri M. S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel apearing for the appellants and Sri K. Subramanyam, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. ( 3 ) THE facts, which are not in dispute and in brief, are that the appellants herein are the defendants 1 and 2 and the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs herein is for dissolution of firm and rendering accounts against the defendant No. 1 and payment of amounts found due. After contest, a preliminary decree was passed dissolving the firm and fixing the liability to render accounts and the extent of shares held by the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 1 to 4. Subsequently, in pursuance of final decree proceedings, after considering the report of the commissioner, a final decree was passed holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 31,000/- from the defendant No. 1, on payment of the required court fee. Thereupon, the appellants herein filed a regular appeal wherein the lower appellate court, after hearing both sides, while partly allowing the appeal, reducing the amount to Rs. 15,932-93 ps. , has awared interest in favour of the plaintiffs, purported to be in exercise of powers under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. it is to be noticed that no appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs as against the decree of the trial court not awarding interest in their favour. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the appellants by placing reliance on a decision reported in Banarasi and others v. Ram Phal apart from other decisions which would be considered at a later stage, contended that in the absence of any appeal by the plaintiff, the lower appellate court could not have exercised the power under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. so as to grant such relief. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the respondents stressing more reliance on the decision of the division bench of this court in Makkala Narsimlu v. Gunnala Raghunandan Rao and another decision reported in chandramohan ramchandra patil and others v. Bapu koyappa patil and others sought to support the findings of the power appellate court in awarding the interest. ( 6 ) THUS, before we consider the question was referred, it necessitates to refer the relevant provisions under the code of civil procedure. Rule 33 of the order xli of the C. P. C. reads as follows:- "the appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees. " ( 7 ) THE other relevant rule which requires to be considered is rule 22 of order xli C. P. C. , which reads as follows:"any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the court below, in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the appellate court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the appellate court may see fit to allow. " ( 8 ) ON a reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is contemplated that the appellate court with a view to give complete Justice, can, in given circumstances, exercise the aforesaid powers and grant relief in spite the fact that no appeal has been filed by a party. And, the other provisions prescribe for preferring objections against any findings given. For a proper appreciation, it is necessary to refer to the following decisions. ( 9 ) IN the decision which has been relied on by the respondents Makkala Narsimlu v. Gunnala Reghunandan Rao (2 supra), it is a case where the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking for refund of the earnest money of Rs. 4,000/- in pursuance of the agreement entered into between the parties and for futher sum of Rs. 4,000/- by way of liquidated damages, and ultimately, a decree was granted by the trial court for refund of the earnest money and the claim for the damages of Rs. 4,000/- was rejected. However, no interest was granted on such amount. Therefore, the division bench of this court, by taking into consideration that the court below while awarding the said decree for Rs. 4,000/- by way of refund, awarded interest in exercise of powers under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. even though there is no appeal by the plaintiff. In this decision, no reference has been made to the earlier decisions considering the scope and powers under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. nor there appears to be any serious challenge. In this decision, no reference has been made to the earlier decisions considering the scope and powers under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. nor there appears to be any serious challenge. ( 10 ) IN another decision in State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh referred to in support of the plaintiffs, the court was considering the power to grant any relief in exercise of powers under article 142 of the constitution of India, which cannot be akin to the other appellate powers of the court as conferred under order xli rule 33 C. P. C. however, it was observed that the power conferred under rule 33 of order xli c. p. c, has to be exercised cautiously in rare cases where totally uncalled for decree/order has been passed by lower court and the appellate court cannot enlarge the scope of appeal in purported exercise of power under order xli rule 33 C. P. C. ( 11 ) IN Choudhary Sahu and others v. State of Bihar and others which has been placed reliance by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants, it was held that rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. do not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decress which had become final merely because the appellate court did not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from. It was a case arising out of land reforms proceedings and at one stage there was determination of the units to which the parties are entitled to. The state having not filed appeal, the appellate court sought to invoke rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. and reversed finding in regard to the allotment of units, which was held to be a manifest error in the absence of any appeal filed by the state and especilly when the same had become final and the rights of the state had come to an end to that extent by not filing any appeal or cross-objections within the period of limitation. ( 12 ) IN Venukuri Krishna Reddy and another v. Koti Rami Reddy and others, where the division bench of Madras high court, considering the powers under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. held as follows: "though o. 41 r. 33 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on courts to pass a decree in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal, there are, however, certain well defined principles in accordance with which that jurisdiction should be exercise. Normally, a party who is aggrieved by a decree, should, if he seeks to escape from its operation, appeal against it within the time allowed after complying with the requirements of law. Where he fails to do so, no relief should ordinarily be given to him under o. 41 r. 33. . . . . . But, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. One is where as a result of interference infavour of the appellant it becomes necessary to readjust the rights of other parties. A second class of cases based on the same principle is where the question is one of settling mutual rights and obligations between the same parties. A third class of case is when the relief prayed for is single and indivisible but is claimed against a number of defendants. In such cases, if the suit is decreed and there is an appeal only by some of the defendents and if the relief is granted only to the appellants there is the possibility that there might come into operation at the same time and with reference to the same subject- matter two decrees which are inconsistent and contradictory. This, however, is not an exhaustive enumeration of the classes of cases in which courts could interfere under o. 41 r. 33. Such an enumeration would neither be possible nor even desirable. ( 13 ) IN other decision relied on by the respondents/plaintiffs in K. Muthuswami Gounder v. N. Palannippa Gounder where both sides filed separate suits and ultimately by taking into consideration it as an exceptional case and on the special circumstances, it was held that the exercise of discretion was found proper. ( 13 ) IN other decision relied on by the respondents/plaintiffs in K. Muthuswami Gounder v. N. Palannippa Gounder where both sides filed separate suits and ultimately by taking into consideration it as an exceptional case and on the special circumstances, it was held that the exercise of discretion was found proper. ( 14 ) IN Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal (1 supra), once again considering the scope of rule 33 and 22 (1) of order xli C. P. C. , it was held as follows:"the C. P. C. amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended order 41 rule 22 (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-objection. A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross-objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross-objection. The amendment inserted by the 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analyzing the provision. There may be three situattions: (i) the impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent; (ii) the decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has been decided against the respondent; (iii) the decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the respondent, but there is a finding the judgment, which goes against the respondent. In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the respondent to file an appeal or take cross-objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the decree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any cross-objection. The law remains so post-amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitled not permit the respondent to take any cross-objection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. The law remains so post-amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitled not permit the respondent to take any cross-objection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. Under the amended CPC, read in the light of the explanation, it is still not necpssary for the respondent to take any crocs-objection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is entirely in his favour and he may support the decree without cross-objection; the amendment made in the text of sub-rule (1) read with expianation newly inserted, gives him a right to take cross-objection to a finding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while dealing with an issue. The advantage of perferring such cross-objection is spelled out by sub-rule (4 ). In spite of the original appeal having been withdrawn or dismissed for default the cross-objection taken to any finding by the respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to be respondent under the unamended CPC. In the pre-amendment era, the withdrawal or dismissal for defult of the original appeal disabled the respondent to question the correctness or otherwise of any finding recorded against the respondent". ( 15 ) IT wwas a suit for specific preformance seeking two reliefs and the court on refusal of larger one granted smaller one, holding to be not inseparably connected or necessarily depending on the other and therefore, it was held that the relief which has been refused, cannot be granted in exercise of powers under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the respondents sought to place reliance on Chandramohan Ramchandra Patil and others v. Bapu Koyappa Patil and others (3 supra) which arose out of a suit for partition and proceeding on the basis that in such suits the plaintiff and the defendant are parties of equal status and therefore, the court is not powerless to invoke rule 4 read with rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. , to do Justice between the parties by passing such order or decree which ought to have been passed already. Having regard to the facts therein, especially in a partition cause, every party being both plaintiff and defendant, the said decision cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Having regard to the facts therein, especially in a partition cause, every party being both plaintiff and defendant, the said decision cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. ( 17 ) IN Harihar Prasad Singh and others v. Balmiki Prasad singh and others, the case arose out of a suit for partition and it was held that where each one of the plaintiffs could have filed a suit for his share and the mere act that all of them joined together as plaintiffs and filed one suit does not mean that if for one reason or other the suit of one of them fails or abates the suit of the others fails or abates. The decree is in substance the combination of several decrees in favour of several plaintiffs. If in an appeal against the decree one of the plaitiffs is not added as a respondent, it only means that the decree in his favour cannot be set aside or modified even if the appeal succeeds against other plaintiffs in respect of their interest. There would in that case be no conflict between the decrees as the decree is a combination of many decrees ( 18 ) HAVING regard to these principles as laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it necessarily follows that the relief for the purpose of exercising any discretion under rule 33 of order xli c. p. c in respect of which no appeal having been filed should have a direct and inseparable link with the other relief so that without which the latter relief could not have been granted. ( 19 ) IN this case, in the final decree, the trial court did not award interest and no appeal has been filed by the paintiffs against it. It is only the defendants who has filed the appeal and wherein the lower appellate court sought to award the interest in exercise of discretion under rule 33 of order xli c. p. c. It is to be seen that the relief of interest stands quite independent of the main relief. Refusal of interest itself constitutes an independent and separable portion of decree, which requires to be appealed against and without which no relief could have been granted by the lower appellate court and therefore, the question of invoking the discretion under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. does not arise. Refusal of interest itself constitutes an independent and separable portion of decree, which requires to be appealed against and without which no relief could have been granted by the lower appellate court and therefore, the question of invoking the discretion under rule 33 of order xli C. P. C. does not arise. Admittedly, there being no appeal or even cross objections as contemplated under rule 22 of order xli C. P. C. , it can not be said that the plaintiffs shall be entitled to interest relief. In view of the principles down in venukuri krishna reddy s case ( 6 supra), and banarsi s case (1 supra), the decision of this court in makkala narasimulu s case (2 supra) cannot have any application to the facts of the case and does not lay down correct principles of law. ( 20 ) IT is represented across the bar that the respondents/plaintiffs had already paid court fee to the extent of grant of relief of interest. However, that itself would not in any way confer any right on the respondents/plaintiffs for the relief. In the circumstances, the reference is answered accordingly in negative. ( 21 ) HAVING regard to the above, office is directed to post the appeal before the learned single judge.