JUDGMENT 1. - Complainant petitioners (husband & wife) have challenged order dated 25.8.01 of CJM Tonk acquitting Kanhaiyalal (respondent No.2) of the charges Under Section 451 & 323, Indian Penal Code in Cr. Case No. 675/2K arising out of FIR No.8/89 registered at PS Kotwali (Tonk) on written complaint of petitioner No. 1 alleging inter alia that his wife was beaten by respondent No. 1 with a hammer blow on her abdomen and at that time, his tenant Nenulal came to rescue but he was also beaten up by causing hunter blow. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial court erred in law in ignoring the fact that due to animosity arising out of litigation pending between the parties, respondent No.2 had caused hammer (Hathodi) blow to petitioner No.2, which itself, proved the motive for the incident, and thereby erred in disbelieving prosecution version only on the ground of discrepancies whereas they were natural in reliable evidence on record. 3. Heard learned counsel for complainant petitioners at admission stage. Perused the impugned judgment and the record,which was called for by this court before admission of this petition. 4. Having considered rival contention and impugned findings of acquittal arrived at by the trial court, at the outset it is made clear that present revision petition is at the instance of complainant in a case proceeded on police report and in such cases, barring a few exceptions in criminal matters, the aggrieved party is the State which is custodian of social interests of community at large and so it is for the State to take all steps necessary for bringing the person acting against social interests of community to book, (See (1) Thakur Ram Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 911 ) , because once in a particular case, criminal investigation and prosecution is launched by the State, then, complainant in his individual capacity cannot be allowed to interact with courts of law by filing appeals or revisions subject to only one exception in cases of acquittal in rarest of rare cases. Criminal machinery cannot be allowed to be used by complainant in such cases to satisfy his bleeding ego or to wreak his vengeance with accused persons. (See (2) Bhupendra Kumar Vs. State ( 1996 CrLJ 3180 ) . 5. Criminal machinery cannot be allowed to be used by complainant in such cases to satisfy his bleeding ego or to wreak his vengeance with accused persons. (See (2) Bhupendra Kumar Vs. State ( 1996 CrLJ 3180 ) . 5. As regards revision petition against acquittal, the Apex Court considered the scope to interfere in the order of trial court in revisional jurisdiction in (3) Jagannath Choudhary Vs Ramayan Singh ( 2002 (5) SCC 659 ) and observed in para 10 as under : "It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can be said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power." 6. Again the Apex Court Lordships considered the scope of revision Under Section 397 and 401, CrPC in (4) Thankappan Nadar Vs. Gopala Krishnan ( 2002 (9) SCC 393 ) and in para 7 observed as under : "In our view, the emphasised portion of the aforesaid judgment is applicable in the present case. It is unfortunate that such a serious offence inspired by rivalry in the matter of election should go unpunished. However, that would not be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this court, which does not empower the court exercising revisional jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence." 7. Thus, as enunciated by the Apex Court in aforecited cases, where the acquittal order does not suffer from any procedural illegality or manifest error of law and the Court passing that order had not over looked the evidence clinching the issue, this Court in revisional jurisdiction cannot re-appreciatc the entire evidence and take a view to the contrary for setting aside the acquittal order. 8. Even otherwise, in view of sub-section (3) of section 401, CrPC the High Court cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, because as laid down in (5) Bindeshwari Prasad Singh Vs. 8. Even otherwise, in view of sub-section (3) of section 401, CrPC the High Court cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, because as laid down in (5) Bindeshwari Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar ( 2002 (6) SCC 650 ) , the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an acquittal order, except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. It has also been held in afore-cited. decision that the High Court will not be justified in interfering with an acquittal order merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence, or that on re-appreciation of evidence the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is found or held to be reliable whereas trial court had taken an opposite view. 9. Be that as it may, upon a careful perusal of the prosecution evidence, I find that Nenual named in FIR as having come to rescue but was beaten allegedly by accused, sustained only two abrasions of simple in nature & caused by blunt, and similarly no fusible injury was found on the person of petitioner No.2 who is alleged to have been caused by respondent No.2 with small hammer blow. Even cross report was also lodged by Kanhaiyala (Ex.D.2) on the very day of incident, i.e. 14.1.89, containing the factum of having long standing animosity on account of pending litigation between the parties. Thus the trial court has rightly held the prosecution evidence unworthy of credence in regard to place of incident so also cause of hammer blow or hunter one, warranting any conviction against respondent No.2. Thus, in my considered view, the judgment of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse, nor there was improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct or trial vitiating the trial itself. 10. In view of limited scope of revision as well as in the absence of any legal infirmity either in procedure or in conduct of trial in the instant case, I see no justification to interfere in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, in the impugned order of acquittal against the respondent.Consequently this revision petition is dismissed in limine.Petition Dismissed. *******