Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. The defendant-State is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the courts below arising out of a suit for possession tiled by the plaintiff-respondents. 2. The plaintiff was owner of land measuring 166 kanals 15 marlas situated at Shamgarh Tehsil and District Karnal. Gurinder Singh, father and natural guardian of plaintiffs executed a sale deed on 28.9.1956 in favour of Harjit Singh for a consideration of Rs. 19,000/- in respect of land measuring 118 kanals 6 marlas. Harjit Singh further sold the said land to State vide registered sale deed dated 1.3.1958 for Rs. 14,784.50p, whereas remaining land was sold to defendant No. 3. The plaintiff filed the present suit for possession on 3.10.1972 on the ground that at the time of sale of land by his father and natural guardian on 28.9.1956, the plaintiff was minor and thus the sale is ineffective qua his rights as effected without permission from the court guardian. 3. In evidence to prove his date of birth, the plaintiff has himself appeared as a witness as PW1 and produced Ex.P.1. The certified copy of pedigree table wherein the date of birth of the plaintiff is given as 16.8.1951. Said pedigree table is stated to be admissible in evidence in terms of the provisions of Punjab Jagir Act, 1941 and the provisions contained in para 172 of the Land Administration Manual. 4. On the basis of such proof of date of birth, the suit filed by the plaintiff for possession of the land stands decreed by the courts below. Still aggrieved against the said judgment and decree the State is in second appeal. While admitting the appeal on July, 18, 1980 the court found the following substantial questions of law arise in this appear for consideration: i) Whether the evidence consisting of a pedigree table contained in the register of Jagirs is legally admissible to prove the factum of the age of a person? ii) Whether the suit in the instant case was barred by limitation in view of the fact that the age given by the plaintiff-respondent was 18 years in 1968 and the suit was filed in September, 1971 after the expiry of more than 3 years of the plaintiff attaining the age of majority? ii) Whether the suit in the instant case was barred by limitation in view of the fact that the age given by the plaintiff-respondent was 18 years in 1968 and the suit was filed in September, 1971 after the expiry of more than 3 years of the plaintiff attaining the age of majority? iii) Whether the appellant State was protected by Section 41 of the Transfer of the Property Act, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case? 5. Before adverting to the respective contentions of the parties, the evidence on record be noticed. The plaintiff has appeared as PW1 and deposed that he was minor at the time of sale in the year 3956 and that his father was Jagirdar and Ex.P1 is the pedigree table from the register of Jagirdar. Ex.P1 is the certified copy of the Pedigree table obtained by the plaintiff on 16.10.1973. Said document is a copy of the register of Jagir Shamgarh and Singh family starting from Kirpal Singh. It also refers the date of birth and date of death of the persons named therein. 6. As per the said pedigree table, the appellant Sukhjit Singh, Gurjit Singh and Daljit Singh are reflected to be born on 16.8.1951, 20.11.1941 and 11.3.1940 respectively to Harinder Singh born on 4.9.1920. Harinder Singh had another brother Gurdial Singh born on 9.10.1934 who died on 9.9.1940. Gurdial Singh and Harinder Singh are sons of Gurbax Singh who was born on 22.8.1877 and died on 23.2.1943. On the basis of birth and death entries recorded in such pedigree table the plaintiff has sought to prove his date of birth as 16.8.1951. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that Ex.P.1 is not admissible in evidence nor the date of birth can be said to have been proved only on the basis of entries contained in such document. Reliance was placed on State of Bihar and Ors. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that Ex.P.1 is not admissible in evidence nor the date of birth can be said to have been proved only on the basis of entries contained in such document. Reliance was placed on State of Bihar and Ors. v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 684 to contend that the entries in such pedigree table are not proved to have been made by a public servant and even if such document is admissible in evidence, the plaintiff cannot succeed unless the primary evidence of the date of birth is led or evidence in support of such date of birth produced as such document can only be corroborative and not a substantive piece of evidence. It is pointed out that the plaintiff has not even pleaded that he is a Jagirdar and therefore, the entries of date of birth and death in the pedigree table are irrelevant. It is pointed out that Para No. 172 of the Land Administrative Manual relied upon by the plaintiff is in fact in respect of Cis Sutlej Jagir. The plaintiff is riot a Cis Sutlej Jagirdar and thus para 172 of Land Administration Manual is not applicable. 8. It is argued that none of the parents of the plaintiff has been examined as a witness nor any residents of the village has been examined to prove the date of birth. The entry from the hospital or municipal record nor from the school have been produced as the plaintiff appears to be an educated person which is apparent from the manner of signatures, appearing on the plaint and power of attorney. 9. In fact under the Punjab Chowkidara Rules framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 39-A of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, the chowkidar is to report of deaths and births which occur in the village and to furnish such other information in connection with vital statistics as may be required of him by the Deputy Commissioner from time to time. He is required to obtain signatures of the patwari of the circle on the death register within one week of his making entry of a death in the said register in token of patwaris having received the information about the occurrence. He is required to obtain signatures of the patwari of the circle on the death register within one week of his making entry of a death in the said register in token of patwaris having received the information about the occurrence. Thus, it is contended that the plaintiff having not produced the best evidence i.e. the entry from the register of chowkidar or the certificate from the school, the date of birth suggested to the plaintiff cannot be said to be proved. The best evidence which was in the knowledge of the plaintiff has been withheld and thus the courts below have erred in law in granting decree for possession. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent rebutted the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and stated that the plaintiff is a Jagirdar which is apparent from the recitals in the pedigree table Ex.P.1. The entries of date of birth and date of death therein have been made by the revenue official in the discharge of his official duties and therefore, the certified copy of the same is admissible in evidence. The State in its written statement has simply denied the averments made in the plaint and the denial in the written statement is evasive and therefore, the claim of the plaintiff is deemed to be admitted, 11. The first substantial question which arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff is a Cis Satluj Jagirdar to whom para No. 172 of the Land Administration Manual is applicable so as to make admissible the entries of date of birth and date of death relevant for the purpose of the present appeal. In Punjab Land Administrative Manual complied by Sir Douie Jagir is a grant of land revenue by the State to private individuals compendiously described as Jagir. The amount which a Jagirdar could take as the rulers share was only limited by his own judgment of the capacity of the cultivators to withstand oppression by force or to escape from it by assertion. Para 81 deals different kinds of Jagir. Said para reads as under: 81. In treating of the subject it will be convenient to deal separately with. (a) the territories included in the Punjab State as Maharaja Ranjit Singh bequeathed it to his successors. Para 81 deals different kinds of Jagir. Said para reads as under: 81. In treating of the subject it will be convenient to deal separately with. (a) the territories included in the Punjab State as Maharaja Ranjit Singh bequeathed it to his successors. Here a distinction must be drawn between the Jagir tenures of (1) Kangra and the tract between the Beas and Sutlej, comprising the present districts of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur, and (2) the district lying to the west of the Beas and Sutlej annexed later; (b) the Cis-Sutlej territory, the plains portion of which was taken under our protection in 1809 and the hill tract in 1815. This includes the present districts of Simla, Ambala, Ludhiana, Ferozepore (except the Fazilka Tehsil), and Tehsil Kaithal and Pargana Indiri in Karnal; (c) the Delhi and Bhatti territories conquered in 1803 and transferred from the North-Western provinces to the Punjab in 1858. These comprise the districts of Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Delhi, Tehsil Panipat and Pargana Karnal in Karnal, and Tehsil Fazilka in Ferozepore." 12. The relevant extract of para No. 172 relied upon by the plaintiff reads as under: 172. Every shareholder in a Cis-Sutlej Jagir required to report the birth of a son within a week of its occurrence in order that the necessary entry may be made in the genealogical tree. No investigation, public or private, should be instituted into the truth of the relationship of the child to his reputed father, when there are kinsmen in the line of succession to be jagir, unless they have moved in the matter in their own interest.........." 13. A perusal of the above shows that para 172 is applicable only to share holder in Cis-Sutlej Jagir, which was a plain portion under the British Government in the year 1809 and Hill track in 1815 including Tehsil Kaithal and Pargana Indri in Karnal. The land in dispute does not fall within Tehsil Kaithal or Pargana Indri nor Shamgarh is shown to be part of portion which was under the British protection in the year 1809. 14. In the absence of any pleading or evidence, that the plaintiff is a Jagirdar, his self-serving statement that he is a Jagirdar cannot be relied upon. As a matter of fact, the Jamabandis Ex.P.8 and P.9 produced by the plaintiff do not show that the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest were Jagirdars. 14. In the absence of any pleading or evidence, that the plaintiff is a Jagirdar, his self-serving statement that he is a Jagirdar cannot be relied upon. As a matter of fact, the Jamabandis Ex.P.8 and P.9 produced by the plaintiff do not show that the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest were Jagirdars. In fact, the land revenue is shown to be payable by them. Therefore, the argument that the date of birth entry by the revenue official in terms of para 172 of the Punjab Land Administration Manual will be an official act in normal course of duties and thus admissible in evidence is not sustainable in law. 15. On the other hand, as per Rule 22 of the Punjab Chowkidara Rules, it is the duty of the village headman and village watchman to maintain a death register and birth register and to report to the officer incharge of the police station of deaths and births. Rule 22 reads as under:- 22. It shall be the duty of the village headman and village watchman to maintain a death register and a birth register to report to the officer incharge of the Police Station within the limits of which his village or beat is situate, all deaths and births which occur in such village or beat, and to furnish such other information in connection with vital statistics as may be required of him by the Deputy Commissioner from time to time. He shall also obtain the signature of the patwari of the Circle on the Death Register within one week of his making the entry of a death in the said register in token of the patwaris having receiving information of the occurrence." 16. The plaintiff has not produced such record which was required to be maintained in terms and Rules framed under Section 39-A of Punjab Laws Act, 1872. Still further, the signature on plaint and vakalatnama does not show that the plaintiff is an illiterate person. The flow and manner of signatures leaves no manner of doubt that the plaintiff is a person who is well conversant in English language. The plaintiff has not produced any school record to support the said date of birth. Still further, the signature on plaint and vakalatnama does not show that the plaintiff is an illiterate person. The flow and manner of signatures leaves no manner of doubt that the plaintiff is a person who is well conversant in English language. The plaintiff has not produced any school record to support the said date of birth. Therefore, the best evidence having been withheld, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the entry in the genealogical tree in view of the Supreme Court judgment referred to above, wherein it was held as follows: "44. Thus, it is absolutely clear to us that the facts of that case are essentially different and clearly distinguishable from the nature of the document that Ex.J. is. Ex.J. cannot be regarded as an entry of the type which was the subject matter of Ghulam Rasul Khans case, (1925)52 Ind.App. 201:(A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 170) (supra). There is absolutely no corroboration of the facts mentioned in Ex.J., either by later entries or by any other document. There are a number of other facts mentioned in the judgment of the Privy Council (supra) which completely distinguishes that case from Ex.3 in the present case. At least this much is clear, as already indicated that in the Privy Council case there was positive evidence to show that the entry was acted upon for several years and that by process of elimination, the caste of the appellants as Mohal Rajputs was established. But, in the instant case there is absolutely no evidence to corroborate the recitals to Ex.J. by any contemporary or subsequent Government record. In our opinion, therefore, the decision relied upon by the counsel for the respondent is of no substance." 17. The entries in genealogical table are not conclusive of the facts stated therein. There is no supporting evidence in respect of the entries of the date of birth and death to prove that such entries. No order of any Revenue or judicial Courts have been produced to show the applicability of provisions of Jagirs or recognising the genealogical tree. Mo notification of establishing Jagir in favour of the ancestors of the plaintiff has been produced. No order of any Revenue or judicial Courts have been produced to show the applicability of provisions of Jagirs or recognising the genealogical tree. Mo notification of establishing Jagir in favour of the ancestors of the plaintiff has been produced. It has been held in the aforesaid judgments itself that there is a tendency on the part of an interested person or a party in order to grab, establish or prove an alleged claim, to concoct, fabricate or procure false genealogy to suit their ends, the Courts in relying on the genealogy put forward must guard themselves against falling into the trap laid by a serious of documents or a labyrinth of seemingly old genealogies to support their rival claims. The Court laid down the principles to rely upon genealogic which reads as under: 19. The principles admitted or proved to be old and relied on in previous cases are doubtless relevant and in some cases may even be conclusive of the facts proved but there are several considerations which must be kept in mind by the Courts before accepting or relying on the genealogies. (a) Source of the genealogy and its dependability. (b) Admissibility of the genealogy under the Evidence Act. (c) A proper use of the genealogies in decisions of judgments on which reliance is placed. (d) Age of genealogies. (e) Litigation where such genealogies have been accepted or rejected. (2) On the question of admissibility the following tests must be adopted. (a) the genealogies of the families concerned must fall within the four corners of Section 32(5) or Section 13 of the Evidence Act. (b) They must not be hit by the doctrine of post litem motam. (c) The genealogies or the claims cannot be proved by recitals, depositions, or facts narrated in the judgment which have been held by a long course of decisions to be inadmissible. (d) where genealogy is proved by oral evidence, the said evidence must clearly show special means of knowledge disclosing the exact source, time and the circumstances under which the knowledge is acquired, and this must be clearly and conclusively proved. 18. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to corroborate self-serving statement of the plaintiff and the pedigree table Ex.P.1. It is not considered appropriate to rely upon such predigree table. 18. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to corroborate self-serving statement of the plaintiff and the pedigree table Ex.P.1. It is not considered appropriate to rely upon such predigree table. Therefore, in respect of first question of law it is held that the date of birth entry in Ex.P.1 does not prove the factum of the birth of the plaintiff. 19. Admittedly, on the date of sale on 28.9.1956, the plaintiff was a minor. The suit has been field on 3.10.1972. As per the case set up, the date of birth of the plaintiff is 16.8.1951. Thus he attains the age of 18 years on 15.8.1989. Any alienation in respect of minors property could be avoided by minor within a 3 years of his attaining majority. Thus he could file suit to avoid the alienation on or before 15.8.1972. Thus having filed the suit after the expiry of 3 years on October 3, 1972, such suit is clearly barred by limitation. The limitation to avoid a sale transaction at the instance of minor is 3 years from the date of attaining majority in terms of Article 60 of the Limitation Act and thus the suit having been field after 3 years is not maintainable. It has been so held by Hon ble Supreme Court in Vishwambhai and Ors. v. Laxminarayana (Dead) through LRs and Anr., A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2607 wherein the minor who had attained majority on 5,8.1975, the suit challenging the alienation having been filed after 3 years is not maintainable. In the said case the plaintiff sought to set aside the transfer by seeking amendment of the plaint in December, 1985 and the said amendment was not allowed as the limitation for challenging the alienation had expired. It was held to the following effect: "9. On a fair reading of the plaint, it is clear that the main fulcrum on which the case of the plaintiffs was balanced was that the alienations made by their mother-guardian Laxmibai were void and therefore, liable to be ignored since they were not supported by legal necessity and without permission of the competent court, on that basis the claim was made that the alienations did not affect the interest of the plaintiffs in the suit property. The prayers in the plaint were inter alia to set aside the sale deeds dated 14.11.1967 and 234.10.1974, recover possession of the properties sold from the respective purchasers, partition of the properties carving out separate possession of the share from the suit properties of the plaintiffs and deliver the same to them. As noted earlier, the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court accepts the case of the plaintiffs that the alienations in dispute were not supported by legal necessity. They also held that no prior permission of the Court was taken for the said alienations. The question is in such circumstances are the alienations void or voidable? In Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, it is laid down, inter alia, that the natural guardian shall not, without previous permission of the Court, transfer by sale any part of the immovable property of the minor. In Sub-section (3) of the said section it is specifically provided that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of Sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. There is, therefore, little scope for doubt that the alienations made by Laxmibai which are under challenge in the suit were voidable at the instance of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were required to get the alienations set aside if they wanted to avoid the transfers and regain the properties from the purchasers. As noted earlier in the plaint as it stood before the amendment the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds was not there, such a prayer appears to have been introduced by amendment during hearing of the suit and the trial Court considered the amended prayer and decided the suit on that basis. If in the law the plaintiffs were required to have the sale deeds set aside before making any claim in respect of the properties sold then a suit without such a prayer was of no avail to the plaintiffs. In all probability realising this difficulty the plaintiffs filed the application for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds. Unfortunately, the realisation came too late. Concededly, plaintiff No. 2 Digamber attained majority on 5th August, 1975 and Viswambhar, plaintiff No. 1 attained majority on 20th July, 1978. In all probability realising this difficulty the plaintiffs filed the application for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds. Unfortunately, the realisation came too late. Concededly, plaintiff No. 2 Digamber attained majority on 5th August, 1975 and Viswambhar, plaintiff No. 1 attained majority on 20th July, 1978. Though the suit was field on 30th November, 1980 the prayer seeking setting aside of the sale deeds was made in December, 1985. Article 80 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for setting aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward, by the ward who has attained majority and the period is to be computed from the date when the ward attains majority. Since the limitation started running from the dates when the plaintiffs attained majority, the prescribed period had elapsed by the date of presentation of the plaint so far as Digamber is concerned. Therefore, the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit filed by Digamber. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit was not challenged by him. Even assuming that as within time the entire suit could not be dismissed on the ground of limitation, in the absence of challenge against the dismissal of the suit filed by Digamber the first appellate Court could not have interfered with that part of the decision of the trial Court. Regarding the suit filed by Vishambar it was filed within the prescribed period of limitation but without the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds. Since the claim for recovery of possession of the properties alienated could not have been made without setting aside the sale deeds the suit as initially filed was not maintainable. By the date the defect was rectified (December, 1985) by introducing such a prayer by amendment of the plaint the prescribed period of limitation for seeking such a relief had elapsed. In the circumstances the amendment of the plaint could not come to the rescue of the plaintiff." 20. Therefore, the suit having been filed after three years of attaining majority even as per the claim set up by the plaintiff, the suit is clearly beyond the period of limitation in terms of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground as well. 21. Therefore, the suit having been filed after three years of attaining majority even as per the claim set up by the plaintiff, the suit is clearly beyond the period of limitation in terms of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground as well. 21. In respect of third substantial question of law, it may be noticed that in the sale deed dated 28.9.1956 the sale has been effected by the father of the minor plaintiff. Father of the minor could not be called an ostensible owner as the sale deed itself recites the name of the true owner, therefore, the appellant is no protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, but in view of the findings on other issues, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 22. In view of findings recorded above, the appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below is set aside, The suit is dismissed with no order as to costs.