T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) INASMUCH as these petitions emanate from the same proceedings in P. R. C. No. 24 of 2003 on the file of XVII Metropolitan magistrate, Hyderabad, and as similar questions of law and fact are involved, they can be disposed of together. ( 2 ) THE second respondent in all these petitions is the ate facto complainant who filed the criminal complaint alleging the offences punishable under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for brevity the IPC ) and Sessions 3 (1) (viii), (ix), (x) and 3 (2) (v) and (vii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of atrocities) Act, 1989 (for brevity the Act ) qua a-1, A-4 to A-7, A-2 and A-3 in the case, who are the petitioners respectively in these petitions. ( 3 ) THE facts lie in a narrow compass, The de facto complainant belongs to the scheduled Caste and he is a retired government servant. According to the complainant, the house bearing No. 1 -1 -258/ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 10/1 situate at main road, chikkadapally, is a joint family property of the complainant and his brothers by name harikishan and Pandu Reddy and the complainant used to manage the same. The said property consists of shops and residential portions. The deceased in this case was the son of Harikishan. The said Harikishan who was in the occupation of the house after having vacated the same was staying outside. He sold the malgies bearing No. 1 -1 -258/7 to 10 and 10/1 and the residential house to the accused 4 to 6 in the year 1991. In connection with the said properties, the complainant filed a civil suit in O. S. No. 118/1985 for declaration on the file of the I Additional judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. He also filed two more suits in O. S. Nos. 888/1994 and 890/1994. On the other hand, A-5 filed two suits in O. S. Nos. 889/1994 and 891/ 1994. Under a common Judgment dated 20-11 -1996, suits in O. S. No. 118/1985, 888/ 1994 and 890/1994 were decreed with costs and suits filed by A-5 in O. S. No. 889/1994 and 891/1994 were dismissed. 888/1994 and 890/1994. On the other hand, A-5 filed two suits in O. S. Nos. 889/1994 and 891/ 1994. Under a common Judgment dated 20-11 -1996, suits in O. S. No. 118/1985, 888/ 1994 and 890/1994 were decreed with costs and suits filed by A-5 in O. S. No. 889/1994 and 891/1994 were dismissed. ( 4 ) IT is alleged inter alia in the complaint that formerly A-1 was the Assistant commissioner of Police, A-2 was the inspector of Police, Begum Bazaar, and A-3 was the Sub-Inspector of Police, chikkadapally. A-1 used to interfere with the civil litigation by misusing his official position for the best reasons known to him and A-4 to a-6 used to abet him for illegal gains. A-1 used to torture the complainant, and his nephew and his family members physically and mentally and used to abuse them in the name of their caste. In that connection, the complainant and his family members gave number of complaints to higher officials of a-1 who by then was working as Circle inspector of Police, Chikkadapally. A-4 to a-6 filed number of criminal cases against the complainant and his family members. All those criminal cases ended in acquittal. ( 5 ) WHILE things stood thus, the marriage of the deceased was performed on 23-06-2002. On 25-06-2002, 17-07-2002 and 10-08-2002 it is alleged that A-1 to A-3 came to his house, abused them in the caste name and took them away to the Chikkadapally police station. They insulted him in the name of his caste and assaulted them on those three days continuously on the ground that criminal cases were pending against them. On 12-08-2002 all the accused came to the house of the complainant and took him away along with the deceased to the Chikkadapally police station whereat both of them were abused in the caste name and assaulted. A-1 and A-3 demanded money from the complainant in the presence of A-4 and further they told him that they would be coming to the premises and the complainant should pay the amount and if the complainant failed to pay the amount, the doors would be broken open and would be handed over to A-4. They were beaten black and blue and the deceased was thrown out of the police station in that condition. The deceased died at 5. They were beaten black and blue and the deceased was thrown out of the police station in that condition. The deceased died at 5. 30 a. m. in the early morning on 13-08-2002 at Apollo hospital, Hyderguda. The complainant gave several complaints to the higher officials of the Police, Home Minister and the Governor but no action was taken on those reports. The complainant, therefore, filed a private complaint on 24-07-2003. ( 6 ) AFTER conducting enquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity the Cr. P. C. ), the learned Magistrate by his docket order dated 10-12-2003 took the complaint on file under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and Section 3 (1) (x) of the act registered the same as P. R. C. No. 24/ 2003 and directed issuance of summons on payment of process to the accused. ( 7 ) THOSE proceedings are now sought to be quashed on the premises that it is nothing but a false complaint filed without any material particulars as to when and where the complainant and the deceased were abused in the name of their caste; and that it was not at all a case of homicidal death of the deceased as he died due to cardiac arrest and as there was no semblance of evidence to show that he sustained any injuries; and that the complaint was taken on file without any application of mind by the learned magistrate and without going through the contents of the complaint or the sworn statements of the witnesses recorded and, therefore, it is nothing but a sheer abuse of the process of Court. ( 8 ) AFTER examining the complainant as p. W. 1 and four more witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 5 and recording their sworn statements, the learned Magistrate passed the following docket order on 20-12-2003,"complainant is present and as per the contents of complaint and sworn statements of complainant and witnesses, there is prima facie case made out against the accused for the offences under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and Section 3 (1) (x) of the scs and the STs (Prevention of atrocities) Act. Therefore, the case is taken on file for the offences under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and Section 3 (1) (x) of the SCs and the STs (Prevention of atrocities) Act. Therefore, the case is taken on file for the offences under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and Section 3 (1) (x) of the SCs and the STs (Prevention of atrocities) Act. Registered as PRC 24/ 2003. Issue Summons to accused on payment of process. Call on 26-04-2004". ( 9 ) THE deceased in this case died obviously on 13-08-2004 at 5. 30 a. m. in apollo Hospital, Hyderguda, due to cardiac arrest. While itwas alleged by the complainant that the complainant and the deceased were beaten black and blue in the police station and the deceased was thrown out of the police station in that condition; and that on the next day the deceased died due to cardiac arrest in the hospital; there was no evidence to show that the deceased died a homicidal death. There is no material on record to show that the deceased sustained any external injuries on the body ultimately leading to death albeit due to cardiac arrest. Nonetheless, the complainant alleges that it was a case of murder of the deceased by custodial violence and abusing the complainant and the deceased in the name of their caste besides putting them to torture and harassment mentally and physically and by filing false criminal cases. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the above factual matrix and the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel the following questions would arise for my determnation in this case. (1) Whether there is any prima facie case appearing on record attracting the offence punishable under section 302 read with 34 of the IPC? (2) What is the scope of enquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the cr. P. C. ? (3) Whether it is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance without assigning any reasons and direct the process to be issued? ( 11 ) FOR brevity and better understanding of the matter it is always expedient to advert to the relevant provisions of law in the first instance. Sections 200 to 204 of the Cr. P. C. are germane to be considered at this stage. While Section 200 deals with the procedure to be followed when a complaint in writing is preferred before the Magistrate; Section 201 contemplates a situation where that magistrate has no jurisdiction and procedure to be followed by him in such contingencies. Sections 200 to 204 of the Cr. P. C. are germane to be considered at this stage. While Section 200 deals with the procedure to be followed when a complaint in writing is preferred before the Magistrate; Section 201 contemplates a situation where that magistrate has no jurisdiction and procedure to be followed by him in such contingencies. Sections 202 to 204 are important and it is better they are extracted hereunder thus,"202. Postponement of issue of process,- (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself ordirect an investigation to be made by a police off icer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made,- (A) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of sessions or (B) where the complaint has not been made by a court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath, provided that if it appears to the magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of session, he shall call upon the complaint to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer-in-charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant. 203. Dismissal of complaint,-If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing. 204. 204. Issue of process,- (1) If in the opinion of Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be- (a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of section 87. " ( 12 ) SECTION 202 of the Cr. P. C. envisages an enquiry to be conducted by the Magistrate while postponing the issue of process so as to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding in the complaint. In the event the enquiry reveals that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, the complaint shall end in dismissal. If for any reason, the enquiry reveals that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the process would be issued under Section 204 of the cr. P. C. While dismissing the complaint the magistrate is obliged to record briefly his reasons for dismissing the complaint. But such an obligation has not been envisaged under Section 204 of the Cr. P. C. while directing the process to be issued. ( 13 ) TURNING to the law on the point, in vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji ghadigaonker, a three Judge Bench of the apex Court held in para 9 thus,"the general scheme of the aforesaid sections is quite clear. Section 200 says inter alia what a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall do on receipt of such a complaint. Section 200 says inter alia what a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall do on receipt of such a complaint. Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; in other words, the scope of an inquiry under the section is limited to finding out the truth or falsehood of the complaint in order to determine the question of the issue of process. The inquiry is forthe purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint, that is. for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage; for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him. only when a process has issued and he is put on trial. Section 203. be it noted, consists of two parts, the first part indicates what are the materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. Section 204 says that if in the opinion of the Magistrate there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall take steps for the issue of necessary process. "again in para 10 it was held thus,"it is manifestly clear from the provisions of Section 203 that the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry. The section itself makes that clear, and it is not necessary to refer to authorities in support thereof. But the judgment which the Magistrate has to form is whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This does not mean that the Magistrate is bound to accept the result of the inquiry or investigation or that he must accept any plea that is set up on behalf of the person complained against. But the judgment which the Magistrate has to form is whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This does not mean that the Magistrate is bound to accept the result of the inquiry or investigation or that he must accept any plea that is set up on behalf of the person complained against. The Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgment. In arriving at his judgment he is not fettered in any way except by judicial considerations, he is not bound to accept what the inquiring Officer says, nor is he precluded from accepting a plea based on an exception, provided always there are satisfactory and reliable materials on which he can base his judgment as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding on the complaint or not. If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of an enquiry under Section 202 and has applied his mind judicially to the materials before him, we think that it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted by him in arriving at his judgment. What bearing such a plea has on the case of the complainant and his witnesses, to what extent they are falsified by the evidence of other witnessesall these are questions which must be answered with reference to the facts of each case. No universal rule can be laid in respect of such questions. "that was a case where on facts Section 202 the Magistrate directed enquiry to be conducted by Inspector, CID, who eventually submitted his report exonerating the accused on the premise that the act done by him was in exercise of the right of private defence. Considering the material on record, namely, the statements of witnesses examined during the course of enquiry and the report of the inspector, ultimately held that the accused had exercised the right of private defence. ( 14 ) IN Pramatha Nath v. Saroj Ranjan the apex Court considered the scope of enquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. Considering the material on record, namely, the statements of witnesses examined during the course of enquiry and the report of the inspector, ultimately held that the accused had exercised the right of private defence. ( 14 ) IN Pramatha Nath v. Saroj Ranjan the apex Court considered the scope of enquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. In para 48 it was held thus,"the scope of enquiry under Sec. 202 is limited to finding out the truth or otherwise of the complaint in order to determine whether process should issue or not and Section 203 lays down what materials are to be considered for the purpose. Under Section 203 Criminal procedure Code the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses and the result of the investigation or enquiry if any. He must apply his mind to the materials and form his judgment whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. "at page 892 in para 28 the Apex Court while consider its earlier Judgment in Ramgopal ganpatrai v. State of Bombay held thus,"the expression "sufficient grounds" occurring in Sections 209, 210 and 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not mean sufficient grounds for the purpose of conviction, but means such evidence as is sufficient to put the accused person upon trial by the jury. In sections 203 and 204. Criminal procedure Code, the expression is "sufficient ground for proceeding" which really means sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint. Sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint is one matter and sufficient ground for convicting an accused person is quite a different matter. It is this distinction which has to be kept in mind. " ( 15 ) HOWEVER, a four Judge Bench of the apex Court in Chandra Deo Singh v, Prokash chandra Bose in para 13 held thus,"on the basis of these observations it was urged that this court has held that a Magistrate has the power to weigh the evidence adduced at the enquiry. As we read the decision, it does not lay down an inflexible rule but seems to hold that while considering the evidence tendered at the enquiry it is open to the magistrate to consider whether the accused could have acted in self defence. As we read the decision, it does not lay down an inflexible rule but seems to hold that while considering the evidence tendered at the enquiry it is open to the magistrate to consider whether the accused could have acted in self defence. Fortunately, no such question arises for consideration in this case but we may point out that since the object of an enquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether the allegations made in the complaint are intrinsically true, the Magistrate acting undersection 203 has to satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In order to come to this conclusion, he is entitled to consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in an enquiry under section 202. or statements made in an investigation under that section, as the case may be. He is not entitled to rely upon any material besides this. By "evidence of other witnesses" the learned judges had apparently in mind the statements of persons examined by the police during investigation under section 202. It is permissible under section 203 of the Code to consider such evidence along with the statements of the complainant recorded by the magistrate and decide whether to issue process or dismiss the complaint. The investigation in that case was made by the police under Section 202, Cr. P. C. at the instance of the Presidency magistrate. Apparently, the statements of the various witnesses questioned by the police were self-contradictory. That being the case, it was open to the presidency Magistrate to considerwhich of them to accept and which to reject. The enquiring Magistrate has not stated nor has the High Court found in the case before us that the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant and his own evidence were self-contradictory and, therefore, it could not be said that there was anything intrinsically false in the allegations made in the complaint. "the Supreme Court in a way though not disapproved its earlier Judgment in Vadilal panchal s case held that, that was an observation made in view of the facts of that case and such a question fortunately had not arisen in the case on hand. "the Supreme Court in a way though not disapproved its earlier Judgment in Vadilal panchal s case held that, that was an observation made in view of the facts of that case and such a question fortunately had not arisen in the case on hand. ( 16 ) NOW, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Chandra deo Singh s case, which is a four Judge bench Judgment, it is obvious that what is open to the Magistrate while acting under section 203 is to satisfy himself as to whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding and in order to come to such conclusion, he is entitled to consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in an enquiry under section 202, or statements made in an investigation under that section, as the case may be, but he is not entitled to rely upon any materials besides this. ( 17 ) IT is also apt to consider the judgment of the Apex Court in Nagawwa v. V. S. Konjalgi. The facts in that case show that the police of Gokak Police Station submitted a charge-sheet against Nagappa giddannavar and seven others under sections 302, 114, 148, 147 and other sections of the IPC on the allegations that on july 19, 1973 the accused persons had waylaid and murdered one Nagappa son of the appellant. The appellant, who did not appear to have been satisfied with the investigation by the Police, filed a complaint before the Magistrate at Gokak alleging that the respondents 1 and 2 had in fact abetted the offence of murder committed by the other accused but as they were influential persons their names were deliberately left out in the report as also in the dying declaration. On receiving the complaint, the Magistrate conducted an enquiry in the course of which six witnesses had been examined. Having been satisfied that the evidence recorded so far was sufficient for the Court to determine the question as to whether or not the process should be issued, he adjourned the case for arguments. But, in the meanwhile, he was transferred. His successor, after hearing the complainant, directed that further enquiry be made by the Superintendent of Police, belgaum. The appellant carried the matter in revision to the High Court. But, in the meanwhile, he was transferred. His successor, after hearing the complainant, directed that further enquiry be made by the Superintendent of Police, belgaum. The appellant carried the matter in revision to the High Court. The High Court remitted the matter to the Magistrate and directed him to decide the case in accordance with the law after recording further evidence, if any. After hearing both sides afresh, the magistrate by his order directed process to be issued against the respondents 1 and 2. The respondents 1 and 2 then preferred a revision before the Court which was allowed by it. In the appeal before the Supreme court, it was contended that the order of the magistrate was perverse and the case was full of patent absurdities and was politically motivated. In para 2 of its Judgment, the apex Court held thus,"it is well settled by a long catena of decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one. "the Apex Court referred to its earlier judgments in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya dulaji Ghadigaonker and Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose (referred to supra ). Upon considering the above two Judgments, the Apex Court held in para 4 thus,"the scope of the inquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal procedure is extremely limitedlimited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court, (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out, and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. "adverting to the contention of the learned counsel that in determining whether the complaint is false the court can go into the question of the broad probabilities of the case or intrinsic infirmities appearing in the evidence, the Apex Court held in para 5 thus,"it is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. "in the process, the Apex Court laid down the following indicia with reference to which the order directing issuance of process be quashed," (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". Applying those principles, the Apex Court on facts held that, that was not at all a case where the High Court should have quashed the proceedings. Applying those principles, the Apex Court on facts held that, that was not at all a case where the High Court should have quashed the proceedings. ( 18 ) IN Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan in para 9 the Apex Court held thus,"at the stage of Sections 203 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of session, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 of the criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge levelled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" against the accused. At this stage, the magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. . . . . . . A fortiori, at the stage of sections 202/204. if there is prima facie evidence in support of the allegations in the complaint relating to a case exclusively triable by the Court of session, that will be a sufficient ground for issuing process to the accused and committing them for trial to the Court of session. "in para 10, the following observations have been made,"the standard for ascertaining whether or not the evidence collected in the preliminary inquiry discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused is lower than the one to be adopted atthe stage of framing charges in a warrant case triable by the magistrate, is now evident from the scheme of the new Code of 1973. "[emphasis is mine] ( 19 ) IN State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar piraji Kalpatri the Apex Court has taken a different view. In para 22 it was held thus,"in fact, the question of mala fides in a case like the present is not at all relevant. "[emphasis is mine] ( 19 ) IN State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar piraji Kalpatri the Apex Court has taken a different view. In para 22 it was held thus,"in fact, the question of mala fides in a case like the present is not at all relevant. If the complaint which is made is correct and an offence had been committed which will have to be established in a court of law, it is of no consequence that the complainant was a person who was inimical or that he was guilty of mala fides. If the ingredients which establish the commission of the offence or misconduct exist then, the prosecution cannot fail merely because there was an animus of the complainant or the prosecution against the accused. Allegations of mala fides may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. In the instant case, specific averments of facts have been made whereby it was alleged that the respondent had disproportionately large assets. Mala fide intention of the appellant in launching prosecution against the respondent with a view to punish him cannot be a reason for preventing the court of competent jurisdiction from examining the evidence which may be led before it, for coming to the conclusion whether an offence had been committed or not. Allegations of mala fides were also made in p. P. Sharma case [1992 SCC (Cri.) 192] against the informer. It was held by this Court that when an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings. "[emphasis is mine] ( 20 ) IN Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Specialjudicial magistrate the Apex Court held in para 28 thus,"summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. "[emphasis is mine] ( 20 ) IN Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Specialjudicial magistrate the Apex Court held in para 28 thus,"summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and is witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. "[emphasis is mine] in Pepsi Foods case (referred to supra) the apex Court has gone a step forward and held that the Magistrate has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and evidence both oral and documentary led in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bring charge home to the accused. This observation appears to be inconsistent with the other authoritative pronouncement of the Apex court particularly the four Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Chandra Deo singh s case (referred to supra ). ( 21 ) IN S. W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar the Apex Court in para 15 held thus,"in case of a complaint under section 200 Cr. ( 21 ) IN S. W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar the Apex Court in para 15 held thus,"in case of a complaint under section 200 Cr. P. C. or IPC a Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence made out and then has to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any, to as certain whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused to issue process so that the issue of process is prevented on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass. Such examination is provided in order to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding. The words "sufficient ground" used under section 203 have to be construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the accused and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction". [emphasis is mine] the Apex Court considered its earlier judgments in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal; Nagawwa v. Veeranna (referred to supra); Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha; and Madhavrao jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao chandraojirao Angre. ( 22 ) FROM the above it is obvious that the object of an enquiry under Section 202 of the cr. P. C. is to ascertain whether the allegations made in the complaint are intrinsically true and to ascertain whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the persons concerned. At that stage, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. In order to come to this conclusion, he is entitled to consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in an enquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. or statements made in an investigation made under that Section, as the case may be. He is not entitled to rely upon any. material besides this. It is manifestly clear from the provisions of Section 203. ( 23 ) IT is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion on the merits and demerits of the case. He is not entitled to rely upon any. material besides this. It is manifestly clear from the provisions of Section 203. ( 23 ) IT is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion on the merits and demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry is limited thus only to the ascertainment of truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint - (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court; (ii)for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. However, the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complainant or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a. very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The standard to be adopted by the magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges, that is to say, about the existence of prima facie case in support of the allegations made in the complaint relating to the case in question and as to whether that is sufficient for issuing process to the accused. However, the standard for ascertaining whether or not the evidence collected in the preliminary enquiry discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused is lesser than the one to be adopted at the stage of framing charges in a warrant case triable by the Magistrate is now evident from the scheme of the new code of 1973. Sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint is one thing and sufficient ground to convict an accused person is quite a different thing. At that stage the prosecution cannot fail merely because there was an animus of the complainant orthe prosecution against the accused. Allegations of I mala fides may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. Allegations of I mala fides may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. The words "sufficient ground" used under Section 203 have to be construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the accused and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. ( 24 ) THIS then takes us to consider the next question as to whether the Magistrate is expected to give reasons at the time of issuing process. ( 25 ) IN Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West bengal it was held in para 12 thus,"the time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial". ( 26 ) IN U. P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Limited a complaint was filed by the State Pollution Control Board against M/s. Mohan Meakins Limited complaining that it was discharging trade effluents into Reiver "gomati" and thereby polluting the said river. The complaint was taken on file and process was issued against the company. That was questioned before a sessions Judge on the premise that the order directing process to be issued was lacking in reasons. That order was quashed and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration. The Chief Judicial Magistrate thereupon passed a detailed order and directed process to be issued. The revision filed challenging the same was dismissed by the High Court. That order was quashed and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration. The Chief Judicial Magistrate thereupon passed a detailed order and directed process to be issued. The revision filed challenging the same was dismissed by the High Court. In appeal by special leave, the Apex Court following its earlier judgment in Kanti Bhadra Shaah s case held in para 6 thus,"in a recent decision of the Supreme court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons, vide Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W. B. [ (2000) 1 SCC 722 ]. The following passage will be apposite in this context, (SCC p. 726, para 12) "12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial". ( 27 ) IT may be mentioned here that under section 200 of the Cr. P. C. upon recording the sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses, if any, the court can proceed to issue process to the accused and where the complainant is a public servant, there is no need even to record the statement of the complainant and the Court can straight away direct process to be issued provided in either case the court is satisfied about the prima facie case. However, the Court may while postponing the issue of process against the accused, enquire into the case either by itself or directing an investigation be made by a police officer or by such other person, as it thinks fit, so as to satisfy itself as to the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint eventually to see whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding further in the case. If the enquiry reveals no prima facie case, the Court would dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of the Cr. P. C. at once. If the Court feels that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further in the case, it can direct process to be issued under Section 204 of the Cr. P. C. The enquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. is not a sine qua non. The apex Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah s case (referred to supra) has taken the view that reasoned order need not be passed by issuing process, remanding the accused to custody and passing over to next stages in the trial for the reason that the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. The same view has been reiterated in U. P. Pollution Control Board s case (referred to supra ). Under Section 203 of the Cr. P. C. the Magistrate shall briefly record his reasons while dismissing the complaint. No such obligation has been envisaged under Section 204 of the Cr. P. C. while directing the process to be issued. That may buttress the view that there is no obligation on the part of the Magistrate to record reasons while directing the process to be issued. However, in Nagawwa s case (referred to supra), as discussed herein above, what has been observed is that it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case. In Pepsi Food s case the Apex Court held that the order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. In kanti Bhadra Shah s case the earlier two judgments in Nagawwa s case and Pepsi food s case have not been referred to. In Pepsi Food s case the Apex Court held that the order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. In kanti Bhadra Shah s case the earlier two judgments in Nagawwa s case and Pepsi food s case have not been referred to. All said and done, one shall not be obvious of the fact that the order directing the process to be issued is a judicial order. Although the order directing the process to be issued need not be a detailed order, certainly, it shall manifest the necessary satisfaction reached by the Magistrate in support of a prima facie case. So as to avoid the comment of arbitrariness, it is expedient that the order manifests visibly the necessary application of mind of the Magistrate by assigning briefly the reasons in support thereof albeit it is not the requirement of law. ( 28 ) KEEPING in view the above broad principles, it is to be seen whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused by directing the process to be issued in the instant case. The uncontroverted averments made in the complaint show that there has been civil litigation between the parties inter se, that is, the complainant and the deceased on one side and the respondents 4 to 7 on the other side and that the respondents 1 to 3 interfered with the said civil litigation. The complainant and the deceased were taken to the police station and the respondents 1 to 3 resorted to custodial violence and abused the complainant and the deceased in the name of their caste. On the previous day of the death of the deceased, again the complainant and the deceased were taken to the police station and the deceased was beaten blue and black by the respondents 1 to 3 and in that condition he was thrown out of the police station. The deceased on the next day died in the hospital due to cardiac arrest. The offences alleged against the petitioners are under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 (1) (viii), (ix), (x) and 3 (2) (v) and (vii) of the Act. The deceased on the next day died in the hospital due to cardiac arrest. The offences alleged against the petitioners are under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 (1) (viii), (ix), (x) and 3 (2) (v) and (vii) of the Act. To show that the deceased was done to death, it must be in the first instance imperative to show that the deceased died a homicidal death and that death was result of an intentional act to kill the person on the part of the accused. Here in this case, except the averments made in the complaint and the statement of the complainant, there has been no medical evidence to buttress the same. On the other hand, it is a case where the death was due to cardiac arrest. Medical evidence appears to be so inconsistent with the oral testimony of the complainant and the averments made in the complaint. Even to show that it was a case of murder, when the evidence intrinsically does not show that it was a case of homicidal death, there is no reason to believe that it is a case of a homicidal death even by an ordinary prudent person. When that test is not satisfied, it cannot be said that prima facie it is a case of murder. By any standards it cannot legitimately be concluded that the deceased was done to death given the statements of the witnesses recorded in this case by the learned Magistrate although the material on record may attract the offence of custodial violence punishable under the relevant provisions of the IPC. It may be reiterated here that the very enquiry is to see whether the allegations made inter alia in the complaint are true or not but not the case of the complainant is true or not. Having due regard to the indicia laid down by the Apex court in Nagawwa s case (referred to supra), the inescapable conclusion appears to be that the learned Magistrate has not exercised his discretion judiciously in directing the process to be issued without there being any evidence or material in support of the averments made in the complaint. Therefore, the complaint insofar as the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC is concerned, shall have to be quashed. Therefore, the complaint insofar as the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC is concerned, shall have to be quashed. ( 29 ) AS regards the offence punishable under various provisions of Section 3 of the act, it is to be seen whether those provisions too are attracted or not. In view of the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the averments made in the complaint and having regard to the test to be applied to see whether there is a prima facie case to issue the process against the accused for those offences, it cannot be concluded unlike in the other case that absolutely there is no evidence in support of the averments made in the complaint. The cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate and the process directed to be issued against the accused for those offences cannot, therefore, be considered as illegal or arbitrary. ( 30 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the Criminal petitions No. 1436, 1621, 1622 and 1653 of 2004 are allowed in part and the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w 34 of the ipc is hereby quashed.