GHULAM MOHAMMED, J. ( 1 ) SINCE these two appeals arise out of the common judgment and the substantial questions of law in the appeals as also the parties are one and the same, they are being disposed of by common judgment. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of brevity, the parties are referred as arrayed in O. S. No. 131 of 1991. Appellants in S. A. No. 92 of 1997 are the defendants in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 while appellants in S. A. No. 429 of 1997 are plaintiffs 2 to 4, who are legal representatives of Plaintiff No. 1 in O. S. No. 62 of 1991 on the file of Principal subordinate Judge, Kurnool. In other words, plaintiff in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 is defendant in O. S. No. 62 of 1991 whereas the defendants in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 are plaintiffs in O. S. No. 62 of 1991. ( 3 ) O. S. No. 131 of 1991 was filed by the defendant in O. S. No. 62 of 1991 seeking declaration of his title to the house bearing No. 9 / 1, Kallur Village, kurnool District whereas O. S. No. 62 of 1991 was filed by Defendants in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 seeking decree for specific performance of agreement dated 15-1-1982 directing the defendant - plaintiff in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 to settle the account in respect of construction of house and loan thereof and also to receive the balance of half-share, if any, from the legal representatives of the defendant, who are Plaintiffs 2 to 6 and further, execute a registered document in their favour. ( 4 ) DURING pendency of suit O. S. No. 131 of 1991 defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record while plaintiff therein died during the pendency of second appeals and his legal representatives were brought on record. ( 5 ) THE facts in brief may be narrated thus: The plaintiff in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 seeks declaration of title to the house bearing nos. 9/1 and 9/2 and direction to Defendants 2 to 5 to vacate the House No. 9/1. The plaintiff claims that he purchased Plot No. 12 from one J. Mounamma on 2-7-1971 for a sum of Rs. 9/1 and 9/2 and direction to Defendants 2 to 5 to vacate the House No. 9/1. The plaintiff claims that he purchased Plot No. 12 from one J. Mounamma on 2-7-1971 for a sum of Rs. 1,000/- and having been employed in Postal Department, the Post Master general, Hyderabad, sanctioned loan of rs. 14,000/-for construction of houses. Thus, the plaintiff got two houses constructed with the help of loan and other savings and recovery was made from his salary from March, 1975 onwards. After the loan was cleared, the house was re-conveyed and as such, he is the absolute owner of the houses bearing nos. 9/1 and 9/2 from 4-2-1986 onwards. ( 6 ) IT is the case of plaintiff that he had allowed the first defendant along with defendants 2 to 6 to occupy the house bearing No. 9/1 when Defendant No. 1, who is his elder brother, was dismissed from service, with specific understanding that he will have to vacate as soon as the entire construction was over, but Defendant No. 2 alone was continuing in the said house after the death of first defendant even though registered notice was issued on 26-3-1986 to vacate the House No. 9/1. Thus, the defendants refused to vacate and set up an agreement dated 15-1-1982 allegedly executed by the plaintiff on non-judicial stamp paper gifting the houses to his mother. Hence, O. S. No. 131 of 1991 was filed seeking declaration of title and possession of the property and also direction to vacate the house in question. ( 7 ) DEFENDANT No. l filed written statement in O. S. No. 131 of 1991 admitting that the loan is taken by the plaintiff after completing the formalities, but stated that the defendant also contributed equally towards construction of two houses - one for the plaintiff and the other for defendant. It is further stated that Defendant No. l had been paying his share of instalment towards discharge of loan every month and as such, the buildings are not constructed with loan amount only. It is also stated that the plaintiff and Defendant No. l agreed before construction of houses that defendant will take western portion bearing D. No. 9/1 and plaintiff will take eastern portion bearing D. No. 9/2. It is also stated that the plaintiff and Defendant No. l agreed before construction of houses that defendant will take western portion bearing D. No. 9/1 and plaintiff will take eastern portion bearing D. No. 9/2. The Defendant No. l averred that the plaintiff executed stamped agreement on 15-1-1982 mentioning that he had purchased the site with joint funds; that after loan is fully discharged, he will execute a registered document and that he had deliberately handwritten in the agreement that he is giving up his rights in favour of his mother with effect from 15-1-1982. Subsequently, the mother of plaintiff and defendant executed a will on stamped paper bequeathing the two portions in favour of plaintiff and Defendant no. l each and thus, the plaintiff is also aware of the fact that defendant is in possession and enjoyment of house bearing no. 9/1 in his own right. Therefore, the plaintiff is estopped from going back en his own admission in the said agreement. The Defendant No. l also stated that the site was purchased with the amount realised by the sale of joint family properties. ( 8 ) THE Defendant No. l in O. S. No. 131 of 1991, who is plaintiff in O. S. No. 62 of 1991 pleaded that the plot in Sy. No. 762/ a -3 in Kallur Village was purchased with joint family funds, but the plot was registered in the name of plaintiff so that he could secure loan from the department as per rules. As the loan amount would not be sufficient to construct two houses, both the plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 jointly sold 59 cents of land in Sy. No. 996-B in Kampli village standing in the name of defendant under a registered sale deed No. 737 dated 22-7-1974 for Rs. 6,000/- and also sold a house situated in Pattikonda, which is in the name of their mother, under registered sale deed No. 690 dated 7-3-1975 for Rs. 3,300/- and utilised the sale proceeds for construction of houses in question. The specific case of defendant No. 1 is that he had also contributed amount for construction of the houses and he occupied House No. 9/1 soon after its construction and continued to reside therein as absolute owner and also paying taxes and that the construction was completed with the funds belonging to the joint family and loan. The specific case of defendant No. 1 is that he had also contributed amount for construction of the houses and he occupied House No. 9/1 soon after its construction and continued to reside therein as absolute owner and also paying taxes and that the construction was completed with the funds belonging to the joint family and loan. Further, the plaintiff also executed stamped agreement on 15-1-1982 containing all the above facts, including the plaintiffs promise to execute registered document in favour of Defendant no. l. The plaintiff is alleged to have suppressed the contents of agreement dated 15-1-1982 and set up absolute title for the two houses. It is also stated that the oral agreement was acted upon by taking the sale deed by paying from the funds belonging to both plaintiff and defendant for the purpose of obtaining the loan from the Postal Department. Thus, the defendant No. l occupied House No. 9/1 while plaintiff occupied House No. 9/2 and the plaintiff had given up his rights over both the houses in favour of his mother and the mother in turn willed the two houses - one in favour of the plaintiff and the other in favour of the Defendant No. l. Therefore, the Defendant No. l seeks to settle the final accounts of loan instalments and the plaintiff to receive balance of the share to enable execution of registered document in respect of the house. ( 9 ) THE Trial Court framed necessary issues in both the suits in the light of above pleadings. Plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and got marked Exs. A-1 to A-33 while defendants got examined DWs. 1 to 5 and marked Exs. B - 1 to B - 25. After analysing the pleadings and the evidence on record, the Trial Court held that the site was purchased by the plaintiff alone under ex. A-1 with his own funds and the site was not purchased with the joint funds belonging to the plaintiff and defendant. Further, the Trial Court disbelieved that amount realised by sale of land in Kampli and house in Pattikonda had been spent for construction of the two houses in question. The Trial Court categorically held that even the house tax receipts as also the electricity bills are issued in the name of the plaintiff and being paid by him. Further, the Trial Court disbelieved that amount realised by sale of land in Kampli and house in Pattikonda had been spent for construction of the two houses in question. The Trial Court categorically held that even the house tax receipts as also the electricity bills are issued in the name of the plaintiff and being paid by him. Thus, the Trial Court refused to accept the plea of the defendant that the transaction under Ex. A-1 is benami in the absence of any evidence in that regard. The Trial Court in regard to execution of Ex. B-24, which is the agreement executed by the plaintiff in favour of Defendant No. l and also Ex. B-25 will executed by mother of plaintiff and defendant, held that Ex. B-24 is executed voluntarily, but the endorsement had nullified it and that the mother does not derive any title to the property and therefore, she has no right to execute the will Ex. B-25. Apart from that, Ex. B-24, which is the basis for defendants, cannot be enforced in view of ambiguity in the terms of agreement and also material alteration. In these circumstances, the Trial Court decreed the suit O. S. No. 131 of 1991 for declaration of title in respect of D. No. 9/1and delivery of vacant possession, but dismissed O. S. No. 62 of 1991 for specific performance of agreement dated 15-1-1982. The lower appellate Court on re-appreciation of evidence on record upheld the decision of the Trial Court. ( 10 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the rival contentions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side, it may be noticed that in view of the common judgment, the substantial questions of law in both the appeals are raised in S. A. No. 92 of 1997 alone. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals submits that the plaintiff (in O. S. No. 131 of 1991), who was examined as PW-1 deposed that he had executed ex. B-24 agreement and subsequently, he made an endorsement in his own handwriting. As such, Ex. B-24 can be said to be executed by the plaintiff. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals submits that the plaintiff (in O. S. No. 131 of 1991), who was examined as PW-1 deposed that he had executed ex. B-24 agreement and subsequently, he made an endorsement in his own handwriting. As such, Ex. B-24 can be said to be executed by the plaintiff. He also submits that when the terms of agreement are vague, then the document must be so construed as to give effect to the original intention of the parties and the subsequent endorsement has to be severed and in such case, the Courts below ought to have granted decree for specific performance. ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants further submits that admittedly the endorsement is subsequently made, and even if it is taken into account, the agreement, as in the instant case, is capable of being made certain, and such agreement is enforceable in law particularly in view of the fact that appellants - defendants are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Learned Counsel further contended that PW-1 admitted the contents of Ex. B-24 agreement and therefore, he is bound by the recitals therein and such document cannot be brushed aside on the ground that the terms therein are uncertain and as such unenforceable in the eye of law. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants has drawn my attention to the decision in rajkishor v. Banabehari, AIR (38) 1951 orissa 291, wherein it was observed as follows:"where a written contract for sale of land is silent about the price and the time for performance, the contract is not void for uncertainty, if it is one that can be made certain within the meaning of Section 29. If on evidence it is found that parties agreed to payment of a reasonable and fair price and complete the contract within the reasonable time, the Court can imply such terms in the contract and determine what is reasonable price and what is reasonable time. "learned Counsel for appellants also relied upon the judgment in Chandrasekhar v. Gopi Nath, AIR 1963 All 248 , and it is appropriate to extract hereunder the relevant portion:"the purpose of Section 29 is to ensure that the parties to a contract should be aware of the precise nature and scope of their mutual rights and obligations under the contract. "learned Counsel for appellants also relied upon the judgment in Chandrasekhar v. Gopi Nath, AIR 1963 All 248 , and it is appropriate to extract hereunder the relevant portion:"the purpose of Section 29 is to ensure that the parties to a contract should be aware of the precise nature and scope of their mutual rights and obligations under the contract. There are many agreements in which the exact obligations of one of the parties cannot be measured at the time of the agreement but can be ascertained afterwards. Illustration (e) of Section 29 of indian Contract Act is an example of such an agreement. Though the cost of construction was not known to the parties at the time of agreement, the agreement was capable of being made certain, and in fact became certain when the construction was completed and the amount spent was known, and hence the agreement was not void for uncertainty under Section 29. "he also relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in D. T. Mangalamurti v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 639 , for the proposition that the Court has jurisdiction to construct the terms of agreement in fair and equitable manner in case of uncertainty and the agreement cannot be held as void for uncertainty. He has also cited the judgment in Khivraj Chordia v. E. S. Eastern INC, AIR 1975 Mad. 374 , wherein it was held as under:". . . that the mandate of the covenant is that the parties shall mutually agree for the payment and acceptance of the rent which has to be fixed with reference to the rent prevailing in the locality. It cannot be said that such rent cannot be found or it would be impossible for the parties to agree upon the just rent so found. . . . . In determining the objections founded on the alleged uncertainty of a term in a contract, the test is not whether the term is in itself certain but whether it is capable of being made certain. Id cerium est quod reddi certum potest (That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain ). Notwithstanding the restrictions and qualifications imposed by operation of technical rules, a liberal construction of written documents is to be made because of the simplicity of the laity, and with a view to carry out the intention of the parties and uphold the document. Notwithstanding the restrictions and qualifications imposed by operation of technical rules, a liberal construction of written documents is to be made because of the simplicity of the laity, and with a view to carry out the intention of the parties and uphold the document. Words used in written instruments ought to be made subservient, not contrary to the intention of the parties. "learned Counsel for the appellants also cited the decisions in Veera Exports v. T. Kalavathy, AIR 2002 SC 38 , Gowramma v. Chenga Reddy, (1965) I An. WR 429, m. Ahamed Koya v. E. Murugesa Son and Company, AIR 1958 Kerala 195, and ram Sukh Das v. Hafiz-Ul-Rahman, AIR (32) 1945 Lahore 177. In Veera Exports case (supra) the Apex Court held that an invalid cheque can be re-validated voluntarily by altering the date so as to give fresh life to cheque. Thus, it is always a question of fact whether the material alteration was made by the drawer himself and whether it was made with the consent of the drawer. It requires evidence to prove the aforesaid question whenever it is disputed. ( 14 ) IN Gowramma case (supra) this court held that when there is a conflict between two clauses in a deed and are irreconcilable, the earlier clause overrides the latter. Unlike in a will, in deeds, inter vivos it is the earlier clause that prevails and if the later clause is repugnant to the earlier one and has the effect of nullifying it, it is the first one that prevails. In M. Ahamed koya (supra) Kerala High Court observed that a party to a contract is not entitled in law to cancel a concluded contract unilaterally. Having entered into an agreement, it is not open to the defendant to resile from the same on untenable grounds as he pleases. Therefore, such a cancellation has no effect in law. In Ram Sukh Das (supra), it was held as follows:"any alteration or interpolation appearing on the face of a document is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have been made before the execution of the deed. The onus therefore to show that the interpolation was made later on would lie on the contesting executant more particularly when the deed was registered with the alleged interpolation already in it. If an addition to a deed is not material, the instrument is not vitiated. The onus therefore to show that the interpolation was made later on would lie on the contesting executant more particularly when the deed was registered with the alleged interpolation already in it. If an addition to a deed is not material, the instrument is not vitiated. An alteration made in good faith to carry out the original intention of the parties does not vitiate the instrument. Where it is admitted that it had been agreed between the parties at the time of drawing up the mortgage deed that the executant should act as agent of his mother, an addition intended to carry out this agreement between the parties would not vitiate the deed. "learned Counsel for the appellants lastly relied upon the decision in K. Ambunhi v. H. G. Bhandary, AIR 1995 SC 2491 , wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with interpretation of the clauses in a Will, held as under:"the rule of interpretation of the will are different from the rules which govern interpretation of other documents say, for example, a sale deed or a gift deed or a mortgage deed or, for that matter any other instrument by which interest in immovable property is created while in these documents if there is any inconsistency between the earlier or the subsequent part or specific clauses inter se contained therein, the earlier part will prevail over the later as against the rule of interpretation applicable to a will under which the subsequent part, clause or portion prevails over the earlier part on the principle that in the matter of will the testator can always change his mind and create another interest in place of the bequest already made in the earlier part or on an earlier occasion. Undoubtedly it is the last will which prevails. A will may contain several clauses and the later clause may be inconsistent with the earlier clause, in such a situation the last intention of the testator is given effect to and it is on this basis that the later clause held is to prevail over the earlier clause. This is regulated by well known maxim: cum duo inter se pugnantia reperiuntur in testamento untimum ratum est, which means that if in a will there are two inconsistent provisions the later shall prevail over the earlier. This is regulated by well known maxim: cum duo inter se pugnantia reperiuntur in testamento untimum ratum est, which means that if in a will there are two inconsistent provisions the later shall prevail over the earlier. " ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for respondents submits that both the Courts below concurrently found that the terms of agreement in Ex. B-24 are not capable of being performed in view of the subsequent endorsement made by the executor, PW-1, and as such, the agreement is void. He has drawn my attention to Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, which reads as follows:"effect of novation, rescission and alteration of contract : If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed. "learned Counsel for respondents further submits that the scope "of interference in second appeal under Section 100 of code of Civil Procedure is limited to the extent of substantial question of law. In the instant case, all the legal and factual aspects with regard to Ex. B-24 have been elaborately dealt with by both the courts below and as such, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned judgment. He relied upon the decision of the Kerala high Court in Nair Service Society v. R. M. Palat, AIR 1966 Ker. 311 , wherein it was held as follows:"in order to enable a Court to decree specific performance of a contract the terms of the contract must be clear, definite, certain and complete. The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness and ambiguity so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be supplied by the Court. In a contract for sale if there is no statement in the contract regarding the price to be paid, the law allows a standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, a fair or, reasonable price is recoverable on the basis of a term to be implied in the contract. But when the terms of a contract exclude that a reasonable or a fair market price was intended by the parties, it is not possible to imply such a term. A contract to sell at a fair price or at a fair valuation or to let out a property, for a reasonable rent or a fair or a proper rent is specifically enforceable. A contract to sell at a fair price or at a fair valuation or to let out a property, for a reasonable rent or a fair or a proper rent is specifically enforceable. "learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the decision in Loonkaran sethia v. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336 , wherein the Supreme Court, while considering the effect of material alteration in a deed without consent of the party liable under it, held as follows:"if an alteration (by erasure, interlineation or otherwise) is made in material part of a deed after its execution by or with the consent of any party to or a person entitled under it, but without the consent of the party or party liable under it, the deed is rendered void from the time of alteration so as to prevent the person who has made or authorised the alteration and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce against any party bound by it, who did not consent to the alteration any obligation covenant or promise thereby undertaken or made. A material alteration, is one which varies the rights, liabilities or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state or otherwise where is the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the- deed as originally executed. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. "learned Counsel for the respondents also relied upon the decision in Krishnanand v. State of M. P. , AIR 1977 SC 796 , wherein the Supreme Court while dealing with the benami transaction held:"the burden of showing that a particular transaction is benami and the owner is not the real owner always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstance unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick wheel which cannot be easily pierced through. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick wheel which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests on him nor justified the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises as a substitute for proof. It is not enough merely to show circumstances, which might create suspicion because the court cannot decide on the basis of suspicion. It has to act on legal grounds established by law. "learned Counsel for respondents has cited the decision in Kalappa Devara v. Krishna mitter, AIR (32) 1945 Mad. 10, for the proposition that the document must be clear on the face of it and the suit on the document, which is unclear must fail by the reason of Section 29 of Indian Contract act. Further, the decision of this Court in v. Kameswara Rao v. Hemalathammarao, air 1959 AP 596 , is to the effect that section 19 of Specific Relief Act posits the existence of a valid contract to enforce specifically while finding is that it was broken by the defendant. But, in a case where the claim of the plaintiff is being rejected not on the ground that it is not a fit case for specific performance but on the ground that they are not entitled to put in suit an agreement which has been materially altered, the plaintiff cannot claim damages on the basis that defendant was guilty of breach of the contract as it had originally stood. Thus, the suit document which has been materially altered is disqualified from putting in the suit. ( 16 ) THIS being the second appeal, the substantial questions of law to be decided are whether Ex. B-24 agreement is void in spite of admission of its execution by the executor and the endorsement on the agreement, which is not in consonance with the terms in Ex. B-24; whether such contract can be made capable of being ascertained and enforced by the decree of court; whether Ex. B-24 agreement is void in spite of admission of its execution by the executor and the endorsement on the agreement, which is not in consonance with the terms in Ex. B-24; whether such contract can be made capable of being ascertained and enforced by the decree of court; whether Ex. B-24 can be rendered void, though materially altered by the executor/plaintiff vide endorsement in his own handwriting, when he is bound by the agreement to execute registered sale deed in favour of Defendant No. 1; whether the provisions of Sections 18 and 21 of indian Evidence Act can be applied to decide the consideration as per terms of Ex. B-24 agreement. ( 17 ) IT is seen from the facts of the case that the entire case of appellants - defendants rests on Ex. B-24 agreement, and as such, the substantial questions of law as framed in the second appeals relate to Ex. B-24. In order to declare Ex. B-24 void or legally valid and enforceable, it is necessary to examine the terms of the agreement and therefore the substantial questions of law rafted in the appeals involve both questions of fact and law. Ex. B-24 agreement dated 15-1-1982 originally executed by the plaintiff would reveal that the site in question was purchased by the plaintiff and defendant who have equally contributed towards the sale consideration; that the loan was obtained by the plaintiff for construction of suit house in two portions and the plaintiff was taking share of the defendant towards discharge of loan and also the use of amount arising from the sale of land in Kampli Village and the house in Pattikonda in that regard. But, the plaintiff categorically denied that he never executed the agreement voluntarily, but stated that he was forced to sign the agreement dated 15-1-1982 at the instance of his mother, who threatened to commit suicide if he does not part with house bearing No. 9/1 in favour of the defendant No. 1. However, the scribe of ex. B-24 by name A. Mukunda Rao was examined to prove Ex. B-24. He categorically stated that the plaintiff signed Ex. B-24 in his presence on each page of the document and there was no threat by anybody or any inducement at the time of execution of Ex. B-24. A. Mukunda rao is an independent witness and he is in no way interested in the case. B-24. He categorically stated that the plaintiff signed Ex. B-24 in his presence on each page of the document and there was no threat by anybody or any inducement at the time of execution of Ex. B-24. A. Mukunda rao is an independent witness and he is in no way interested in the case. The trial Court has elaborately dealt with the attendant circumstances at the time of execution of Ex. B-24 in Para-15 of its judgment. Thus, the execution of Ex. B-24 by the plaintiff was held to be voluntary. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, it is seen that Ex. B-24 agreement contains the endorsement at the bottom of Page No. 4. The said endorsement in effect stipulates that the plaintiff has relinquished his rights, in writing with free will, over the above two portions in favour of his mother D. Kamalamma and the possession of the said portions has been delivered with effect from 15-1-1982 and thereafter, the plaintiff or his family members will not have any right over the said property. In the light of this endorsement Ex. B-24 agreement appears ambiguous. Thus, on one hand, the original agreement stipulates the site in question was purchased by the plaintiff and defendant who have equally contributed towards the sale consideration and the loan was obtained by the plaintiff for construction of suit houses in two portions and the plaintiff was taking share of the defendant towards discharge of loan and also the use of amount arising from the sale of land in Kampli Village and the house in pattikonda in that regard, and on the other hand, the endorsement of the plaintifl stipulates that he is relinquishing his rights over the two portions and the possession is delivered on 15-1-1982. ( 19 ) THE endorsement made later in ex. B-24 has changed the intent and entire complexion of the agreement. The endorsement per se will render Ex. B-24 void and ineffective. ( 19 ) THE endorsement made later in ex. B-24 has changed the intent and entire complexion of the agreement. The endorsement per se will render Ex. B-24 void and ineffective. The contentions of the learned Counsel for appellants cannot be countenanced for the reason that the endorsement implies in the agreement that the plaintiff and his family members are relinquishing his rights over the two houses and as such, it implies that he was the owner of two houses whereas the original intention of the agreement was that plaintiff and defendant equally contributed towards the construction of two houses and the defendant was paying his share of loan etc. , and therefore, the earlier terms of the agreement are in contrast to the endorsement later made. Thus, the endorsement made in Ex. B-24 has materially altered the agreement and such agreement cannot be enforced by a decree of Court. From the terms of the agreement including the endorsement, the intention of the parties cannot be determined or measured. In these circumstances, both the Courts below rightly held that Ex. B-24 is not capable of being made certain and as such void in the eye of law. ( 20 ) A plain reading of Ex. B-24 agreement even without the endorsement would reveal that after discharge of loan obtained from the Postal Department and settlement of accounts, the plaintiff would execute a registered deed in respect of half portion of the suit house. Even as per the terms of agreement, the accounts have to be settled for execution of document on a future date. Further, no accounts are produced by the defendants to ascertain any amount payable to the plaintiff. Thus, the terms of the agreement are so vague that legal obligation cannot be created upon the plaintiff. Therefore, the terms of the agreement in Ex. B-24 are vague and not certain and incapable of being made certain and the agreement is hit by the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act and the same is not enforceable by a decree of Court. On this ground also, the suit for specific performance has to fail and both the Courts below rightly dismissed the said suit. ( 21 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for appellants that when there is no dispute with regard to execution of Ex. On this ground also, the suit for specific performance has to fail and both the Courts below rightly dismissed the said suit. ( 21 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for appellants that when there is no dispute with regard to execution of Ex. B-24, the suit filed by appellants ought to be decreed cannot be accepted for the reason that the endorsement had materially altered the agreement thereby making it incapable of being performed. It may be noticed here that there is nothing on record to show that the defendants- appellants have taken steps pursuant to the endorsement calling upon the plaintiff to execute fresh document. This conduct of the defendants, in effect, shows that they have substituted a new contract and have rescinded the original contract and in such case, Ex. B-24 is covered by the provisions of Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act. It is well settled principle of law that the disputed document must be read and taken as whole but not in part. In the circumstances, Ex. B-24 suffers from legal infirmities and as such the same is not enforceable. ( 22 ) THE decisions relied upon by the counsel for the appellants in the cases of rajkishor (supra) and Chandrasekhar (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In the case on hand, the agreement is not capable of being made certain in the light of the endorsement which materially altered the agreement and therefore has nullifying effect of the original agreement. Further, the judgments in D. T. Mangalamurti case (supra) and khivraj Chordia case (supra) cannot help the appellants - defendants for the reason that the plaintiff in Ex. B-24 agreed to execute the registered document in favour of his elder brother in respect of house bearing No. 9/1, but the endorsement made in Ex. B-24 agreement is to the effect that the plaintiff had relinquished his rights over two houses bearing Nos. 9/1 and 9/2 in favour of the mother. Thus, the terms of ex. B-24 agreement are contradicting each other and hence, the agreement is void. B-24 agreement is to the effect that the plaintiff had relinquished his rights over two houses bearing Nos. 9/1 and 9/2 in favour of the mother. Thus, the terms of ex. B-24 agreement are contradicting each other and hence, the agreement is void. In the same manner, the other decisions relied upon by the Counsel for appellants have no relevance to the instant case for the reason that the facts are different and in the case on hand, the endorsement later made was acted upon by the mother of plaintiff by executing the will and in any case, the endorsement had materially altered the agreement and created uncertainty in the agreement and therefore, the agreement is void. Both the Courts below have given cogent and convincing reasons for arriving at the concurrent decision. In the above circumstances, the appeals fail and are liable to be dismissed. ( 23 ) THE second appeals are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.