Honble GOYAL, J.–This is the tenants second appeal arising out of a suit for arrears of rent and eviction. (2). The plaintiff-respondent No.1 instituted a civil suit for arrears of rent and eviction on 22.7.1982 against the appellant and his nephew Sh. Nand Lal (respondent No.2) with the averments that the suit shop was let-out to the defendants for a period of 15 years on 23.3.1967. Monthly rent agreed upon was Rs. 35/-. Eviction was sought on the ground that the plaintiffs son Shyam Lal of 24 years of age would start his cloth business. (3). Vide amended plaint, an additional ground of eviction was added that the defendants have failed to pay the rent for 13 moths after institution of the suit. (4). Vide written statement, the tenancy was admitted, but the grounds of eviction were denied. (5). Issues were framed. Evidence was recorded. Vide judgment dated 13.4.1993 learned Additional Munsif No.1, Alwar giving the benefit of the first default in payment of rent decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement. First appeal preferred by one of the tenants Shyam Sunder was dismissed by learned Additional District Judge No.1, Alwar vide impugned judgment dated 28.4.1998. Concurrent findings of two courts below have now been assailed by the defendant in the instant second appeal. (6). Following substantial questions of law were framed by this Court on 24.7.1998:- (i) That the finding of Issue No.1 is based on no evidence and wrong tests have been applied. In the facts and circumstances of this case no case of alleged necessity was established. If so, whether the impugned judgment and decree of both the courts below are not sustainable in law? (ii) That for deciding Issue No.4 regarding comparative hardship wrong tests have been applied and in fact if the disputed shop will be got vacated the defendant will suffer grater hardship. Whether finding on Issue No.4 is sustainable in law? (7). Both the questions co-relate, hence are taken up together. Section 13(1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) provides that where the premises are required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord for the use of occupation of himself or his family, a decree of eviction shall be passed. (7). Both the questions co-relate, hence are taken up together. Section 13(1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) provides that where the premises are required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord for the use of occupation of himself or his family, a decree of eviction shall be passed. Section 14 (2) of the Act provides that no decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. (8). These facts are not in dispute that the plaintiffs husband Sh. Girdhari Lal is occupying the adjoining shop of the suit shop. The defendant No.2 nephew and co-tenant of the defendant No.1 started his separate business in 1974 and since then only the defendant No.1 is in occupation of the suit shop. (9). According to the statement of the plaintiff Smt. Narbada Devi her husband Girdhari Lal is carrying on cloth business in adjoining shop, her eldest son Mukesh is in service of L.I.C., her youngest son is a student in B.A. classes and the suit shop is required for her son Shyam Lal to carry on cloth business. Presently, her son Sh. Shyam Lal is serving at his fathers shop on payment of Rs. 400/- per month and they have no other shop. P.W.2 Girdhari Lal husband of the plaintiff, P.W. 3 Ramesh Chand Singhal, P.W. 4 Shyam Lal, for whose requirement the eviction was sought, P.W.5 Jayanti Prasad, P.W.6 Inder Lal and P.W.7 Hardwari Lal supported the statement of the plaintiff. According to the statement of the defendant Shyam Sunder he is carrying on his business of fans, radio etc. in the suit shop along with his sons and in the adjoining shop Girdhari Lal and his son Shyam lal carry on their cloth business and he has no other shop. D.W. 2 Jagdish Prasad and D.W. 3 Navneet Lal, D.W.4 Surjan Singh and D.W. 5 Krishna Kumar have corroborated the statement of D.W.1. (10). in the suit shop along with his sons and in the adjoining shop Girdhari Lal and his son Shyam lal carry on their cloth business and he has no other shop. D.W. 2 Jagdish Prasad and D.W. 3 Navneet Lal, D.W.4 Surjan Singh and D.W. 5 Krishna Kumar have corroborated the statement of D.W.1. (10). The trial court having taken into consideration the entire evidence came to this conclusion that PW2 Girdhari Lal is doing cloth business in the adjoining shop, that his son Shyam Lal is a paid employee in that shop, that the defendant failed to prove plaintiffs desire to increase the rent, that the defendant No.2 started his business separately in 1974, the defendant Shyam Sunder vide registered sale deed Ex.5 dated 21.7.1992 purchased one shop in the name of his two sons Krishna Kumar and Harish Chandra. Thus, the plaintiffs requirement for her son was held to be reasonable and bonafide and that grater hardship would be caused to her in comparison to the tenant. (11). The First Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and it further observed that even if it is assumed that Shyam Lal is not an employee in the shop of his father girdhari Lal, even then Sh. Shyam lal has a right to carry on his separate business from his father. (12). Mr. Sharma, senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that it is a case of mere desire and not of genuine requirement and thus decree of eviction was wrongly passed. He placed reliance upon Govind Ram vs. Abdul Wahab (1), wherein it was held that a decree of eviction can not be based on mere wish or desire of the landlord and the court has to view reasonable and bonafide requirement objectively. In Sadiq Ali vs. Sagarmal (2), it was held that mere fact that the tenant acquired another shop is no ground to eject him. (13). It was also contended that the plaintiffs husband Girdhari Lal has got vacant possession of the other shop from its tenant M/s. Prabhu Dayal Nawal Kishore and during the pendency of the first appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was moved on behalf of the appellant to place on record a copy of the suit filed by Sh. Girdhari Lal against other tenant, but that application was rejected and this rejection also involves a substantial question of law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed upon Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (3), wherein it was held that the construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the right of the parties necessarily raises a question of law. Similar view was taken in Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs. Sampati Subba Rao (4) and Hira Lal and Another vs. Gajjan and Others (5). (14). Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent No.1 contended that two courts below arrived at concurrent findings of the facts and there is no perversity in the same. he placed reliance upon Akhileshwar Kumar and Others vs. Mustaqim and Others (6), wherein it was held that educated unemployed son was in need of setting himself independently in business and simply because he was provisionally assisting his father in family business does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. (15). I have considered the above submissions and the impugned judgments in the light of the judgments relied upon and am of the view that both the courts below arrived at concurrent findings on issues No. 1 & 4 having considered the entire evidence in a proper way and no case of applying wrong tests has been made out. Further, the First Appellate Court rightly observed that copy of the other suit filed by Girdhari Lal against other tenant is not relevant to decide this case as the other suit was filed by Sh. Girdhari lal for the requirement of his other son Mahesh to carry on business as a Commission Agent in foodgrains. Therefore, both the questions of law are decided against the appellant. It is also held that the rejection of the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. by the First Appellate Court was justified. (16). Girdhari lal for the requirement of his other son Mahesh to carry on business as a Commission Agent in foodgrains. Therefore, both the questions of law are decided against the appellant. It is also held that the rejection of the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. by the First Appellate Court was justified. (16). One application under Section 151 C.P.C. was filed on behalf of the appellate in this Court with a prayer that no issue with regard to partial eviction was framed by the trial court which was essential in view of Section 14 (2) of the Act, therefore, this case should be remanded back to the trial court fro framing an additional issue, to record the evidence and then to decide the same. He placed reliance upon Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Mitar Singh (7). It was also submitted that three judgments of this Court reported in Bhanwar Lal vs. Tikam Chand & Ors. (8), Anandi Lal vs. Smt. Sarju Devi & Ors. (9) and Devi Shanker vs. Ugam Raj. (10), are not applicable as the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court delivered in Krishna Murari Prasads case (supra) was not considered. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Mandhana contended that the question of partial eviction was not raised before the trial court. It was raised in first appeal and was decided against the appellant and in view of the evidence available on the record this question may be decided in appeal and there is no need to remand the case to the trial court. (17). Section 14 (2) of the Act provides that where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. No doubt, thus provision casts duty upon the court to consider the question of partial eviction. This question was raised in the first appeal and it was decided against the appellant-defendant. Learned counsel for the parties admitted in this Court that measurements of the suit shop are 14ft. x 6ft. No doubt, thus provision casts duty upon the court to consider the question of partial eviction. This question was raised in the first appeal and it was decided against the appellant-defendant. Learned counsel for the parties admitted in this Court that measurements of the suit shop are 14ft. x 6ft. It is correct to say that the judgment of Apex Court in Krishna Murari Prasads case (supra) was not referred in these three judgments of this Court in Bhanwar Lal, Anandi lal and Devi Shankers case (all supra) while deciding the question of partial eviction, but this fact in itself is no ground to allow the contention of learned senior counsel Mr. Sharma, as the facts of that case are quit distinct from the facts of the instant case. The measurements of the shop in Krishan Murari Prasads case (supra) were 24"x 22" with a Verandah attached to it measuring 6"x 22". In view of the relevant provision of Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, the Honble Supreme Court observed that it is a question of fact in each case whether a partial eviction can be made or not and this Court in M.C. Sindhi vs. Hemndass (11), and it was observed that the provisions of Section 11 of the Bihar Act lays down that where the Court thinks that the landlords reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only and allowing the tenant to continue in occupation of the rest of the premises and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the court shall pass the decree accordingly. Whereas, sub-para 2 of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act provides that where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. (18). In the instant case the size of the shop is only 14ft. in length and 6ft. in width and in case the said shop is divided in two parts, it would hardly serve the purpose of either party and rather it would cause hardship to the plaintiff-landlord to carry on cloth business in a shop of such measurements if divided between the plaintiff-landlord and the appellant-tenant. in length and 6ft. in width and in case the said shop is divided in two parts, it would hardly serve the purpose of either party and rather it would cause hardship to the plaintiff-landlord to carry on cloth business in a shop of such measurements if divided between the plaintiff-landlord and the appellant-tenant. Thus, in view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the First Appellate Court on the question of partial eviction. It is also significant to say here that the appellant is the tenant since March, 1967, the present suit for eviction was filed in July, 1982 and thus a period of more than 22 years has passed since the institution of the suit. Therefore, the prayer for remand of the case is quite unreasonable in this case. (19). Consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed with costs.